Egypt being pushed into sectarian violence

by Crescent online

Saudi preacher, Muhammad al-Arifi, has issued a fatwa saying prostitution by Muslim girls to service takfiri fighters in Syria is permissible.  Has the Ummah (Muslim world) fallen so low that such filthy fatwas can be issued and Muslims remain silent? At the same time, Arifi and Sheikh al-Qaradawi have launched an anti-Shia crusade leading to the lynching of four Shias in a village outside Cairo.

Muhammad al-Arifi

The lynching of four Muslims by a Salafi mob in Egypt has aroused fears about sectarian warfare in the country that is already reeling under multiple crises. Four Muslims were dragged out of a house in the village of Abu Mussalam near Cairo in Giza Province and beaten to death because they were Shias. The house was also set on fire.

The June 23 attack occurred when Shia Muslims gathered in the house of Sheikh Hassan Shehata to participate in prayers and duas on what is considered by many Muslims as a very auspicious night: Nisfu Sha‘ban (middle of the month of Sha‘ban). Many Muslims believe that on this night, Allah (swt) determines the fate of people for the coming year, hence the special prayers and duas for forgiveness and mercy.

The Salafis do not believe in this considering it as bida‘h (innovation in Islam). While there are differing opinions among Muslims about the significance of this night, only and only the Salafis think they have the license to kill people if they participate in such prayers. Hitherto, the Salafis in Egypt that are massively funded by the obscurantist Saudis and their court ulama, had not resorted to such atrocities. Political developments in the region have spurred them to launch vicious attacks against the small Shia community in Egypt that is less than 1% of the total population.

The defeat of takfiri groups in Syria at the hands of the Syrian army in recent weeks and anti-Shia rantings by people like Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian alim residing in Qatar, have encouraged the Salafis in Egypt and elsewhere to go on the offensive. It is distressing that al-Qaradawi, instead of thinking of the larger good of the Muslim Ummah has resorted to spewing sectarian hatred. He is widely seen as a stooge of the Qataris. Interestingly, the Saudis that consider the Qataris as too uppity, are also supporting al-Qaradawi’s sectarian crusade. One Saudi preacher in particular, Mohammed al-Arifi has made a name for himself in Salafi/takfiri circles.

In recent months, he is known to have issued a fatwa for Muslim girls to join what is referred to as “Jihad al-Munakiha”. What this means is that Muslim girls should go to Syria to provide sex services to the takfiri fighters in order to boost their morale. This is described as their “jihad”. Unfortunately some gullible girls from Tunisia have fallen for this obnoxious practice and actually gone to Syria to indulge in what is essentially prostitution.

The June 23 attack in the village of AbuMussalam was captured on video. It is horrible to watch a mob beat people to death with clubs while shouting “Allahu Akbar”. One wonders what kind of demonic notions these people hold. How are they glorifying Allah by killing people that were nothing more than praying the Merciful Lord!

Egyptian Prime Minister Hisham Qandil has said the attackers have been identified and would be punished. While the perpetrators of this attack may have been identified and perhaps will also be brought to court for trial, Qandil would be deluding himself if he believes that that would end the crisis. His own government led by President Mohamed Mursi is directly responsible for this horrible crime.

Only a day earlier (June 22), Mursi had addressed a huge rally in a Cairo stadium in which he not only announced cutting off diplomatic relations with Syria because of the Syrian army’s recent successes but he also urged “Sunni Muslims” to join the jihad in Syria! Salafi/takfiris were the predominant group in the stadium attracted to attend by the presence of the likes of al-Qaradawi and Arifi. Mursi’s call was made two days after a meeting by a group of about 70 ulama led by Sheikh al-Qaradawi that indulged in wild anti-Shia rhetoric. When otherwise respected scholars resort to such rhetoric and then political leaders adopt that rhetoric as policy, the consequences are bound to be catastrophic. The mob will take the law into its hands considering the vicious rhetoric as license to kill.

Mursi is faced with many challenges but this kind of dangerous rhetoric targeting a vulnerable minority to divert attention from his other problems will have grave consequences for Egypt. Even more disappointing than Mursi’s call is the hate-filled rhetoric of people like al-Qaradawi and Arifi. The Saudis had always indulged in such rhetoric but Qaradawi’s lending his support and weight will push the Ummah into a dangerous confrontation that can only benefit the enemies of Islam and Muslims.

Whether he realizes it or not, al-Qaradawi is acting as an imperialist-zionist agent. The Saudis were always part of that criminal syndicate. May Allah have mercy on the Ummah that has people like al-Qaradawi as its scholars.
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Comment: this article was sent to me by a friend and I am happy to post it here as yet another proof of two extremely important facts:

a) Salafi/Takfiris hate other Muslims no less than they hate non-Muslims, and they treat them with the same brutal viciousness.
b) There are plenty of Muslims out there who are categorically against the kind of pseudo-Islam used to justify the crimes of these crazed thugs.  Please note that the author of this article speaks of "demonic notions" which, in the mouth of a religious person, is just about the strongest condemnation possible.

Most readers of this blog do understand all that, but I urge those of you who still hold to the simplistic (and factually wrong) notion that its Muslims vs non-Muslims to realize that this myth - usually spread by the Zionist media - only serves to divide those who otherwise should stand together against our common enemy: Anglo imperialism, Jewish Zionist and Takfiri/Salafi/Wahabi Satanism.

The Saker
 
PS: another crazy Salafi cleric,  Sheikh Yasir Al-Ajlawni, also recently contributed to an interesting fatwa.  In his opinion, it is legitimate to capture and rape non-Sunni (i.e. Shai, Alawi, Christian) women.  Clearly, this guy and his likes cannot be reasoned with and should be shot on site.  Which is what the Syrian Army is doing, for which they have my deepest gratitude.

Very candid statement from Israel's Deputy Prime Minister

In an interview with Russia Today Israel's Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor has called Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, the "Axis of Unholy Lands":

Syria is the only Arab country that is ally with Iran.  The axis that was built between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, the Unholy Lands, should I call it. ­This is a very bad and dangerous axis against us and all the Arab countries. In that respect this alliance between Iran and Syria is broken – this is good for peace, not bad.

Well there we have it straight from the horse's mouth: the Shia are in the cross-hairs of US/Israeli Empire and the civil war in Syria is "good for peace" i.e., good for Israel.

You gotta give it to Dan, the expression "Axis of Unholy Lands" is neat.  First, the "Axis" will always elicit the correct response from the doubleplusgoodthinking folks who watch TV and have been thoroughly brainwashed by Zio-propaganda.  Say "Axis" and they see swastikas, SS skulls, Mussolini raising his chin to the sky, etc.

Then, "Unholy Lands" is a wonderful contrast with "Holy Land" which the Israelis, of course, conflate with their racist regime and a Palestinian-free "Jewish Homeland".

The achieved effect is perfect: the Shia are assimilated to the Nazis while Israel is "holy".  Very, very neat.

After Dubya's "Axis of Evil" (well, really David Frum's, of course) we now have Danny's "Unholy Axis".

Same old, same old.

Pakistan sectarian bus attack in Kohistan kills 18

The BBC reports:

Gunmen have killed at least 18 Shia Muslim bus passengers in a sectarian attack in the northern Pakistani district of Kohistan, officials say.

The attackers are reported to have checked the identity cards of all the passengers before removing the Shias and shooting them.

About 27 other passengers on the bus were spared. (...) Last month more than 30 Shias were killed in an attack on a mosque in north-west Pakistan.

Yet another typical example of the rabid hatred the Wahabi/Salafi/Takfi/al-Qaeda/etc. -types (call them what you wish) have for the Shia.  It is in this context that the slow encirclement of Iran via Syria and the bloody crackdown in Bahrain is now taking place.

Largest demonstration in Bahrain since March

The Shia of Bahrain "only God is with us"

In Bahrain, human-rights workers say at least 50 medical staff are still missing after a crackdown on hospital care for injured anti-government demonstrators.

There are fears that some of the detained staff could face stiff sentences for treating protesters. Among them is Dr al-Dallal, a prominent physician arrested on March 17 during a military raid at Salmaniyah Hospital in Manama.

His wife, Fareeda al-Dallal, was also arrested and beaten under custody last Tuesday. Al Jazeera spoke to her about her arrest and the fears she has about the safety of her husband.

The massacre the world ignored: Parachinar

by 'Ya Baqiyatullah'

Very few open crimes against humanity are as disregarded as the assault against Shia Muslims in Parachinar, an area west of Islamabad. Many European and American media outlets have completely ignored the onslaught against Shia civilians at the hands of the Taliban and Sunni extremist militants. Parachinar is a town of 20,000 individuals, with almost all being exclusively Shiites and belonging to the Turi and Bangash tribes.

