Showing posts with label Spetsnaz. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Spetsnaz. Show all posts
Saturday, April 12, 2014
Excellent footage of the "Polite Armed Men in Green" during their operation in Crimea
What had to happen did happen. One, or more, of the "Polite Armed Men in Green" (PAMG) did use his cellphone or GoPro to shoot footage of his unit's operations in Crimea. According to the intro, this unit is called "detachment 0900" which could be nonsense or true, it does not matter. What is sure is that this denomination does not conform to the Russian official/public military unit classification which normally has four or five digits (as in m/u xxxxx). I have personally never heard of a detachment 0900 nor have I found anything about it on the Russian Internet. This proves nothing, of course, and chances are that this number was an operational once, used just for this one time.
Everything I see in this video personally points me to the Spetsnaz GRU (the "original" or "genuine" military Spetsnaz forces), primarily because I see reasons to exclude other candidates (Airborne, AirAssault, Naval Infantry, FSB, ODON, etc.).
In purely technical terms, I have to say that this operation is another masterpiece maybe not as flashy as the storming of the Tajbeg Palace in Afghanistan during "Operation Storm-333", but in a way at least as remarkable. There were at least 30'000 fully armed Ukrainian troops in Crimea (a lot them from the western Ukraine) and an overall population of over 2'000'000 people, and yet not a single person was killed (a few shots were fired during the operation). I don't think that there is anything like it in modern history (Turkish occupation of Cyprus, Grenada, Panama, French operations in Rwanda or Mali, etc.) From the footage you can also see two things: a) even the local "civilians" were armed to the teeth and b) there were Right Sector activists in Crimea. At the end of the video you see them being taken prisoner by the PAMG who then take a shoot at their computer with a screensaver which shows a Ukrainian flag and the caption "The Crimea will be Ukrainian or desolated/uninhabited". Charming young men for sure...
Anyway, thanks to "anonymous" for calling my attention to this unique footage taken by the Spetsnaz themselves. Clearly they are happy to share a glimpse of their usually top secret work with the world. I even suspect that this "leak" was allowed, off the record of course, by the equally happy higher-ups.
Here is that footage, enjoy!
The Saker
Everything I see in this video personally points me to the Spetsnaz GRU (the "original" or "genuine" military Spetsnaz forces), primarily because I see reasons to exclude other candidates (Airborne, AirAssault, Naval Infantry, FSB, ODON, etc.).
In purely technical terms, I have to say that this operation is another masterpiece maybe not as flashy as the storming of the Tajbeg Palace in Afghanistan during "Operation Storm-333", but in a way at least as remarkable. There were at least 30'000 fully armed Ukrainian troops in Crimea (a lot them from the western Ukraine) and an overall population of over 2'000'000 people, and yet not a single person was killed (a few shots were fired during the operation). I don't think that there is anything like it in modern history (Turkish occupation of Cyprus, Grenada, Panama, French operations in Rwanda or Mali, etc.) From the footage you can also see two things: a) even the local "civilians" were armed to the teeth and b) there were Right Sector activists in Crimea. At the end of the video you see them being taken prisoner by the PAMG who then take a shoot at their computer with a screensaver which shows a Ukrainian flag and the caption "The Crimea will be Ukrainian or desolated/uninhabited". Charming young men for sure...
Anyway, thanks to "anonymous" for calling my attention to this unique footage taken by the Spetsnaz themselves. Clearly they are happy to share a glimpse of their usually top secret work with the world. I even suspect that this "leak" was allowed, off the record of course, by the equally happy higher-ups.
Here is that footage, enjoy!
The Saker
Wednesday, May 11, 2011
Possible signs of real changes in the Russian security and elite military forces
One of the more exotic technologies for tracking deeply submerged submarines consists of using a satellite based radar to measure the tiny elevation of the water surface of the ocean above an otherwise well hidden and silently moving submarine. Some less exotic techniques including detecting wakes, tiny differences in water temperatures, magnetic fluctuations and many other "indirect" methods. What I propose to do today is something similar: to try to look at some possible signals of what might be happening hidden deep inside the Russian security establishment.
