Iran's Foreign Ministry said Tuesday that it has found traces of US and Israel's involvement in the assassination of an Iranian nuclear physics scientist. "Primary investigations into the assassination revealed signs of the involvement of the Zionist regime [Israel], the US and their allies in Iran," spokesman Ramin Mehman-Parast said. Professor Massoud Ali-Mohammadi, a lecturer at Tehran University, was killed by a booby-trapped motorbike blast in the Iranian capital earlier in the day.
Very creatively, the BBC's report added that "There was also confusion as to whether the attack had any political overtones. One university official said Mr Mohammadi was not a political figure. But other reports said his name appeared on a list of academics backing opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi before the 2009 presidential election" thereby hinting that the Iranian government had decided to blow-up one of its own nuclear scientists.
It might be useful to remember that Iran has recenlty accused Saudi Arabia of kidnapping one of its nuclear scientists and handing him over to Uncle Sam.
Showing posts with label nuclear program. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nuclear program. Show all posts
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
Monday, June 30, 2008
Interview with Iran's Ambassador to IAEA
CASMII Exclusive: Interview with Iran's Ambassador to IAEA
(source: CASMII)
Mohammad Kamaali, board member of CASMII UK speaks to Iran's Ambassador to the IAEA Dr Ali Asghar Soltanieh who was recently in London to attend an international conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, organised by the School of Oriental and African Studies, SOAS. 
In this interview Dr Soltanieh explains the reasons behind Iran's determination to develop an indigenous uranium enrichment capability and why Iran believes the countries pursuing or relying on nuclear weapons are making a mistake. He also gives his viewpoint on how international institutions such as the UN Security Council are in practice used as instruments of political pressure by a select few member states, ultimately undermining the authority and credibility of those institutions.
The following is a transcript of the interview with minor editing for clarity. A Podcast is also available for download from here [.mp3].
Dr Ali Asghar Soltanieh: It is simple, Iran’s nuclear programme did not start yesterday for it to be stopped tomorrow as it is today demanded by some countries like the US. Nuclear activities in Iran go back to half a century ago, before and after the [1979] revolution. In fact, I myself started my work before the revolution in the Atomic Energy Organisation (AEO) and I have witnessed the double standard approach before and after the revolution.
Therefore there are good technical and financial justifications for having also nuclear energy as an option. But at the same time we have never envisioned an ambitious programme so as to consider nuclear energy as the only option. We have always thought of the policy of diversifying energy resources. We have used a technical/scientific program in the IAEA namely the VASP programme; with which countries use all their data to find out in a scientific way what share nuclear energy can play for them. Using this programme we have come to the conclusion that in the next twenty years, roughly by 2020, we will have up to 20,000 megawatts from nuclear energy. Right now in our national grid we have about 35,000 megawatts and if Bushehr becomes operational, the share of nuclear energy will be 1,000 out of 35,000 megawatts. But given the constant growth of industry and naturally for many other uses across the country, the energy demand is increasing. Therefore 20,000 megawatts by the year 2020 again will be perhaps a small portion of this sort of energy. It is not 400% therefore it is not that ambitious, it is a more realistic approach so that step-by-step we can have a gradual contribution from nuclear power.
MK: Could you explain what those other purposes might be?
AS: Yes, in fact I have been twice the director of nuclear research centre in Tehran (NRC). One of the main applications of nuclear energy is in producing various radioisotopes for medical, agricultural and industrial purposes. Right now over 200 hospitals and clinics are using the radioisotopes produced in Tehran's 5 megawatts reactor; and of course in addition to these applications the sources also could be used for many leakage applications in industry as well as agriculture of course.
We do have for example a gamma radiation centre in Tehran. Everyday trucks of the chemical by-products and in fact the material used in the medical applications are sterilised by gamma radiation by cold sources there. There are various applications which are increasing everyday not only in Iran but in the whole world.
Therefore for all these we come back to the nuclear material used for that purpose, for either radioactive sources or reactor. But then the question is you need fuel and the fuel should be assured. The main question is why we started to choose our own way for enrichment in order to produce the fuel indigenously.
I explain this to you very briefly; I am sure that your colleagues will be convinced because this is part of history and these are well documented facts. First of all we have a confidence deficit for the last thirty years particularly after the revolution when Western countries immediately stopped their nuclear cooperation [with Iran.] We paid $2m before the revolution in order to have new fuel for the Tehran reactor which produces mainly radioisotopes. The Americans neither gave the fuel nor the $2m that they received. Therefore when I was the Ambassador to the IAEA 26 years ago, I raised the issue of an urgent need for fuel with the Director General at the time, Hans Blix, and asked the IAEA to do something as intermediation for this problem. The IAEA in fact wrote to different potential suppliers, reflecting our request; unfortunately none of them agreed to even give the fuel for Tehran's research reactor which has been under the IAEA's full-scope Safeguards.
MK: Were they obliged to accept Iran's request at all?
AS: Yes, because this is under the IAEA. First of all the US was legally obliged because they had a contract; they received $2m out of $2.3m before the revolution. The fuel was ready to ship and they stopped the shipment of that fuel. Finally when the Argentineans had success in enrichment, they announced their readiness to give fuel to Iran under the auspices of the IAEA and that is what happened. Therefore the Tehran reactor right now is working with Argentinean fuel and this was in fact a good sign of South-South cooperation.
Having all these in mind and with this background we had no choice but to have our own enrichment and fuel production. However, there was also another important development in the international arena which in fact pushed Iran to make this decision. In the IAEA there was a committee for guaranteeing nuclear supply. That committee collapsed in 1987 after seven years of negotiation. It means that after seven years of negotiation, they were not able to have one piece of paper as a legally binding assurance for guaranteeing nuclear fuel.
MK: Was there any particular reason for that?
AS: The reason was because the industrialized countries did not want to give that assurance and this is their historical mistake. This was 1987 and if you refer to the IAEA website and reports you will see that the IAEA has reported that Iran in fact decided to go after enrichment by coincidence after 1987. It means that when we lost all hope in international arrangements and also the bilateral problems we had after the revolution when [our partners] did not cooperate, altogether pushed Iran and Iranian decision-makers to the position that there is no other choice but to go for indigenous enrichment and fuel production. So we have designed the Natanz nuclear plant so as to produce, if it works annually with 54,000 P1 type centrifuges, the fuel required for the annual consumption of the Bushehr nuclear plant
MK: Is the Natanz nuclear plant under IAEA inspections?
AS: Natanz is under the full-scope of IAEA inspections and beyond . In order to remove any ambiguity and provide 100% transparency guarantee, we agreed and negotiated a legal text with the IAEA and have accepted further legal obligations. These two legal texts are called Facility Attachment and Safeguard Approach for Natanz Enrichment. It means that the operator inspectors do not need to discuss each time what to see, how to see, where to install or not to install cameras.. Therefore this is the legal obligation that Iran has accepted that everything is under the most intrusive and robust inspections. Apart from that we have also agreed that the agency could have short notice snapshot inspections, within two hours or so. This is of course maximum transparency and assurance.
MK: Do these measures apply to other nuclear sites across Iran as well?
AS: Yes, in fact this is the case. Since it was established over 35 years ago, the Tehran research reactor has been under continuous Agency surveillance and there is also a Facility Attachment for Tehran research reactor as well as in Isfahan and other [sites]. Therefore even in Isfahan which is a Uranium conversion [facility] we do have IAEA cameras. In fact I took the ambassadors of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), G77 and the Arab League to Isfahan and in that visit I invited and permitted over 100 international journalists to also accompany me to visit all parts of the Isfahan [facility]; they were able to see with their own eyes the IAEA cameras installed in different corners of that facility. Similar facilities in other countries do not have these cameras and therefore we have accepted additional measures to make sure that everything is under the full-scope Safeguards.
MK: So what has the IAEA or its Director General expressed concern about, especially in its latest report?
AS: We implemented the Additional Protocol for two and a half years voluntarily but a historical mistake was made by the US and a couple of other Western countries that after so much cooperation and having even suspended these activities, they conveyed this file to New York. Of course it was not officially referred because it was not following the provision of the statute of the IAEA Safeguards.
MK: The latest report of the IAEA contains some issues mentioned in the media especially with regards to the contents of that particular laptop and there are the explosives and detonator tests, missile re-entry vehicles and the uranium metal document. These are the things that have been raised and branded as outstanding questions with regards to Iran's nuclear programme. Some of it has been answered in the work-plan, some of it even contradicts the actual work-plan. How does Iran view the latest report in particular with regards to the track record of its relationship with the IAEA?
AS: The work-plan, which we agreed with the IAEA [Aug. 07], has resolved all six issues, called the outstanding issues, and the Director General has clearly reported to the whole world that they are resolved in the past reports.
One issue which was not categorized as an outstanding issue was the issue of "alleged studies." That is the allegation by the US that there were some studies on Green Salt, high explosives and re-entry missiles. And as you correctly mentioned it was the issue the so-called “laptop”. After the first process i.e. the six outstanding issues which were all nuclear-related matters and within the domain of the IAEA, was over, in a compromise we accepted to also discuss these matters. Because missiles or explosives are not within the contents of the statute of the IAEA. These are outside the domain of the IAEA. But we showed flexibility and we said OK let us have the documents, we will study them and give our assessment.
In the work-plan it was clearly mentioned that the Agency was obliged to deliver this document and we were only obliged to give our assessment of it. No discussions, no interviews, not even visits. That was the agreement and understanding with the IAEA. The high officials and the head of the legal department, policy making and technical safeguard departments were also present when this text was finalised. It is interesting that in spite of the Americans' march against Mr ElBaradei and the IAEA secretariat about the [IAEA-Iran] work-plan, this document was supported almost unanimously in the IAEA and even in the Board of Governors it was discussed and many European countries and others welcomed the IAEA for having achieved this work-plan.
Therefore this work-plan has an important status and both sides should fulfil their obligations. Unfortunately the Americans prevented the IAEA to fulfil its obligation by not delivering the documents and not permitting the IAEA to deliver the documents to Iran. But again we showed flexibility and we accepted that the documents could only be shown so that we could put an end to this endless process. Finally [the documents] were shown and we explained comprehensively why these papers are forged and baseless. We had many meetings, over 200 pages of explanation have been given in a confidential manner to the IAEA and unfortunately the Americans are still trying to keep this file [open] by continuing to make ceaseless allegations.
MK: How were these documents shown to you? Was it in a paper format? Was it digital? Did they have any confidential seals?
AS: That is an important point you raised. In the first round of our meeting, they simply brought some sheets of papers in hard copy and said that we were not allowed to take them outside the room or make a copy. Then in the second round the secretariat was further embarrassed and they apologised to Iran and said that this time the Americans had not even permitted [the IAEA] to obtain or show hard copies [of the documents].
Therefore they brought us electronic versions, which were shown on a computer laptop screen. This has created a lot of problems for the secretariat and Iran; the Director General has in fact complained about the US actions creating impediments in the work, and in the last report he has indeed criticised this.
MK: Doesn't this play with the credibility of the IAEA as a whole and if it does, is it the case that the IAEA has to do whatever the US asks it to do?
AS: That is exactly the concern reflected in the Non-Alignment Movement statement. Here over one hundred countries expressed their serious concern and dissatisfaction and objection to this status quo. That one country is somehow interfering in the impartial and professional work of the IAEA. It is absolutely a violation of the spirit and the letter of [the IAEA] statute that one state has allegations against another state and gives documents to the IAEA but dictates what to do with it and how to do it and when to do it. This is 100% against the statutory obligations of each member state. That is exactly what happened.
In the meeting we had in Tehran, every problem, every shortcoming and inconsistency was thoroughly discussed and reflected. Therefore this matter is in fact over and I just want to conclude by saying that for the last five years there have been over twenty seven allegations about military sites in Iran and at least 248 samples have been taken from military sites and have been fully analysed which proved that none has any evidence of nuclear weapons or nuclear material. Therefore they have been baseless.
MK: Do you expect any more UN Security Council sanctions against Iran, given that IAEA reports have been in the passed used as justification for UNSC resolutions?
AS: No, in fact there were some attempts in this direction by the US before June in the Board of Governors. For almost two weeks they made much effort to lobby and convince many member states by talking to their capitals. The US mission in Vienna tried hard to convince the member states to have a resolution in the IAEA against Iran. Based even on that report they were unable to succeed. It means that the member states of the IAEA, who are the same members of the United Nations, disagree [with the US] because they do not assess this report as negative, because over ten paragraphs are very positive in the report particularly the paragraphs which repeat that there is no evidence of diversion of nuclear material and facility, towards military nuclear purposes and that all nuclear material are accounted for. This is a very important message.
MK: What about the UN Security Council itself and if another sanctions resolution is passed what would be Iran's likely response?
AS: Well I have to say that these resolutions have been in fact counter-productive. It has in fact undermined to a great extent the authority of the IAEA and it has not had any effect on our nuclear activities. We have even speeded up and tried to show our determination that by sanctions or resolutions or threats of military attack, Iran will not give up its inalienable right for these activities. But at the same time we follow a policy which makes the US administration very disappointed. In spite of the disappointment and frustration about the UN Security Council resolutions which have been in fact very negative on the UN ['s image] and proved that the UNSC is used as an instrument against countries, Iran decided not to react to reduce or halt its cooperation with the IAEA. Therefore despite those resolutions we continue our cooperation with the IAEA within our legal obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards of the NPT agreement and therefore we neither suspended enrichment nor we suspended [our cooperation with the IAEA]. That is exactly the policy which has upset the US administration. Because they love to hear the news that Iran has decided either to stop or reduce the inspections or to withdraw from NPT and we have not done either.
MK: Does Iran have any incentive to go after Nuclear weapons given Israel's presence and Pakistan's and other countries around Iran?