Extremist Sunni tribesmen from the North Waziristan agency along with militants from the Arab countries and the Caucasus have been attacking the Shia civilians for he past two years. Hundreds if not thousands of Shias have already been killed, and the important supply routes are also controlled by the militants. The supply of food and medical equipment has been badly affected, consequently doctors have had to operate without anesthesia. Power and water supplies are sparse and subject to sabotage and lack of functionality.

Interview of a native of Parachinar by 'Ya Baqiyatullah'

YB: To begin with, can you please give a brief introduction about yourself?

SZ: My name is Sayed Zeeshan, I am currently residing in Islamabad but occasionally visit my village in the North West Province of Pakistan, where the conflict is going on. I have a Masters degree in Electrical Engineering and am currently working as a Research Engineer in a research organization in Islamabad.

YB: To understand the situation at hand in Parachinar one needs to look at the historical aspect of the situation to see the current situation, can you summarize for how this struggle began and what have been the major events of this struggle?

SZ: Indeed, the historical perspective to every conflict is very important. Instead of focusing on the conflict in Parachinar, I must deal with it as a problem which affects the whole area of North West Frontier Province including Parachinar, Hangu, Kohat, Orakzai and Dera Ismail Khan. Except for Dera Ismail Khan the other regions are loosely interconnected geographically. Prior to 1980s the Shia-Sunni conflict was muted if even existent. Orakzai was the only area where there are known instances of hostilities before 1980. In 1977, Army Chief Zia-ul-Haq overthrew democratically elected President, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in a coup d’état and later hanged him in 1979. USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and the Afghan war started which lasted ten long years from 1979-1989. Being a Military dictator, Zia, sidelined the popular parties and backed Islamist Parties, which were rather unknown till then, prime among them were Jamat Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulama Islam (JUI). These parties were used to prepare militias for the Afghan war which primarily consisted of Islamist Jihadists. This war was funded by Arab oil money and the US. It was a part of the ongoing cold war between USSR and the US which US has vowed to win no matter what forces they had to support. With the coming of Saudi and Arab money a mushroom growth of Doebandi madrasas (religious seminaries) was witnessed in the North West and Baluchistan provinces in the areas adjoining Afghanistan.

At around the same time another group called Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) was emerging in South Punjab lead by Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the ex- provincial vice chief of JUI. Their sole agenda was to declare the Shia population of Pakistan as non Muslim as was done to Ahmedis in 1974. With the emergence of SSP and LJ (Lashkar Jhangvi, a splinter group of SSP) a wave of Shia target killings began. Most of the operatives of these terrorist groups had directly/indirectly taken part in Afghan War and had very good working relations with other jihadist organizations that were active in Kashmir and Afghanistan. This all was ignored by the government and the security agencies (primarily ISI) because of the strategic partnership with the Jihadist Organization for their agendas in Kashmir and Afghanistan to gain “strategic depth”. These organizations were sectarian up to the hilt. Although only a few of them saw Shias as their prime enemies they all thought of Shias as antagonists up to a certain degree. In Hangu and Parachinar the war affected Afghans settled their throughout 80s and 90s. SSP and LJ started recruiting them and then used them to attack Shia targets. This is the backdrop in which this conflict started.

The important incidents were the attacks on Shia Turi tribesmen of Parachinar by the Afghans in 1986. Another significant incident was the tribal war that started in Hangu and Orakzai in 1998 after a clash over flag rising on the event of Nauroz (Spring Solstice celebrations). Taliban from Orakzai attacked Shia village of Shahu Khel and razed it to ground; killing scores of Shia men, women and children. Hundreds of families were dislocated and took refuge in neighboring Shia villages. Army intervened afterwards to calm the situation. Since 2005, when a suicide bomber attacked Ashura Procession in Hangu and managed to kill 40 people, every year the local Shia and Sunni tribes clash with each other using heavy weapons to target each others’ positions and at times civilian population. Usually it’s because of the intransigence of the radical local Sunni groups, inspired by SSP, that the Ashura processions are not allowed to be taken out.

External forces, like Taliban from the nearby areas like Douaba and Orakzai and some tribesmen from Parachinar also took part in this conflict. In fact, in 2008, the ceasefire was only enforced when the Army provided a safe passage to the external Taliban forces that were adamant to continue hostilities. In Kurram, the capital of which is Parachinar, gunmen attacked a Shia procession and killed several people. This kick started a series of events that gave rise to a full blown tribal war between Turi (Shia) tribesmen on one side and Bangash (Sunni) tribesmen on the other side, whom were also helped by the Taliban from Waziristan and Orakzai. The road links were closed for all kinds of traffic and a severe shortage of food and medicine started. This conflict was escalated by a particular gory incident. Army wanted to transport some foodstuff in trucks to Parachinar, which was blockaded for months, but Taliban attacked the convoy, the Army marooned the convoy and absconded; the truck drivers were taken by the Taliban. They executed them in a very brutal fashion, reminiscent of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, severing the heads and limbs of the victims in an animalistic fashion.

This exacerbated the situation still further and the Turi tribesmen went on offensive taking several of Bangash villages. It ensued in a deadlock situation and after several rounds of talks between the tribal elders of both sides in Islamabad a ceasefire agreement was reached in October, 2008. This fragile agreement is holding on by thin strings. There have been several killings and kidnappings after the agreement. The roads are open but people travel on these roads with throbbing hearts, waiting for something gory to happen. Shias from Parachinar and Hangu areas have also been killed in Dara Adam Khel, a lawless town connecting Kohat to Peshawar. People were stopped and based on the ID card information (name, residence etc.) decapitated. The situation is particularly difficult for Shias who are killed indiscriminately for the only reason of being Shia.

YB: Do you have an estimate for the population within the affected region?

SZ:The figures I am providing are rather crude and are used here to give an idea of the population. The population of Kohat is roughly about a million people. That of Orakzai and Parachinar will add another million to this figure.

YB: What is the demographic makeup in the North-West region of Pakistan, with particular emphasis on the sectarian composition of the population?

SZ: Quite a few villages in Kohat consist of a majority Shia population; they are mainly located between the districts of Kohat and Hangu and a few in Orakzai. Upper Kurram also consists of mainly Shia villages and the town of Parachinar is primarily Shia. There is a zone separating Kurram from Hangu populated by primarily Sunni population. Towards the south of Parachinar is the restive North Waziristan which is the stronghold of Taliban.

YB: How would you describe the nature of sectarian relations over the years?

SZ: There wasn’t any big conflict going on in this region prior to the Zia’s Jihad campaign. This question has been dealt with in detail in the answer to the second question.

YB: Militant terror groups like the Tehrik-e-Taliban, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba are said to operate in the region, and are blamed for the ongoing violence. Did these groups receive any support from regional and international players; would you care to kindly elaborate on the local and regional context of the developments within the region?

SZ: This question is a bit tricky and the information regarding the financial aspect of these organizations is a bit hazy. Although it is well known that the Arab oil money and the CIA money played a big role in arming and maintaining the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan but the sectarian phenomenon, which although intertwined with the global Jihad, is relatively recent. It is concurrent with the advent of Taliban in Afghanistan, which drew its force from Pakistani madrasas. Taliban were helped financially by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as asserted in the famous book Taliban by Ahmed Rashid. They were also helped by the drug money that came to Afghanistan through the poppy and heroin trade. Some of the groups like SPP and LJ were helped by local and Middle Eastern traders. After 9-11, Pakistan joined the war against terror but didn’t stop supporting the jihadist groups completely. Now this strategy has backfired and TTP, which consists of a plethora of Jihadist groups, sectarian or otherwise, has gained significant clout in regions bordering Afghanistan and several settled areas like Swat Valley. These groups operate by looting weapons from security forces and NATO convoys, getting money from local population and Middle Eastern traders under charity organizations and kidnapping wealthy people, especially Shia. Some of the money comes from Arab countries which they give to madrasas to export Salafism. It is asserted by some political analysts that some rouge elements of the ISI are still backing these groups but the validity of this claim is still unverified.

YB: Do they still receive support from these quarters? And what is the nature of this support?

SZ: They still receive support from these quarters. They mainly receive money from wealthy businessmen in Arab countries. Some of the money comes from drug trade and some from Arab countries that use this money to gain support for Salafism.

YB: Are there any Shia groups operating in the area to ensure safety of the Shia residents there and around that area?

SZ: There are several groups operating in the area but they usually have local roles. These groups aren’t very organized and lack command and control structure and therefore aren’t too much effective. Although, they successfully defend their areas in time of conflict and provide a buffer between the attackers and the civilian population, they still lack leadership. They consist of local people who have some knowhow of the warfare and are supported by small donations from the locals in form of defense funds.

YB: According to experts, the central policy of the former government in Pakistan was said to have unleashed a "violence-accommodation cycle". What is your assessment and do you think the present administration will treat these militant groups any differently?