![]() | |
Doku Umarov |
As some of you might have recalled, I have regularly covered what I saw as a government campaign to defund, "reform" (read: shut down) and otherwise weaken the Russian elite military forces. A Spetsnaz brigade was dismantled, the military intelligence service (GRU) was almost reduced to a Department of the General Staff, the 106th Airborne Division came close to being simply eliminated, and a number of top officers were either rather "mysteriously died" or resigned. Things got totally out of control when the Airborne Forces almost officially demanded the sacking of Defense Minister Serdyukov.
![]() |
Magomedali Vagabov |
And then things suddenly seemed to cool down, and an eerie silence covered this entire "front". There are now some signs that things have actually begun to change.
First, the Russian security services have embarked on a major campaign to capture or eliminate the leaders of the Wahabi underground in the Caucasus.
Even before the bombing of the Domodedovo airport in Moscow several top leaders of the Wahabi underground in the Caucasus (such as Magometali Vagabov) were killed in the course of several special operations. Following the Domodedovo bombing (which was officially claimed by the self-styled "First Emir of the Emirate of the Caucasus" Doku Umarov) the campaign to track
![]() | |
Abdullah Kurd |
down and kill the Wahabi leaders suddenly intensified and achieved major successes. Many top officials of the Wahabi insurgency were killed including "Moganned" (a Saudi national), "Abdullah Kurd" (a Turkish national), Israpil Validjanov, Asker Djapuev and even Astemir Mimishev - the assassin of the Mufti of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic. All of them were killed in the time period between April and May of this year.
The one still not caught, although his death has been announced many times only to be proven wrong is Doku Umarov himself. Umarov, arguably the very last "historical" leader of the Chechen insurgency alive, has skillfully managed to escape many times from some very close calls, but there is no doubt in my mind that the noose around him is now extremely tight and that he will be killed very soon.
![]() | |
Asker Djapuev |
As for the insurgency itself, it is reduced to two basic types of operations: high visibility "symbolic" terrorist attacks such as the one in Domodedovo or small, local level, assassinations of junior policemen and murders of "collaborators". The single best indicator of the real capabilities of the insurgency is that it is handled only by Ministry of Internal Affairs forces and not by the military (the exception being, of course, the killing of top level commanders which is typically a join effort of the FSB and the GRU with logistical support from local police forces).
![]() | |
Astemir Mamishev |
Bottom line: the insurgency has been defeated, most of its leaders are dead, and the scope and nature of Wahabi terrorism in the Caucasus and south Russia has been brought down to something similar to what the IRA was in the years preceding the Good Friday Agreement.
Of course, there is a Presidential election coming up in Russia and Medvedev has been challenged for many of his policies (betrayal of Iran, his "reforms" of the military, Russia's vote in the UN on Libya and many others) and, just like Obama, he needs to market himself as a "strong leader". This is particularly true considering that Prime Minister Putin is far more popular than Medvedev.
![]() |
Moganned |
There are also signs that Medvedev is openly courting elite Russian military forces. First, there was the absolutely unprecedented move to award the Order of Kutuzov to the 45th Independent Special Operations Airbore Regiment as a whole (rather than to one individual). Not only that, but this year the 45th Independent Special Operations Airborne Regiment was invited to the Victory Parade on Red Square.
Something even more amazing happened on the same day: for the first time ever the traditionally super-secret GRU Spetsnaz forces were also represented during the Victory Day lead by a Spetsnaz Colonel who was identified by name (!). Considering the fact that Spetsnaz GRU forces are still normally
![]() |
Israpil Validzhanov |
under order never to even show their faces, having them participate in a parade transmitted worldwide is an absolutely amazing, I would say earth-shattering, departure from the usual practice.
Medvedev also showed his support for the Special Forces of the Internal Ministry during a visit to the HQ of the "Rys'" Spetsnaz unit which included a lengthy conversation with the officers of this elite unit.
Clearly Medvedev is going out of his way to make all the political moves needed to show his support for the previously neglected security forces. His efforts actually go beyond the symbolic.
