I love the American expression "Hope for the best, prepare for the worst, and settle for anything in the middle" and since no halfway clear picture is coming out of the combat operations taking place in Novorussia, I think that this is the approach we should use.
Hope for the best is easy: the Novorussian resistance beats back the Nazi forces.
But what is the worst which can happen?
The worst which can happen is that a lot of Novorussian defenders get killed, that the towns of Slaviansk, Kramatorsk, Krasnyi Liman and others will get basically flattened and most of their inhabitants killed, that the road between Donetsk and Lugansk gets cut-off by the Ukies and that Ukie forces enter deep inside these two cities.
I have to be honest here, there is a pretty good chance that all of the above will happen in the next 24 hours.
If that happens, I would like to remind you all that entering into a city is one thing, taking control of it is quite another. Think Beirut, think Grozny, think Baghdad, think Fallujah, think Gaza, think Bint Jbeil. Even if Poroshenko announces that Donetsk and Lugansk have "fallen", this will be only a empty statement on par with Dubya's "mission accomplished". What will *really* happen is that the type of warfare taking place will change. Not only will it change, but the new (urban) type of warfare will almost completely negate the current huge advantage in aviation, artillery and armor of the Ukie side. So if these cities "fall" - please do not despair.
I hope that Novorussians will be able to resist the Ukie attack, but I also know that by all accounts the kind of firepower the junta is using now is truly huge - we are dealing with a merciless and massive attack with everything the junta could muster and we have to accept that the Novorussian Defense Forces might have to retreat deeper into the cities or even go underground. While heroic for sure, it is not smart to stay in the open when your enemy is using Smerch and Uragan MRLS against you or even the building you are in. During the first Chechen war the Chechen retreated deeply inside Grozny and did not even bother defending the outskirts, in part because the city center buildings were far stronger than the flimsy houses in the suburbs. I never studied the layout of the cities of Lugansk and Donetsk, but if they are typical of the way the Soviets liked to build, then retreating into the city center and giving up the suburbs would probably make sense.
The first defensive option is to let the Ukies enter the suburbs and then cut them off, envelop (surround) them, and then attack them. If that works, great! But if the Ukies clear the way with massive sustained strikes and flatten their way in, then it will become necessarily to switch to "plan B" and retreat deeper into the cities. If the Ukie advance is multi-pronged and too fast, or if the city center defenses were not adequately prepared (for whatever reason), then plan "C" is to go more or less underground and switch to an active mobile defense centered on short but intense ambushes followed by immediate retreats.
I am not saying that this will happen, I have not heard from Juan or Gleb yet, but I think that I ought to prepare you for the worst, should it happen.
The Saker
Showing posts with label military analysis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label military analysis. Show all posts
Tuesday, July 1, 2014
Sunday, June 29, 2014
Could the Ukraine, backed by NATO, attack Russia?
On at least three occasions I tried to dispel the notion that the US/NATO could attack Russia or Russian forces in the Ukraine (see here, here and here). I tried to show that geography, over-reach and politics made a conventional attack impossible and I tried to show that a nuclear attack, whether tactical or strategic, could not succeed. There is a new theory which is apparently going around now which goes something like this: the Ukraine will re-arm and re-organize with the technical and financial help of the AngloZionist Empire, and then it will attack Crimea, possibly with the support of NATO airpower. Sounds scary, but the good news is that it is just as implausible as the other theories. Today, I want to explain why.
First and foremost, from a military point of view there can be no such thing as an "attack in Crimea" separate form a full-scale attack on Russia itself. Crimea is not a distant island in the middle of nowhere (like the Malvinas) and it will soon be fully integrated into the Russian defense system. Second, being a peninsula, Crimea is extremely hard to attack as the British and the Germans have found out. So no matter how you try to package it, from a purely military point of view, to have any chance of success an attack on Crimea would have to include a full scale attack on Russia.