SZ: This is a very old policy of cozying up to jihadists to achieve the ends in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Although a certain level of reversal of this policy has been witnessed in recent days but it’s too little too late. For instance, the radical madrasas which spread sectarian hatred are thriving with impunity. Maulvis have been given free hand to preach sectarianism from mosque pulpits. The target killings of Shias have risen exponentially since the arrival of the democratic government. All these factors indicate that there is no serious effort going on to eradicate these ills from the society.

YB: As we speak today, many towns in the Kurram Agency have been under virtual siege from early 2007 - a period of two years. Can you describe the humanitarian situation on the ground? Additionally, have humanitarian aid organizations, particularly international ones, played any significant role in dealing with the humanitarian situation?

SZ: Things are a bit better now since the ceasefire that came in effect in October, 2008. But this agreement is very fragile. It’s waiting like a time bomb to blast any day. It is because the root problem has not been addressed. The monster has been put under the carpet for now but it will raise its head again with much ferocity than previously witnessed. As for the international aid agencies, there has been no significant help. One reason is the closure of the transportation routes heading towards Parachinar from Pakistan but the routes from Afghanistan were open. International aid agencies were in a better position to help because of their presence in Afghanistan, but they chose to ignore this problem or weren’t well informed.

YB: What is the reason for the muted coverage of the crisis in the region by Western media outlets? Can anything be done to place the spotlight on the grave human costs and tales of sorrow from the region?

SZ: The local media covered this event somewhat, although insignificantly, without divulging any details about the sectarian aspect of this problem and made it look like a tribal war between warring factions. In fact this is the case with any sectarian event. The logic they give is that this issue is too sensitive to be discussed publicly. It would flare conflict in other parts of the country. This is the kind of apathy we are dealing with in Pakistan. As for the international media, the tribal areas are too remote and restive for the international journalists to operate. But that is not a good reason for them to ignore such significant events. There are other ways in which these events could be covered. BBC Urdu did cover the event in somewhat detail but it doesn’t have an international outreach.

YB: Any final words, particularly to the Shias situated in the West?

SZ: I would say that the apathy has gone for too long and if something significant is not done a massacre is in waiting. It has happened before in Mazar Sharif (Afghanistan) in 1998, it could happen in any of these areas again. Hundreds of people have been killed; scores of children died of lack of medicines and this conflict is far from over. The Western Shias should put pressure on the Government of Pakistan through demonstrations and lobbying and by writing to different news agencies, informing them of the scale of the atrocities. This is the least that anyone can do. They could also help by donating for the orphans of the conflict which number in hundreds if not thousands.
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Commentary: I am deeply grateful to 'Ya Baqiyatullah' for offering this amazingly interesting and important information on my blog. Many topics touched upon here (the role of Pakistan, Sunni extremism, ISI, the Taliban, etc.) are, I believe of immense importance not only to the region, but to the entire world. As my readers already know, I strongly believe that the kind of extreme Sunni Islamism (Wahabism, Salafism, Deobandism, Qutbism, etc. - they all have a common root) which is now growing in influence in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and much of the Sunni Muslim world is a major threat to, literally, the entire planet. Likewise, I believe that the opposition that many feel to the 'imperial' policies of the elites which have now taken control of the USA should not obscure the fact that there are other, equally dangerous, foes out there, some even possibly harder to defeat than the "last superpower" (since the latter is well on its way to deafeat itself having become a de-facto Israeli colony and client state).

'Ya Baqiyatullah's' interview clearly shows that Sunni extremists make absolutely no difference between the infidel kafirs and their fellow Muslims if the latter dare to confess a different type of Islam. Nor will they make any distinction along ethnic lines: they will murder anyone, including their fellow Pakistanis, just like they murdered Daniel Perl or Russian conscripts in Chechnia: by slitting their throats and cutting off their heads. In their mind, just like in Dubya's, you are "either with us or against us" and if you choose the latter, well, then murdering you is a pious act.

From the many comments to my recent piece on Afghanistan (I thank you all for sharing them with us!!) I get a strong sense that many are still dubious about the reality of the threat presented by this type of Sunni Islamism. I will therefore try to regularly post articles here which describe some important feature of this phenomenon.

The Saker

Iran's Modern History: Beyond the Legacy

It is with great joy that I am publishing the first article in a series on a topic which is practically *never* seen anywhere: the Shia point of view on the events in the larger Middle-East. This is something of a pet project of mine every since I got involved, more than a decade ago already and quite by chance (the Middle-East never was my formal area of expertise), in the analysis of events in Lebanon: the more I looked into the Hezbollah phenomenon and then, later, into the developments in Iran, the more I began to be convinced that the Shia represented a *qualitatively* different force quite unlike any other regional actor.

The deeper I dug, the more the usual "garden variety" explanations (training, money, weapons, circumstances, etc.) for the truly phenomenal force of the Shias fell aside. I then did what I was trained to do: I dug deeper following Arthur Conan Doyle's advice "when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth". After a decade long "digging spree" I came to the only possible conclusion: it is the Shia spirituality, the Shia ethos, which sets them aside from all their adversaries. The next step was then very simple: to understand Hezbollah and Iran one must at least have a basic understanding of the Shia faith , history, culture and worldview.

Look at this paradox: all the pundits and "experts" are pontificating about Iran and Hezbollah offering their "great insights" and yet not only are all these pundits and "experts" never Shia themselves, but they mostly completely ignore the Shia mind, the Shia soul and the Shia world view. Go to your local library and check the books about Iran. They are either written by highly secular Americanized Iranian immigrants or by Jews. They are never, *ever* written by a pious Shia or an Iranian living in Iran.

Anyway - let me get off my soap box and simply conclude here that I am deeply grateful to "Ya_Baqiyatullah" (a pseudo, obviously) for finally agreeing to my numerous requests to write a series of articles for my blog. "Ya_Baqiyatullah" is neither Lebanese nor Iranian - he is from Pakistan - but he has travelled (very recently) to Iran and he plans on attending the famous seminaries in the holy city of Qom. He knows what he is writing about.

His first article today is somewhat of a "general" introduction to the series to follow which will gradually become more and more focused on specific topics (the next one, which I will publish next week will address the SOFA the US is trying to impose on Iraq).

"Ya_Baqiyatullah" has told me that he will be available for Q&As in the comment sections so I urge you all the use this opportunity to interact with him, challenge his views and share your critical comments with all of us.

The Saker
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Iran's Modern History: Beyond the Legacy

by Ya_Baqiyatullah

Since the revolution of 1979, we find that Iran as a country has been under immense pressure to bow to the demands of International heavyweights. These demands only intensified in recent years due to a propaganda cycle generated by the United States and Israel regarding the Iranian nuclear program. Despite 29 years of sanctions, threats, and war one has to ask what is the motivation that has kept the Iranian nation so steadfast and firm on their path despite these countless obstacles?

The answer to the above question lies in different aspects of the Iranian History. One has to explore the history of this nation deeply to see why they are so firm on this path regardless of the struggle they are facing. Iran is a stronghold of Shia Learning, and one of the most talked about and important subjects regarding the Shia faith is the tragedy of Karbala. The story of Al-Husayn [a], the grandson of the Prophet [p], and his revolution against the oppressive forces of Yazeed may sound like a simplistic battle between good and evil, but beyond the apparent, there is much more which is applicable to the lives of many Shias around the world today; be it in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or Pakistan. This tragedy is a source of inspiration for all and most importantly it was the foundation for the revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini.

His first speech against the Shah was given on the 15th of Kordad which coincided with the day of Ashura. It was the perfect starting point to a revolution which would change the world for years to come. In one of his speeches, the great Ayatollah had stated ‘They call us a nation of tears, but with these tears we have overthrown an empire’ – this statement in itself shows how important the tragedy of Ashura was in success of the revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini.

Iran, a country like many others, bears a past of oppression and tyranny, but the fragrance of freedom and the aroma of independence can be noticed in the masses who laid their lives to make this revolution a living present. An 8 year war which Saddam Hussein had initiated against the Iranians and was backed by several Western governments did not deter the Iranian nation from their path. One only has to look as far as Beshte Zehra, the Garden of Zehra, which is a graveyard for the martyrs of this nation who fought in the war against the Saddam and those who were killed in the revolution. The belief in martyrdom over a life of humiliation stems from the tragedy of Karbala. These people understood the essence of martyrdom and were ready to give all they had for their country but most importantly to safeguard the religion. One of the shining examples of this is MostafaChamaran, the defense minister under Ayatollah Khomeini. Defense ministers are known for their tactics and strategies in war and in survival of the country but this man had not limited himself to just giving orders. He practiced what he himself ordered others and fought alongside many of the young soldiers in the Iranian army and embraced martyrdom on the war front.

