Iranian Parliament Speaker Larijani warns Iraq against US SOFA

Press TV reports that Iran's Majlis (parliament) speaker says an Iraq-US security pact would have dire consequences for the Iraqi nation and regional states.

Under the proposed security agreement, American troops will be able to legally stay in Iraq for three more years after a UN mandate allowing their military presence on Iraqi soil expires on December 31.

The Iraqi parliament is scheduled to vote on the controversial treaty on Wednesday.

Ali Larijani, the top Iranian Majlis member, said Monday that Iraqi parliamentarians should carefully study all aspects of the agreement and have the right to be over sensitive about it.

"There are articles in the deal that are a kind of deception ... and contradict Iraq's sovereignty," Larijani was quoted by Mehr news agency.

"The treaty is a mirage that if finalized will compel Iraqis to follow the Americans for a very long time," he continued.

The top US military commander, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, hinted last week that even after signing the agreement, Washington would continue talks to change the articles of the security treaty.

"Three years is a long time. Conditions could change in that period of time," said Adm. Mullen. "Clearly, [changing the agreement] is theoretically possible."

Sunni bloc may boycott vote on US pact

Press TV reports:

The main Sunni-Arab bloc in the Iraqi Parliament threatens to boycott a parliament session to vote on the Iraq-US security agreement.

"The IAF would not enter the parliament if there was no popular referendum over the agreement or assurances from the US side," Abdelkareem al-Samarraie, a leading lawmaker from the Iraqi Accord Front (IAF), told the Voices of Iraq on Tuesday.

The lawmaker said parliament should postpone voting on the deal, since every one agrees how serious the pact is. The Parliament is to put the pact to a vote on Wednesday.

Earlier, the bloc's leader, Adnan al-Dulaimi, had said the agreement, which is endorsed by the Iraqi cabinet, should be put to the public in a referendum.

Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi also called on the country's politicians not to make any 'hasty' decision on the agreement, which is the most challenging issue facing Iraq since the overthrow of the Saddam regime in 2003.

Under the deal the US would be allowed to stay three more years in Iraq after its UN mandate expires in December 31.

Hezbollah Condemns US-Iraq Pact, Calls to Reject It

Al-Manar TV reports that while the Iraqi parliament was likely to approve a "suspicious" pact with the US occupation forces allowing them to stay in the country for another three years, Hezbollah finally broke its silence on Thursday and denounced the pact as harmful and called on all Iraqi MPs to assume their responsibilities and reject it as soon as possible.

In a statement it released, Hezbollah emphasized that the US occupation of Iraq actually represents a big crime and an international terrorism against the Iraqi people as well as the region's people "who are still suffering from the occupation's various repercussions at all levels."

The Resistance movement, known to oppose the occupation and haughtiness policies, went on to affirm that all pressures the US was seeking to exert in order to "polish" its picture have actually failed in their mission. "All pressures would lead to more damages and disadvantages for the occupation," Hezbollah's statement read, adding that the security pact, in its actual form, will lead, in its turn, to additional negative impact on Iraq and its people.

Hezbollah pointed out that the pact under question would, if adopted, give the US occupation a supplementary opportunity to organize its domination and plunder the generous country's fortunes.

"What's required at this moment is not to reward the occupation and give it presents or legitimacy," Hezbollah's statement stressed, explaining that "regardless of all the justifications that anyone could give to legalize the occupation, the US withdrawal without conditions remains the major interest for the Iraqi people."

"Iraqis have suffered a lot and paid big sacrifices, they fought against occupation at the most difficult circumstances and strived to achieve the sovereignty and independence of their country," Hezbollah pointed out, recalling how Iraqis have also rejected foreign tutelage.

The Resistance group concluded its statement by calling on members of the Iraqi parliament to reject the pact, drawing their attention to its negative effects on the Iraqi sovereignty, unity as well as fate and future.

Hezbollah called upon the MPs to take such a "courageous" and "historic" position, assuring them of its positive effects on the country "that deserves stability, unity and honorable life."

Unofficial Translation of US SOFA from the Arabic Text

By McClatchy Newspapers

An Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America regarding the Withdrawal of the American Forces from Iraq and Regulating their Activities During their Temporary Presence in it

PREFACE

The United States of America and the Republic of Iraq - which will hereafter be referred to as the two parties - recognize the importance of strengthening their joint security and participating in global peace and stability, fighting terrorism in Iraq and cooperating in the fields of security and defense to deter aggression and threats directed towards the sovereignty and unity of Iraq and its constitutional, federal, democratic system;

They hereby confirm that this cooperation is built upon the basis of mutual respect for each other's full sovereignty and according to the objectives and principles of the UN mandate;

And according to the wish of both parties to reach a mutual understanding to enhance cooperation between them;

Without encroaching upon the sovereignty of Iraq, upon its soil, water or airspace, and upon the basis of being two independent, equal states of sovereignty, have agreed to the following:

Article 1
Scope and Purpose

This agreement defines the basic rules and requirements that regulate the temporary presence of the American Forces in Iraq, their activities in it and their withdrawal from Iraq.

Article 2
Definition of Terms

"The installations and areas agreed upon" refers to the Iraqi areas used by the U.S. Forces while this agreement is valid."

"U.S. Forces" refers to the entity that includes all the personnel of the American Armed Forces, the civilian personnel connected to them and all their possessions, installations and equipment present on Iraqi territory.

"Member of the U.S. Forces" refers to any person that belongs to the army of the United States, its navy, air force, marine force or coast guard.

"Civilian element member" refers to any civilian working for the U.S. Department of Defense. And this term does not include the personnel usually resident in Iraq.

Contractors with the U.S government" and "those who work for the contractors with the United States of America" refer to the legal non-Iraqi persons or entities and their workers who are either American citizens or third country citizens present in Iraq to provide commodities, services and security for the U.S. Forces or on behalf of them, in Iraq, according to a contract or a sub-contract with or for the U.S. Forces. These two terms do not include the legal persons or entities usually resident upon Iraqi soil.

"Official vehicles" refers to the commercial vehicles that may be modified for security purposes, and that are designed originally to transport individuals on different terrains.

"Military vehicles" refers to all manner of vehicles used by the U.S. Forces that were originally designed for combat operations and carry special distinctive numbers and signs.

"Defense equipment" refers to the systems, weapons, ammunition, supplies and materials used in traditional warfare exclusively, that the U.S. needs in connection to the activities agreed upon in this agreement, and that are not related directly or indirectly to the weapons of mass destruction systems (chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, radiological weapons, biological weapons and the wastes connected to such weapons).

"Storing" refers to keeping the defense equipment that the U.S. needs in relation to its activities agreed upon in this agreement.

"Taxes and charges" refers to all the taxes and charges (including customs tariffs) and all charges of any kind that the Iraqi government, its establishments or provinces levies in accordance with the Iraqi laws and regulations. This term does not refer to the funds that are collected by the Iraqi government, its establishments or provinces for services requested by and rendered to the U.S Forces.

Article 3
The Laws

U.S. troops and the members of the civilian element commit to the necessity of respecting Iraqi laws, customs, traditions and conventions while conducting military operations in accordance with this agreement, and will refrain from any activities that are not compatible with the spirit of this agreement. The U.S. is obliged to take all the necessary measures for this purpose.

With the exception of U.S. troops and the members of the civilian element, it is not permitted for the U.S. to transport anyone into Iraq or out of it on board the ships or aircraft included in this agreement unless in accordance with valid Iraqi laws and regulations including any executive arrangements that the Iraqi government may agree to.

Article 4
The Missions

The Iraqi government requests temporary assistance from the U.S. Forces to support its efforts in keeping peace and stability in Iraq, including cooperation in conducting operations against al Qaida and other terrorist groups and outlaw groups and the remnants of former regime.

All military operations conducted in accordance with this agreement are conducted with the approval of the government of Iraq. Full coordination will take place with the Iraqi authorities regarding these operations and the Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee (JMOCC), which is to be formed according to this agreement, is to supervise the coordination of all the military operations. Any issues regarding proposed military operations that the Committee cannot resolve will be referred to the Joint Ministerial Committee.

All these operations will be conducted with the necessity of fully respecting the Iraqi Constitution and Iraqi Law, and conducting these operations will be without overstepping the sovereignty of Iraq and its national interests as determined by the Iraqi government. It is the duty of the U.S. to respect the laws of Iraq, its customs and traditions and valid international law.