![]() |
Spetsnaz GRU sniper in Ossetia |
The 106th Guard Airborne division has recently received a lot of high tech gear including UAVs, reconnaissance vehicles and ATV, top of the line night vision gear, encryption communications, advanced computerized command and control networks, etc. A division which was almost disbanded is now receiving lavish care from the Kremlin.
Of course, this could all be a short lived, one-time, effort in order to achieve some political gains. But this might also signal that Medvedev has finally accepted the fact that he cannot indefinitely oppose the security establishment and that a typically Russian backstage deal was made between the Kremlin and the security and key military forces. I am inclined to believe that the latter is true.
![]() |
45 Airborne Spetsnaz on Victory Day |
Whatever may be the case, this is clearly good news for Russia in general and for the Caucasus in particular. After two decades of absolute horror and chaos, there is a least a non-irrelevant possibility that some normalization and recovery might take place. The combined action of the security forces and the Kremlin's campaign to support non-Wahabi Islam are slowly bringing about some results. What is now needed is another double struggle: to bring in economic growth to the Caucasus and a merciless crackdown at the local corruption which is absolutely horrendous, even by Russian standards.
![]() | |
Spetsnaz "Rys'" officer |
Medvedev has embarked on a massive campaign to fight corruption in Russia. This campaign is centered on two mains tracks: a massive overhaul of the hideously corrupt and incompetent police force combined with an equally ferocious crackdown on corrupt government officials. The faces of sacked police generals are now paraded on TV on an almost daily basis and the Kremlin is using the crafty pretext of a "re-attestation" of *all* the Internal Ministry official (from the rank and file to the very top commanders) to sack anybody who is perceived as corrupt or incompetent. The Russian public in understandably viewing all this with a lot of skepticism, or even cynicism, and only time will show if all these efforts are for real or not. The key test, in my opinion, will be if the Kremlin will be willing (and able) crackdown on the all-powerful Mafia and gangs of thugs which have prospered in the Caucasus for many decades.
![]() |
Spetsnaz GRU Col. Tkachuk on Victory Day |
The problem of the Wahabi insurgency cannot be separated from the problem of the south Russian mob - the two are twin brothers, closely linked at many levels. For example, one of the reasons why only central "elite" Spetsnaz forces have been able to eliminate so many Wahabi leaders is not that such operations require an amazing amount of military skills, but simply because the central Spetsnaz forces have no connections to the local mob or the local police (which, for all practical purposes is one and the same).
This is an ambitious multi-tired program for sure, but one which is vital for the stability and security of all of Russia. If it takes a looming Presidential election to finally make it happen, then this is a good thing.
The Saker
Friday, April 24, 2009
Who is purging the Russian military intelligence and why?
For several months already, rumors have abounded about the reported conflict between the head of the Russian military intelligence service (GRU), Valentin Korabelnikov, and President Medvedev. Today, the Russian media announced that Korabelnikov had been replaced by one of his deputies, Alexander Shliakhturov.
Of all the intelligence and security services of the former Soviet Union and Russia, the GRU was by far the most secretive. It was also one of the most influential ones, and it is not surprising that many strange events surrounding the GRU have taken place over the past years which were almost never reported (such as the streak of "accidental" deaths of quite a few top GRU officials in Moscow several years ago). This time again, there is little real info on what is going on, but rumors persistently point to what might be a major purge of the GRU and forces subordinated to it.
According to these rumors, the GRU itself might loose its virtual autonomy and become a department of the Ministry of Defense, while most of its cadre would be transferred to the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Other rumors claim that several GRU Spetsnaz brigades will be disbanded (along with the 106 Airborne Division). If any of these rumors are true, then what is taking place in Russia is nothing short of a massive breakup, if not breakdown, of the most elite segment of the Russian armed forces.
All this is taking place in the midst of a much-needed (and much delayed!) reform of the Russian armed forces. Thus, these rumors might reflect not so much the real plans of the Kremlin as the worst fears of the top brass of the Ministry of Defense.