In the recent years we find that the Iranian nation has successfully progressed in many fields, most notably in the discipline of science. Iran being a nuclear entity is something which threatens most of the Western powers and especially the Israeli regime. Since the turn in the presidency, we find that the Western powers have left no leaf unturned in their agenda to slow down Iran’s advancement. After having visited Iran many times and speaking to the people there, the general attitude is way different than that is portrayed by the media in the Western countries. Many Iranians are unfazed by the talk of war and people believe it is simply hype created by the media with little substance. They fear nothing, simply because they believe they are only seeking their right by being nuclear. Many, if not most of the Iranians actually believe that the Government is doing well given the current situation. There will always be a small minority who would play down the Government regardless of their work in the betterment of the country. These individuals even if given the luxuries they demand would be impossible to please, hence to listening to them is futile.

The reason as to why Iran has remained so strong despite the sanctions and threats is due to the differences in their ideologies in comparison with other states and even other people to an extent. When the focal point of one’s every action is influenced by religion then one will evolve to be steadfast and be able to take the challenges head on Iran, from past to present, has done this quite openly, most notable example was the war by Saddam. It is a nation in their majorities who are vigilant and have faith in Almighty alone. They do not seek the luxuries nor do they seek a way of living which will cause them to delve into greed or diver them away from their purpose of life. For them religion is everything and in the examples above that have been mentioned that has been the common denominator: Islam!

"Ya_Baqiyatullah" is a 23 year old Pakistani Shia Muslim who has spent a few summers in Iran studying and in the near future will be moving to Iran for studying full time in the Seminary in Qum. He has been living in UK for nearly a decade after spending much of his early years in Pakistan.

Iraqi cleric issues decree against SOFA

Press TV reports:

A senior Shia cleric has issued a religious decree prohibiting Iraqis from signing a controversial security agreement with the US.

Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem al-Husseini al-Haeri issued a fatwa (decree) against the US-proposed Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

The cleric said that the agreement was in violation of the Islamic law, calling it a humiliating pact that would undermine Iraq's sovereignty.

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen warned that Iraq risked security losses of 'significant consequence' unless it approved the deal, AFP reported.

The deal which would determine a legal framework for the presence of US forces in the country after their UN mandate expires in December 2008 would provide Washington with permanent military bases in Iraq.

The deal has so far met fierce opposition by a majority of lawmakers, whose approval is necessary for a final agreement.

The Iraqi cabinet and the Presidency Council must also approve the deal.

In a Tuesday cabinet meeting, Iraqi ministers refused to support the deal's latest draft and called for amendments to the proposal.

The agreement is also opposed by the Iraqi people who have been staging rallies across the country to protest US military presence in the country.

US SOFA: Is Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani's resolve wobbling?

Press TV just published the following on its website:

Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has set four conditions for any security pact between the US and Iraq, top Iraqi politician says.

"The cleric stressed that any long-term pact in Iraq should maintain four key terms including safeguarding Iraqis' interests, national sovereignty, national consensus and being presented to the Iraqi parliament for approval." leader of the largest bloc in Iraq's parliament, Seyyed Abdul Aziz al-Hakim said quoting Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.

Abdul Aziz al-Hakim's remarks came in a press conference after he met Ayatollah al-Sistani in Najaf.

Al-Hakim said that the current terms and articles of the security pact violates Iraq's sovereignty and dose not take away Iraq from Section VII of the United Nations' Charter, nor does it keep Iraq's natural wealth and interests.

"Ayatollah Sistani stresses that Iraqis should preserve the national unity and union among them and confront any challenges." Al-Hakim said.

"He brought about general guidance for the nation and did not go through the details," Al-Hakim said, adding that the overall vision between us and Ayatollah al- Sistani is the same and we work as the top cleric says and leave the details for the government.

The news of the security pact caused growing opposition among Iraqis from all walks of life.

Senior Iraqi clerics including Ayatollah al- Sistani, Ayatollah al-Shirazi and Ayatollah al-Hairi denounced any attempt by the government to sign the security pact with the United States.

Conspicuously absent from this is any references to a national referendum. Worse, the above also explicitly gives the Iraqi Parliament the final say in the matter. Of course, this could be al-Hakim's version of al-Sistani's words, but if this is correct, then we are witnessing the first sign of successful imperial pressure on al-Sistani and that, in turn will inevitably lead to a split in the Shia community. If such a split occurs, and in particular on such a crucial matter, it would be at the worst time possible for the Shia.

I sure hope that Khamenei and Nasrallah step in as rapidly and as forcibly as possible to prevent this from happening.

Saudi clerics attack Shi'ites, Hezbollah

RIYADH, June 1 (Reuters) - Clerics in Sunni Muslim Saudi Arabia attacked minority Shi'ites in a statement on Sunday saying Lebanon's Hezbollah was posturing against Israel to hide an anti-Sunni agenda.

The Saudi government and religious establishment has watched with alarm as the Lebanese Shi'ite group's popularity rose in the Arab world since forcing Israel to withdraw in south Lebanon in 2000 and surviving an Israeli military onslaught in 2006.

Although most Arabs are Sunni Muslims, Hezbollah is generally popular in the region. Saudi Arabia sees the group, which is funded by Shi'ite Iran, as an extension of Iranian power.

"Many Muslims have been fooled by the Shi'ites' claims to be championing Islam and challenging the Jews and Americans and Hezbollah's claims in Lebanon," the statement distributed on Islamic websites said.

"Those who believe their claims have not realized the reality of the infidel bases of their faith ... It was the rejectionist Shi'ites who began the practice of visiting graves and building shrines," it said, citing a major concern of Saudi Arabia's particular brand of Islam, often termed Wahhabism.

"They (Shi'ites) humiliate Sunnis whenever they have the chance, in Iran and Iraq. They are destabilizing Muslim countries as happened during pilgrimage and in Yemen."

Some members of a Shi'ite sect in north Yemen, to the south of Saudi Arabia, are locked in rebellion there. Iranian pilgrims making political statements have often clashed with Saudi authorities during the haj pilgrimage.

Hezbollah and its allies won a bigger seat in government after street fighting broke out between government and opposition militias last month, further alarming Riyadh.

The statement was signed by 22 clerics including the leading independent religious scholars Abdul-Rahman al-Barrak and Abdullah bin Jabreen.

The Grand Mufti, who represents the government's position, was not a signatory but he was quoted in the media during last month's fighting in Lebanon saying groups who raise the banner of Islam were exposing the country to the danger of Israeli reprisals, but he did not specify Hezbollah by name
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Commentary: "infidel bases of their faith". There we go, here is the pure Wahabi view of Shia Islam.

Iraqi government rejects US SOFA; bomb explodes near Iranian embassy in Baghdad

It's official now: even the Iraqi government has rejected the US SOFA. The former Prime Minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari also condemned the SOFA as "undermining the Iraqi sovereignty".

Of course, that rejection should not be seen as some sudden outburst of patriotic fervor: the Maliki regime is a US stooge and that did not change overnight. But even a US stooge cannot openly defy a united Shia opposition to the SOFA. Besides, the Iraqi government spokesman did add that the "negotiations were at an early stage" leaving the door wide open for a slightly amended version of the SOFA to be endorsed.

Still, this development is significant as it illustrates that a united Shia front is a force which even the occupation cannot successfully challenge.

Lastly, a car bomb exploded near the Iranian embassy in Baghdad. Coincide? Hardly.

Iraqi Shias demand a referendum on US SOFA

That's it. Moqtada al-Sadr and Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani are demanding a popular referendum on the SOFA the US is trying to impose on Iraq. By demanding a referendum the Shias are achieving three results:

a) they are completely by-passing the National Assembly
b) they are making the SOFA an election issue
c) any referendum on the SOFA will be a de-facto referendum on the US presence in Iraq

The Imperial Command is now in a loose/loose situation. If it allows the referendum to go ahead it will suffer a highly visible and embarrassing political defeat and the legitimacy of the US occupation (assuming there ever was one) will be *officially* down to zero. If it bans the referendum it will prove to the entire world that is is an occupying force which does not give a rat's ass about what the Iraqis think (we already know that, but this will prove it).

It looks like the Shias have effectively checkmated the Occupation.

United Iraqi Alliance leader al-Hakim opposes the US SOFA

Following the lead of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr, Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, head of the Badr Organization, has now voiced his opposition to the US SOFA. This means that every major Shia faction in the country is now openly opposed to the US proposal.

The USA wanted up at least 13 permanent military bases in Iraq and it demanded that US citizens be granted immunity from legal prosecution. It will have to do with just (barely) controlling the Green Zone. As for US citizen, whether uniformed soldiers are mercenaries, they will get no special status other that of unwelcome invader.

The occupation forces and the Shias are now on an open collision course.