AS: The answer is very simply, no. It is not a slogan, I have some logic for it. First of all there are religious fatwas or decrees that we are against weapons of mass destruction. We have proved this by our action during the eight years of imposed war by Saddam where Iraq used chemical weapons and over 100,000 people were affected; over 30,000 are still under treatment. Everybody knows that Iran had at that time considerable advanced chemical and petrochemical technology. We could have produced and used [such weapons.] We didn't do that. This is a clear example at a time when we were facing to be or not to be.
The second reason is if a country like Iran or other developing countries decide to have nuclear weapons, how many can they have? Maybe a couple of them? They cannot have 1000s of nuclear bombs in order to compete for example with the United States. Then the quantity would be the crucial factor in competing with the adversaries where they are.
MK: Finally I want to touch upon the way forward. How do you see this current crisis -if it is a real crisis, if it is even a nuclear crisis- can be resolved? There are various ideas floating such as a joint consortium [for enrichment], you've got the temporary suspension of enrichment, the Additional Protocol ideas. How do you think this can be resolved?
AS: I will try to be very concise. We are going to continue our cooperation with the IAEA. All our activities are under routine inspection. We have already given our explanations to the IAEA on the last issue of so-called alleged studies; and that if there are any questions or ambiguities for the IAEA or even member states we are well prepared to answer them because we are transparent and we want to make sure that all member states are confident that everything is for peaceful purposes.
At the same time and with the same mentality we welcome all member states in parallel to work with the IAEA to come to the negotiating table. Negotiating table means they can come and we can discuss the common elements about international issues and many things that concern all of us. International security, regional security, international cooperation, energy, energy safety and many other issues. That is why we have given our package which includes all these elements and we were open minded and we have received the 5+1 or the so called 3+3 package. We are studying these carefully. I personally hope and I am optimistic that if the 5+1 showed they have a political will and they want to prove their political and good intention, they should immediately come to the negotiating table without any preconditions and we can have two proposals on the table for discussion.
MK: Would Iran be prepared to accept the Additional Protocol if Iran's file is returned from the UN Security Council to the board of the IAEA?
AS: Well of course this question should be addressed to the Parliament. But I can say that the file has not officially been referred to [the UNSC]. But let's say if the UNSC stopped its illegal involvement, engagement or interference, this of course will help and the environment will be better. Because as long as the UN Security Council is involved and passes resolutions, they just continue to poison the environment and put the spirit of cooperation in jeopardy. Therefore if they will do this, that is a right step in the right direction. In the Board of Governors last week I said that if this issue is removed from the agenda of the board and if the [IAEA] Safeguards is implemented in a routine manner then Iran will show more flexibility to take voluntary steps such as those which were discussed during the visits of the Director General to Tehran. So we will show [flexibility] and this is part of our Iranian culture with thousands of years of civilisation. We cannot accept threats, intimidation and humiliation but if there is a civilised environment and a language of dialogue and a constructive environment then we will show flexibility in order to make sure that the other side also will have enough confidence. Therefore the building of confidence is a two way process. They make accusations against Iran over some issues or in the past over confidence deficit, while in fact we have a large amount of records regarding confidence deficit vis-à-vis Western countries particularly the US and some of the European countries including EU3, specifically the UK and France. They have done much [wrong] against the Iranian nation and this is a time for them to compensate.
MK: The sanctions resolutions passed were initially based on the concern that Iran may divert its nuclear program towards a military goal; but the IAEA has already confirmed that this is not the case. Perhaps that would mean the previous sanctions would have to be removed and future ones should not be passed. Why do you think the Security Council is still willing to accept the US agenda of pushing Iran into isolation? And -I know this may be a difficult question- but do you think that the comments of the Iranian President regarding Israel has helped this process, this push for sanctions against Iran?
AS: Two different things. First of all, on the resolutions they tried to justify it by saying it is because of the "outstanding issues." The Director General has always said that this issue is in New York not because of verification or any problems that Iran has created; Iran is in fact continuing its work and the Director General has continuously reported that the Agency is able to continue its verification. Therefore the involvement of the UNSC in New York is not because of a problem between the IAEA and Iran within the statute of the work. Iran is not like the case of other countries such as North Korea who withdrew from NPT and therefore technically and legally this matter was passed and referred to UN Security Council. We are continuing our work with the IAEA and routine inspections continue. But they then raised the issue of outstanding issues. Now that the outstanding issues are resolved and the Director General has reported in March also that all six outstanding issued are resolved, there is no technical justification and any merit for suspension. Because they asked to suspend enrichment until the Agency and Iran resolved these outstanding issues.
That is why the [idea of] suspension has lost its technical and even political merits that the proponents of the resolutions were raising.
Secondly, we have to bear in mind that since the victory of the [1979] revolution, our people have been echoing to the whole world that they oppose any mentality that is against humanity. Genocide, discrimination, aggression, apartheid and Zionism, these are all the categories that the people of Iran have said they are committed not to accept and they will not support this kind of mentality. That is the reason immediately after the revolution, Iran in fact stopped its diplomatic relation with the Apartheid regime of South Africa and the Zionist regime of Israel. After the revolution, we did not even stop our diplomatic relationship with the US which was the first adversary, having many issues with our people from the coup [of 1953] and onward interventions in our country. It means that was our first priority and as soon as the apartheid mentality was removed and a popular government was in place, we supported the South Africans and we now have the best relationship with the South African people and the South African government. Therefore that is the problem and the message of the Iranian officials and the Iranian people is that we cannot accept that a group of people occupy a place and make many innocent people homeless. This is a matter of principle against humanity, that was the whole issue. At the same time we have clearly mentioned and our supreme leader also had a message over four years ago that if people there -in occupied Palestine- Palestinians, Jews, Christians and Muslims, who are all followers of divine religions come together and follow a democratic referendum and choose a democratic government, then we will support that. That is exactly what we want. The homeless Palestinians also have the right to live there and this is the minimum that we expect. Because this is a right of human beings to have a home and to live there in peace and in equal footing. We are always for peace and prosperity in that region, the Middle East and also in the whole world.
MK: Thank you Mr Ambassador for speaking to us.
AS: Thank you indeed.
For further information or to contact CASMII please visit http://www.campaigniran.org
(source: CASMII)
Mohammad Kamaali, board member of CASMII UK speaks to Iran's Ambassador to the IAEA Dr Ali Asghar Soltanieh who was recently in London to attend an international conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, organised by the School of Oriental and African Studies, SOAS.
In this interview Dr Soltanieh explains the reasons behind Iran's determination to develop an indigenous uranium enrichment capability and why Iran believes the countries pursuing or relying on nuclear weapons are making a mistake. He also gives his viewpoint on how international institutions such as the UN Security Council are in practice used as instruments of political pressure by a select few member states, ultimately undermining the authority and credibility of those institutions.The following is a transcript of the interview with minor editing for clarity. A Podcast is also available for download from here [.mp3].
---
Mohammad Kamaali: Thank you Mr Ambassador for agreeing to talk to us. If you could please briefly explain the history of Iran's nuclear programme, where it started, what stage is it at present and what are your future plans.
Dr Ali Asghar Soltanieh: It is simple, Iran’s nuclear programme did not start yesterday for it to be stopped tomorrow as it is today demanded by some countries like the US. Nuclear activities in Iran go back to half a century ago, before and after the [1979] revolution. In fact, I myself started my work before the revolution in the Atomic Energy Organisation (AEO) and I have witnessed the double standard approach before and after the revolution.
A very simple question that is always addressed to us is what is the justification for Iran to have nuclear energy while it has huge amounts of natural resources of oil and gas. This question was never raised before the revolution when the [oil] resources were much more than today and the population was about half. [Today] the added value of the oil bid for application in our chemical and petrochemical industry is much more because we now have a lot of advancements in this area which we can use for producing a great amount of by-products. So the added value is much more than thirty years ago, in addition to the price of oil which is of course increasing everyday.
Therefore there are good technical and financial justifications for having also nuclear energy as an option. But at the same time we have never envisioned an ambitious programme so as to consider nuclear energy as the only option. We have always thought of the policy of diversifying energy resources. We have used a technical/scientific program in the IAEA namely the VASP programme; with which countries use all their data to find out in a scientific way what share nuclear energy can play for them. Using this programme we have come to the conclusion that in the next twenty years, roughly by 2020, we will have up to 20,000 megawatts from nuclear energy. Right now in our national grid we have about 35,000 megawatts and if Bushehr becomes operational, the share of nuclear energy will be 1,000 out of 35,000 megawatts. But given the constant growth of industry and naturally for many other uses across the country, the energy demand is increasing. Therefore 20,000 megawatts by the year 2020 again will be perhaps a small portion of this sort of energy. It is not 400% therefore it is not that ambitious, it is a more realistic approach so that step-by-step we can have a gradual contribution from nuclear power.
Now the issue which I think has been made so much politicised but is mainly technical is when you have nuclear energy and you want to have nuclear energy for different applications including nuclear power then the issue is that you need reactors and reactors need fuel and the fuel should be assured.
MK: Could you explain what those other purposes might be?
AS: Yes, in fact I have been twice the director of nuclear research centre in Tehran (NRC). One of the main applications of nuclear energy is in producing various radioisotopes for medical, agricultural and industrial purposes. Right now over 200 hospitals and clinics are using the radioisotopes produced in Tehran's 5 megawatts reactor; and of course in addition to these applications the sources also could be used for many leakage applications in industry as well as agriculture of course.
We do have for example a gamma radiation centre in Tehran. Everyday trucks of the chemical by-products and in fact the material used in the medical applications are sterilised by gamma radiation by cold sources there. There are various applications which are increasing everyday not only in Iran but in the whole world.
Therefore for all these we come back to the nuclear material used for that purpose, for either radioactive sources or reactor. But then the question is you need fuel and the fuel should be assured. The main question is why we started to choose our own way for enrichment in order to produce the fuel indigenously.
I explain this to you very briefly; I am sure that your colleagues will be convinced because this is part of history and these are well documented facts. First of all we have a confidence deficit for the last thirty years particularly after the revolution when Western countries immediately stopped their nuclear cooperation [with Iran.] We paid $2m before the revolution in order to have new fuel for the Tehran reactor which produces mainly radioisotopes. The Americans neither gave the fuel nor the $2m that they received. Therefore when I was the Ambassador to the IAEA 26 years ago, I raised the issue of an urgent need for fuel with the Director General at the time, Hans Blix, and asked the IAEA to do something as intermediation for this problem. The IAEA in fact wrote to different potential suppliers, reflecting our request; unfortunately none of them agreed to even give the fuel for Tehran's research reactor which has been under the IAEA's full-scope Safeguards.
MK: Were they obliged to accept Iran's request at all?
AS: Yes, because this is under the IAEA. First of all the US was legally obliged because they had a contract; they received $2m out of $2.3m before the revolution. The fuel was ready to ship and they stopped the shipment of that fuel. Finally when the Argentineans had success in enrichment, they announced their readiness to give fuel to Iran under the auspices of the IAEA and that is what happened. Therefore the Tehran reactor right now is working with Argentinean fuel and this was in fact a good sign of South-South cooperation.
Now I give this as one example and there are many examples both bilaterally and multilaterally that have affected us. I want you to consider these and then everybody could easily judge if they were in Iran's position whether or not they would have taken the same decisions [as we did] . This is one reason. The second reason is this: Iran was part of Eurodif, an enrichment company in France, to which the Shah gave $1bn as a loan thirty years ago. Right now that I am giving this interview, Iran holds 10% of the shares of that company, but we have not even received 1 gram of uranium from that factory, uranium which is being produced under the full-scope of [the IAEA] safeguard. That is also another reason why Iran was disappointed and frustrated, and therefore it had to decide otherwise.
The next issue of course is the Bushehr power plant which is a tragedy in fact among all industrial projects of the world. It was supposed to be in operation almost twenty eight years ago and after thirty years it is still not in operation. We spent another $1bn [in dealing] with the Russians and it is still not in operation. And I want to inform you that, while we thank the Russians for their cooperation, they have only given the fuel so far for the first load and the first year. They have not provided any guarantees on paper for the fuel in the next five or ten years. Therefore there is no guarantee for even the Bushehr power plant.
Having all these in mind and with this background we had no choice but to have our own enrichment and fuel production. However, there was also another important development in the international arena which in fact pushed Iran to make this decision. In the IAEA there was a committee for guaranteeing nuclear supply. That committee collapsed in 1987 after seven years of negotiation. It means that after seven years of negotiation, they were not able to have one piece of paper as a legally binding assurance for guaranteeing nuclear fuel.
MK: Was there any particular reason for that?
AS: The reason was because the industrialized countries did not want to give that assurance and this is their historical mistake. This was 1987 and if you refer to the IAEA website and reports you will see that the IAEA has reported that Iran in fact decided to go after enrichment by coincidence after 1987. It means that when we lost all hope in international arrangements and also the bilateral problems we had after the revolution when [our partners] did not cooperate, altogether pushed Iran and Iranian decision-makers to the position that there is no other choice but to go for indigenous enrichment and fuel production. So we have designed the Natanz nuclear plant so as to produce, if it works annually with 54,000 P1 type centrifuges, the fuel required for the annual consumption of the Bushehr nuclear plant
MK: Is the Natanz nuclear plant under IAEA inspections?
AS: Natanz is under the full-scope of IAEA inspections and beyond . In order to remove any ambiguity and provide 100% transparency guarantee, we agreed and negotiated a legal text with the IAEA and have accepted further legal obligations. These two legal texts are called Facility Attachment and Safeguard Approach for Natanz Enrichment. It means that the operator inspectors do not need to discuss each time what to see, how to see, where to install or not to install cameras.. Therefore this is the legal obligation that Iran has accepted that everything is under the most intrusive and robust inspections. Apart from that we have also agreed that the agency could have short notice snapshot inspections, within two hours or so. This is of course maximum transparency and assurance.
MK: Do these measures apply to other nuclear sites across Iran as well?