And let me immediately put to rest the argument about NATO airpower: not only did it miserably fail in Bosnia, it did not even have what it takes to attack Syria, nevermind Iran. The USAF is flying either very good old aircraft or very bad modern aircraft whose attrition rate trying to deal with both the Russian Air Force and the Russian Air Defense Network, especially around Crimea, would be huge. Bombing an almost defenseless Serbia for 78 days (for pathetic results!) is one thing, trying to bomb Crimea and Russia proper is harder by several orders of magnitude. As for US/NATO ground forces, they would have a hard time even getting anywhere near Crimea. Which leaves the US Navy.
Unlike the US Army and Air Force, the USN is in much better shape and far more powerful than the Russian Navy. But to meaningfully participate in an attack on Crimea it would have to act from the eastern Mediterranean as entering the Black Sea would be not only suicidal, but even impossible for US Aircraft Carriers (not to mention completely contrary to US Naval doctrine). In reality, the USN could inflict far more devastating attacks on Russia in the Pacific, the Kola Peninsula or even the Baltic Sea than in southern Russia.
Which leave a hypothetical "future Ukrainian military" (the current one is unable to take Slaviansk or Kramatorsk, and could not even hold on to Krasnyi Liman). We can hypothesize all we want about how motivated this future Ukrainian military would be, but I personally cannot imagine what would motivate a future Ukrainian soldier to go and fight Russia, even for Crimea. But even if we assume a tremendous motivation, the fact is that the most the Ukraine can hope for in the next 1-10 years is to put a lot of men under arms and use outdated military hardware augmented with modern electronics, communication gear, targeting systems, command and control networks, etc. But even this relatively modernized Ukrainian military would face the very same problem which defeated the Swedes, the Crusaders, Napoleon and Hitler: no, not the "General Winter" canard, but Russia's strategic depth. Let me give just one example.
One of the most formidable weapons in the Russian military arsenal is the new Su-34 figher-bomber whose combat radius is estimated at over 1'000km but who already flew 6'000km with 2 mid-air refuellings. In a combat mission, such Su-34s could be protected by advanced Su-35S' who have a very similar combat range. In practical terms, this means that the Russian Air Force could strike Ukrainian units practically from anywhere west of the Urals. And did I mention that Russia has 28 AWACs while the Ukraine has none? This is just one small example, but it illustrates the different kind of importance strategic depth can in modern warfare.
I could go on for hours giving further examples, but I think that the point is clear: the Ukrainian military, even with the benefit of western financial and technical aid, and even with motivated soldiers, simply has no chance at all to re-take Crimea, nevermind prevail in a conflict against Russia.
So the only real risk is that the AngloZionists would order their Gauleiter in Kiev (whether Poroshenko or any other) to provoke a conflict with Russia not with the aim to prevail, but with the aim to create a crisis and force Russia to use her military power. Alas, the Ukraine will always have enough military power to attack Crimea and get many people killed. The attack will fail, but a crisis will be triggered.
Whatever may be the case, the Russian military has already announced a major effort to strengthen the defenses of the Crimean Peninsula and the Black Sea (including new bombers, submarines, air defense systems, naval infantry, etc.). In fact, all the signs are that Russia will make the Crimean Peninsula the key node of her entire southwestern defense posture.
I sincerely believe that while such theories make for good headlines, an attack by anybody on Russia is extremely unlikely and that it is unhelpful to spend too much time on such far-fetched possibilities. Senseless terrorist attacks and the subversion of the Crimean Tatars minority are far more likely threats than a conventional military attack.
The Saker
First and foremost, from a military point of view there can be no such thing as an "attack in Crimea" separate form a full-scale attack on Russia itself. Crimea is not a distant island in the middle of nowhere (like the Malvinas) and it will soon be fully integrated into the Russian defense system. Second, being a peninsula, Crimea is extremely hard to attack as the British and the Germans have found out. So no matter how you try to package it, from a purely military point of view, to have any chance of success an attack on Crimea would have to include a full scale attack on Russia.