Gary Brecher, a.k.a. the "War Nerd" on recent developments in the Middle-East

One can love or hate Gary Brecher, a.k.a. the "War Nerd" for his style or the the magazine he usually writes for (the eXile in Russia). But I would argue that he has far more common sense that most of the talking heads on the TV, including the generals and so-called "specialists" of the Middle-East. Funny that a magazine like the eXile would have a better military analyst than, say, the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal, isn't it?

For all his rather crude delivery, Brecher makes a lot of good points, basic common sense stuff which the western corporate media avoids like the plague, like pointing out the huge difference between the Hezbollah operators and the hired militias for the Lebanese millionaires. There is really nothing new in what Brecher writes, but his article is interesting as an illustration that it is possible to "get it" for an American journalist, provided he/she wants to.

The Saker
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From Lebanon To Iraq: We’re In Deep Shia Now

By Gary Brecher


FRESNO, CA — OK, we’ve just gone through a really exciting time in world military moves, so let’s test your strategic IQ. What’s the relation between these three recent developments:

1. On May 9, Hezbollah took over West Beirut against feeble resistance.

2. The Iraqi Army, such as it is, is now moving into Mosul in a major anti-al Qaeda operation.

3. At the end of March, the Iraqi Army attacked Sadr strongholds in Basra and East Baghdad, and got its ass kicked.

If you want some clues, you can read my account of event #3 in detail from my April 2nd column:

http://www.exile.ru/articles/detail.php?ARTICLE_ID=18297&IBLOCK_ID=35

The other clue that might help is that Sadr’s Mahdi Army in Iraq is totally based on Nasrallah’s Lebanese Hezbollah, so—to kinda give it away a little—in just over a month’s time, you’ve got two Shia militias stomping the better-armed and -funded old-style powers in Arab countries a thousand miles apart. Kind of a trend.

Item #2, the move on Mosul, is the trick question here, because there are no Shia to speak of up there; the Iraqi Army is moving against Al Qaeda in Iraq up there. What’s the connection?

As you chew on that food fer thought, let’s fill in the details on what happened and why in this week’s sudden Shia-ization of what the media always call "fashionable West Beirut." "Fashionable"—I love imagining these Shia puritans with Kalashnikovs and RPGs stalking through rubble filled with confused airhead supermodels: "Like…hel-LO? What are you…I mean…doing here anyway? In that ugly Kevlar vest which doesn’t match your beard at all, I mean YUCK, and that so-eighties gun accessory…don’t you realize I’ve got a SHOOT today?" The Hezzies don’t get her babble, but they hear the word "shoot" and it all goes to pieces very fast. That’s one of the first thing a supermodel’s got to learn: don’t say "shoot" around a nervous militiaman who thinks women should wear black hefty bags, head to foot, even when showering. Or "if" showering; for these boys, Sharia tops hygiene every time.

South Beirut or Sadr City: Can You Tell The Difference?

Hezbollah took their beach trip on May 9, but it wasn’t announced to anybody in the media. The Lebanese elite was stunned. This was not supposed to happen. It would be like West LA being overrun by Baptist gangs from Bakersfield. And there was nothing the cool Lebanese could do about it but sneer and whine and blog. Boy, did they blog. In the blog-o-sphere battle, the West Beirut coolsters won hands down. Out on the streets, though, it was all Hezbollah. They came, they saw, they burned down a TV station that had been broadcasting anti-Hezbollah stories…and a couple of days later, they left. It wasn’t like your classical military maneuver; these are commuter troops, and what they did was pack their weapons—mostly rifles and RPGs, some of the rifles looking surprisingly new and expensive—in the trunks of their little fuel-efficient sedans, and head back to the slums of South Beirut. No word on whether traffic was snarled by the sudden withdrawal: "KBRT’s traffic helicopter, Beirut’s only traffic reporter with look-down-shoot-down capability, brings you this update: avoid the Shia-town expressway, which is jammed with weekend Hezbollah visitors evacuating the capital…."

Like I said, this wasn’t supposed to happen. It’s part of a pattern that isn’t supposed to be happening all across the Middle East: the Shia militias are kicking serious ass. In the past few weeks we’ve seen weirdly identical moves by weak central governments in Iraq and Lebanon to push back against Shia militias: in Iraq, al-Maliki’s government, acting as a front for al-Hakimi and the Badr Brigades, tried to "assert itself" against Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army in Basra and in Sadr City; and now the weak interfaith committee trying to run Lebanon moved against Hezbollah, firing their security chief at the airport and cracking down on Hezbollah’s private communication network, which apparently has 100,000 private telephone lines running.

Nasrallah, the mullah who runs Hezbollah, called that crackdown a "declaration of war" against his boys and sent them out onto the streets of West Beirut, where the rich Sunni Muslims live.

Militarily, it was over pretty fast. There’s no armed Sunni group in Lebanon that can stand against Hezbollah. The BBC is now calling Hezbollah "by far the strongest force in Lebanon," which may seem pretty obvious now but is a huge surprise to all the so-called experts. You see, the Shia aren’t supposed to count at all in Lebanon. The Lebanese constitution lays down that the President has to be a Maronite Christian, because they were the big players in 1943 when the thing was written. The Prime Minister has to be a Sunni Muslim, because they were next. Nobody else counted for much, except maybe the Druze. But the Shia weren’t consulted at all, because they were nothing—a bunch of hicks down in the southern and eastern boonies.

Since then a lot of those hicks have moved into Beirut, and the ones who stayed home made a name for themselves by having a lot of babies who grew up to be the best guerrilla fighters in the country. They forced Israel out of Southern Lebanon in 2000 and took on the Israeli armed forces one-on-one in 2006, and came out of it looking like heroes.

Since then, the Hezbollah leader, Nasrallah, who’s pretty obviously a smart dude, has parlayed his victory into national popularity. He didn’t let his people gloat too openly--instead of the yellow Hezbollah flag, he told them to wave the Lebanese red-white-and-green (the one with the tree, even though there ain’t hardly any of those trees left in the place any more, just like the California Grizzly on our flag).

What really pisses off the "government" in both Iraq and Lebanon is that the Shia leaders—Nasrallah in Lebanon and Sadr in Iraq—are starting to break into the crossover market: after Hezbollah scored the first respectable showing against Israel by any Arab guerrilla army, you’d see Druze and Sunni and even a few Maronite kids saying "Go Hezzies!"—usually in a safe quiet voice, where nobody’d hear, but they were saying it. And that spelled death for the old godfathers who run these places, especially Lebanon. Lebanon is like NYC without the money: it’s all sleazy politicos and gangs profiting from ethnic grandstanding politics. They call the system "zuama," godfather-ism. And the key there is, you’ve got to be able to control your ethnic group, your gang. So guys like Walid Jumblatt, the chieftan of the Druze, go psycho when they see rival Druze politicos deserting to Hezbollah. Jumblatt’s business is using his people as a bargaining chip; if they’re going to start shopping around for better deals, he’s as doomed as a smalltown hardware store watching the new WalMart go up.

Don’t start thinking these godfathers are the good guys. You can think of Hezbollah as the bad guys if you want, even though I admire the hell out of them, but just don’t think those old-school godfathers are the good guys here. Jumblatt, for example, is on record saying he cheers when US troops are killed in Iraq and it can’t happen often enough for him. He backed the Syrians when they occupied Lebanon, then broke with them over his cut; he massacred thousands of Christian villagers in Central Lebanon in the 1980s. When he comes into a room you can hear blood sloshing around his ankles, and that goes for every big player in Lebanon.

They’re a lot like the old Italian mafia, in fact: they’ve still got the big government connections, but they don’t have control over the streets any more. But Hezbollah does, for two familiar reasons, the same ones traditional military types don’t like to mention: demographics and civilian aid.

Demographics first: like I’ve said before, the Shia suddenly found themselves as the only ghetto boyz in a rich, spoiled neighborhood. While all the other "Cedar Revolution" (aka "Crock of Shit") Lebanese were partying on the "fashionable" beach, the Shia were living in slums, pumping out lots of kids, hearing about martyrdom and finding out up close and personal what it feels like to get shelled, bombed and sniped. They raised a whole lot of kids who were natural soldier material, with your classic Shia martyr complex and a don’t-give-a-fuck slum attitude that was straight outta Karbala. All they needed was a movement they could actually believe in, and they’d slice through the rich-boy gangs like a scimitar through hummus.

Hezbollah provided the Shia with the cause they were looking for. You can say what you want about the Hezzies, but unlike most other Lebanese movements, including Amal, the other big Shia party, Hezbollah is NOT in it just for the money. They actually believe the stuff they say, and they prove it by getting their hands dirty rebuilding blasted slum neighborhoods, handing out food to the hungry, and trying to bring water and electricity to Shia dumps that never had them before. That kind of actual concern for the poor is just about unheard-of in these places, and it inspires fanatical loyalty when people see it happening for the first time in their lives. Sadr’s people are the only ones who manage to get food, water and electricity to the huge stinking Shia slums in Iraq, and Hezbollah has an even longer record of putting in the money and time, like Mao said a guerrilla army should, on civilian projects. So for example, after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah campaign, there was a lot of grumbling, even among Shiites in Lebanon, that Hezbollah’s glorious fight against the Israelis had left a lot of ordinary Lebanese with bombed-out houses as souvenirs of that divine victory. Instead of dealing with these subversive complainers the usual Arab way—making a gross, gory example of the loudest naysayers and continuing to pocket all that Iranian aid money—Hezbollah actually went out and rented the heavy equipment, cleared the rubble, and put up new apartments.