AS: Yes, in fact this is the case. Since it was established over 35 years ago, the Tehran research reactor has been under continuous Agency surveillance and there is also a Facility Attachment for Tehran research reactor as well as in Isfahan and other [sites]. Therefore even in Isfahan which is a Uranium conversion [facility] we do have IAEA cameras. In fact I took the ambassadors of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), G77 and the Arab League to Isfahan and in that visit I invited and permitted over 100 international journalists to also accompany me to visit all parts of the Isfahan [facility]; they were able to see with their own eyes the IAEA cameras installed in different corners of that facility. Similar facilities in other countries do not have these cameras and therefore we have accepted additional measures to make sure that everything is under the full-scope Safeguards.
MK: So what has the IAEA or its Director General expressed concern about, especially in its latest report?
AS: We implemented the Additional Protocol for two and a half years voluntarily but a historical mistake was made by the US and a couple of other Western countries that after so much cooperation and having even suspended these activities, they conveyed this file to New York. Of course it was not officially referred because it was not following the provision of the statute of the IAEA Safeguards.
In fact immediately after the involvement of the UN Security Council in this issue, which is in fact an unlawful involvement, the Iranian Parliament passed a law restricting the government to only accept the Comprehensive Safeguards of the NPT. Therefore we were not going to discuss the issues beyond our legal obligations such as the so called "outstanding issues." However after one year that we stopped these discussions we as a matter of fact showed our maximum flexibility and concession. Under the work-plan which was negotiated and agreed with the IAEA we decided to resolve those issues. But of course the Agency asked not only Iran but many other countries to sign, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol. Because of the unfortunate decision to get the UN Security Council involved and the ongoing resolutions that they are passing against Iran, one can not expect a parliament in a democratic society to ignore this fact and pass and ratify the Additional Protocol. I want to say that the Director General [of the IAEA] has reported that over one hundred countries at present do not implement the Additional Protocol and therefore this is not only about Iran.
MK: The latest report of the IAEA contains some issues mentioned in the media especially with regards to the contents of that particular laptop and there are the explosives and detonator tests, missile re-entry vehicles and the uranium metal document. These are the things that have been raised and branded as outstanding questions with regards to Iran's nuclear programme. Some of it has been answered in the work-plan, some of it even contradicts the actual work-plan. How does Iran view the latest report in particular with regards to the track record of its relationship with the IAEA?
AS: The work-plan, which we agreed with the IAEA [Aug. 07], has resolved all six issues, called the outstanding issues, and the Director General has clearly reported to the whole world that they are resolved in the past reports.
One issue which was not categorized as an outstanding issue was the issue of "alleged studies." That is the allegation by the US that there were some studies on Green Salt, high explosives and re-entry missiles. And as you correctly mentioned it was the issue the so-called “laptop”. After the first process i.e. the six outstanding issues which were all nuclear-related matters and within the domain of the IAEA, was over, in a compromise we accepted to also discuss these matters. Because missiles or explosives are not within the contents of the statute of the IAEA. These are outside the domain of the IAEA. But we showed flexibility and we said OK let us have the documents, we will study them and give our assessment.
In the work-plan it was clearly mentioned that the Agency was obliged to deliver this document and we were only obliged to give our assessment of it. No discussions, no interviews, not even visits. That was the agreement and understanding with the IAEA. The high officials and the head of the legal department, policy making and technical safeguard departments were also present when this text was finalised. It is interesting that in spite of the Americans' march against Mr ElBaradei and the IAEA secretariat about the [IAEA-Iran] work-plan, this document was supported almost unanimously in the IAEA and even in the Board of Governors it was discussed and many European countries and others welcomed the IAEA for having achieved this work-plan.
Therefore this work-plan has an important status and both sides should fulfil their obligations. Unfortunately the Americans prevented the IAEA to fulfil its obligation by not delivering the documents and not permitting the IAEA to deliver the documents to Iran. But again we showed flexibility and we accepted that the documents could only be shown so that we could put an end to this endless process. Finally [the documents] were shown and we explained comprehensively why these papers are forged and baseless. We had many meetings, over 200 pages of explanation have been given in a confidential manner to the IAEA and unfortunately the Americans are still trying to keep this file [open] by continuing to make ceaseless allegations.
MK: How were these documents shown to you? Was it in a paper format? Was it digital? Did they have any confidential seals?
AS: That is an important point you raised. In the first round of our meeting, they simply brought some sheets of papers in hard copy and said that we were not allowed to take them outside the room or make a copy. Then in the second round the secretariat was further embarrassed and they apologised to Iran and said that this time the Americans had not even permitted [the IAEA] to obtain or show hard copies [of the documents].
Therefore they brought us electronic versions, which were shown on a computer laptop screen. This has created a lot of problems for the secretariat and Iran; the Director General has in fact complained about the US actions creating impediments in the work, and in the last report he has indeed criticised this.
MK: Doesn't this play with the credibility of the IAEA as a whole and if it does, is it the case that the IAEA has to do whatever the US asks it to do?
AS: That is exactly the concern reflected in the Non-Alignment Movement statement. Here over one hundred countries expressed their serious concern and dissatisfaction and objection to this status quo. That one country is somehow interfering in the impartial and professional work of the IAEA. It is absolutely a violation of the spirit and the letter of [the IAEA] statute that one state has allegations against another state and gives documents to the IAEA but dictates what to do with it and how to do it and when to do it. This is 100% against the statutory obligations of each member state. That is exactly what happened.
Apart from these issues, among all the documents and material received from the United States against Iran, those essentially forged documents and communications, none of them have any seals of “confidential” or “highly confidential” or “top secret”. How can one imagine that a country has had some sort of a Manhattan nuclear weapon project and all these communications between the Ministry of Defence and all other organisations related to it lack any level of confidentiality on such papers and that this is just normal communication? While they have put some secret codes in order to show that they are some secret projects, at the same time one of the sheets in the third line in parenthesis explains that 111 or 12 or whatever, that this code is about a "nuclear weapon warhead"! This is ridiculous; and there are numerous points like this that we have fully explained to the agency inspectors.
In the meeting we had in Tehran, every problem, every shortcoming and inconsistency was thoroughly discussed and reflected. Therefore this matter is in fact over and I just want to conclude by saying that for the last five years there have been over twenty seven allegations about military sites in Iran and at least 248 samples have been taken from military sites and have been fully analysed which proved that none has any evidence of nuclear weapons or nuclear material. Therefore they have been baseless.
MK: Do you expect any more UN Security Council sanctions against Iran, given that IAEA reports have been in the passed used as justification for UNSC resolutions?
AS: No, in fact there were some attempts in this direction by the US before June in the Board of Governors. For almost two weeks they made much effort to lobby and convince many member states by talking to their capitals. The US mission in Vienna tried hard to convince the member states to have a resolution in the IAEA against Iran. Based even on that report they were unable to succeed. It means that the member states of the IAEA, who are the same members of the United Nations, disagree [with the US] because they do not assess this report as negative, because over ten paragraphs are very positive in the report particularly the paragraphs which repeat that there is no evidence of diversion of nuclear material and facility, towards military nuclear purposes and that all nuclear material are accounted for. This is a very important message.
MK: What about the UN Security Council itself and if another sanctions resolution is passed what would be Iran's likely response?
AS: Well I have to say that these resolutions have been in fact counter-productive. It has in fact undermined to a great extent the authority of the IAEA and it has not had any effect on our nuclear activities. We have even speeded up and tried to show our determination that by sanctions or resolutions or threats of military attack, Iran will not give up its inalienable right for these activities. But at the same time we follow a policy which makes the US administration very disappointed. In spite of the disappointment and frustration about the UN Security Council resolutions which have been in fact very negative on the UN ['s image] and proved that the UNSC is used as an instrument against countries, Iran decided not to react to reduce or halt its cooperation with the IAEA. Therefore despite those resolutions we continue our cooperation with the IAEA within our legal obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards of the NPT agreement and therefore we neither suspended enrichment nor we suspended [our cooperation with the IAEA]. That is exactly the policy which has upset the US administration. Because they love to hear the news that Iran has decided either to stop or reduce the inspections or to withdraw from NPT and we have not done either.
MK: Does Iran have any incentive to go after Nuclear weapons given Israel's presence and Pakistan's and other countries around Iran?
AS: The answer is very simply, no. It is not a slogan, I have some logic for it. First of all there are religious fatwas or decrees that we are against weapons of mass destruction. We have proved this by our action during the eight years of imposed war by Saddam where Iraq used chemical weapons and over 100,000 people were affected; over 30,000 are still under treatment. Everybody knows that Iran had at that time considerable advanced chemical and petrochemical technology. We could have produced and used [such weapons.] We didn't do that. This is a clear example at a time when we were facing to be or not to be.
The second reason is if a country like Iran or other developing countries decide to have nuclear weapons, how many can they have? Maybe a couple of them? They cannot have 1000s of nuclear bombs in order to compete for example with the United States. Then the quantity would be the crucial factor in competing with the adversaries where they are.
Therefore nuclear weapons create vulnerability for the country. As soon as a country obtains nuclear weapons they will have a problem because they cannot compete in this way. We know in the cold war the Soviet Union and the US were just competing over the number of their warheads because it was this quantity that was playing the role. Therefore this is a historical mistake for any country to go after nuclear weapons. We do not need it.
Apart from this, the [Iranian] revolution for the last 30 years since its triumph has had one simple message; that the Islamic Republic and this democratic system that has been established after the revolution could only be sustained by popular support and the unity of the people who play their role for the sustainable and continuous progress of the country. Therefore this is the main thing the government respects namely to have the popular support and also to make every effort that our cooperation with all countries of the whole world is promoted every day. And that we will always be committed to international laws.
That is why you have never heard any news that Iran has had any problems with its neighbours.
That is why you have never heard any news that Iran has had any problems with its neighbours.
MK: Finally I want to touch upon the way forward. How do you see this current crisis -if it is a real crisis, if it is even a nuclear crisis- can be resolved? There are various ideas floating such as a joint consortium [for enrichment], you've got the temporary suspension of enrichment, the Additional Protocol ideas. How do you think this can be resolved?
AS: I will try to be very concise. We are going to continue our cooperation with the IAEA. All our activities are under routine inspection. We have already given our explanations to the IAEA on the last issue of so-called alleged studies; and that if there are any questions or ambiguities for the IAEA or even member states we are well prepared to answer them because we are transparent and we want to make sure that all member states are confident that everything is for peaceful purposes.
At the same time and with the same mentality we welcome all member states in parallel to work with the IAEA to come to the negotiating table. Negotiating table means they can come and we can discuss the common elements about international issues and many things that concern all of us. International security, regional security, international cooperation, energy, energy safety and many other issues. That is why we have given our package which includes all these elements and we were open minded and we have received the 5+1 or the so called 3+3 package. We are studying these carefully. I personally hope and I am optimistic that if the 5+1 showed they have a political will and they want to prove their political and good intention, they should immediately come to the negotiating table without any preconditions and we can have two proposals on the table for discussion.
MK: Would Iran be prepared to accept the Additional Protocol if Iran's file is returned from the UN Security Council to the board of the IAEA?
AS: Well of course this question should be addressed to the Parliament. But I can say that the file has not officially been referred to [the UNSC]. But let's say if the UNSC stopped its illegal involvement, engagement or interference, this of course will help and the environment will be better. Because as long as the UN Security Council is involved and passes resolutions, they just continue to poison the environment and put the spirit of cooperation in jeopardy. Therefore if they will do this, that is a right step in the right direction. In the Board of Governors last week I said that if this issue is removed from the agenda of the board and if the [IAEA] Safeguards is implemented in a routine manner then Iran will show more flexibility to take voluntary steps such as those which were discussed during the visits of the Director General to Tehran. So we will show [flexibility] and this is part of our Iranian culture with thousands of years of civilisation. We cannot accept threats, intimidation and humiliation but if there is a civilised environment and a language of dialogue and a constructive environment then we will show flexibility in order to make sure that the other side also will have enough confidence. Therefore the building of confidence is a two way process. They make accusations against Iran over some issues or in the past over confidence deficit, while in fact we have a large amount of records regarding confidence deficit vis-à-vis Western countries particularly the US and some of the European countries including EU3, specifically the UK and France. They have done much [wrong] against the Iranian nation and this is a time for them to compensate.
MK: The sanctions resolutions passed were initially based on the concern that Iran may divert its nuclear program towards a military goal; but the IAEA has already confirmed that this is not the case. Perhaps that would mean the previous sanctions would have to be removed and future ones should not be passed. Why do you think the Security Council is still willing to accept the US agenda of pushing Iran into isolation? And -I know this may be a difficult question- but do you think that the comments of the Iranian President regarding Israel has helped this process, this push for sanctions against Iran?
AS: Two different things. First of all, on the resolutions they tried to justify it by saying it is because of the "outstanding issues." The Director General has always said that this issue is in New York not because of verification or any problems that Iran has created; Iran is in fact continuing its work and the Director General has continuously reported that the Agency is able to continue its verification. Therefore the involvement of the UNSC in New York is not because of a problem between the IAEA and Iran within the statute of the work. Iran is not like the case of other countries such as North Korea who withdrew from NPT and therefore technically and legally this matter was passed and referred to UN Security Council. We are continuing our work with the IAEA and routine inspections continue. But they then raised the issue of outstanding issues. Now that the outstanding issues are resolved and the Director General has reported in March also that all six outstanding issued are resolved, there is no technical justification and any merit for suspension. Because they asked to suspend enrichment until the Agency and Iran resolved these outstanding issues.
That is why the [idea of] suspension has lost its technical and even political merits that the proponents of the resolutions were raising.