Still, for a purely pragmatic point of view, disbanding the GRU or re-subordinating as a department of the Ministry of Defense makes absolutely no sense whatsoever. True, the GRU was the least reformed of all the institutions and agencies of the former Soviet Union, and quite of few of its officers were found guilty of a wide range of criminal offences (corruption, racketeering, trafficking, murders, etc.). Furthermore, the GRU was probably a bloated institution in need of streamlining. So the basic principle of reforming the GRU is probably sound. However, what is taking place today appears to be far more than just a shake-up and clean-up operation.
The elimination of one or even two Spetsnaz Brigades, however, is rather bizarre. Frankly, I suspect that what is taking place is a massive reallocation of resources from the military special forces to the special forces of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs. Keep in mind that the term "Spetsnaz" simply means "special purpose" and does not, in itself, denote any one structure. In the former Soviet Union, both the military and the KGB had special purpose units, but by and large it was the Spetsnaz forces of the GRU which made the word "Spetsnaz" famous. In the years of total anarchy under the presidency of Boris Eltsin, many more units, departments and forces declared themselves to be "Spetsnaz". I would not be surprised to learn that some construction battalion in the Ural Mountains also claims the "Spetsnaz" status and the fancy badge which comes along (or so they would believe)....
Anyway, along the *real* special forces of the GRU and the KGB, a number of new special purpose units were formed, including in various police departments, the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and even in the prison system. Since Putin and, later, Medvedev came to power the Russian media has been filled with not-so-subtle quasi-propaganda reports about the "heroic" "Spetsnaz" of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). A large number of fancy (and costly!) schools and training camps have now been opened for these forces. The fact that the performance of the MVD units in, for example, Chechnya was less than stellar did not have any negative consequences for their funding. Even more puzzling is that the one type of unit which performed rather well in Chechnya (the rapid reaction "SOBR" forces) were simply disbanded.
So a rather strange dynamic began to take place in the last decades: When real, tough, fighting was called for the Kremlin sent in the Spetsnaz GRU, the KGB special purpose forces "Alpha" and "Vympel", Paratroopers from the Airborne Forces, Marines from Navy and even Border Guard (many of which were at least as good as any other Spetsnaz forces) units were typically sent in. Then, once the mean and ugly fighting was over, all sorts of police forces were sent in to clear and control the terrain taken by the military. They manned checkpoints, seized suspected insurgents, interrogated prisoners, etc. They were also almost universally disliked by the military who had done the real fighting.
Simply put - Spetsnaz operators are not cops. These two cultures are fundamentally different and deeply antagonistic and what is taking place today in Russia might well be an attempt by the Russian cops to finally get rid of those whom they have always perceived as their main competitors. Likewise, it is quite possible that the former KGB people around Medvedev are now using the reform of the Russian armed forces as a convenient pretext to finally crush the influence of the GRU once and for all.
If so, than this is a potential disaster for Russia. The fact is that if a military is reduced in size or substantially reorganized, its intelligence component must be *strengthened* and not weakened. Simply put, the need for a high quality military intelligence service is inversely proportional to the capabilities of the armed forces: the weaker these forces are, the stronger the military intelligence must be.
While the wars in Chechnya and in Georgia have shown that while the Russian military can prevail - brilliantly in the case of Georgia - there still a dire need to reform these forces before the existing cracks in organization, training, command and control, etc. become insurmountable. The Air Force, for example, is now in truly urgent need of new aircraft and the Ground Forces need a major upgrade of its aging command and control infrastructure.
If the Kremlin is serious about reforming the military then it simply cannot do that while allowing the GRU and the forces subordinated to the GRU to become the victim of a purge. Not only would that eliminate any chance for the creation of the planned "mobile forces" (which have been discussed since at least 20 years now), but it would even transform the much needed reform of the armed forces into a disaster at a time when Russia can least afford it.
Of all the intelligence and security services of the former Soviet Union and Russia, the GRU was by far the most secretive. It was also one of the most influential ones, and it is not surprising that many strange events surrounding the GRU have taken place over the past years which were almost never reported (such as the streak of "accidental" deaths of quite a few top GRU officials in Moscow several years ago). This time again, there is little real info on what is going on, but rumors persistently point to what might be a major purge of the GRU and forces subordinated to it.