So it’s not that much of an oversimplification to say that Hezbollah built a movement and an army from the bottom up, and then took it into battle last week against a bunch of traditional top-down gangs whose "gunmen" were in it only for the money. You don’t have to ask who won a fight like that. Just imagine Valmy, where French troops who really believed in the republican revolution went into battle against old-style degenerate European troops. A wipeout. The hired guns who were supposed to protect West Beirut just fled, while the Hezzies popped up all over that expensive beachfront like Bugs Bunny’s instant Martians popping up out of every manhole.

And where was the Lebanese Army that we’re funding, you ask? Keeping very, very quiet. Maybe waving a nervous "Hi!" to the Hezbollah fighters as they got out of their cars and started walking toward the Mediterranean. The Hezzies had no armored vehicles, but they had RPGs which they actually know how to use, and against the Lebanese Army’s Thrift-Store mix of light armored vehicles, RPGs work all too well.

It’s kind of an exciting time, militarily, when a bunch of weekend soldiers can carry a weapon in the trunks of their cars, weapons that will actually intimidate troops in APCs. Morale trumps light armor every time. (Air power and MBTs are another story.)

The Army only intervened when it was time to give Hezbollah everything it wanted: the right to a separate comm network, and the rehiring of their Airport Security dude. As for the latter demand, I’m not saying smuggling was involved or anything but somebody’s got to get those West-Beirut party kids their E and coke, and having your man in charge of airport security sure would make it easier to bring in da stuff, whether it’s Semtex or pure Bolivian. If the guy was worth going to war for, he must be doing something pretty darned important.

Once their demands were met, Hezbollah packed the weapons in the trunks and headed home for supper. That was another very smart move. One thing you can sort of figure out without being Einstein is that this is not a good era for military occupations of other tribes’ territory. What you want is to impose your will militarily, then get out before you become the occupier. That’s exactly what the Hezzies did—wish we could learn a thing or two from them.

So Lebanon right now has a simple box score: Hezzies everything, Old Bosses nothing. Now, let’s zip to the other side of the Middle East and see how the Iraqi game is going. About the same, actually. Weirdly the same. What just happened in Lebanon happened six weeks ago in Iraq: weak central government tries to "assert itself" against rising Shia militia, gets smacked down, then after the smackdown, the Shia militia hands back territory. In the case of Iraq, it was a Shia government, so this was all Shia-on-Shia violence, Maliki’s army vs. Sadr’s militia.

There’s still a lot of argument about whether the US pushed Maliki’s government into this or tried to stop them from attacking. I hear from sources in Iraq that US officers advising Maliki warned him that his "army" (basically Badr Brigade vets wearing Iraqi National uniform) weren’t good enough to take on Sadr’s militia on their home ground, but woke up to find the armored columns already moving south to Basra and east into Sadr City. They should have stayed in bed, as the saying goes, because if they’d had another nap—say an hour or so—they’d have seen the same columns breaking all speed limits coming back to base, stomped to within an inch of their lives.

And now for the odd item out: what’s Mosul got to do with it? There are two things going on. At a tactical level, it’s simple: Mosul and Al Qaeda in Iraq is a target that the Iraqi Army might actually be able to handle. They need a morale-building fight against a softer opponent after getting their asses kicked in Basra and Sadr City, and the Sunni jihadi nutcases are an easy target. There aren’t many of them, they’re foreign imports with no neighborhood base (they’ve alienated just about every Sunni Iraqi alive), and they’re more interested in dying than fighting. A counter-insurgency officer’s dream opponent.

There was a story last week that showed why the Iraqi Army would rather fight Al Q than keep battering its head against the Sadrists in East Baghdad. This Iraqi officer was whining, "The Shia in this neighborhood PROMISED us that they’d let us patrol in our vehicles and tell us where the IEDs were buried, they PROMISED, and then within ten meters of leaving our base three IEDs went off under us! It’s not fair!"

That’s what happens when you fight people who have the neighborhood behind them, and that’s why it’s way, way easier to go to Mosul to track down some nerd-gang of Saudi dweebs who took up Jihad 1A because they flunked Engineering or they’re scared of girls or something. Dying solves a lot of problems for people like that.

But if you really consider the Mosul operation on another level, that’s where it gets a little more interesting. It’s part of a pattern of what Cheney, that strategic genius ("Shit, Iran is RIGHT NEXT to Iraq? Why didn’t you tell me? No wonder we’re having all these problems!") expected to happen: he figured that the Shiite’s military energy would wear itself out in a civil war against Al Qaeda Sunnis, both in Lebanon and in Iraq, rather than making problems for their pro-American governments and us. That was the Cheney Plan, except it didn’t happen. Al Qaeda just doesn’t have the support in the ‘hood to take on these neighborhood militias, either in Iraq or in Lebanon. But there was a funny little footnote: Al Q has officially declared war on Hezbollah in Lebanon and "ordered its operatives to defend the Sunni community in Lebanon" according to this story:

http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=54916&sectionid=351020203

The trouble with being a James-Bond-y international conspiracy like Al Q is that there’s no way on earth you can compete militarily with local, broad-based militias like Hezbollah. Commuting from the Shia slums to West Beirut is one thing, but the notion that Al Q’s International Brigade can all fly into Lebanon undetected and assemble to march on the Hezzies is too far-fetched and idiotic even for a Bond flick. The notion they’d beat Hezbollah if they could manage to mobilize a force against it is even more ridiculous. The Hezzies even scare the IDF, and the IDF has wet dreams about facing Al Q. The rankings are pretty clear, and getting clearer, and they add up to something simple: in Iraq and in Lebanon, two countries the Western powers have operated on like they were diabetics with Medicaid, the net result of all the slicing and cutting is victory, hands down, for Shiite militias that didn’t even figure in the big plans. They just weren’t supposed to be part of the equation, and now they’re on top.

And that’s assuming it’s all being decided by Washington. Suppose we entertain, as they say, another idea: suppose it’s true that the Lebanese Hezzies are just "puppets" of Iran the way Cheney keeps saying they are. Well, if that’s true, then…lessee here: Cheney woofs on and on about attacking Iran and just coincidentally these Iranian puppets just casually take over Lebanon, one of the few supposedly pro-Western Arab states. And they do it without even breaking a sweat. Like saying, "Hello Meester Cheney, joost a leetle reminder, we know zee game about a t’ousand times better dan yoooo, sir!"

There are two possibilities: Cheney is an Iranian mole, and he’s laughing his head off chewing pistachios, kicking back on his prayer mat in front of the flatscreen, something I’ve been arguing for awhile now—or he’s the stupidest human being ever to step out of his league—which would be Wyoming, Little League. Girls’ Softball to be exact.

Will Grand Ayatollah Sistani expel the Empire out of Iraq?

Note: I believe that the AP story to which RNN is referring is this one.

State and Religion in Shi’ah Islamic Thought

Today I am beginning a series of publications of articles about the Shia faith, culture and history. I think that it is important, crucial in fact, to understand the uniqueness and specificity of this branch of Islam which so often either totally ignored or, worse, conflated with Saudi Wahabism. How often do we hear that Iran and Saudi Arabia are "Islamic states"? To a certain degree such a statement is undeniably true; the danger here is that it somehow assumes that the two countries, societies and religious wordviews are somehow similar, if not identical. Nothing could be further from the truth.

While there undoubtedly is an over-arching commonality among the various branches of Islam, this shared heritage should not serve to somehow occult the very substantial differences among them.

The Muslim world is amazingly diverse and the Islam of the Talebans has little in common with the Shia Islam of neighboring Iran which, in turn, has little in common with the kind of Islam practiced in Turkey and even less so with the Islam of the Saudis. Still, the Western corporate media likes it conflate it all together into a vague, but always frightening, "Islamic fundamentalism" or, even worse, "Islamo-Fascism" (the beloved expression of the UN Neocons).

I have come to the conclusion that Shia Islam is one of the least known or understood religions of the planet even though Iran, Iraq and Lebanon are, in many ways, among the most important countries on earth. Furthermore, the USraelian Empire has now clearly embarked on a long term strategy of aggression and sabotage against the Shia world. Even if the West knows close to nothing about the Shia, they will become the central key force of the Middle-East in the foreseable future.