The two parties will continue their efforts to enhance Iraq's security capabilities, as agreed upon by both sides, including training, provision, support, supply, building and updating logistic systems, including transport, accommodations and provisions for the Iraqi security forces.

Both parties retain the right to legitimate self defense within Iraq as is described in valid international law.

Article 5
Ownership of Property

Iraq owns all the buildings and installations, the nontransferable structures on the ground that are located in the areas and installations agreed upon, including those the U.S. utilizes, constructs, changes or improves.

At withdrawal, the U.S. will return all the installations and the agreed upon areas allocated for the use of the U.S. combat forces according to two lists (of inventory) to the Iraqi government. The first of these is to be submitted covering the installations and agreed upon areas as soon as the agreement is implemented. And the other list is to be submitted no later than June 30, 2009, the appointed date for U.S. Forces withdrawal from cities, towns and villages. And the Iraqi government has the right to permit the U.S. Forces to use some necessary installations for this agreement's purposes at withdrawal.

The U.S. bears all the costs of building, modification or renovation in the installations and agreed upon areas allocated for their exclusive use. The U.S. will consult with the Iraqi government as to building, modification or renovation works and must seek the approval of the Iraqi government regarding major modifications and construction projects. And in cases of joint utilization of installations and agreed upon areas, both parties will bear the cost of construction, modification or renovation according to the percentage of use.

The U.S. will bear the cost of the services it requests and receives in the installations and agreed upon areas for its exclusive use. And both parties will bear the cost for requested and received services in the installations and agreed upon areas and according to percentage of each party's use.

When a historical or cultural site is discovered, or a strategic resource is found within the installations and agreed upon areas, all construction, modification and innovation works are to stop immediately, and the Iraqi representatives in the Committee are to be informed in order to determine the appropriate steps in regard to it.

The U.S shall return the installations and agreed upon areas and any other installations, or non-transportable structures that it erected, fixed or used during the validity of this agreement according to mechanisms and priorities defined by the Joint Committee; and these installations and areas are to be returned to the Iraqi government free of debts and any financial obligations.

The U.S. Forces shall return to the Iraqi government the installations and agreed upon areas of traditional, moral and political importance and any other fixed structures that the U.S. Forces may have built, assembled, or installed according to mechanisms and priorities and a time period to be agreed upon in the Joint Committee, and with no financial obligations.

The U.S. shall return the rest of the installations and agreed upon areas to the Iraqi government when the validity of this agreement comes to an end or when it is terminated, or at any time prior to that, agreed upon by the two parties, or when the U.S. no longer needs the installations in accordance to what the Committee decrees, without debt or financial obligations.

The U.S. and the contractors with the U.S. retain the ownership of all the equipment, materials, supplies, transportable installations and other transportable property imported to Iraq or acquired in Iraq legitimately and in connection to this agreement.

Article 6
Usage of the Installations and the Agreed Upon Areas

With full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq, in the framework of exchanging points of view between the two parties regarding this agreement, Iraq guarantees that the U.S. Forces and contractors with the U.S Forces and the workers employed by these contractors and the personnel and other entities can reach and use the installations and agreed upon areas according to what both parties agree upon.

Iraq permits the U.S. Forces, according to this agreement, to exercise inside the installations and agreed upon areas all rights and authorities that may be necessary to build, use and secure these installations and agreed upon areas. Both parties are to coordinate and cooperate as to how these rights and authorities may be practiced in the installations and agreed upon areas that are joint utilities.

The U.S Forces control the entrances to the installations and agreed upon areas that are allocated for their exclusive use. Both parties are to coordinate the control of the installations and agreed upon areas of joint use, and according to mechanisms approved by the Joint Committee to coordinate joint military operations. Both parties are to coordinate the guard missions in the areas adjacent to the installations and the agreed upon areas through the Joint Committee for coordination of military operations.

Article 7
Installing and Storing Defense Equipment

U.S. Forces may install inside the installations and agreed upon areas and in other temporary sites agreed upon by both parties, defense equipment and supplies and materials the U.S. Forces need in connection to activities agreed upon in this agreement. The U.S. is to use and store this equipment in a manner appropriate to their temporary mission in Iraq and in accordance with article four of this agreement, on condition that it has no direct or indirect connection to weapons of mass destruction (chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, radiological weapons, biological weapons and the wastes related to such weapons). And the U. S. is to control the use and transport of the defense equipment owned by it that is stored in Iraq. It (the U.S.) is to guarantee that no explosives or ammunition are to be stored in installations near residential areas, and that it is to move materials stored in installations near residential areas. The U.S. is to provide the Iraqi government with the necessary information regarding the quantities and types of these stored materials.

Article 8
Environmental Protection

Both parties are to execute this agreement in a manner consistent with protection of the natural environment, health and human security. And the U.S. commits again to respecting the laws of the environment and Iraqi laws in implementing its policies for the purposes of this agreement.

Article 9
Movement of Vehicles, Ships and Planes

With full respect for the rules of safety in land and marine movement, vehicles and ships used by the U.S Force and those that are administered on its account exclusively, may enter and depart and move within Iraqi territory for the purposes of implementing this agreement. The Joint Committee is to coordinate joint military operations and lay down the appropriate rules and procedures to facilitate and regulate the movement of vehicles.

With full respect for the related rules of safety in flight and aviation, permission will be given for the aircraft of the U.S. government and the civilian aircraft at the time to fly in the Iraqi airspace that are operating in accordance with a contract with the Department of Defense of the U.S. exclusively, and to re-fuel in the air exclusively for the purposes of implementing this agreement; and to land and take off within Iraqi territory for the purposes of implementing this agreement. Iraqi authorities will annually issue a permit for the aforementioned aircraft to land on Iraqi territory and take off from it for the exclusive purpose of implementing this agreement. The aircraft, ships and vehicles of the U.S government and the civilian aircraft exclusively working at the time in accordance with a contract with the U.S. Department of Defense will not permit any party aboard them without the consent of the U.S. Forces authorities, and the related joint subcommittee is to agree upon the appropriate procedures to facilitate regulating the traffic.

Iraqi airspace control and monitoring will be transferred to the Iraqi authorities immediately as this agreement becomes valid.

The Iraqi government has the right to request the temporary support of the U.S. Forces for the Iraqi authorities in controlling and monitoring Iraqi airspace.

U.S. government aircraft and civilian aircraft at that time working in accordance with a contract with the U.S. Department of Defense exclusively are exempt from any taxes, or any similar charges including the flight, aviation, landing or waiting at the airport charges by the Iraqi government. And also exempt from any taxes, government collections or any other charges are the vehicles owned by the U.S. Forces or are being used exclusively by the U.S. Forces for the purposes of implementing this agreement. And this includes the ports run by the Iraqi government, and these vehicles, aircraft and ships are exempt from registration demands inside Iraq.

U.S Forces are to pay for any services it requests and obtains.

Each of the two parties is to provide the other party with maps and other available information regarding locations of mine fields and other obstacles that may obstruct movement within the Iraqi land and waters or endanger it.

Article 10
Contracting Procedures

U.S. forces have the right to choose contractors and have contracts with them, according to American law, to buy materials and services in Iraq, including reconstruction and building services. U.S. forces can have contracts with Iraqi suppliers for materials and services when they have competitive tenders and value. U.S. forces should respect Iraqi law when they have contracts with Iraqi suppliers and contractors, they should inform Iraqi authorities of the Iraqi contractors and suppliers and the value of their contracts.

Article 11
Services and Communications

U.S. forces can produce and supply water and electricity and any other services for the installations and areas agreed upon in coordination with the Iraqi authorities through the related Joint sub-committee.

The Iraqi government owns all frequencies. The Iraqi authorities specialized in frequencies allocate frequencies for the U.S forces according to coordination between the two sides via a Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee (JMOCC).The US forces should return the allocated frequencies when they have finished using them at a date no later than the last day of this agreement.

U.S. forces will operate their communications system with full respect to the Iraqi constitution and laws, and according to the text of communication regulations in the International Union of Communications for the year 1992, including the right to use means and special necessary services related to their system to guarantee the full capacity to operate the communications system.

For the purposes of this agreement, U.S. forces are exempt from paying any government collection for using the transmission waves and frequencies now in use or those which will be allocated to them in the future, including administrative and any other charge.