Secondly, we have to bear in mind that since the victory of the [1979] revolution, our people have been echoing to the whole world that they oppose any mentality that is against humanity. Genocide, discrimination, aggression, apartheid and Zionism, these are all the categories that the people of Iran have said they are committed not to accept and they will not support this kind of mentality. That is the reason immediately after the revolution, Iran in fact stopped its diplomatic relation with the Apartheid regime of South Africa and the Zionist regime of Israel. After the revolution, we did not even stop our diplomatic relationship with the US which was the first adversary, having many issues with our people from the coup [of 1953] and onward interventions in our country. It means that was our first priority and as soon as the apartheid mentality was removed and a popular government was in place, we supported the South Africans and we now have the best relationship with the South African people and the South African government. Therefore that is the problem and the message of the Iranian officials and the Iranian people is that we cannot accept that a group of people occupy a place and make many innocent people homeless. This is a matter of principle against humanity, that was the whole issue. At the same time we have clearly mentioned and our supreme leader also had a message over four years ago that if people there -in occupied Palestine- Palestinians, Jews, Christians and Muslims, who are all followers of divine religions come together and follow a democratic referendum and choose a democratic government, then we will support that. That is exactly what we want. The homeless Palestinians also have the right to live there and this is the minimum that we expect. Because this is a right of human beings to have a home and to live there in peace and in equal footing. We are always for peace and prosperity in that region, the Middle East and also in the whole world.
MK: Thank you Mr Ambassador for speaking to us.
AS: Thank you indeed.
For further information or to contact CASMII please visit http://www.campaigniran.org
Friday, December 7, 2007
Russia dismisses U.S. claims Iran sought nuke prior to 2003
(RIA Novosti) - Russia has no information on Iranian attempts to develop nuclear weapons before 2003, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Wednesday.
His statement came following a Monday publication by the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stating that Tehran had halted weapons production in 2003, although it was continuing to enrich uranium.
"We have no data that such work was conducted before 2003, although our American colleagues have claimed that this was the case," Lavrov told a news conference.
"During our continuous contacts over the last two or three years we exchanged assessments based on intelligence data obtained before 2003, and the information our U.S. colleagues possess does not support the statements that Iran ever had a military nuclear program," Lavrov said.
The Russian minister said the issue still needs to be clarified, a goal set by the UN nuclear watchdog.
The UN Security Council introduced two rounds of sanctions against Iran over its refusal to halt uranium enrichment, and Washington has insisted on new sanctions. Lavrov said the sensible restrictions will remain in place until all enrichment issues have been clarified by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
"We will consider the proposal on a new UN Security Council resolution taking into account all these factors, including the public confirmation that the U.S. has no data that would corroborate that Iran had a military nuclear program," the minister said.
The U.S. report, contradicting a previous U.S. intelligence assessment in 2005 which said that Iran was actively pursuing a nuclear bomb, has pleased Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who said: "That report symbolizes a victory for the Iranian nation against international forces on the issue of nuclear weapons."
But Lavrov said the U.S. position on Iran has not toned down since the publication. "I would not describe the U.S. position as softer in any way," he said.
U.S. President George W. Bush remained hawkish, despite the report, saying on Tuesday that, "Iran was dangerous, Iran is dangerous and Iran will be dangerous if they have the know how to make a nuclear weapon."
When asked if military action remained an option, the president answered, "The best diplomacy - effective diplomacy - is one in which all options are on the table."
"What's to say they couldn't start another covert nuclear weapons program?" the president told a news conference at the White House.
-------
(Note: is there any reason *not* to believe Lavrov? I really think that there is none. Sure, the Russians have major economic and political interests in Iran, but they are already well-served by the theory that Iran stopped all its alleged nuclear weapons research in 2003. Simply put, there is no reasons for the Russians to lie here. The question then is how good the Russian intelligence on Iran is likely to be. I would argue that is is most likely the best on the planet. Russia has plenty of Farsi speaking intelligence analysts and it has a large number of expats in Iran, many working inside the civilian nuclear program. Unlike the USA or Israel, Russia most likely has, over many years, most likely developed a solid human intelligence capability in Iran. Lastly, Lavrov's statement is in full agreement with what has been said by pretty much ever expert in this field. The 'secret program stopped in 2003' nonsense is evidently the result of horse trading between the Neocons and the US intelligence community who probably had to agree to this concession - based on the 'smoking laptop' with documents written in English on it - in order to finally get this crucial NIE out)
His statement came following a Monday publication by the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stating that Tehran had halted weapons production in 2003, although it was continuing to enrich uranium.
"We have no data that such work was conducted before 2003, although our American colleagues have claimed that this was the case," Lavrov told a news conference."During our continuous contacts over the last two or three years we exchanged assessments based on intelligence data obtained before 2003, and the information our U.S. colleagues possess does not support the statements that Iran ever had a military nuclear program," Lavrov said.
The Russian minister said the issue still needs to be clarified, a goal set by the UN nuclear watchdog.
The UN Security Council introduced two rounds of sanctions against Iran over its refusal to halt uranium enrichment, and Washington has insisted on new sanctions. Lavrov said the sensible restrictions will remain in place until all enrichment issues have been clarified by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
"We will consider the proposal on a new UN Security Council resolution taking into account all these factors, including the public confirmation that the U.S. has no data that would corroborate that Iran had a military nuclear program," the minister said.
The U.S. report, contradicting a previous U.S. intelligence assessment in 2005 which said that Iran was actively pursuing a nuclear bomb, has pleased Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who said: "That report symbolizes a victory for the Iranian nation against international forces on the issue of nuclear weapons."
But Lavrov said the U.S. position on Iran has not toned down since the publication. "I would not describe the U.S. position as softer in any way," he said.
U.S. President George W. Bush remained hawkish, despite the report, saying on Tuesday that, "Iran was dangerous, Iran is dangerous and Iran will be dangerous if they have the know how to make a nuclear weapon."
When asked if military action remained an option, the president answered, "The best diplomacy - effective diplomacy - is one in which all options are on the table."
"What's to say they couldn't start another covert nuclear weapons program?" the president told a news conference at the White House.
-------
(Note: is there any reason *not* to believe Lavrov? I really think that there is none. Sure, the Russians have major economic and political interests in Iran, but they are already well-served by the theory that Iran stopped all its alleged nuclear weapons research in 2003. Simply put, there is no reasons for the Russians to lie here. The question then is how good the Russian intelligence on Iran is likely to be. I would argue that is is most likely the best on the planet. Russia has plenty of Farsi speaking intelligence analysts and it has a large number of expats in Iran, many working inside the civilian nuclear program. Unlike the USA or Israel, Russia most likely has, over many years, most likely developed a solid human intelligence capability in Iran. Lastly, Lavrov's statement is in full agreement with what has been said by pretty much ever expert in this field. The 'secret program stopped in 2003' nonsense is evidently the result of horse trading between the Neocons and the US intelligence community who probably had to agree to this concession - based on the 'smoking laptop' with documents written in English on it - in order to finally get this crucial NIE out)
Wednesday, December 5, 2007
Iran Intelligence Report: Another Psychological Warfare?
By Soraya Sepahpour-Ulrich for Countercurrents.org
‘To subdue an enemy without fighting is the acme of skill…’ - Sun Tzu
Under the current administration, it is increasingly difficult to know who the enemy is, but what is certain is that the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is a brilliantly executed psychological warfare by way of misinformation. This dastardly plan is so devious that even the anti-war groups are jubilant at its release, and they are naively sharing its contents. Perhaps non are as enthusiastic about the report as the most powerful lobby group in America hostile to Iran.
The AIPAC was quick to announce: "Far from acquitting Iran, the NIE reveals that Tehran continues to violate the international community's calls to end the pursuit of the fuel cycle and the ability to make highly enriched uranium, concludes that Iran has utilized and has at its disposal a hidden, secret second unacknowledged, unmonitored track for enriching bomb fuel, and has engaged in a nuclear weaponization program, an assessment never before made public by the American intelligence community". "All in all, it's a clarion call for additional and continued effort to pressure Iran economically and politically to end its illicit nuclear programs” (source JTA http://www.jta.org/cgi-bin/iowa/breaking/105674.html).
The NIE claims that ‘Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003’. This report now in circulation, and being repeated by every media outlet, and as importantly, by way of word of mouth, is giving credibility to the warmongers that Iran actually had a nuclear weapons program, with the idea that ‘repetition begets belief’. Drumming home a false message, the White House will get the justification it needs to impose further sanctions, with the idea of escalating into a war.
In December 2002, an Iranian terrorist group, the Mojahedeen-e Khalg (MEK), listed on the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, informed the U.S. government of the existence of two nuclear sites in Iran. Sy Hersh later revealed in The New Yorker that Israel had provided them with this information. It must also be pointed out that as a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is not under any obligations to inform the IAEA of construction sites. However, members must inform the Atomic Agency 180 days prior to introducing uranium processing equipment and material to the site. Once the United States confirmed the existence of the sites by satellite, it accused Tehran of "across-the-board pursuit of weapons of mass destruction." To dispel such accusations, Iran agreed to intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This accusation was false.
Iran was late in reporting which is a Safeguard issue. In a spirit of cooperation, and in an attempt to demonstrate its in October 2003, after meeting French, German and British foreign ministers, Tehran voluntarily stopped the process of enriched uranium; it also allowed the IAEA to carry out intrusive, spot inspections. No country has allowed as many inspection hours as Iran. In the meanwhile, it proposed to operate Iran’s enrichment program as joint ventures with private and public sector firms from other countries; this would ensure that the program remained transparent and could not be secretly diverted for military purposes, at the same time it would maintain Iran’s sovereignty by having an indigenously enriched uranium cycle (source: IAEA Bulletin Online, vol 46, no 2, 2004 “Nuclear fuel cycle: which way forward for multilateral approaches?”) . Although this was rejected, Iran continued to cooperate.
Iran suspended its enrichment activities for two and half years, but each time under pressure from the U.S., the burden of proof was transferred to Iran knowing the negative could not be proved. Instead of Iran getting the full cooperation of the IAEA for the development of nuclear technology, it was ordered to stop preparations for large-scale uranium enrichment. In 2005 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell labeled Iran a growing danger and called for the UN Security Council to impose sanctions.
According to Article 19 of Iran’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the Agency may refer Iran to the UN Security Council if it is “unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this agreement, to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”. The IAEA had reported that all declared fissile material in Iran had been accounted for, and none has been diverted. (source: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n009.html)
In December 2006, Congress overwhelmingly signed a controversial bill to expand the sale of civilian nuclear technology to India. Not only is this bill in violation of Article III of the NPT given that India is not a member state of the NPT, but the irony is that the catalyst for the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG)) in 1976 was India’s nuclear test. This group (first called the London Group) met to restrain the transfer of uranium-enrichment and plutonium-extraction equipment and technology. What added to the Iranian grievance was the speech given by undersecretary of State, Nicholas Burns, as he announced the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation: “after 30 years we have realized that the NPT is ineffective, therefore we are going to reward India for non-proliferation . In response to a reporter who quizzed him about Iran, he said we plan to punish Iran for violating the NPT. Iran was sent to the UNSC, however, later it was revealed by (former) undersecretary for arms control Radermaker that the U.S. had coerced India into voting against Iran.
As for the covert operations Iran is accused of, again, it is worthwhile examining the facts versus the mainstream media propaganda.
In 1982 Iranian officials announced that they planned to build a reactor powered by their own uranium at the Isfahan nuclear technology centre after the Iraqis destroyed the one almost completed under the Shah. The IAEA inspected that and other facilities in Iran in 1983, and planned to assist Iran in converting yellowcake into reactor fuel. The IAEA report stated clearly that its aim was to “contribute to the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain an ambitious program in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology” – the inalienable right of an NPT signatory under Article IV, but the agency’s assistance program was terminated under US pressure (source: Mark Hibbs, “US in 1983 stopped IAEA from helping Iran make UF6", Nuclear Fuel, 4 August 2003).
Undeterred, Iran searched for alternatives sources of uranium and in 1984 Iranian radio announced that negotiations with Niger on the purchase of uranium were nearing conclusion. In 1985 another broadcast openly discussed the discovery of uranium deposits in Iran with the director of Iran’s atomic energy organization. In 1992, an IAEA spokesperson, Melissa Flemming, confirmed that its inspectors had visited the mines and Iran had announced plans to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle. (Source: Associated Press, 10 February 2003 and “Front End nuclear capability being developed”, Nuclear Engineering International, 31 March 2003).
Tehran had openly entered into negotiations with several nations, including Brazil, Russia, India, Argentina, Germany, Ukraine and Spain, for the purchase of nuclear energy facilities and components. Almost all of these deals ultimately fell through after pressure from Washington. Iran finally turned to the Soviet Union( later Russia) and concluded a deal in .
Despite economic ties with Iran and a foothold into the Moslem world, under pressure from the U.S., Russian officials expelled Iranians studying nuclear physics and missile science from Russian schools in late 1997 (Iran Times, August 22, 1997). They also halted all vocational training of Iranian students in fields that may have had applications for nuclear weapons and missiles. In addition to this, the power stations that Iran bought from Russia and China are peaceful nuclear technology. President Yeltsin assured Washington that Iran would not be able to make weapons-grade plutonium and that he had canceled the "military components" of two nuclear reactors bound for Iran. Under U.S. pressure, both Ukraine and China have made some adjustments. China also suspended the sale of a plant for the conversion of uranium hexafluoride, which is required for making fuel rod.
None of this points to a covert nuclear program.
For readers who feel some relief that the prospect of an imminent war has somewhat faded, let us be reminded of the report’s ‘findings’, its implications, and of recent history.
Word is being circulated that sanctions were effective in curbing Iran’s nuclear weapons program. First, as discussed above, Iran did not have a nuclear weapons program, and second, Iran voluntarily halted its enrichment program two years BEFORE sanctions were imposed on it.
The international community must put pressure on world leaders to lift current sanctions on Iran. It cannot be emphasized strongly enough that sanctions are a form of long warfare. How can we forget the 500,000 Iraqi children who died as a result of our sanctions? We shamelessly overlook the other Iraqis whose lives we took with our sanctions. As citizens of the country we live in and as members of a global community, each one of us must be reminded of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” and act on it:
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
sorayau@earthlink.net
‘To subdue an enemy without fighting is the acme of skill…’ - Sun Tzu
Under the current administration, it is increasingly difficult to know who the enemy is, but what is certain is that the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is a brilliantly executed psychological warfare by way of misinformation. This dastardly plan is so devious that even the anti-war groups are jubilant at its release, and they are naively sharing its contents. Perhaps non are as enthusiastic about the report as the most powerful lobby group in America hostile to Iran.