Let us not forget here that the Shia were the first Arabs to even defeat the Israelis not only in combat, but politically. Likewise, the Shia were the first in the Middle-East to overthrow a pro-US dictatorship and replace it by an Islamic government in Iran. The very same Shia are now in the process of booting out from power the Three Stooges (Siniora, Hariri, Jumblatt) and their clique of overweight millionaires from power in Lebanon. The Shia are clearly a formidable force and one whose main strength lies in their faith.

It is therefore exceedingly important to learn more about the Shia, their history, culture and beliefs. With this new series about Shia Islam I will endeavor to regularly publish essays written by Shia Muslims on various aspects of their identity. Hopefully, this will give a valuable insight to all those who, like myself, are not Muslims but who want to understand this complex, rich and original faith.

The concept of Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of Islamic Jurists) is a very important one albeit not one which is accepted by all Shia. For example, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, arguably the single most influential Iraqi Shia authority, does not accept the point of view of Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei on this topic. Hezbollah, which is under the spiritual guidance of Ayatollah Khamenei, does endorse this teaching (which is why it does not accept the spiritual leadership of Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah which most non-Hezbollah Lebanese Shia consider their spiritual leader). Thus, the idea of Wilayat al-Faqih is at the center of not only Shia-Sunni differences, but even intra-Shia polemics.

I am deeply grateful to Ali Mahdi for allowing me to publish his most interesting article.

The Saker
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State and Religion in Shi’ah Islamic Thought

By: Ali Mahdi

Port Dover, Ontario, Canada

Written for: “History of the Middle East,”

at Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

Imam ‘Ali says, “Scholars are the rulers of the people.”¹ In Islam, there is no room for secularism, as Islam encompasses all aspects of society, economics, administration and politics. Islam is not just worshipping God, it includes politics as well. This can be proved from the Qoran and hadith (traditions). Therefore an Islamic state ruled by the ‘ulama or clergy is necessary under Islamic Shari’ah or law, which is applicable for all time. The necessity for a true Islamic state became a reality with the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, which was led by (Imam) Ayatollah Sayyed Ruhollah Mousavi Khomayni. Islamic government is not a recent theory, as many scholars argue, but it has its origins in the Qu’ran and Sonnah (traditions) of the Prophet Muhammad, and his Holy Family. The theory of Wilayat al-Faqih, the rule of the Islamic jurist, is the form of government used in the Islamic Republic of Iran; this theory was developed by Imam Khomayni. It is explained in many of his books, especially “Wilayat al-Faqih.” Wilayat al-Faqih, an Islamic government with a strong leader/jurist, is the main theory of Islamic governance in Shi’ah thought, and has proved itself to be an alternative to secular styles of government promoted by the United States of America and its allies. Today, Iran is the only true Islamic state; its constitution is based on the Islamic laws put down by the Prophet mixed with a modern Republican state. State politics and religion in Shi’ah Islamic thought provides a compatible system of governance for all Muslims.

The Islamic state is not a new phenomenon, but comes from the teachings of Prophet Muhammad. Prophet Muhammad, took the existing Arabian society, and tore it apart as it was a decayed and corrupt system, which was far from the ideals set prescribed by God for humanity.² He established an Islamic government that is the model and inspiration for a modern Islamic government which encompasses all aspects of life within the state. The Islamic revolution brought by Imam Khomayni is not dissimilar to that brought by Prophet Muhammad. Before the Islamic Revolution, Iran was ruled by the tyrant monarch Reza Shah Pahlavi, who repressed Islam and the political, social and economic aspects of Islam which were crucial to the maintenance of social justice. The Islamic Revolution brought power and influence to the clergy, and implemented an Islamic state based on the rules and traditions given by our Prophet and his Holy Family.

Wilayat al-Faqih is the rule of a pious and just (‘adl) jurist who is learned in all aspects of diniyat (religion). This method of determining this person is elaborated in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.³ It is necessary for an Islamic society to have a religious judge as a ruler to defend the ‘ummah (community) from its enemies, develop justice, and society. Not all people would agree with these goals, and see them as going against their interests and liberties. The leader has absolute authority and his will and authority are superior to the wills and power of the people.⁴ Islam is a not only restricted to individual prayers, fasting, and moral values and is involved in the solution of social problems, justice, and political and economic issues. In Islam, the general population must accept the guardianship of the jurist, which means the enforcement of Islamic laws. Problems must be solved and governance must be guarded by the ‘ulama. In the Qoran, God asks Prophet Muhammad to consult the people (shura) before making a decision, although the final decision lies with the ruler. This was done to show the fallible people how to run an Islamic state. In Islam, it is necessary that the believers follow all the rules of Islam and obey their scholars.

The concept of Wilayat al-Faqih was originally detailed by in “’Awa’id al-Ayam” by Ayatollah Mulla Ahmad Naraqi in the early nineteenth century, although it had been mentioned earlier.⁵ He argues that the faqih is entrusted with guardianship rights during Occultation of Imam al-Mahdi. He writes that this can only mean that a qualified jurist could be the legitimate ruler in the absence of the Imam, and this was the only legitimate government.⁶ Ayatollah Naraqi develops his arguments from the Qoran, hadith and jurisprudence. He stresses that the scholars have the same right to rule as the Prophet and Imams. Imam Khomayni was the next scholar to study the role of the jurisprudent in governance, and he expanded on the theories of Ayatollah Naraqi.⁷ In his book “Wilayat al-Faqih,” written from a collection of speeches while in exile in Iraq in the early 1970s, Imam Khomayni discusses guardianship as a principle of Islam, which serves as a foundation for all duties. He expands on this concept from governmental and political points of view. He writes that the Prophet’s successors (Imams) were not just appointed for expanding on the principles of Islam, but for “rulership, and for enforcement of laws and regulations.”⁸ Imam Khomayni writes in his book “Qa’edah la-Zarar” that the jurist in the time of occultation had authority of the society just as the prophet did. The four deputies of Imam al-Mahdi during the Lesser Occultation were his successors in political matters, and today the ‘ulama hold this role, so they have the right to political power.

Islamic law was not meant to be enforced only for the time of the Prophet and Imams, but for all time. The ‘ulama are the representatives of the Imams, so therefore have a right to rule. Imam Khomayni explains the deviation from Islamic government during the Ummayad and Abbasid dynasties and its continuation into the modern day. He emphasizes the importance of rising up against tyrannical governments and to establish and Islamic government, with the enforcement of Islamic law, Islamic unity, and to save the oppressed from tyranny. He notes that this is the religious duty of all Muslims, especially the scholars. Imam Khomayni explains the role of the Islamic legislature, writing that it is their goal to develop all government programs within an Islamic framework and not that of other states.

Next Imam Khomayni explains the important qualities of the Islamic ruler. The leader of the Islamic state has not been appointed by Imam al-Mahdi, but from ahadith we know that he must have command over religious laws (fiqh) and be just (‘adl.) He must be knowledgeable about Islamic law and he must be “just,” meaning moral and trustworthy. Imam Khomayni recommends “A person, who intends to be the guardian of the Muslims and successor of the Commander of the Faithful [Imam ‘Ali], should not be attached to worldly matters. If one indulges in worldly matters, he cannot be the trustee and reliable person for people.”⁹ This was evident in Imam Khomayni’s very simple and humble lifestyle. The Leader of the Islamic state tries to be the executors of the rules of God, and they cannot go against God’s rules. They can only use their own authority when there is no clear principle.¹⁰ Imam Khomayni argues that divine Islamic law is applicable to all aspects of all societies in all eras. Gods’ religious commandments are not useful unless they are applied to form an Islamic state based on divine guardianship. To protect Islam from its enemies and to prevent chaos in an Islamic society, an Islamic state is necessary. Even though our infallible Imam is in Occultation, we must have an Islamic state. Imam Khomayni writes that we live in the time of the Occultation, and that Islamic principles are to be enforced, and no one has been appointed by God to fulfill this task. However, God has given man the qualities which are required for leadership to a great number of ‘ulama since the beginnings of Islam. They must join together to form a just government in the world. It is the duty of the ‘ulama to fulfil their role to enforce Islamic law. Laws, some seen as harsh or authoritarian by outsiders who do not understand their obligations to Islam, are made to protect the people from corruption in society and to protect Islam. Imam Khomayni writes that it is not the role of the ‘ulama to sit in “some corner in Najaf or Qom studying the questions of menstruation and parturition instead of concerning themselves with politics, and draw the conclusion that religion must be separate from politics.”¹¹ He notes that during the time of the Prophet and Imam ‘Ali religion and politics was one, as they were political and religious leaders. If one concentrates only on prayer and the other duties of Islam, the imperialists and colonialists will be able to take the Muslim society over.