U.S forces should obtain the Iraqi government's approval regarding any infrastructure projects for communications located outside the installations and areas agreed upon for the exclusive purposes of implementation of this agreement according to Article 4, unless there is an actual combat operation, in which case use Article 4.

U.S. forces should use the communication system exclusively for the purposes of this agreement.

Article 12
Jurisdiction

In recognition of Iraq's sovereign right in defining and enforcing the principles of criminal and civilian law on its land and in view of Iraq's request for temporary assistance from U.S. forces as explained in article 4 and as is consistent with the obligation of U.S. forces' and the members of the civilian element to respect Iraqi laws, traditions, customs and values, both parties agreed to the following:

Iraq has the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over members of the U.S. forces and members of the civilian element regarding major and premeditated crimes, according to item 8, when these crimes are committed outside installations and areas agreed upon and off duty.

Iraq has the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over private contractors which have contracts with the United States and their employees.

The United States has the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over members of the U.S. forces and members of the civilian element regarding matters that take place inside the installation and areas agreed upon and during duty outside the installations and areas agreed upon and circumstances not included in the text of item 1.

According to a request from either party, both parties will assist one another to carry out an investigation into incidents and to collect evidence and to exchange them to guarantee justice.

When a member of the U.S. forces or the civilian element is arrested or detained by the Iraqi authorities, the authorities of the U.S. forces should be informed immediately and the detainee should be handed over within 24 hours from the time of detention or arrest. When Iraq practices its jurisdiction in implementation of the text of item 1 of this article the authorities of the U.S. forces then undertake the detention of the accused from the members of the U.S. forces or the civilian element. Then the authorities of the U.S. forces are to submit the accused person or persons to the Iraqi authorities for the purpose investigation and trial.

The authorities of either side may request the authorities of the other side to forgo their primary right of jurisdiction in a specific case. The Iraqi government agrees to exercise jurisdiction according to item 1 above only after informing and notifying the U.S. in writing within 21 days of discovering the alleged crime, its practice of jurisdiction has a special significance.

In cases where the U.S. has the right to exercise jurisdiction according to item 3 of this article, the members of the U.S. forces and of the civilian element have the right to have the legal criteria, procedures and guaranteed protection under the American law and constitution. In case a crime is committed which falls under item 3 of this article and the victim is not a member of the U.S. forces or of the civilian element, both parties agree upon procedures through a joint committee to inform the persons involved of the investigation in an appropriate way, the status of the investigation of the crime, the charges against the accused, a date of trial and the results of the deliberations regarding the suspects situation, the opportunity to hear the accused's statements in open sessions during which he will be sentenced, consultation with the lawyers of the prosecution to follow up the case and to assist in presenting a request according to article 21 of this agreement. The U.S. authorities will seek to hold a trial for cases such as these inside Iraq. And in case trials of such cases are held in the United States, efforts will be made to facilitate the victim's presence personally in the court.

In the cases where Iraq exercises jurisdiction according to item 1 of this article, members of the U.S. forces and the civilian element have the right to the legal criteria, procedures and guarantees that are consistent with those enjoyed under American and Iraqi law. The joint committee will lay down procedures and mechanisms to implement this article, which includes a record of major and premeditated crimes that fall under item 1 and procedures according to the criteria of legitimate trial and guarantees. It is not permitted to exercise jurisdiction according to the text of item 1 of this article unless the mentioned procedures and mechanisms are in place.

The U.S. authorities will state according to items 1 and 3 of this article whether the alleged crime was committed on duty. In cases in which the Iraqi authorities believe that the circumstances call for revision of this account, both parties will deliberate immediately via the joint committee, and the authorities of the U.S. forces will take into full consideration the facts, the circumstances and any other information the Iraqi authorities may submit and that might have an effect upon the report of the authorities of the U.S. forces.

Both parties will review the provisions of this article every six months, including any suggested amendments of this article, taking into consideration the security situation in Iraq and how engaged the U.S. forces are with military operations, the growth and development of the Iraqi judicial system and changes in the American and Iraqi laws.

Article 13
Carrying Weapons and Wearing Official Uniforms

Members of the U.S. forces and the civilian element have the right to possess and carry weapons that belong to the U.S. during their presence in Iraq according to the authorization given to them, the orders given to them and according to their needs and duties. Also the U.S forces should wear their official uniforms while on duty in Iraq.

Article 14
Entry and Departure

For the purposes of this agreement, members of the U.S. forces and members the civilian element may enter and depart Iraq through the formal passages of entrance and departure. They need only to carry identification and travel orders issued to them from the United States. The joint committee handles the task of laying down procedures and mechanisms to check which the specialized Iraqi authorities will implement.

Iraqi authorities have the right to check and verify the names on lists of members of the U.S forces and the civilian element entering Iraq and departing directly into and out of the installations and areas agreed upon. These lists are to be delivered to the Iraqi authorities by the U.S forces.

For the purposes of this agreement, members of the U.S forces and the civilian element may enter and depart Iraq via the installations and areas agreed upon and will not be required to submit anything other than their identification issued in the United States. The joint committee is to lay down the procedures and mechanisms for checking and verifying these documents.

Article 15
Importing and Exporting

For the purposes of implementing this agreement exclusively U.S. forces and contractors with the U.S. forces may import into Iraq and export from it materials that have been bought inside Iraq, and they have the right to re-export and transport and use in Iraq any equipment, supplies, materials and technology on the condition that the materials they import or bring are not prohibited inside Iraq, from the date this agreement takes effect. Importing such materials and re-exporting, transporting and using these materials would not expose them to searches. Also these materials are not subject to licensing or any other restrictions or taxing or customs or any other charges imposed in Iraq in accordance with the definition in item 10 of article 2. U.S authorities have to file to the Iraqi authorities the suitable documents ensuring that these materials are imported by the U.S forces or those contractors with the U.S. forces for the use of the U.S. forces in implementing this agreement exclusively. According to available security information, the Iraqi authorities have the right to ask the U.S forces, in their presence, to open any container which has imported materials to check its contents. The Iraqi authorities will respect while submitting its request the security requirements of the U.S. forces and will accept if the U.S. forces requested that the verification operations should be carried out in the installations used by the U.S. forces. Iraqi goods exported by the U.S. forces and the contractors with the U.S. forces are not subject to any searches or any restrictions except the requirements of a license. The joint committee with the Ministry of Trade according to the Iraqi law will facilitate the requisition of a license for the purpose of the U.S forces to export goods or commodities that they have bought in Iraq for the purposes of this agreement. Iraq has the right to request a review of any matter related to the implementation of this item. The two parties are to discuss immediately such cases via the Joint Committee, or if necessary, via the Joint Ministerial Committee.

Members of the U.S forces and members of the civilian element can import, re-export, and use the materials and personal equipment for consumption or personal use. Importing, re-exporting, transporting and using such imported materials in Iraq is not subject to licensing, or any restrictions, taxes, collections, or any other charges imposed in Iraq as is illustrated in item 10 of article 2. The amount of the imports should be reasonable and suitable for personal use. The U.S authorities should take measures to guarantee that any valuable cultural materials or historical materials related to Iraq are not exported.

Any searches referred to in item 2 by the Iraqi authorities must be carried out quickly in an agreed upon location according to the procedures laid down by the Joint Committee.

Taxes and custom fees, as defined in item 10 of article 2, will be levied upon any imported material that is exempt from custom fees and any other fees according to this agreement and any other fees at the point of sale to individuals or entities not included in the tax exemption or special privileges for import. The buyer should pay these taxes and fees, including the customs fee, for the materials that have been sold. The amount of tax and customs paid will be estimated at the time of their sale inside Iraq.

Importing and using the materials referred in the above mentioned items of this article are prohibited for commercial purposes.

Article 16
Taxes

No taxes, charges or government duties are levied as defined in item 10 of article 2, which are estimated and levied on Iraqi territory for commodities and services bought inside Iraq by the U.S. forces or on their behalf for official purposes. And no other levy is placed on commodities and services that are bought inside Iraq on behalf of the U.S. forces.

Members of the U.S forces and the civilian element do not bear the responsibility of paying any tax, charge or government collection whose value is determined and levied inside the Iraqi territory unless in exchange for services requested and rendered.

Article 17
Licenses and Permits

Valid driving licenses issued by U.S authorities to the members of the U.S. forces and the civilian element and employees of contractors with the United States are accepted by the Iraqi authorities. Those who carry these licenses do not have to take a test or pay any fee to drive their vehicles, ships and planes that belong to the U.S forces in Iraq.