The AIPAC was quick to announce: "Far from acquitting Iran, the NIE reveals that Tehran continues to violate the international community's calls to end the pursuit of the fuel cycle and the ability to make highly enriched uranium, concludes that Iran has utilized and has at its disposal a hidden, secret second unacknowledged, unmonitored track for enriching bomb fuel, and has engaged in a nuclear weaponization program, an assessment never before made public by the American intelligence community". "All in all, it's a clarion call for additional and continued effort to pressure Iran economically and politically to end its illicit nuclear programs” (source JTA http://www.jta.org/cgi-bin/iowa/breaking/105674.html).
The NIE claims that ‘Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003’. This report now in circulation, and being repeated by every media outlet, and as importantly, by way of word of mouth, is giving credibility to the warmongers that Iran actually had a nuclear weapons program, with the idea that ‘repetition begets belief’. Drumming home a false message, the White House will get the justification it needs to impose further sanctions, with the idea of escalating into a war.
In December 2002, an Iranian terrorist group, the Mojahedeen-e Khalg (MEK), listed on the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, informed the U.S. government of the existence of two nuclear sites in Iran. Sy Hersh later revealed in The New Yorker that Israel had provided them with this information. It must also be pointed out that as a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is not under any obligations to inform the IAEA of construction sites. However, members must inform the Atomic Agency 180 days prior to introducing uranium processing equipment and material to the site. Once the United States confirmed the existence of the sites by satellite, it accused Tehran of "across-the-board pursuit of weapons of mass destruction." To dispel such accusations, Iran agreed to intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This accusation was false.
Iran was late in reporting which is a Safeguard issue. In a spirit of cooperation, and in an attempt to demonstrate its in October 2003, after meeting French, German and British foreign ministers, Tehran voluntarily stopped the process of enriched uranium; it also allowed the IAEA to carry out intrusive, spot inspections. No country has allowed as many inspection hours as Iran. In the meanwhile, it proposed to operate Iran’s enrichment program as joint ventures with private and public sector firms from other countries; this would ensure that the program remained transparent and could not be secretly diverted for military purposes, at the same time it would maintain Iran’s sovereignty by having an indigenously enriched uranium cycle (source: IAEA Bulletin Online, vol 46, no 2, 2004 “Nuclear fuel cycle: which way forward for multilateral approaches?”) . Although this was rejected, Iran continued to cooperate.
Iran suspended its enrichment activities for two and half years, but each time under pressure from the U.S., the burden of proof was transferred to Iran knowing the negative could not be proved. Instead of Iran getting the full cooperation of the IAEA for the development of nuclear technology, it was ordered to stop preparations for large-scale uranium enrichment. In 2005 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell labeled Iran a growing danger and called for the UN Security Council to impose sanctions.
According to Article 19 of Iran’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the Agency may refer Iran to the UN Security Council if it is “unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this agreement, to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”. The IAEA had reported that all declared fissile material in Iran had been accounted for, and none has been diverted. (source: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n009.html)
In December 2006, Congress overwhelmingly signed a controversial bill to expand the sale of civilian nuclear technology to India. Not only is this bill in violation of Article III of the NPT given that India is not a member state of the NPT, but the irony is that the catalyst for the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG)) in 1976 was India’s nuclear test. This group (first called the London Group) met to restrain the transfer of uranium-enrichment and plutonium-extraction equipment and technology. What added to the Iranian grievance was the speech given by undersecretary of State, Nicholas Burns, as he announced the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation: “after 30 years we have realized that the NPT is ineffective, therefore we are going to reward India for non-proliferation . In response to a reporter who quizzed him about Iran, he said we plan to punish Iran for violating the NPT. Iran was sent to the UNSC, however, later it was revealed by (former) undersecretary for arms control Radermaker that the U.S. had coerced India into voting against Iran.
As for the covert operations Iran is accused of, again, it is worthwhile examining the facts versus the mainstream media propaganda.
In 1982 Iranian officials announced that they planned to build a reactor powered by their own uranium at the Isfahan nuclear technology centre after the Iraqis destroyed the one almost completed under the Shah. The IAEA inspected that and other facilities in Iran in 1983, and planned to assist Iran in converting yellowcake into reactor fuel. The IAEA report stated clearly that its aim was to “contribute to the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain an ambitious program in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology” – the inalienable right of an NPT signatory under Article IV, but the agency’s assistance program was terminated under US pressure (source: Mark Hibbs, “US in 1983 stopped IAEA from helping Iran make UF6", Nuclear Fuel, 4 August 2003).
Undeterred, Iran searched for alternatives sources of uranium and in 1984 Iranian radio announced that negotiations with Niger on the purchase of uranium were nearing conclusion. In 1985 another broadcast openly discussed the discovery of uranium deposits in Iran with the director of Iran’s atomic energy organization. In 1992, an IAEA spokesperson, Melissa Flemming, confirmed that its inspectors had visited the mines and Iran had announced plans to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle. (Source: Associated Press, 10 February 2003 and “Front End nuclear capability being developed”, Nuclear Engineering International, 31 March 2003).
Tehran had openly entered into negotiations with several nations, including Brazil, Russia, India, Argentina, Germany, Ukraine and Spain, for the purchase of nuclear energy facilities and components. Almost all of these deals ultimately fell through after pressure from Washington. Iran finally turned to the Soviet Union( later Russia) and concluded a deal in .
Despite economic ties with Iran and a foothold into the Moslem world, under pressure from the U.S., Russian officials expelled Iranians studying nuclear physics and missile science from Russian schools in late 1997 (Iran Times, August 22, 1997). They also halted all vocational training of Iranian students in fields that may have had applications for nuclear weapons and missiles. In addition to this, the power stations that Iran bought from Russia and China are peaceful nuclear technology. President Yeltsin assured Washington that Iran would not be able to make weapons-grade plutonium and that he had canceled the "military components" of two nuclear reactors bound for Iran. Under U.S. pressure, both Ukraine and China have made some adjustments. China also suspended the sale of a plant for the conversion of uranium hexafluoride, which is required for making fuel rod.
None of this points to a covert nuclear program.
For readers who feel some relief that the prospect of an imminent war has somewhat faded, let us be reminded of the report’s ‘findings’, its implications, and of recent history.
Word is being circulated that sanctions were effective in curbing Iran’s nuclear weapons program. First, as discussed above, Iran did not have a nuclear weapons program, and second, Iran voluntarily halted its enrichment program two years BEFORE sanctions were imposed on it.
The international community must put pressure on world leaders to lift current sanctions on Iran. It cannot be emphasized strongly enough that sanctions are a form of long warfare. How can we forget the 500,000 Iraqi children who died as a result of our sanctions? We shamelessly overlook the other Iraqis whose lives we took with our sanctions. As citizens of the country we live in and as members of a global community, each one of us must be reminded of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” and act on it:
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
sorayau@earthlink.net
Friday, November 16, 2007
Summary of the latest IAEA report on Iran
F. Summary (emphasis added)
39. The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. Iran concluded a Facility Attachment for FEP. However, it should be noted that, since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the Agency’s knowledge about Iran’s current nuclear programme is diminishing.
40. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP. Iran has also continued the construction of the IR-40 and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant. 41. There are two remaining major issues relevant to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear programme: Iran’s past and current centrifuge enrichment programme and the alleged studies. The Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided on the declared past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes are consistent with its findings. The Agency will, however, continue to seek corroboration and is continuing to verify the completeness of Iran’s declarations. The Agency intends in the next few weeks to focus on the contamination issue as well as the alleged studies and other activities that could have military applications.
42. Iran has provided sufficient access to individuals and has responded in a timely manner to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on issues raised in the context of the work plan. However, its cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive. As previously stated, Iran’s active cooperation and full transparency are indispensable for full and prompt implementation of the work plan.
43. In addition, Iran needs to continue to build confidence about the scope and nature of its present programme. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme requires that the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Although the Agency has no concrete information, other than that addressed through the work plan, about possible current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran without full implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially important in the light of Iran’s undeclared activities for almost two decades and the need to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Therefore, the Director General again urges Iran to implement the Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date. The Director General also urges Iran to implement all the confidence building measures required by the Security Council, including the suspension of all enrichment related activities.
44. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
------
The picture is simple:
1) Iran has proven that its nuclear program is fully accounted for and thereby that it is purely civilian in nature
2) Iran refuses to stop enriching uranium, which it is fully entitled to do as a member of the NPT, even though the UNSC (illegally, in violation of NTP obligations) demands that Iran stops all enrichment
Iran is thus no 'threat' to anyone. The 'illegal Iranian nuclear weapons program' canard is dead.
Full text of the report (in PDF format) available here
39. The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. Iran concluded a Facility Attachment for FEP. However, it should be noted that, since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the Agency’s knowledge about Iran’s current nuclear programme is diminishing.
40. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP. Iran has also continued the construction of the IR-40 and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant. 41. There are two remaining major issues relevant to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear programme: Iran’s past and current centrifuge enrichment programme and the alleged studies. The Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided on the declared past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes are consistent with its findings. The Agency will, however, continue to seek corroboration and is continuing to verify the completeness of Iran’s declarations. The Agency intends in the next few weeks to focus on the contamination issue as well as the alleged studies and other activities that could have military applications.
42. Iran has provided sufficient access to individuals and has responded in a timely manner to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on issues raised in the context of the work plan. However, its cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive. As previously stated, Iran’s active cooperation and full transparency are indispensable for full and prompt implementation of the work plan.
43. In addition, Iran needs to continue to build confidence about the scope and nature of its present programme. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme requires that the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Although the Agency has no concrete information, other than that addressed through the work plan, about possible current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran without full implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially important in the light of Iran’s undeclared activities for almost two decades and the need to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Therefore, the Director General again urges Iran to implement the Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date. The Director General also urges Iran to implement all the confidence building measures required by the Security Council, including the suspension of all enrichment related activities.
44. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
------
The picture is simple:
1) Iran has proven that its nuclear program is fully accounted for and thereby that it is purely civilian in nature
2) Iran refuses to stop enriching uranium, which it is fully entitled to do as a member of the NPT, even though the UNSC (illegally, in violation of NTP obligations) demands that Iran stops all enrichment
Iran is thus no 'threat' to anyone. The 'illegal Iranian nuclear weapons program' canard is dead.
Full text of the report (in PDF format) available here
Monday, October 29, 2007
ElBaradei: No Evidence That Iran is Building Nuclear Weapons
(DemocracyNow) UN atomic watchdog chief Mohamed ElBaradei said Sunday the International Atomic Energy Agency has no evidence that Iran is building nuclear weapons. During an interview on CNN, ElBaradei urged the Bush administration to back away from its bellicose statements about Iran.
Mohamed ElBaradei: "I very much have concern about confrontation, building confrontation, Wolf, because that would lead absolutely to a disaster. I see no military solution. The only durable solution is through negotiations and inspections… My fear if that we continue to escalate from both sides from both sides that we would end up into a precipice, we would end up into an abyss. As I said, the Middle East is in a total mess, to say the least. And we cannot add fuel to the fire."
Earlier this month President Bush warned that World War III could begin if Iran obtains the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon. But on Sunday Mohamed ElBaradei said the UN has no evidence that Iran is running a nuclear weapons program.
Mohamed ElBaradei: "But have we seen having the nuclear material that can be readily used into a weapon? No. Have we seen an active weaponization program? No. So there is a concern, but there is also time to clarify these concerns."
Mohamed ElBaradei: "I very much have concern about confrontation, building confrontation, Wolf, because that would lead absolutely to a disaster. I see no military solution. The only durable solution is through negotiations and inspections… My fear if that we continue to escalate from both sides from both sides that we would end up into a precipice, we would end up into an abyss. As I said, the Middle East is in a total mess, to say the least. And we cannot add fuel to the fire."Earlier this month President Bush warned that World War III could begin if Iran obtains the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon. But on Sunday Mohamed ElBaradei said the UN has no evidence that Iran is running a nuclear weapons program.
Mohamed ElBaradei: "But have we seen having the nuclear material that can be readily used into a weapon? No. Have we seen an active weaponization program? No. So there is a concern, but there is also time to clarify these concerns."
Saturday, September 15, 2007
Proxy war could soon turn to direct conflict, analysts warn
US strikes on Iran predicted as tension rises over arms smuggling and nuclear fears
by Julian Borger and Ian Black for the Guardian
The growing US focus on confronting Iran in a proxy war inside Iraq risks triggering a direct conflict in the next few months, regional analysts are warning.
US-Iranian tensions have mounted significantly in the past few days, with heightened rhetoric on both sides and the US decision to establish a military base in Iraq less than five miles from the Iranian border to block the smuggling of Iranian arms to Shia militias.
The involvement of a few hundred British troops in the anti-smuggling operation also raises the risk of their involvement in a cross-border clash.
US officers have alleged that an advanced Iranian-made missile had been fired at an American base from a Shia area, which if confirmed would be a significant escalation in the "proxy war" referred to this week by General David Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq.
"The proxy war that has been going on in Iraq may now cross the border. This is a very dangerous period," Patrick Cronin, the director of studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said.
Iran's leaders have so far shown every sign of relishing the confrontation. The supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared yesterday that American policies had failed in the Middle East and warned: "I am certain that one day Bush and senior American officials will be tried in an international court for the tragedies they have created in Iraq."
In such circumstances, last week's Israeli air strike against a mystery site in northern Syria has triggered speculation over its motives. Israel has been silent about the attack. Syria complained to the UN security council but gave few details. Some say the target was Iranian weapons on their way to Hizbullah in Lebanon, or that the sortie was a dry run for a US-Israeli attack on Syria and Iran. There is even speculation that the Israelis took out a nuclear facility funded by Iran and supplied by North Korea
The situation is particularly volatile because the struggle for influence threatens to exacerbate a confrontation over Tehran's nuclear ambitions.