Imam Khomayni writes about the necessity for an Islamic government in his book “Wilayat al-Faqih.” He continues his discussion that the Prophet Muhammad laid down the laws for an Islamic state and implemented these laws as well, and called for an Islamic state to be set up. The Islamic state cannot just have Islamic legislations to protect Islam; it needs an “executor.” This executor is called the Wali al-‘Amr, meaning “the one who holds authority,” a term derived from the Quranic verse 4:59: “O you who believe! Obey God, and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority (wali al-‘amr) from among you.” The Wali al-‘Amr, implements the laws and verdicts given by the courts, allowing society to benefit from the just laws that the courts deliver.¹² Without an Islamic state, religion would into destruction and decay causing its institutions and rites to decay and then vanish. Wilayat al-Faqih protects the religion from “madmen.”

The legitimacy of Islamic government can be proved by hadith (traditions) reported by the Prophet and Imams. Here are a few prominent hadith out of many hadith regarding Islamic government. Imam Jaafar as-Sadeq says in the Hadith of Wilayah (of the ‘Ulama):

They must seek out one of you who narrates our traditions, who is versed in what is permissible and what is forbidden, who is well-acquainted with our laws and ordinances, and accept him as judge and arbiter, for I appoint him as judge over you. If the ruling which he based on our laws is rejected, this rejection will be tantamount to ignoring the order of Allah and rejecting us is the same as rejecting Allah, and this is the same as polytheism.¹³

This means that the ‘ulama are the heirs of the Imams in the “absence” of Imam al-Mahdi according to Shi’ah fiqh (law). The majority of people are not given the Wilayah (guardianship); it is the ‘ulama who have this power during the Imam’s Occultation.¹⁴ In another hadith, Imam ‘Ali says, “Scholars are the rulers of the people.”¹⁵ In an Islamic society, the head of government should be a “just” jurist with all the prescribed qualifications. These jurists are the authorized representatives of Imam al-Mahdi, while he is in Occultation. Devine commandments cannot be altered, as it would be going against the will of God.¹⁶ Imam ‘Ali also says: “I have accepted the task of government because God, Exalted and Almighty, has exacted from the scholars of Islam a pledge not to sit silent and idle in the face of gluttony and plundering of the oppressors, on the one hand, and the hunger and deprivation of the oppressed, on the other.”¹⁷ This means that the scholars have the role of running the Islamic state. The fifth Imam, Muhammad al-Baqer says: “Islam is founded on five pillars: prayers (salat), zakat (charity), hajj (pilgrimage), sawm (fasting), and Wilayah (guardianship).” Zurarah (a student) asked the Imam: “Which one is the most important?” The Imam answered: “Wilayah is.” After the Imam emphasized Wilayah as the most important, he added: “Because it acts as the key for them (ie: the five pillars) and the wali is the guide towards them.” ¹⁸ Imam Husayn says, “Discharging of the duties and the enforcement of laws should be in the hands of the scholars, God-fearing and pious persons. These are the people who do not make any changes in the Divine commands pertaining to lawful and unlawful things, and who are the custodians of trusts.”¹⁹

Scholars point to the Verse of Authority (4:59)²⁰ to show that the Wali al-‘Amr cannot be a corrupt or a secular leader. God gives us the command to the Leader in all material, religious and spiritual matters.²¹ The authority of the Leader over the Islamic state is derived from Ayah (verse) 2:246: “…Raise up for us a king (that) we may fight in the way of Allah…” This means that even in the time of an infallible, people need one ruler to lead them and to fight against oppression.²² Ayatollah Momen, a member of the Council of Guardians, writes that by disobeying the Wali al-Faqih, you are disobeying the laws of God. Ayatollah Khamenei also mentions that since Wilayat al-Faqih is the law of God, obedience to the Islamic state is mandatory (as a divine duty).²³ It is necessary to follow the Wali al-Faqih; this is said by all ‘ulama. All ‘ulama believe in Wilayat al-Faqih, although some interpret it differently. Ayatollah ‘‘Ali Sistani (most senior marja’/religious authority in Shi’ah Islam) says: “everyone, even other mojtaheds, are obligated to follow the hokm (jurisdiction) of the person who has Shar'ei Wilayah, when the hokm is related to public issues where social order and people's sustenance are concerned. On the issues that are related to the protection of the Islamic system, the accepted Faqih has Wilayah on all the believers.”²⁴ This means that everyone has to follow the Wali al-Faqih, regardless of the marja’ they follow.

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the world’s only true Islamic state, the highest-ranking official is the Leader (Rahbar) or Wali al-Faqih, who is the head of the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government. Imam Khomayni was the first Leader, and since 1989, Ayatollah Sayyed ‘Ali Khamenei holds this role. The leader (or leadership council) is chosen by the Assembly of Experts (Khobregan), of which the seventy mojtahed’s (jurisprudents) are chosen directly by the people. According to the Constitution the Wali al-Faqih must be pious and fair, and have proper political and social expertise. The Wali al-Faqih must have the qualifications to issue decrees on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution has many functions and duties, including the appointment and dismissal of most heads of state organizations, the president (after the Supreme Court has made a ruling on a violation of his legal duties or a vote of his incompetence by the Majles). The Leader also has the ability to pardon the sentences of condemned people, and to resolve problems that cannot be settled by the Expediency Council, and other disputes. The Islamic Republic of Iran is obviously not perfect, as it is fallible, but it is the closest thing we have of Islamic government in practice. The only true Islamic state will be implemented when Imam al-Mahdi appears.

Islamic government is not just a reaction against imperialism and the corrupt Pahlavi monarchy, but a return to the Islam of our Prophet, who commanded that we follow in his footsteps. He commanded that we have an Islamic state, and Imam Khomayni was the first person to establish this state. Imam Khomeini’s ideas are not his alone; they are based on an extensive study of hadith, Quran, and Islamic history. From the careful study of this, scholars find that the leader of the Islamic state must be a jurisprudent – who has both a religious and legislative role, of which are explained in hadith and the books of our scholars. These laws are not ancient and can be replaced as time goes on; they are progressive and must be applied for all time. According to the eminent scholars that Shi’ah follow, it is necessary that we follow the Wali al-Faqih. Imam Rouhollah Khomayni has brought an Islamic revival to Iran that was so desperately needed. With religion, all social, economic, and political problems can be solved. It is the scholars, according to Imam ‘Ali, who hold the rights to the governance of the Islamic state.²⁵ With his strong words and actions Imam Khomayni defeated an imperialist tyrant (Shah Pahlavi and his American supporters), who repressed Islam, and brought Islam back to the rightful role that is so clearly explained in the writings of Prophet Muhammad and the Twelve Infallible Imams.

Notes:

1 “Ghorar al-Hekam.” (book of hadith). Volume II. 293.
2 Shaykh Shabbir Hassanally. “Islamic Revolution Question.” (online posting). Islamic Digest Forum. 8 March, 2005.
http://www.islamicdigest.net/v61forum/index.php/topic,352.0.html.
3 Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali. “Practical Laws of Islam.” Islamic Culture and Relations Organization: Tehran, 1997. 30.
4 Practical Laws of Islam, 32-33.
5 Algar, Hamid. Forward to “Wilayat al-Faqih.” Imam Ruhollah Khomayni. 4.
6 Martin, Vanessa. “Creating an Islamic State.” IB Tauris Publishers: London. 117.
7 Arjomand, Said Amir. “Turban for the Crown.” Oxford University Press: New York. 180.
8 Algar, 5.
9 Khomayni, Imam Ruhollah. “Hokomat-e Eslami.” Page 199.
10 Khomayni, Imam Ruhollah. “Sahif-e Nour.” Publication of Minister of Islamic Guidance. Volume 11. 123.
11 Khomayni, Imam Ruhollah. “Wilayat al-Faqih.” 16.
12 Khomayni, Imam Ruhollah. “Wilayat al-Faqih.” 18.
13 “Furu’ al-Kafi.” (book of hadith). Volume 7. Tehran, 2001. 412.
14 “Wilayat al-Faqih - A Contribution.” http://www.qaed.net.
15 Ibid. 1.
16 “Why do we need an Islamic Governance and Guardianship of a Jurist?” http://www.qaed.net.
17 Imam Ali ibn Abi Taleb. “Nahj al-Balaghah.” Sermon 3 (Khutbat ash-Shaqshaqiyah). Ahlul-Bayt Assembly of America. 8.
18 “Wasael ash-Shi’ah.” (book of hadith). Volume I. 40.
19 “Tuhaf al-‘Uqoul.” (book of hadith). 242.
20 Quran: “Oh you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority from among you…”
21 Arjomand, 177.
22 Ibid. 5
23 Arjomand, 183.
24 Sistani, Ayatollah ‘Ali. “Wilayat al-Faqih.” Email. 10 February, 2005.
25 “Nahj al-Balaghah (Peak of Eloquence)”, Sermon 2 (regarding hypocrites). 6.