The valid driving licenses issued by the U.S authorities to the members of the U.S forces and the civilian element and the employees of the contractors with the United States are accepted by the Iraqi authorities when they use their own cars on Iraqi territory without taking a test or paying a fee.

All the professional licenses issued by the U.S authorities to the members of the U.S forces and the civilian element and employees of contractors with the United States are accepted by the Iraqi authorities on the condition that these licenses are related to the services they perform within the frame of performing their official or contracted duties to support the U.S forces and the members of the civilian element and contractors with the United States and the employees who work for those contractors, according to the conditions agreed upon by both parties.

Article 18
Military and Official Vehicles

The official vehicles are to carry Iraqi license plates, which are agreed upon between the two parties. The Iraqi authorities, upon the request by the authorities of the U.S. forces, will issue license plates for the official vehicles of the U.S forces without fees and according to procedures approved by the Iraqi armed forces. The U.S authorities pay the Iraqi authorities the cost of the license plates.

Licensing and registration authorizations issued by the authorities of the U.S forces for official vehicles of the U.S. forces are accepted by the Iraqi authorities.

Military vehicles used by the U.S. forces exclusively are exempt from the licensing and registration requirements and these vehicles are to be marked by clear numbers.

Article 19
Support Activities Services

The U.S forces or those who act on behalf of the U.S forces have the right to build and administer activities and entities inside the installations and areas agreed upon through which they supply services to the members of the U.S. forces and the civilian element, the contractors with the United States and the employees of the contractors with the United States. These entities and activities include; military mail, financial services, stores for selling food, medication and other commodities and services, other places for providing entertainment, wire and wireless communications, including cable and radio broadcasting. Constructing these services does not require a license.

The entertainment, media and radio services, which are outside of the installations and areas agreed upon, fall under Iraqi law.

These supporting activities and services are limited to the members of the U.S forces and the civilian element, contractors with the United States and their employees and individuals and entities the two parties agree upon. The authorities of the U.S. forces should take suitable measures to prevent the misuse of the services mentioned above and to prevent the sale or re-sale of the services mentioned above to persons who are not permitted to reach these entities and benefit from the services they present. The U.S forces determine the broadcasting transmissions for radio and television program for the authorized receivers.

The entities and activities mentioned in this article enjoy the same financial and customs exemption as do the U.S forces, including the guaranteed exemptions in articles 15 and 16 of this agreement. Running and administering these entities and activities that provide services according to United States regulations will not require taxes or any other charges for the activities related to their operation.

Mail sent through military mail services should have the verification of the United States authorities, and this mail will be exempt from searching, examination and confiscation by the Iraqi authorities with the exception of unofficial mail that may be monitored electronically. The Joint Committee will handle such issues that stem from the implementation of this item and they will be settled by the agreement of the two parties. The related joint sub-committee will regularly search for the mechanisms by the U.S. authorities to verify military mail.

Article 20
Currency and Foreign Exchange

The U.S. forces have the right to use any amount of U.S. currency or financial assets whose values are determined by American currency for the purposes of this agreement exclusively. The use of the U.S forces of Iraqi currency and private banks should be according to the Iraqi laws.

The U.S forces are not permitted to export Iraqi currency from Iraq and are to take measures to guarantee that none of the members of the U.S forces and the civilian element, contractors with the United States and the employees working for the contractors with the United States to export the Iraqi currency from Iraq.

Article 21
Claims

Except for claims that stem from contracts, both parties forgo their right to demand the other party to compensate for any damages, loss or destruction of properties of the armed forces or the civilian element of either party or to demand compensation for injuries or deaths that may happen to members of the armed forces or the of civilian element that are a result of carrying out their official duty in Iraq.

U.S. authorities should pay fair and reasonable compensation to settle entitled claims for any third party, that may stem from actions of members of the U.S. forces and the civilian element or as a result of their negligence, malfeasance or during their official duty or may be related to non-combat activities of US forces. U.S. authorities may settle entitlement claims that do not stem from performing their official duty as quickly as possible according to laws and regulations of the United States. When settling the claims, the authorities of the U.S. forces take into consideration any report regarding an investigation or opinion issued by Iraqi authorities concerning the responsibility or volume of damages.

Both parties consult immediately through the Joint Committee or if it is necessary through the Joint Ministerial Committee in the cases that need revision and that have been mentioned in item 1 and 2 above, according to the request of one of the parties.

Article 22
Detention

It is not permitted for the U.S. forces to detain or arrest any person (except the detention or arrest of a member of the US forces or the civilian element) unless it is in accordance with an Iraqi decision issued under Iraqi law implementing Article Four.

If US forces detain or arrest persons as is permitted under this agreement or under Iraqi law, they should be turned over to the specialized Iraqi authorities within 24 hours of their detention or arrest.

Iraqi authorities can request assistance from U.S. forces for the purpose of detaining or arresting wanted persons.

The U.S. forces shall provide the Iraqi Government with the available information about all the detainees when this agreement is implemented. The specialized Iraqi authorities shall issue arrest warrants for those who are wanted. The U.S. forces will coordinate completely and effectively with the Iraqi government for the handover of the wanted people to it, according to valid Iraqi arrest warrants and release all other detainees in an organized and secure way unless the Iraqi government requests otherwise under article 4 of this agreement.

U.S. forces are not permitted to search houses or other premises unless it is in accordance with an Iraqi judicial order issued for this purpose with complete coordination with the Iraqi government, except in cases where there is actual combat which comes under Article 4.

Article 23
Implementation

The implementation of this agreement and the settlement of resulting disputes regarding explanations and implementation are the responsibility of the following commissions:

Forming a Joint Ministerial Committee whose members are persons on the ministerial level determined by both parties. This Joint Ministerial Committee undertakes reviewing and resolving the basic necessary issues to explain and implement this agreement.

The Joint Ministerial Committee will undertake the formation of the Joint Military Operation Coordinating Committee (JMOCC) that is composed of representatives of both parties. There will be a Joint Chairmanship of the Joint Military Operation Cooperating Committee (JMOCC) from the two parties.

The Joint Ministerial Committee also forms a joint committee composed of representatives chosen by the two parties and jointly headed by a representative from each party. This committee undertakes reviewing and resolving all the issues related to this agreement that is not the specialization of the Joint Military Operations Coordinating Committee (JMOCC).

The joint committee forms according to item (3) of this article joint subcommittees in various fields who undertake reviewing the issues that stem from this agreement according to their specializations.

Article 24
Withdrawal of American Forces from Iraq

Admitting to the performance of Iraqi forces, their increased capabilities and assuming full responsibility for security and based upon the strong relationship between the two parties the two parties agreed to the following:

All U.S. forces are to withdraw from all Iraqi territory, water and airspace no later than the 31st of December of 2011.

All U.S. combat forces are to withdraw from Iraqi cities, villages, and towns not later than the date that Iraqi forces assume complete responsibility of security in any Iraqi province. The withdrawal of U.S. forces from the above-mentioned places is on a date no later than the 30 June 2009. The withdrawing U.S. forces mentioned in item (2) above are to gather in the installations and areas agreed upon that are located outside of cities, villages and towns that will be determined by the Joint Military Operation Coordinating Committee (JMOCC) before the date determined in item (2) above.

The United States admits to the sovereign right of the Iraqi government to demand the departure of the U.S. forces from Iraq at anytime. The Iraqi government admits to the sovereign right of the United States to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq at anytime.

The two parties agree to put a mechanism and preparations for reducing the number of U.S. forces during the appointed period. And they are to agree on the locations where the forces are to settle.

Article 25
The Procedures of Lifting Article Seven from Iraq

Recognizing the Iraqi government's right not to request the renewal of the United Nations mandate and the authorization granted to the Multi-National Force Iraq according to chapter seven that is included in the International Security Council's resolution number (1790) (2007) the authorization that will expire on 31 December 2008,

And referring to the two letters directed to the International Security Council: the letter from the Iraqi Prime Minister and the letter from the American Secretary of State dated 7 and 10 December 2007, respectively and they are annexed to resolution (1790),

Noting the third part of the Declaration of Principles regarding the cooperation and long term friendship that was signed by the President of United States of America and the Prime Minister of Iraq on 26 November 2007 which registered in history the Iraqi call for extending the period of the above mentioned mandate for the last time to end on a date no later than 31 December 2008,

Admitting to the great and positive developments in Iraq and reminding that the situation in Iraq is basically different than the situation that was prevalent when the Security Council adopted the resolution number (661) in (1990), and especially as the danger that the Iraqi government used to represent to international peace and security is gone:

The two parties emphasize, as to this issue, that at the end of the working day on 31 December 2008 which terminates the mandate and authorization granted to the Multi-National Force Iraq according to Chapter Seven, that is included in the resolution of the International Security Council number (1790), Iraq should regain its legal and international position that it enjoyed before adoption of resolution (661) (1990) by the U.N. Security Council. And they confirm that the United States will do its best to help Iraq to take the necessary steps to achieve that on 31 December 2008.