The US has called a meeting of major powers in Washington next Friday to discuss Iran's defiance of UN resolutions calling for its suspension of uranium enrichment. It comes amid signs that the Bush administration is running out of patience with diplomatic efforts to curb the nuclear programme. Hawks led by the vice-president, Dick Cheney, are intensifying their push for military action, with support from Israel and privately from some Sunni Gulf states.
"Washington is seriously reviewing plans to bomb not just nuclear sites, but oil sites, military sites and even leadership targets. The talk is of multiple targets," said Mr Cronin. "In Washington there is very serious discussion that this is a window that has to be looked at seriously because there is only six months to 'do something about Iran' before it will be looked at as a purely political issue."
US presidential elections are due in November 2008, and military action at the height of the campaign is usually seen by voters as politically motivated.
Vincent Cannistraro, a former CIA counter-terrorism chief who is now a security analyst, said: "The decision to attack was made some time ago. It will be in two stages. If a smoking gun is found in terms of Iranian interference in Iraq, the US will retaliate on a tactical level, and they will strike against military targets. The second part of this is: Bush has made the decision to launch a strategic attack against Iranian nuclear facilities, although not before next year. He has been lining up some Sunni countries for tacit support for his actions."
US and British officials have complained to Iran about the use by Shia militias in Iraq of what they say are Iranian-made weapons. The main concern is the proliferation of roadside bombs that fire a bolt of molten metal through any thickness of armour, which the officials say must have been made in Iran.
A US military spokesman in Baghdad, Major General Kevin Bergner, raised the stakes when he said the 240mm rocket that hit the US military headquarters outside Baghdad this week, killing an American soldier and wounding 11, had been supplied to Shia militants by Iran.
Gen Bergner used to work in the White House, where he was aligned with administration hawks, and his dispatch to Baghdad was seen by some as a move to increase pressure on Iran.
"There are an awful lot of lower level officers who are very angry about the deaths from explosively formed projectiles said to come from Iran. There is a certain amount of military pressure to do something about this," said Patrick Clawson, the deputy director for research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "That said, it is very difficult for us to do anything without much better evidence. In that respect, border control is a sensible solution."
Any US decision to attack Iran would force Gordon Brown to choose between creating a serious rift in the transatlantic alliance and participating in or endorsing American actions. British officials insist that Washington has given no sign it is ready to abandon diplomacy and argue that UN sanctions are showing signs of working. They point to the resurgence in Iran of Hashemi Rafsanjani, seen as a pragmatic counterweight to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Hopes that a new war could still be avoided have also been boosted by Gen Petraeus's claim that Iran's covert Quds force alleged to be supporting Shia attacks on coalition forces had been pulled out of Iraq. If true, it could be that in the stand-off between the US and Iran, Iran has blinked first.
by Julian Borger and Ian Black for the Guardian
The growing US focus on confronting Iran in a proxy war inside Iraq risks triggering a direct conflict in the next few months, regional analysts are warning.
US-Iranian tensions have mounted significantly in the past few days, with heightened rhetoric on both sides and the US decision to establish a military base in Iraq less than five miles from the Iranian border to block the smuggling of Iranian arms to Shia militias.
The involvement of a few hundred British troops in the anti-smuggling operation also raises the risk of their involvement in a cross-border clash.
US officers have alleged that an advanced Iranian-made missile had been fired at an American base from a Shia area, which if confirmed would be a significant escalation in the "proxy war" referred to this week by General David Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq.
"The proxy war that has been going on in Iraq may now cross the border. This is a very dangerous period," Patrick Cronin, the director of studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said.
Iran's leaders have so far shown every sign of relishing the confrontation. The supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared yesterday that American policies had failed in the Middle East and warned: "I am certain that one day Bush and senior American officials will be tried in an international court for the tragedies they have created in Iraq."
In such circumstances, last week's Israeli air strike against a mystery site in northern Syria has triggered speculation over its motives. Israel has been silent about the attack. Syria complained to the UN security council but gave few details. Some say the target was Iranian weapons on their way to Hizbullah in Lebanon, or that the sortie was a dry run for a US-Israeli attack on Syria and Iran. There is even speculation that the Israelis took out a nuclear facility funded by Iran and supplied by North Korea
The situation is particularly volatile because the struggle for influence threatens to exacerbate a confrontation over Tehran's nuclear ambitions.
The US has called a meeting of major powers in Washington next Friday to discuss Iran's defiance of UN resolutions calling for its suspension of uranium enrichment. It comes amid signs that the Bush administration is running out of patience with diplomatic efforts to curb the nuclear programme. Hawks led by the vice-president, Dick Cheney, are intensifying their push for military action, with support from Israel and privately from some Sunni Gulf states.
"Washington is seriously reviewing plans to bomb not just nuclear sites, but oil sites, military sites and even leadership targets. The talk is of multiple targets," said Mr Cronin. "In Washington there is very serious discussion that this is a window that has to be looked at seriously because there is only six months to 'do something about Iran' before it will be looked at as a purely political issue."
US presidential elections are due in November 2008, and military action at the height of the campaign is usually seen by voters as politically motivated.
Vincent Cannistraro, a former CIA counter-terrorism chief who is now a security analyst, said: "The decision to attack was made some time ago. It will be in two stages. If a smoking gun is found in terms of Iranian interference in Iraq, the US will retaliate on a tactical level, and they will strike against military targets. The second part of this is: Bush has made the decision to launch a strategic attack against Iranian nuclear facilities, although not before next year. He has been lining up some Sunni countries for tacit support for his actions."
US and British officials have complained to Iran about the use by Shia militias in Iraq of what they say are Iranian-made weapons. The main concern is the proliferation of roadside bombs that fire a bolt of molten metal through any thickness of armour, which the officials say must have been made in Iran.
A US military spokesman in Baghdad, Major General Kevin Bergner, raised the stakes when he said the 240mm rocket that hit the US military headquarters outside Baghdad this week, killing an American soldier and wounding 11, had been supplied to Shia militants by Iran.
Gen Bergner used to work in the White House, where he was aligned with administration hawks, and his dispatch to Baghdad was seen by some as a move to increase pressure on Iran.
"There are an awful lot of lower level officers who are very angry about the deaths from explosively formed projectiles said to come from Iran. There is a certain amount of military pressure to do something about this," said Patrick Clawson, the deputy director for research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "That said, it is very difficult for us to do anything without much better evidence. In that respect, border control is a sensible solution."
Any US decision to attack Iran would force Gordon Brown to choose between creating a serious rift in the transatlantic alliance and participating in or endorsing American actions. British officials insist that Washington has given no sign it is ready to abandon diplomacy and argue that UN sanctions are showing signs of working. They point to the resurgence in Iran of Hashemi Rafsanjani, seen as a pragmatic counterweight to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Hopes that a new war could still be avoided have also been boosted by Gen Petraeus's claim that Iran's covert Quds force alleged to be supporting Shia attacks on coalition forces had been pulled out of Iraq. If true, it could be that in the stand-off between the US and Iran, Iran has blinked first.
Thursday, September 13, 2007
Israeli point of view on US-Iran confrontation: "The moment of truth is approaching"
By Shmuel Rosner in Washington and Aluf Benn in Jerusalem
Standing on the deck of his ship, Vice Admiral Doug Crowder, the senior commander of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk, rebuffed the speculations directed at him. No, he said, in reference to the large-scale military maneuvers in the Indian Ocean, there is "no connection between this exercise and any other country" - that is, Iran or China. Nevertheless, this was one of the largest exercises ever, right at the mouth of the Arabian Sea, a collaboration between the United States and India, with the active participation of forces from Japan, Australia and Singapore. The exercise was called Operation Malabar, and 28 ships, one submarine and more than 150 fighter planes took part in it. It ended a few days ago.
In recent months, the USS Nimitz, an aircraft carrier that also participated in the exercise, has been stationed in the Persian Gulf, serving as a major part of the American military force building up on Iran's border. Of late, the Nimitz and the USS John C. Stennis, yet another carrier, have been sailing back and forth in the waters of the Gulf. The USS Enterprise has also been part of the rotation. This week it emerged that the United States is also planning to build a military base on the land border with Iran, albeit a small one. It is supposed to serve as a crossing point on the way to Baghdad and is intended to prevent the passage of unwanted visitors.
The effort to prevent Iran from joining the prestigious club of nuclear powers will top Israel's strategic and diplomatic agenda during the new year. There is no national or international issue that is more important, and the decisions that will be made by U.S. President George W. Bush will shape the regional balance of power for many years to come. The talks Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is conducting with Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas will be a sideshow, no more than a warm-up act, even if they result in agreements, understandings and spectacular ceremonies.
The Iranian atom has been engaging Israel's defense and strategic establishment for nearly 15 years but only during the past year - in the wake of the decrease in Palestinian suicide terror, the Israel Defense Forces' failure to deal with Hezbollah, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's threats of destruction - that the threat has begun to sink into public consciousness and to feature in public opinion polls as the principal one to Israel.
So far, this fear has not found expression in Israel's overt behavior: Real estate prices are soaring and there is no word of a wave of emigration. At most, Israelis of European descent are acquiring foreign passports for a rainy day, but it is not at all clear whether this trend is connected to the Iranian threat.
The government is dealing with the Iranian issue behind closed doors and is saying little, on the grounds that it is "an international and not an Israeli problem." In fact, there is not even a real political debate concerning Iran. Even the extreme left is not proposing that Israel hold a dialogue with a bitter foe such as Ahmadinejad, and the right is avoiding public exhortations to launch an attack on the Iranian nuclear installations. Everyone is united in calling for an increase in international pressure on Tehran - pressure that has thus far resulted in "signs of success," which are in actual fact quite far from success.
Washington. The moment of truth is approaching
At the University of New Hampshire's Whittemore Center Arena, known locally as the Whitt, the contenders for the 2008 Republican presidential nomination gathered last week for the first political debate of the fall. Toward the end of the discussion they were asked to weigh in on the following scenario regarding Iran: "Its nuclear program has continued to advance. United Nations weapons inspectors are now saying that it appears Iran is on the verge of being able to produce, and may already be producing, nuclear weapons. Iran has suspended its cooperation with the UN nuclear agency and has asked the inspectors to leave the country. Cross-border incidents in Iraq involving elements of the Revolutionary Guard continue to increase and pose a continuing problem for U.S. forces there and for the Iraqis as well. The UN Security Council has imposed some economic sanctions on Iran, but has refused to authorize the use of force against that country. In addition, the threats by Iran's leader against Israel have become more pronounced and more extreme. What do you do?"
Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas replied: "I think the problem with your question and scenario is it's an all too likely scenario. What you're describing is much of the situation we're facing today." Senator John McCain of Arizona agreed. "Your hypothetical is closer to reality than many of us appreciate," he said. In any case, it is doubtful the decision will wait for president McCain, or Brownback, or Rudy Giuliani or even for one of the Democratic candidates, who now look like they have a better chance of winning the election. The public silence and the slow progress of Iran's nuclear engineers have allowed the frequent postponement of the decision. However, this coming year, Bush's last in the White House (his terms ends in January 2009), the fence-sitting will come to an end.
Even though it often seems like the American president is no more than a lame duck, and Bush has been looking like that for some time now, the American presidency has a long tradition of making crucial decisions in an election year. This is true both with regard to matters that concern the U.S. and matters that concern Israel, and it affects presidents running for re-election, like Harry Truman, the U.S. leader who recognized Israel, as well as presidents ending their term in office, like Lyndon B. Johnson, who approved the sale of Phantom jets to Israel, and Ronald Reagan, who entered into a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization. The current president, too, sent a famous letter to former prime minister Ariel Sharon in his previous election year, 2004.
But the envelope Bush will consider sending to Iran is heavier and its postage is more costly. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who met Bush during a short summer vacation he spent not far from the Bush family estate in Penobscot, Maine, correctly identified the approaching moment of decision. The Iranian nuclear program, he declared upon his return, is the number 1 international problem. And if this is how things look from tranquil Paris, certainly they appear this way in threatened Israel.
Ever since the cease-fire in Lebanon, the regional arena has been preparing for a confrontation between the United States and Iran that will determine which of the two will be the leading power in the region. As has been the case before every major war in history, this time, too, the two sides are forming alliances. The Iranians with Syria, Hezbollah and "Hamastan" in the Gaza Strip, and more loosely with Russia; the Americans with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Fatah in the West Bank, and Israel. These alliances are manifested in massive transfers of arms and military aid, in increasing operational coordination between Iran and its partners and, from another angle, in an attempt to revive the peace process between Israel and the Arabs.
The gathering forces themselves testify that a war is inevitable. Or they could lead to an increase in deterrence and give rise to a cold war in the Middle East that would manifest itself in a struggle for spheres of influence and wars by proxy, like the Second Lebanon War or Hamas' takeover of Gaza.
Bush will have to decide whether to throw his waning power into a final fight against Iran or to procrastinate in barren diplomatic talks and pass the buck to his successor. The risks of an attack on Iran are tremendous. Iran is strong enough to respond and to cause harm around the world. It is doubtful that a new president would want to take upon him- or herself the risk of a new war in the Middle East. This is why, if Bush blinks and refrains from taking action, Iran will be able to luxuriate in its new status as the world's 10th nuclear power. Tenth, but certainly not last.
Assessments have already been written in Washington predicting that many states will follow in Iran's footsteps: Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia. The nuclear anti-proliferation regime will collapse - in the Middle East of all places, where the ties between states and dubious organizations can make Washington's ultimate nightmare scenario come true: the atom in the service of terror.
Jerusalem and Ramallah. Lining up
And if Bush hesitates, will Israel attack Iran on its own? Olmert has declared that Israel will not countenance a nuclear Iran. In so doing he signaled his continued allegiance to the "Begin doctrine," what researchers and theoreticians have associated with the destruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981. It holds that Israel will use force to prevent hostile elements in the region from obtaining nuclear weapons.