According to these rumors, the GRU itself might loose its virtual autonomy and become a department of the Ministry of Defense, while most of its cadre would be transferred to the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Other rumors claim that several GRU Spetsnaz brigades will be disbanded (along with the 106 Airborne Division). If any of these rumors are true, then what is taking place in Russia is nothing short of a massive breakup, if not breakdown, of the most elite segment of the Russian armed forces.
All this is taking place in the midst of a much-needed (and much delayed!) reform of the Russian armed forces. Thus, these rumors might reflect not so much the real plans of the Kremlin as the worst fears of the top brass of the Ministry of Defense.
Still, for a purely pragmatic point of view, disbanding the GRU or re-subordinating as a department of the Ministry of Defense makes absolutely no sense whatsoever. True, the GRU was the least reformed of all the institutions and agencies of the former Soviet Union, and quite of few of its officers were found guilty of a wide range of criminal offences (corruption, racketeering, trafficking, murders, etc.). Furthermore, the GRU was probably a bloated institution in need of streamlining. So the basic principle of reforming the GRU is probably sound. However, what is taking place today appears to be far more than just a shake-up and clean-up operation.
The elimination of one or even two Spetsnaz Brigades, however, is rather bizarre. Frankly, I suspect that what is taking place is a massive reallocation of resources from the military special forces to the special forces of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs. Keep in mind that the term "Spetsnaz" simply means "special purpose" and does not, in itself, denote any one structure. In the former Soviet Union, both the military and the KGB had special purpose units, but by and large it was the Spetsnaz forces of the GRU which made the word "Spetsnaz" famous. In the years of total anarchy under the presidency of Boris Eltsin, many more units, departments and forces declared themselves to be "Spetsnaz". I would not be surprised to learn that some construction battalion in the Ural Mountains also claims the "Spetsnaz" status and the fancy badge which comes along (or so they would believe)....
Anyway, along the *real* special forces of the GRU and the KGB, a number of new special purpose units were formed, including in various police departments, the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and even in the prison system. Since Putin and, later, Medvedev came to power the Russian media has been filled with not-so-subtle quasi-propaganda reports about the "heroic" "Spetsnaz" of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). A large number of fancy (and costly!) schools and training camps have now been opened for these forces. The fact that the performance of the MVD units in, for example, Chechnya was less than stellar did not have any negative consequences for their funding. Even more puzzling is that the one type of unit which performed rather well in Chechnya (the rapid reaction "SOBR" forces) were simply disbanded.
So a rather strange dynamic began to take place in the last decades: When real, tough, fighting was called for the Kremlin sent in the Spetsnaz GRU, the KGB special purpose forces "Alpha" and "Vympel", Paratroopers from the Airborne Forces, Marines from Navy and even Border Guard (many of which were at least as good as any other Spetsnaz forces) units were typically sent in. Then, once the mean and ugly fighting was over, all sorts of police forces were sent in to clear and control the terrain taken by the military. They manned checkpoints, seized suspected insurgents, interrogated prisoners, etc. They were also almost universally disliked by the military who had done the real fighting.

If so, than this is a potential disaster for Russia. The fact is that if a military is reduced in size or substantially reorganized, its intelligence component must be *strengthened* and not weakened. Simply put, the need for a high quality military intelligence service is inversely proportional to the capabilities of the armed forces: the weaker these forces are, the stronger the military intelligence must be.
While the wars in Chechnya and in Georgia have shown that while the Russian military can prevail - brilliantly in the case of Georgia - there still a dire need to reform these forces before the existing cracks in organization, training, command and control, etc. become insurmountable. The Air Force, for example, is now in truly urgent need of new aircraft and the Ground Forces need a major upgrade of its aging command and control infrastructure.
If the Kremlin is serious about reforming the military then it simply cannot do that while allowing the GRU and the forces subordinated to the GRU to become the victim of a purge. Not only would that eliminate any chance for the creation of the planned "mobile forces" (which have been discussed since at least 20 years now), but it would even transform the much needed reform of the armed forces into a disaster at a time when Russia can least afford it.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)