Article 26
Iraqi Assets

In order to enable Iraq to continue developing its national economy by rehabilitating the Iraqi economic infrastructures and also to provide the basic vital services for the Iraqi people and to continue to preserve Iraqi resources such as petroleum, gas and other resources and also to preserve its financial and economic assets abroad, including the Development Fund of Iraq, the United States of America guarantees its best effort in order to:

Support Iraq to cancel its international debts that resulted from the policy of the former regime.

Support Iraq to reach a final and comprehensive decision regarding the demands of compensation that Iraq inherited from the former regime that have not been resolved yet, including the demands of compensation that was imposed on Iraq by the International Security Council.

Admitting to the concern that Iraq shows towards the demands based upon the actions committed by the former regime and in understanding of this matter, the President of the United States will use his authority to provide the protection for the Development Fund of Iraq and other specific assets that Iraq partly owns from the American judicial system. The United States will stay committed in a complete and effective way with the Iraqi government to continue this protection and in regard to those demands.

Based on a letter that will be sent from the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of Iraq, the United States will remain committed to helping Iraq in regard to the demand it submitted to the Security Council to extend the protection and other arrangements regarding petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas produced in Iraq and the resources and commitments that stem from these sales and the Development Fund of Iraq, these are the arrangements defined in the two resolutions of the Security Council (1483)(2003) and (1546)(2003).

Article 27
Deterrence Security Dangers

In order to support the security and stability in Iraq and to contribute to establishing international peace and stability, both parties seek actively to strengthen the political and military abilities for the Republic of Iraq and to enable Iraq to deter the dangers that threaten its sovereignty and political independence, the unity of its land and its democratic federal constitutional system, they agreed upon the following:

When any external or internal danger emerges against Iraq or an aggression upon it violates its sovereignty, its political stability, the unity of its land, water, and airspace or threatens its democratic system or its elected establishments and according to the request of the Iraqi government, the two parties will immediately start strategic talks and according to what they will agree on between them the United States will undertakes the appropriate measures that include diplomatic, economic, military or any other measure required to deter this threat.

Both parties agree to continue their strong cooperation to strengthen and maintain the military, security and democratic political institutions in Iraq in accordance with what they agree upon, cooperation, supplying and arming the Iraqi Security Forces for the prevention of local and international terrorism and outlaw groups, upon the request of the Iraqi government.

It is not permitted to use Iraqi land, water and airspace as a route or launching pad for attacks against other countries.

Article 28
The Green Zone

When this agreement takes effect the Iraqi government undertakes complete responsibility of the Green Zone.

The Iraqi government may request limited, temporary support from the U.S. forces for the Iraqi authorities regarding the mission of securing the Green Zone and when submitting such a request the related Iraqi authorities are to work in collaboration with the U.S. forces regarding security in the Green Zone during a time period determined by Iraq government.

Article 29
Arrangement for Implementation

Whenever there is a need, both parties lay down appropriate mechanisms for the implementation of the articles of this agreement including the articles that do not include specified mechanisms for implementation.

Article 30
Time Period of Validity of this Agreement

This agreement is valid for three years unless it is terminated by one of the parties before that period ends in accordance with item (3) of this article.

This agreement is not to be amended unless by formal written approval of both parties and in accordance with the constitutional procedures in both countries.

The validity of this agreement will terminate after one year from the date that either of the two parties receives written notification for termination.

This agreement will take effect on the first day of January 2009 after both parties have exchanged diplomatic memorandums concerning the completion of necessary procedures for both parties to implement the agreement in accordance with the valid constitutional procedures of both parties.

This agreement has been signed in Baghdad on the 17th day of the month of November, 2008 in two original copies in both the Arabic and English languages and both texts are equal in legal procedures.

Translated from the Arabic by Sahar Issa, Jenan Hussein and Hussein Kadhim of the McClatchy Baghdad Bureau.

So what's the deal with the US SOFA in Iraq?

First, let me point you to some other analyses about the SOFA: Juan Cole,Robert Dreyfuss, Stratfor and Pepe Escobar.

Reading through these analyses I amazed that nobody seems to be very concerned about the fact that the final text has still not been leaked. It will, probably before the end of the week, but for the time being everybody is commenting mostly on the basis of what can only be called hearsay. Still, whatever the fine print of the SOFA is, a number of elements in it appear to be quasi-certain. According to the SOFA,

• The USA will have to give up the ideas of permanent bases
• The USA will not be able to launch military operations from Iraq on other countries
• The USA will be out of Iraq by 2011

There is more stuff than that, but the rest is mostly "fluff" (for example, nobody seriously expects the USA to place any of its forces under Iraqi authority).

So who 'won' here? Did the Maliki government obtain major concessions from the USA?

Frankly, I am not impressed. Not one bit.

First, there defenders of the SOFA are trying to present as a huge victory that the US will not be able to station bases in Iraq. That is no victory at all. Consider this:

De jure, First, the UN mandate expires in December and after that the US would, theoretically need to get out anyway.

De facto, the US is bankrupt and regardless of its imperial hubris it does not have the means so sustain an occupation which costs the taxpayer anywhere from a billion a day to several trillions over time.

So what does this SOFA achieve on getting the USA out of Iraq? Nothing. Nothing for the Iraqis, that is.

For the Americans is gives them three years to withdraw in an organized and planned fashion. Is that in the interests of the Iraqi people? That is for them to decide, of course, but I for one thing would have preferred a panicked "run for our lives" similar to what happened when the Vietnamese booted out the Empire out of their country, with the last folks jumping into helicopters from the roof the US embassy. That kind of image is *priceless* in hammering into the minds of the (mostly militaristic) American people the basic truth that wars are dangerous, costly, and not so easily won. What does the SOFA do in this respect? It allow the USA to do what it loves to do: declare victory and leave. Why give them this present?

Score on this one: USA 1, Iraq 0

Now let's look at the second "victory": the guarantee that the US will not launch military operations from Iraq.

Let's us just use basic common sense here. Let's say that the Americans decide to bomb some construction site in Syria or an empty building in Khorramshar (the usual "terrorist bases" the Americans love to destroy). What will the Iraqis do in response? They will protest, no doubt. And what will the Americans answer to the Iraqi protests? "Sue me!", of course.

The fact that the USA has no problems violating international law in all its aspects and that it would be naive in the extreme to expect it to abide by the terms of a SOFA signed with a puppet government whose survival depends on American protection in the first place.

Score card so far: USA 2, Iraq 0

Let's look at the last "victory". The USA will be out of Iraq by 2011. Last time I checked, Obama promised to be out in 16 months, so what the Maliki cabinet is giving him is *more* time to stay in Iraq, hardly something to be proud of.

Final score card: USA 3, Iraq 0.

I would also add the following: a SOFA is not an international treaty and the USA has absolutely no legal obligation to abide by its provisions. An international treaty has to be ratified by Congress after which, and only after which, it becomes the Law of the Land in the USA. Not so with a SOFA whose exact terms are often kept secret to begin with.

No matter how you look at it, the SOFA gives the Iraqis absolutely nothing while providing the USA with a desperately needed figleaf to hide is abject failure in Iraq and that begs the question of why al-Sistani and the Iranians are not overly opposing it like the Sadrists do.

I don't know enough about al-Sistani to speculate about his motives. The little I know about him leaves me utterly unimpressed by his attitude. Sure, being "above the crowd" does look noble and majestic, but when your country is being raped, pillaged and destroyed and when more of your fellow Iraqis have been killed then in the Cambodian and Rwandan genocides this kind of lofty silence does not look so noble at all, at least to me.

What about the Iranians?