In embarking on the Second Lebanon War, and as has become evident as a result of decisions he made in its wake, Olmert has demonstrated that he does not hesitate to use force. Certainly not when an experienced and activist defense minister like Ehud Barak is at his side. The question is whether this determination will suffice when the relevant targets are distant, scattered and fortified in deep bunkers.
There are quite a few Israeli experts and officials who do not believe in a solution by force. In their opinion, while Ahmadinejad and his buddies want power and influence, they are not crazy and will not dare to use nuclear weapons. In contrast, the Likud's chair, MK Benjamin Netanyahu, likes to say that the Iranians would agree to lose a million lives in an attempt to destroy the Zionist project.
For now, Israel's main contribution to the formation of a front against Iran has not been in the military arena but rather in advancing negotiations with the Palestinians. Judging by their public statements, Bush and Olmert would be more than happy to forge a deal between them to the effect that an evacuation of the settlements and an end to the Israeli occupation would be rewarded with the destruction of Iran's nuclear installations. Ofra and Beit El in return for Natanz and Isfahan. Such a deal would help both states justify their actions: Olmert would be able to tell the settlers and their supporters that the evacuation constitutes a reasonable price for the elimination of an existential danger. Bush, in turn, would be able to deal with his European and Arab critics by presenting them with an impressive achievement in a matter where others have so far failed. But this is nothing but a fantasy. Bush and Olmert aren't running the world by themselves and the reality in which they are acting is far more complex.
Nevertheless, Olmert is moving in this direction in the talks he is holding with Mahmoud Abbas on a formula for ending the conflict. He has developed good personal relations with the Palestinian leader in their one-on-one meetings in the prime minister's private study. They praise one another to other people.
According to Israelis with connections to the Palestinian side, the veteran Abbas has been surprised by his interlocutor's inexperience. "I can't believe you aren't insisting on this," Abbas told Olmert in reference to one of the issues that was discussed at length and did not result in any agreement during the Oslo period. Olmert offered him a number of Jerusalem neighborhoods and was interested in whether the "safe passage" between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank could be considered an exchange of territories that would satisfy the Palestinians in exchange for the annexation of settlement blocs to Israel. They also spoke a great deal about the refugees.
The deadline Bush set for them, the peace conference in November ("It isn't a conference, it's a meeting," Olmert has been insisting, in coordination with the Americans), obligates them to arrive at "something." This something will not consist of a signed agreement along the lines of Oslo but rather will be a joint statement, an agreed-upon document or a speech by Bush with whose contents Abbas and Olmert will agree. The conference is supposed to be followed by more detailed negotiations that will be reinforced by an Israeli gesture to the Palestinians. Hamas and its friends will of course try to spoil the party, with terror attacks or an escalation in Qassam rockets, which will drag the IDF back into Gaza and cause the delicate diplomatic process to implode.
In agreeing to meet with Olmert on Monday in Jerusalem, Abbas demonstrated that he was ignoring Syria's claim of an Israel Air Force infiltration into its territory and showed that he would rather advance the agreement with Israel than evince solidarity with the Arab country that is providing sponsorship for his rivals. But this is a small gesture. It will be far more interesting to see whether Saudi Arabia shakes off its traditional reticence and sends a senior representative to the Washington conference, who will have his picture taken with Olmert and indicate the support of King Abdullah, the guardian of Islam's holy places, for the move of reconciliation with Israel. If that happens - and Olmert believes it will - the front against Iran will receive important reinforcement. This would also serve as a reminder to Bush that the moment of truth is approaching: Saudi Arabia, just like Israel, does not want a nuclear Iran as a neighbor.
Standing on the deck of his ship, Vice Admiral Doug Crowder, the senior commander of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk, rebuffed the speculations directed at him. No, he said, in reference to the large-scale military maneuvers in the Indian Ocean, there is "no connection between this exercise and any other country" - that is, Iran or China. Nevertheless, this was one of the largest exercises ever, right at the mouth of the Arabian Sea, a collaboration between the United States and India, with the active participation of forces from Japan, Australia and Singapore. The exercise was called Operation Malabar, and 28 ships, one submarine and more than 150 fighter planes took part in it. It ended a few days ago.
In recent months, the USS Nimitz, an aircraft carrier that also participated in the exercise, has been stationed in the Persian Gulf, serving as a major part of the American military force building up on Iran's border. Of late, the Nimitz and the USS John C. Stennis, yet another carrier, have been sailing back and forth in the waters of the Gulf. The USS Enterprise has also been part of the rotation. This week it emerged that the United States is also planning to build a military base on the land border with Iran, albeit a small one. It is supposed to serve as a crossing point on the way to Baghdad and is intended to prevent the passage of unwanted visitors.
The effort to prevent Iran from joining the prestigious club of nuclear powers will top Israel's strategic and diplomatic agenda during the new year. There is no national or international issue that is more important, and the decisions that will be made by U.S. President George W. Bush will shape the regional balance of power for many years to come. The talks Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is conducting with Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas will be a sideshow, no more than a warm-up act, even if they result in agreements, understandings and spectacular ceremonies.
The Iranian atom has been engaging Israel's defense and strategic establishment for nearly 15 years but only during the past year - in the wake of the decrease in Palestinian suicide terror, the Israel Defense Forces' failure to deal with Hezbollah, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's threats of destruction - that the threat has begun to sink into public consciousness and to feature in public opinion polls as the principal one to Israel.
So far, this fear has not found expression in Israel's overt behavior: Real estate prices are soaring and there is no word of a wave of emigration. At most, Israelis of European descent are acquiring foreign passports for a rainy day, but it is not at all clear whether this trend is connected to the Iranian threat.
The government is dealing with the Iranian issue behind closed doors and is saying little, on the grounds that it is "an international and not an Israeli problem." In fact, there is not even a real political debate concerning Iran. Even the extreme left is not proposing that Israel hold a dialogue with a bitter foe such as Ahmadinejad, and the right is avoiding public exhortations to launch an attack on the Iranian nuclear installations. Everyone is united in calling for an increase in international pressure on Tehran - pressure that has thus far resulted in "signs of success," which are in actual fact quite far from success.
Washington. The moment of truth is approaching
At the University of New Hampshire's Whittemore Center Arena, known locally as the Whitt, the contenders for the 2008 Republican presidential nomination gathered last week for the first political debate of the fall. Toward the end of the discussion they were asked to weigh in on the following scenario regarding Iran: "Its nuclear program has continued to advance. United Nations weapons inspectors are now saying that it appears Iran is on the verge of being able to produce, and may already be producing, nuclear weapons. Iran has suspended its cooperation with the UN nuclear agency and has asked the inspectors to leave the country. Cross-border incidents in Iraq involving elements of the Revolutionary Guard continue to increase and pose a continuing problem for U.S. forces there and for the Iraqis as well. The UN Security Council has imposed some economic sanctions on Iran, but has refused to authorize the use of force against that country. In addition, the threats by Iran's leader against Israel have become more pronounced and more extreme. What do you do?"
Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas replied: "I think the problem with your question and scenario is it's an all too likely scenario. What you're describing is much of the situation we're facing today." Senator John McCain of Arizona agreed. "Your hypothetical is closer to reality than many of us appreciate," he said. In any case, it is doubtful the decision will wait for president McCain, or Brownback, or Rudy Giuliani or even for one of the Democratic candidates, who now look like they have a better chance of winning the election. The public silence and the slow progress of Iran's nuclear engineers have allowed the frequent postponement of the decision. However, this coming year, Bush's last in the White House (his terms ends in January 2009), the fence-sitting will come to an end.
Even though it often seems like the American president is no more than a lame duck, and Bush has been looking like that for some time now, the American presidency has a long tradition of making crucial decisions in an election year. This is true both with regard to matters that concern the U.S. and matters that concern Israel, and it affects presidents running for re-election, like Harry Truman, the U.S. leader who recognized Israel, as well as presidents ending their term in office, like Lyndon B. Johnson, who approved the sale of Phantom jets to Israel, and Ronald Reagan, who entered into a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization. The current president, too, sent a famous letter to former prime minister Ariel Sharon in his previous election year, 2004.
But the envelope Bush will consider sending to Iran is heavier and its postage is more costly. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who met Bush during a short summer vacation he spent not far from the Bush family estate in Penobscot, Maine, correctly identified the approaching moment of decision. The Iranian nuclear program, he declared upon his return, is the number 1 international problem. And if this is how things look from tranquil Paris, certainly they appear this way in threatened Israel.
Ever since the cease-fire in Lebanon, the regional arena has been preparing for a confrontation between the United States and Iran that will determine which of the two will be the leading power in the region. As has been the case before every major war in history, this time, too, the two sides are forming alliances. The Iranians with Syria, Hezbollah and "Hamastan" in the Gaza Strip, and more loosely with Russia; the Americans with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Fatah in the West Bank, and Israel. These alliances are manifested in massive transfers of arms and military aid, in increasing operational coordination between Iran and its partners and, from another angle, in an attempt to revive the peace process between Israel and the Arabs.
The gathering forces themselves testify that a war is inevitable. Or they could lead to an increase in deterrence and give rise to a cold war in the Middle East that would manifest itself in a struggle for spheres of influence and wars by proxy, like the Second Lebanon War or Hamas' takeover of Gaza.
Bush will have to decide whether to throw his waning power into a final fight against Iran or to procrastinate in barren diplomatic talks and pass the buck to his successor. The risks of an attack on Iran are tremendous. Iran is strong enough to respond and to cause harm around the world. It is doubtful that a new president would want to take upon him- or herself the risk of a new war in the Middle East. This is why, if Bush blinks and refrains from taking action, Iran will be able to luxuriate in its new status as the world's 10th nuclear power. Tenth, but certainly not last.
Assessments have already been written in Washington predicting that many states will follow in Iran's footsteps: Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia. The nuclear anti-proliferation regime will collapse - in the Middle East of all places, where the ties between states and dubious organizations can make Washington's ultimate nightmare scenario come true: the atom in the service of terror.
Jerusalem and Ramallah. Lining up
And if Bush hesitates, will Israel attack Iran on its own? Olmert has declared that Israel will not countenance a nuclear Iran. In so doing he signaled his continued allegiance to the "Begin doctrine," what researchers and theoreticians have associated with the destruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981. It holds that Israel will use force to prevent hostile elements in the region from obtaining nuclear weapons.
In embarking on the Second Lebanon War, and as has become evident as a result of decisions he made in its wake, Olmert has demonstrated that he does not hesitate to use force. Certainly not when an experienced and activist defense minister like Ehud Barak is at his side. The question is whether this determination will suffice when the relevant targets are distant, scattered and fortified in deep bunkers.
There are quite a few Israeli experts and officials who do not believe in a solution by force. In their opinion, while Ahmadinejad and his buddies want power and influence, they are not crazy and will not dare to use nuclear weapons. In contrast, the Likud's chair, MK Benjamin Netanyahu, likes to say that the Iranians would agree to lose a million lives in an attempt to destroy the Zionist project.
For now, Israel's main contribution to the formation of a front against Iran has not been in the military arena but rather in advancing negotiations with the Palestinians. Judging by their public statements, Bush and Olmert would be more than happy to forge a deal between them to the effect that an evacuation of the settlements and an end to the Israeli occupation would be rewarded with the destruction of Iran's nuclear installations. Ofra and Beit El in return for Natanz and Isfahan. Such a deal would help both states justify their actions: Olmert would be able to tell the settlers and their supporters that the evacuation constitutes a reasonable price for the elimination of an existential danger. Bush, in turn, would be able to deal with his European and Arab critics by presenting them with an impressive achievement in a matter where others have so far failed. But this is nothing but a fantasy. Bush and Olmert aren't running the world by themselves and the reality in which they are acting is far more complex.
Nevertheless, Olmert is moving in this direction in the talks he is holding with Mahmoud Abbas on a formula for ending the conflict. He has developed good personal relations with the Palestinian leader in their one-on-one meetings in the prime minister's private study. They praise one another to other people.
According to Israelis with connections to the Palestinian side, the veteran Abbas has been surprised by his interlocutor's inexperience. "I can't believe you aren't insisting on this," Abbas told Olmert in reference to one of the issues that was discussed at length and did not result in any agreement during the Oslo period. Olmert offered him a number of Jerusalem neighborhoods and was interested in whether the "safe passage" between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank could be considered an exchange of territories that would satisfy the Palestinians in exchange for the annexation of settlement blocs to Israel. They also spoke a great deal about the refugees.
The deadline Bush set for them, the peace conference in November ("It isn't a conference, it's a meeting," Olmert has been insisting, in coordination with the Americans), obligates them to arrive at "something." This something will not consist of a signed agreement along the lines of Oslo but rather will be a joint statement, an agreed-upon document or a speech by Bush with whose contents Abbas and Olmert will agree. The conference is supposed to be followed by more detailed negotiations that will be reinforced by an Israeli gesture to the Palestinians. Hamas and its friends will of course try to spoil the party, with terror attacks or an escalation in Qassam rockets, which will drag the IDF back into Gaza and cause the delicate diplomatic process to implode.
In agreeing to meet with Olmert on Monday in Jerusalem, Abbas demonstrated that he was ignoring Syria's claim of an Israel Air Force infiltration into its territory and showed that he would rather advance the agreement with Israel than evince solidarity with the Arab country that is providing sponsorship for his rivals. But this is a small gesture. It will be far more interesting to see whether Saudi Arabia shakes off its traditional reticence and sends a senior representative to the Washington conference, who will have his picture taken with Olmert and indicate the support of King Abdullah, the guardian of Islam's holy places, for the move of reconciliation with Israel. If that happens - and Olmert believes it will - the front against Iran will receive important reinforcement. This would also serve as a reminder to Bush that the moment of truth is approaching: Saudi Arabia, just like Israel, does not want a nuclear Iran as a neighbor.
Tuesday, September 11, 2007
Changing course on Iran
by Abbas Edalat and Mehrnaz Shahabi
Ahead of the crucial meeting of the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which starts today in Vienna, Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the IAEA, has greeted the recent accord between the IAEA and Iran as "a significant step forward".
Following the July visit of the IAEA to Tehran, agreement was reached on an action plan with defined modalities and timetable to address all outstanding ambiguities in relation to Iran's nuclear programme within a strict timeframe until November. As the first outcome of this agreement and a strong vindication of its workability, the August 27 announcement of the IAEA cleared Iran's plutonium experiments - labelled by the US as major evidence of Iran's weaponisation programme. Furthermore, according to a statement, "the Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear material at the enrichment facilities in Iran and has therefore concluded that it remains in peaceful use."
Notwithstanding this very promising development, the US government has described Iran's cooperation with the IAEA as an attempt by the Iranian government to distract from its alleged intention of developing nuclear weapons. This US description prompted the following response from ElBaradei in an interview with Spiegel: "I am familiar with these accusations. They are completely untrue. It's not possible to manipulate us. We are not naive and we do not take sides." Dismissive of the head of IAEA, the US, with some supportive words from Gordon Brown, has recklessly called for a third round of sanctions against Iran by the UN security council, which will no doubt jeopardise the Iran-IAEA agreement as Iran has already warned.
In response to the US stance, ElBaradei warned on Friday that some of the rhetoric against Iran is a reminder of the prelude to the invasion of Iraq and firmly supported the IAEA agreement with Iran. In this context, and faced with the inevitable prospect of Russia vetoing any new sanctions against Iran, the US then adopted a more diplomatic veneer. The US Ambassador to Vienna, Gregory Schulte, while acknowledging the potential of the work plan for resolving "historical questions", reiterated the US persistence that Iran stops its uranium enrichment programme or face sanctions, pressing to force Iran to open "manufacturing and military facilities" to inspection.
In fact, the Bush-Cheney leadership has shown no interest in the resolution of the outstanding problems between the IAEA and Iran since its principal aim is to grossly distort and exaggerate these issues in order to use them as a false pretext for a military action against Iran, very much like the hysteria it created over the alleged but non-existent weapons of mass destruction in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq.
Thus, in contradiction to the recent findings of the IAEA and the agreed work plan with Iran, George Bush, in his belligerent speech of August 28, raising the prospect of US war against Iran, falsely warned that Iran's nuclear programme was spreading the "shadow of nuclear holocaust" over the Middle East. Given the completely discredited WMD charges against Iraq such accusations against Iran are hardly convincing, which is why the US has, since early this year, launched a new propaganda campaign to make Iran a scapegoat for its failures in Iraq and Afghanistan and create a casus belli by trying to implicate the Iranian government in supporting the Iraqi anti-occupation forces with roadside bombs that kill American soldiers. In line with this strategy, Bush declared in his speech: "Iran's leaders ... cannot escape responsibility for aiding attacks against coalition forces ... The Iranian regime must halt these actions. And until it does, I will take actions necessary to protect our troops. I have authorised our military commanders in Iraq to confront Tehran's murderous activities."
However, the US allegations of Iranian involvement in aiding attacks against the coalition forces in Iraq have not been supported by any evidence and, as recently as in the last few weeks, President Karsai and Prime Minister Maliki praised Iran. The British foreign secretary, David Miliband, admitted in his interview with the Financial Times that there was no evidence of Iran's complicity in violence and instability in Iraq.
Strikingly though, their failure to produce a case to attack Iran has not deterred Bush and Cheney to try to sell their new war of aggression to the US public thanks to the massive demonisation of Iran by the western media. If unchallenged, their bellicose statements and call for new sanctions will pave the way for such an assault in what is eerily reminiscent of the prelude to the invasion of Iraq. There are strong warnings from intelligence sources that massive military strikes on Iran's nuclear, military, political and economic infrastructure are ready for execution within the next few months with its widely predicted catastrophic consequences for the people of Iran, the region and the whole world.
Today, a delegation of Iranian academics and MPs alarmed by the threat of an imminent US attack on Iran are urging the Brown government to clearly distance itself from the pursuit of aggressive US foreign policy, to denounce US war plans, oppose another round of sanctions on Iran and persuade the EU as a whole to do the same. The British government, and EU, must insist that the IAEA-Iran agreement be allowed to work within the agreed timeline without any act of sabotage by the US so that the remaining outstanding issues over Iran's nuclear programme are resolved in a peaceful way. Otherwise, if the EU again follows the US to support another round of sanctions on Iran, then it will be complicit in preparing the ground for a new neoconservative illegal war of aggression.
Tuesday, September 4, 2007
Iran’s Nuclear Chess Game
By Nader Bagherzadeh and Soraya Sepahpour-Ulrich
Ali Larijani , who is the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council responsible for nuclear discussions with the West, has called nuclear negotiations a “diplomatic chess.” Perhaps he is implying that like a good chess player he plans a few moves ahead of his opponent. After receiving two sanctions, Larijani had taken the position that as long as the Security Council (SC) refuses to return Iran’s case to the IAEA, Iran will not clarify nuclear ambiguities that have been reported by the Atomic Agency and will continue to reduce cooperation on many additional inspection activities that are not within the framework of the standard Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The grand wizard of current US interventionist foreign policy, Dick Cheney and his cohorts such as Elliot Abrams, were eager to take advantage of this situation and rally up the support of the P5 members of the Security Council for a third and more damaging sanction against Iran. Although the War Party is very much in favor of a military outcome to the current debacle, there are some that prefer the continuation of sanctions to squeeze and isolate Iran even further and not risk another preemptive war in the Middle East with a far more devastating outcome.
However, Larijani’s decision to clarify nuclear activities while under SC sanctions has made grand wizard’s job tougher to get a unanimous support for yet another sanction. That is probably one of the reasons why the war mongering rhetoric from the White House has reached a dangerous level: The opponent does not like Iran’s latest chess move and wants to shake up the board. Bush’s incendiary speech at the American Legion was a clear indication of Cheney’s frustration with Iran and looking to find a way out of this juggernaut, by elevating it to a military confrontation. After all the only way Cheney can be assured that centrifuges will not continue to work after he leaves office is to have them destroyed--enrichment suspension is not good enough.
The result of Larijani’s bold reversal move could not bear fruit unless both Javier Solana and Mohammad El Baradei were willing to engage Iran while US was pushing for more sanctions. El Baradei’s recent balanced comments regarding Iran’s case to BBC and New York Times are truly exemplary of a Nobel Peace laureate and if his actions prevent another illegal and immoral attack by US, he should be fully recognized by UN for his efforts. The IAEA’s latest report has several interesting points about their agreement with Iran for resolving existing concerns that are worth discussing:
1. The plutonium related concerns have all been satisfactorily addressed by Iran. Recall that plutonium is one of the key elements to make a nuclear bomb and also a byproduct of nuclear power reactor. Contrary to what US officials have been saying IAEA does not confirm existence of any plutonium reprocessing activities.
2. According to this agreement all the remaining concerns will be addressed sequentially. Namely once a concern has been fully resolved they will move on to the next one. This is a good move for Iran, since it will allow them to close a file before moving on to the next concern. The agreement schedule is as follows:
• Explain circumstances related to a more advanced centrifuge machine that is in the R&D phase
• Resolve equipment contamination at Tehran University
• Explain uranium metal design document which could be related to instructions for bomb making
• Explain Polonium 210 (Po 210) experimentation; this was used by Russia for their early nuclear bomb designs and for poisoning a former Russian agent in London and caused several death cases in Israel more than 40 years ago
• Provide details about a uranium mine near Bandar Abbas
• Explain the alleged military nature of Iran’s nuclear program on a “laptop” that was given by a defector to US
3. IAEA is expecting Iran to accept the highly intrusive Additional Protocols (AP). Not all NPT members have accepted it. For instance, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Brazil have not ratified it yet. Once accepted AP will force the member country to, inter alia, allow spot inspection of non-declared nuclear sites.
4. Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz which is the source of controversy with US has been running at a reduced capacity since the last IAEA report. The number of cascades has increased from 8 to 12, but they are running at one tenth of the capacity. Given the quality of Iranian engineers working on this project, it is most likely due to political reasons that anything else. The remaining 6 cascades are at different levels of preparation; and it is likely that this slow down will continue unless the third sanction is ratified. The Agency has also implemented a variety of safeguards at the FEP, including unannounced inspections.
5. IAEA has assigned a staggering 219 inspectors for Iran. This must be a record for this organization for inspecting any country in the past 50 years.
In spite of this, nothing can be achieved in an arena void of honor. The mainstream media in reporting this intricate ‘chess game’ has decided to champion the side of war and has given the truth a ‘check mate’. Even ‘reputable’ papers such as The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post have all decided that serving a departing administration that has led the nation into one quagmire is of greater importance than loyalty to a nation consistent in its devotion to the flag. By violating the truth and misinforming the public about the IAEA’s findings on Iran’ cooperation with the Atomic Agency, the media’s betrayal of the sons and daughters of a nation which goes to war to make possible the existence of the free media, is nothing short of treachery most brutally executed.
For deceit, we have others. An English Terrier that barked, and a French Poodle that bites. Mr. Blair and Mr. Sarkouzy have taken the war to the edge, waiting to push humanity into a dark abyss where it will not be recovered. It will pass the gates of hell, Dante’s inferno will no longer be a work of imagination – for us, it will be our experience, our doom. Will the papers, the media, be the trumpeters to this eternal hell that Mr. Cheney has in mind?
Ali Larijani , who is the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council responsible for nuclear discussions with the West, has called nuclear negotiations a “diplomatic chess.” Perhaps he is implying that like a good chess player he plans a few moves ahead of his opponent. After receiving two sanctions, Larijani had taken the position that as long as the Security Council (SC) refuses to return Iran’s case to the IAEA, Iran will not clarify nuclear ambiguities that have been reported by the Atomic Agency and will continue to reduce cooperation on many additional inspection activities that are not within the framework of the standard Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The grand wizard of current US interventionist foreign policy, Dick Cheney and his cohorts such as Elliot Abrams, were eager to take advantage of this situation and rally up the support of the P5 members of the Security Council for a third and more damaging sanction against Iran. Although the War Party is very much in favor of a military outcome to the current debacle, there are some that prefer the continuation of sanctions to squeeze and isolate Iran even further and not risk another preemptive war in the Middle East with a far more devastating outcome.
However, Larijani’s decision to clarify nuclear activities while under SC sanctions has made grand wizard’s job tougher to get a unanimous support for yet another sanction. That is probably one of the reasons why the war mongering rhetoric from the White House has reached a dangerous level: The opponent does not like Iran’s latest chess move and wants to shake up the board. Bush’s incendiary speech at the American Legion was a clear indication of Cheney’s frustration with Iran and looking to find a way out of this juggernaut, by elevating it to a military confrontation. After all the only way Cheney can be assured that centrifuges will not continue to work after he leaves office is to have them destroyed--enrichment suspension is not good enough.
The result of Larijani’s bold reversal move could not bear fruit unless both Javier Solana and Mohammad El Baradei were willing to engage Iran while US was pushing for more sanctions. El Baradei’s recent balanced comments regarding Iran’s case to BBC and New York Times are truly exemplary of a Nobel Peace laureate and if his actions prevent another illegal and immoral attack by US, he should be fully recognized by UN for his efforts. The IAEA’s latest report has several interesting points about their agreement with Iran for resolving existing concerns that are worth discussing:
1. The plutonium related concerns have all been satisfactorily addressed by Iran. Recall that plutonium is one of the key elements to make a nuclear bomb and also a byproduct of nuclear power reactor. Contrary to what US officials have been saying IAEA does not confirm existence of any plutonium reprocessing activities.
2. According to this agreement all the remaining concerns will be addressed sequentially. Namely once a concern has been fully resolved they will move on to the next one. This is a good move for Iran, since it will allow them to close a file before moving on to the next concern. The agreement schedule is as follows:
• Explain circumstances related to a more advanced centrifuge machine that is in the R&D phase
• Resolve equipment contamination at Tehran University
• Explain uranium metal design document which could be related to instructions for bomb making
• Explain Polonium 210 (Po 210) experimentation; this was used by Russia for their early nuclear bomb designs and for poisoning a former Russian agent in London and caused several death cases in Israel more than 40 years ago
• Provide details about a uranium mine near Bandar Abbas
• Explain the alleged military nature of Iran’s nuclear program on a “laptop” that was given by a defector to US
3. IAEA is expecting Iran to accept the highly intrusive Additional Protocols (AP). Not all NPT members have accepted it. For instance, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Brazil have not ratified it yet. Once accepted AP will force the member country to, inter alia, allow spot inspection of non-declared nuclear sites.
4. Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz which is the source of controversy with US has been running at a reduced capacity since the last IAEA report. The number of cascades has increased from 8 to 12, but they are running at one tenth of the capacity. Given the quality of Iranian engineers working on this project, it is most likely due to political reasons that anything else. The remaining 6 cascades are at different levels of preparation; and it is likely that this slow down will continue unless the third sanction is ratified. The Agency has also implemented a variety of safeguards at the FEP, including unannounced inspections.
5. IAEA has assigned a staggering 219 inspectors for Iran. This must be a record for this organization for inspecting any country in the past 50 years.
In spite of this, nothing can be achieved in an arena void of honor. The mainstream media in reporting this intricate ‘chess game’ has decided to champion the side of war and has given the truth a ‘check mate’. Even ‘reputable’ papers such as The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post have all decided that serving a departing administration that has led the nation into one quagmire is of greater importance than loyalty to a nation consistent in its devotion to the flag. By violating the truth and misinforming the public about the IAEA’s findings on Iran’ cooperation with the Atomic Agency, the media’s betrayal of the sons and daughters of a nation which goes to war to make possible the existence of the free media, is nothing short of treachery most brutally executed.
For deceit, we have others. An English Terrier that barked, and a French Poodle that bites. Mr. Blair and Mr. Sarkouzy have taken the war to the edge, waiting to push humanity into a dark abyss where it will not be recovered. It will pass the gates of hell, Dante’s inferno will no longer be a work of imagination – for us, it will be our experience, our doom. Will the papers, the media, be the trumpeters to this eternal hell that Mr. Cheney has in mind?
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