The idea is being floated out there about some kind of bargain being made between the Iranians and the new Obama administration and I have to say that this seems plausible to me. For many years the Iranians have tried to reach some deal with the USA and only the amazing stupidity of the Neocons prevented any kind of deal from being made. There is, however, another explanation which seems far more likely, at least to me.

Iran is not the unitary actor which the Western media likes to say it is. The fact is that the Iranian political system is extremely decentralized, with plenty of different centers of power and that the Iranian society in general, and the Iranian political scene in particular, is composed of many different factions with often radically opposed views and agendas. To make things worse, or better - depending on your outlook, there is an upcoming Presidential election in Iran, and considering the, shall we say, less than stellar performance of President Ahmadinejad, this election will be highly contested. As a result, politicians in Iran are walking a very fine line with the situation in Iraq. On one hand, to openly criticize the Maliki government might alienate some Shia factions in Iran (and Iraq), but on the other hand not criticising this SOFA, or the generally collaborationist attitude of the Maliki government, might alienate other Shia factions. One has to also consider the objective options Iran has.

Taking an openly "Sadrist" position is guaranteed to finally push Maliki and the rest of his cabinet in the arms of the American and leave the Iranians with only one potential ally in Iraq: al-Sadr himself. I don't know what the assessment of al-Sadr is in Tehran, but I would most definitely not want to rely on this character for my policy towards Iraq. The fundamental reality for the Iranian is this:

While Iran has plenty of power and influence in Iraq, it does not have any reliable allies. In other words, there is no "Iraqi Hezbollah" or "Iraqi Hassan Nasrallah". That is the crucial dilemma, the most painful headache for the Iranians and their stance towards Iraq.

The devil's choice of "Maliki versus Sadr" leaves only one viable option for the Iranians: not to decide at all. It is far more advantageous for the Iranians to play one against the other since that maximizes Iran's influence over the developments in Iraq and it allows them time to seek out and groom a much needed *trustworthy* partner in Iraq.

In the meantime, this dilemma explains the rather bland mix of reservations and tacit understanding which we see coming out of Iran on the topic of the SOFA. I have no doubt whatsoever that Tehran fully understands that Maliki and his cohorts are for sale to the highest bidder. Likewise, the Iranians also fully understand that Sadr is too inconsistent and too unreliable to bet on him. Thus, they are stuck in a very dangerous role of being always halfway here and halfway there.

This is a very dangerous place to be in for the Iranians. First, it makes them look unprincipled and cynical. I bet you that all the arguments about the lack of good allies don't look one bit convincing to the average Iraqi. Second, but not being able to articulate a clear position, Iran risks alienating every major faction in Iraq. "Divide and conquer" can be an effective technique for the short to middle term, but for the long term it never makes you popular and the risk of blowback are very real.

Of course, Iran could try to do what the Americans do in so many countries and create a political force ex nihilo, but think about this: has this tactic every worked?! I can't think of a single case.

Iran did not "create" Hezbollah. Hezbollah really created itself. All the Iranians did was to correctly identify it as a trustworthy partner and support it. That is, alas, not an option which Iran has in Iraq, at least for the time being.

The political realities on the ground in Iraq being what they are, I expect the chaos and bloodshed to continue for the foreseeable future.

The Saker

Breaking News: Iraqi Cabinet endorses US SOFA

According to the BBC, the Iraqi Cabinet has endorsed the US SOFA which includes the following elements:

1. placing US forces in Iraq under the authority of the Iraqi government
2. US forces to leave the streets of Iraq's towns and villages by the middle of 2009
3. US forces to hand over their bases to Iraq during the course of 2009
4. US forces to lose the authority to raid Iraqi homes without an order from an Iraqi judge and permission of the government.

We will see if these reports are true fairly soon.

I will comment on this as soon as the hard facts come out.

The President of Iraq's Kurdistan local government threatens a 'civil war' if SOFA not signed

Press TV reports: The President of Iraq's Kurdistan local government has warned of a 'civil war' if Baghdad refuses to sign a security agreement with the US.

"If the pact is not signed, the situation in the country may deteriorate to the point of a civil war," Voices of Iraq news agency quoted Masoud Barzani as saying at a press conference on Wednesday.

Barzani had earlier said his region will provide the US with military bases if the Iraqi government refuses to sign the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

Baghdad and Washington are negotiating the deal to provide a legal basis for the presence of US troops in Iraq after their UN mandate expires in December 2008.

Based on the agreement's provisions, the US would be granted the permission to build military bases, camps and prisons inside Iraq.

The deal, however, has met fierce opposition from the country's political and religious leaders who are concerned about those SOFA provisions which would "violate Iraq's sovereignty".

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has also declared that any agreement with the United States should consider the country's sovereignty and national interests.
-------
Comment: If this report is correct it appears that the Iraqi Kurds are picking the worst possible position which will alienate both the Iraqis and the Iranians who are vehemently opposed to the US imposed SOFA. There will be hell to pay for the Iraqi Kurds if they persist in this kind of political myopia.

Understanding the SOFA

by Ya Baqiyatullah

Five years after the invasion of Iraq by the Allied Forces, the people of Iraq find themselves at a crossroad; to accept the SOFA and legalize an occupation or reject it and live indefinitely under the shadows of the US forces. The Iraqi people, after being promised so much in the name of liberation are now left in a dilemma in which either choice will adds to their sufferings.

An indicator of the mainstream Iraqi opinion can be found amongst the religious figures who have opposed deal. The highest ranking cleric in Iraq, Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Sistani has openly objected to this and has imposed certain conditions for it to be accepted by the Iraqi Government. He has called for any deal to safeguard: the common interest of the Iraqi people, national sovereignty, national consensus, and obtain a parliamentary approval.

This sort of objection is not surprising given the history. Previously the US had concluded similar deals in Japan and South Korea, both of which allowed the US troops to be stationed there until now. Moreover, this deal is not detrimental for the Iraqis but also for the rest of the neighboring countries. Having permanent military bases in the region could become a catalyst to launch an attack on neighboring countries such as Iran and Syria. This is part of the reason as to why there has been strong objection from the two leading Shia clerics; Ayatollah Sistani and Ayatollah Sayyed Kazem Haeri with the latter going as far as issuing a fatwa to make it impermissible to vote in the favour of such a deal. Both these clerics consider it a moral and religious obligation to prevent this deal from taking place as it would only endanger the Shias further, not to mention many more innocents too.

The implications of the second part of the SOFA are equally dangerous as the first part and present a more serious issue for the Iraqi people. The fact that US is calling for immunity for its citizens from prosecution in Iraq sends out a strong message as to how ‘mutual’ this agreement really is. In the past it is well known that US has put this condition on a number of their deals with other government most notably the one concluded by the Shah in Iran, prior to the 1979 Revolution, which was met with fierce opposition by Ayatollah Khomeini.

Giving immunity will not only cover up the acts such as the abuse of the Abu Gharib Prisoners and the deaths by Blackwater but it would also give a free pass for many to operate corruptly with the country. It is well known that the Bush Government has turned a blind eye to the corruptions with the Iraqi Government as well as any sort of legal accountability by their own citizens and contractors. Any lack of immunity will only discourage any transparency as to what is occurring in Iraq. A blank check should not be given to anyone, be they the Iraqi Government or foreign forces.

The course of the occupation has led Iraq to rely on foreign aid, namely from the United States. Any suggestion of leaving the country after a Government was in place became a distant memory due to several factors such as insurgency, the militias and sectarian violence all which contributed to the stay of the US in the region. The question that must be posed, was the occupation strategy by the Pentagon the necessary way to remove Saddam? Or did other interests lie at heart when the decision was made regarding the removal of Saddam Hussein? One has to remember that Saddam was a person backed and supported by the US hence to remove him without an occupation would have been a very viable possibility however, the greed of oil was something which was too good to be missed too and sadly, the greed won the day.

Dependency of the Iraqi nation is not the sole reason for the US to remain in Iraq. Given the rhetoric between Tehran and Washington, the cycle of threats has taken a new level with US going as far as funding the terrorists groups such as PEJAK and PKK to infiltrate Iran and going as far as declassifying MKO as a terrorist organisation, MKO are guilty of a number of terrorist activities in Iran after the revolution. All these actions indicate that the US plan in Iraq was much more than the removal of Saddam to begin with.

The United Nations mandate runs out in December 2008 so that begs the question, which road is the best for the Iraqi nation; the SOFA which ensures permanent military bases and immunity in Iraq leaving the people of Iraq under a legalized occupation or an Iraq without SOFA under the occupation of US troops for indefinite or a possible third solution that brings about the true liberation which was promised to the Iraqis?

The solution to this mess that has been caused in Iraq by the US troops is recognition that the solution firstly lies internally and then more importantly on the regional level. They are interlinked and the resolution of one would lead to the other. The settlement should not be dictated by any foreign power regardless of their influence in the region. No other region of the world would tolerate such interference in the region so the same measure should apply here. Consideration should be undertaken in regards to the legitimate interests of the powers in the area but the future of the area should not be held hostage to their exclusive interests, such as the export of oil.

The neighboring states of Iraq which are threatened by the changes in Iraq need to be addressed and treated in any lasting deal for Iraq and the area. Countries like Iran and Turkey need to be introduced in a new security measure which would take into account their concerns, fears and interests. Furthermore, any deal must secure the sovereignty of the region, what happens inside Iraq has repercussions on the lives of millions inside and outside the country. The best hope for the Iraqi people for now, is to reach a deal that provides clear guidelines for foreign troops, and attempts at best to respect an already fragile new nation.

More fallout from the botched US raid on Syrian village

The shit is hitting the fan after the botched US raid on the Syrian village near the Iraqi border and even nominal US allies such as the Maliki government and even Fouad Siniora (!!) in Lebanon are condemning this aggression. Other protesting voices include Qatar, the OIC, the Arab League, Russia and China. Even the otherwise 'tame and lame' EU "voiced concerns" about this raid (which just goes to show that the EU is even more under the US boot than the Maliki government or Siniora). Iran also warned that the US should not try this kind of trick with Iran.

In the West the corporate press is doing an excellent job keeping this story as low profile as possible but then, it really matters little what the TV watching idiots in the West think about any of that. What matters is that this botched raid is nothing short of a PR-disaster in the entire Middle-East. Yet again, the Americans come out of this looking stupid, incompetent and phenomenally arrogant.

The UK's Guardian put it well in an article called Syria, the US goes at it alone again: Yesterday's raid into the Middle Eastern country was yet another example of Bush's often disastrous approach to the 'war on terror'.

To fully measure the boundless imbecility of it all one needs to remember that the Baathist regime of Assad in Syria has been, for a long while already, a very faithful and trustworthy ally of the USA in the self-declared GWOT (Global War on Terror): heck, they even kindly agreed to detain and torture high-security detainees kidnapped by the CIA goons and then turn them back to the Americans. Does anyone seriously believe that the USA would allow the Syrians to detain and interrogate any al-Qaeda members if at the same time Syria was protecting al-Qaeda?! And if not, then the Americans could have easily asked the Syrian to detain and torture or kill any presumed al-Qaeda members hiding right across the Iraqi-Syrian border. But no, they went in themselves, in broad daylight of all things, and did what US Special Ops do best: bungle a raid and shoot a bunch of civilian bystanders.

[The gross incompetence of US special ops never ceases to amaze me. The Brits, the Russians or the Israelis would have gone in quietly and either bombed the place or snatched their targets without anyone even knowing who did it. For that, of course, they would have needed to either bring (or get) some vehicles to a landing zone about 10km outside any inhabited area and they would have done so at night. The cowboys decided to come in with guns blazing and ended up being filmed by cellphone cameras. And I bet you that, like in Grenada (arguably the most inept military operation of all times) the morons who conducted this raid will get medals and promotions].

One could expect anything from the Maliki government in Iraq of course, but my guess is that the SOFA thing is dead and that the latest US fiasco will prove to be the final blow to this deal.

US raid on Syria 'will hamper SOFA'

Exactly as I predicted:

Press TV reports that An Iraqi lawmaker has warned that Sunday's attack on Syria would negatively affect a security pact the US is insisting to sign with Iraq.

"The air strike will send a negative message to Iraq's neighbors," MP Abbass al-Bayati told Voices of Iraq news agency on Tuesday.

US commandoes onboard four helicopters attacked a Syrian border region on Sunday, killing at least eight civilians and wounding several others. Washington claims all victims of the attack were members of a terrorist network. Syrian officials and witnesses, however, have dismissed the allegations.

Al-Bayati said the timing of the US attack was wrong and could have negative consequences.

"I hope that this air strike will not affect the Iraq-Syria relations that have recently started to improve," the parliamentarian added.

The remarks were made just hours after the Iraqi Parliament voiced concern about the attack and called on the government to launch a probe into the incident and inform the legislative body.

Syria termed the incursion as a terrorist act and warned of retaliatory measures if the US launched similar attacks.

The military operation has also fueled the speculations that Washington might use Iraqi soil as a launch pad for further wars in the region if Baghdad signs the so-called Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

The controversial agreement has sparked outrage among Iraqi political and religious leaders who say SOFA would virtually put the war-torn country under the US's tutelage.

Iraqi cleric issues decree against SOFA

Press TV reports:

A senior Shia cleric has issued a religious decree prohibiting Iraqis from signing a controversial security agreement with the US.

Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem al-Husseini al-Haeri issued a fatwa (decree) against the US-proposed Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

The cleric said that the agreement was in violation of the Islamic law, calling it a humiliating pact that would undermine Iraq's sovereignty.

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen warned that Iraq risked security losses of 'significant consequence' unless it approved the deal, AFP reported.

The deal which would determine a legal framework for the presence of US forces in the country after their UN mandate expires in December 2008 would provide Washington with permanent military bases in Iraq.

The deal has so far met fierce opposition by a majority of lawmakers, whose approval is necessary for a final agreement.

The Iraqi cabinet and the Presidency Council must also approve the deal.

In a Tuesday cabinet meeting, Iraqi ministers refused to support the deal's latest draft and called for amendments to the proposal.

The agreement is also opposed by the Iraqi people who have been staging rallies across the country to protest US military presence in the country.

Iraqi Shias organize a massive demonstration against the proposed US SOFA

Al-Manar reports:

Muslim Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr urged Iraqi lawmakers on Saturday to reject a planned US-Iraqi security deal as tens of thousands of his followers poured on to the streets of Baghdad in a massive anti-American protest.

"When the agreement is in your hands, the destiny of Iraq and its people is also in your hands," Sadr said in a statement, speaking to MPs, whose approval is necessary once the deal is signed by leaders of the two countries.

"Do not vote for the agreement. If they tell you the agreement ends the occupation ... no, the occupier will still remain. If you are told that it would give sovereignty to Iraq, it is a lie."

Sadr, who is reputed to be living in Iran, is a strong opponent of the US presence in Iraq, and has consistently opposed the deal since it was proposed last year. US and Iraqi negotiators have reached agreement on a draft deal that would govern the status of American forces in Iraq after the present UN mandate ends in December. The pact must be approved by leaders of both countries as well as the Iraqi parliament.

Details have not been made public but officials have said agreement was reached on a timeline for withdrawing all US combat troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. A key point of contention in the months-long negotiations has been whether US occupation troops would fall exclusively under US jurisdiction if accused of serious crimes in Iraq.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said on Saturday it was "time to take decisions" regarding the security deal. "It is difficult to reopen the text. The parliament either ratifies or rejects it," he said, adding that the deal does not allow Washington to have a permanent military presence in Iraq. "There is no hidden agenda ... the next few days are very crucial for Iraqi leaders to decide," he said.

Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Sadr supporters spat anger at US occupation and the proposed deal as they marched through the dusty streets of Baghdad. Effigies of US President George W. Bush -- with bandaged head and fractured right arm -- and of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice were set ablaze along with American flags.

Sadrist MP Nasser Al-Saadi said that more than one million people took part in the demonstrations, which could not be independently confirmed. The march began in the cleric's Sadr City bastion in east Baghdad and ended at nearby Mustansiriyah Square, where the effigies were torched.

"No, No, to America! No, No to the devil!" shouted crowds of men, women and children as they walked the three kilometre (two mile) route. Carrying Iraqi flags and banners of the Sadr movement, the demonstrators demanded an end to the US occupation. "Get out occupier! We demand an end to the occupation!" they shouted.

Karim Kadhim, a demonstrator from the holy city of Najaf, said "we are marching to reject the occupation. "Would America like to be occupied by any other country? Would America like its sons to be attacked? Why are they occupying our country?" he asked. "They have been lying for the past five years. They told us they are coming to free us and go. But they are still lying."

Demonstrators also chanted slogans praising Sadr's Mahdi Army. "The Mahdi Army is still powerful and Sadr is still powerful," they chanted, referring to the cleric's 60,000-strong militia. The protest was originally to be held on April 9 -- the anniversary of the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. It was postponed due to clashes between Sadr's Mahdi Army and US occupation forces.

Press TV reports:

Iraqi demonstrators have staged massive anti-US rallies in Baghdad to protest the controversial US-proposed security deal.

The rallies were held as the security pact nears its final stages. Nearly a million demonstrators from different cities of the war-torn country participated in the rallies.

Denouncing the American occupation of Iraq, the crowds shouted anti-US slogans and called for ending the US presence in the oil-rich country.

"Get out occupier! We demand an end to the occupation!" shouted protesters.

The move comes a day after Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent the draft of the security deal to the parliament for final approval.

Last week Iraqi clerics including the anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr called for a nationwide demonstration on October 18.

On Friday, several Sunni and Shia clerics spoke out against the deal, as opposition, among Iraqis from all walks of life, was growing against it. The clerics argued that the Iraqi public knew little about the terms of the deal which could change the future of the nation.

Meanwhile, Sadr Eddin al-Qzbangi, a confidant of Iraq's most revered Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani said Friday that the Ayatollah has “expressed concerns about the secret provisions of the agreement."

Al-Sistani has also said any accord must have national consensus.

Al-Qzbangi said that although al-Sistani has repeatedly called for clarification of the deal, the details have not been released.

Al-Qzbangi urged the Iraqi parliament to study all the terms of the agreement very carefully.

The draft accord includes a timeline for US withdrawal by the end of 2011 and gives Baghdad limited authority to try US contractors and soldiers for major crimes committed off-duty and off-base.

RAW VIDEO FOOTAGE OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS:

US-Iraqi agreement: leaked

from Raed Jarrar's blog via Palestinian Pundit:

I read about a leaked copy of the US-Iraqi agreement a few days ago when a radio station in Iraq mentioned some of its details, then it was mentioned in some Arab newspapers like Al-Qabas and Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. A couple of days ago, one Iraqi website (linked to an Iraqi armed resistance group) published the leaked draft on their web page for less than a couple of days before their website went offline. (Thankfully, I downloaded the 21 pages agreement and saved them before their server went down)

I spent this weekend translating it, and just finished now. you can read the 27 articles August 6th draft by clicking here or here or here. The title of this draft is "Agreement regarding the activities and presence of U.S. forces, and its withdrawal from Iraq", but this is the same agreement that is referred to as a "status of forces agreement" or "SOFA" or framework or whatever. It's the result of months of negotiations after Bush and Al-Maliki signed the "Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America" by the end of last year.

This leaked draft is a treasure of information. It's the first time any document related to this topic is made public. It shows how weak the Iraqi negotiations team is (it is really pathetic to read their "suggestions" on how to fix the disaster of an agreement).

There are many outrageous articles in the agreement that violates Iraq's sovereignty and independence, and gives the U.S. occupation authorities unprecedented rights and privileges, but what has draw my attention the most (so far) are three major points:

1- the agreement does not discuss anything about a complete US withdrawal from Iraq. Instead, it talks about withdrawing "combat troops" without defining what is the difference between combat troops and other troops. It is very clear that the US is planning to stay indefinitely in permanent bases in Iraq (or as the agreement calls them: "installations and areas agreed upon") where the U.S. will continue training and supporting Iraqis armed forces for the foreseeable future.

2- the agreement goes into effect when the two executive branches exchange "memos", instead of waiting for Iraqi parliament's ratification. This is really dangerous, and it is shocking because both the Iraqi and U.S. executive branches have been assuring the Iraqi parliament that no agreement will go into effect without being ratified by Iraq's MPs.

3- this agreement is the blueprint for keeping other occupation armies (aka Multi-national forces) in Iraq on the long run. This explains the silence regarding what will happed to other occupiers (like the U.K. forces) after the expiration of the UN mandate at the end of this year.

It is really disturbing to read how the U.S. government is still going down the same path of intervention and domination in Iraq.

This agreement will not be accepted by the Iraqi people and their elected representatives in the Iraqi parliament, and if the U.S. and Iraqi executive branches try to consider it valid anyway it will lead to more violence in Iraq.

The US SOFA in Iraq - showdown bewteen the USraelien Empire and the Shias

First, please take a look at this al-Jazeera report:

First, a superficial impression: the contrast between the dignified attitude of Salah al-Obeidi (the Sadrist spokesman) and the petty bickering of the two other participants of this show. Second, listening to this conversation I think that one can only come to one objective conclusion: the only real patriots are the Sadrists.

The Kurds are clearly sold to the Americans. Considering how they were treated by Saddam one can not blame them too much, but I would not say that their stance inspires any respect. Then, we have the nebulous but large constellation of the "concerned local citizens" and "sons of Iraq" who are, literally, on the US payroll. Again, one can understand the rationale for their sell-out, but one can hardly be inspired by it. The al-Maliki clique is, I think, the most repulsive of all. Al-Maliki and his supporters seem to be spending all their time trying to figure out whether they are better off selling themselves to the Iranian or the Americans and their clear preference is to do so with both at the same time. Their recent assault on Basra and entire SOFA issue is now firmly pegging them into the American camp and their relationship with Iran is clearly come to an end.

Then there is the truly bizarre case of the most powerful man in Iraq: al-Sistani. Whatever his motives may be, he cannot ignore that every person who goes and meets him comes out of the meeting claiming that he has his support. I don't know whether he is trying to stay above the political issues, or whether he always agrees with the last person he speaks to, but the fact is that he has, so far, failed to clearly come out with a firm stance on the SOFA issue. Most reports say that he is very opposed to it, but it is unclear whether he is only opposed to some provisions of the SOFA or opposed to it in principle. Whatever may be the case, al-Sistani has, at least for the time being, chosen to remain in the sidelines of this issue.

There are basically two major forces in Iraq who are clearly and unambiguously opposed to the SOFA: first, the Sadrists supported by all the other influential Shia clerics and, second Iran.

Bottom line: the SOFA issue is, at its core, an US versus Shia issue and a political arm-wrestling match between the two most powerful forces in Iraq. This is also the culminating phase of the "redirection" and, probably, the last non-military phase of the strategic campaign waged by the USraelien Empire against the Shia of the Middle-East. Whoever comes out on top in this struggle with become the uncontested leading political force in Iraq.

Maliki: US-Iraq Security Deal Fails

Alalam News reports: Iraq's Premier Nuri al-Maliki said on Friday that negotiations with the US on a security agreement that extends US presence in the war-torn country beyond 2008 has reached a "dead end."

Maliki said that the talks have failed because of US demands that infringe Iraq's sovereignty.

During a visit to neighboring Jordan, Maliki told journalists: "We have reached a dead end, because when we started the talks, we found that the US demands hugely infringe on the sovereignty of Iraq, and this we can never accept."

The controversial pact paves the way for long-term presence of occupation troops in Iraq after the UN mandate ends in 2008.

The US presence currently relies on a mandate by the UN, renewed annually upon the request of the Iraqi government.

The deal would also give the occupation troops a free rein to carry out military operations whenever and wherever they deem necessary.

It contains unannounced objectives, including using facilities and potentials in Iraq to bring developments in the Middle East under its control, which would leave dangerous consequences.

The Iraqi prime minister said Iraq objected to Washington's insistence on giving its troops immunity from prosecution in Iraq and freedom to conduct operations independent of Iraqi control.

Maliki said: "We can't extend the US forces permission to arrest Iraqis or to undertake terror fighting in an independent way, or to keep Iraqi skies and waters open for themselves whenever they want."

"One of the important issues that the US is asking for is immunity for its soldiers and those contracting with it. We reject this totally," Makili added.

However, US President George W. Bush said on Wednesday that he was confident of reaching an agreement with Iraq. (Dubya is really totally out of touch. VS)

US officials say they hope to reach a deal by July, but Iraqi officials have been more cautious and suggested that date may be missed.

The security deal had earlier drawn a volley of criticisms from both international and domestic political and religious figures.

Iraqi political figures, scholars and media activists have all expressed their disgust to the agreement.

A declaration of principles was signed between Bush and Nuri al-Maliki in December 2007.

The declaration was planned to be ratified on July 31, 2008 to be effective as of January 1, 2009.

The agreement could not be effective except after endorsement by the 275-member Iraqi parliament.