And let me immediately put to rest the argument about NATO airpower: not only did it miserably fail in Bosnia, it did not even have what it takes to attack Syria, nevermind Iran. The USAF is flying either very good old aircraft or very bad modern aircraft whose attrition rate trying to deal with both the Russian Air Force and the Russian Air Defense Network, especially around Crimea, would be huge. Bombing an almost defenseless Serbia for 78 days (for pathetic results!) is one thing, trying to bomb Crimea and Russia proper is harder by several orders of magnitude. As for US/NATO ground forces, they would have a hard time even getting anywhere near Crimea. Which leaves the US Navy.
Unlike the US Army and Air Force, the USN is in much better shape and far more powerful than the Russian Navy. But to meaningfully participate in an attack on Crimea it would have to act from the eastern Mediterranean as entering the Black Sea would be not only suicidal, but even impossible for US Aircraft Carriers (not to mention completely contrary to US Naval doctrine). In reality, the USN could inflict far more devastating attacks on Russia in the Pacific, the Kola Peninsula or even the Baltic Sea than in southern Russia.
Which leave a hypothetical "future Ukrainian military" (the current one is unable to take Slaviansk or Kramatorsk, and could not even hold on to Krasnyi Liman). We can hypothesize all we want about how motivated this future Ukrainian military would be, but I personally cannot imagine what would motivate a future Ukrainian soldier to go and fight Russia, even for Crimea. But even if we assume a tremendous motivation, the fact is that the most the Ukraine can hope for in the next 1-10 years is to put a lot of men under arms and use outdated military hardware augmented with modern electronics, communication gear, targeting systems, command and control networks, etc. But even this relatively modernized Ukrainian military would face the very same problem which defeated the Swedes, the Crusaders, Napoleon and Hitler: no, not the "General Winter" canard, but Russia's strategic depth. Let me give just one example.
One of the most formidable weapons in the Russian military arsenal is the new Su-34 figher-bomber whose combat radius is estimated at over 1'000km but who already flew 6'000km with 2 mid-air refuellings. In a combat mission, such Su-34s could be protected by advanced Su-35S' who have a very similar combat range. In practical terms, this means that the Russian Air Force could strike Ukrainian units practically from anywhere west of the Urals. And did I mention that Russia has 28 AWACs while the Ukraine has none? This is just one small example, but it illustrates the different kind of importance strategic depth can in modern warfare.
I could go on for hours giving further examples, but I think that the point is clear: the Ukrainian military, even with the benefit of western financial and technical aid, and even with motivated soldiers, simply has no chance at all to re-take Crimea, nevermind prevail in a conflict against Russia.
So the only real risk is that the AngloZionists would order their Gauleiter in Kiev (whether Poroshenko or any other) to provoke a conflict with Russia not with the aim to prevail, but with the aim to create a crisis and force Russia to use her military power. Alas, the Ukraine will always have enough military power to attack Crimea and get many people killed. The attack will fail, but a crisis will be triggered.
Whatever may be the case, the Russian military has already announced a major effort to strengthen the defenses of the Crimean Peninsula and the Black Sea (including new bombers, submarines, air defense systems, naval infantry, etc.). In fact, all the signs are that Russia will make the Crimean Peninsula the key node of her entire southwestern defense posture.
I sincerely believe that while such theories make for good headlines, an attack by anybody on Russia is extremely unlikely and that it is unhelpful to spend too much time on such far-fetched possibilities. Senseless terrorist attacks and the subversion of the Crimean Tatars minority are far more likely threats than a conventional military attack.
The Saker
Friday, May 23, 2014
The conflict in the Ukraine as seen by a professional soldier
I have recently come into contact with "Juan" who currently resides near the conflict area in the Ukraine. I don't personally know Juan but I am confident that he/she is a person with a military background and a first-hand knowledge of the Russian military, including elite units. In our email exchanges we soon established that while I was "one of 'them' who was buried under 15 kilometers of concrete, rock and steel" "Juan" was one of the "poor ground pounders had to slog through the mud and slime, rain and snow'. This gave me the idea to ask "Juan" to provide the readers of this blog with an analysis of the conflict in the Ukraine written from the point of view of somebody whose career was on the front lines and not, like me, in air-conditioned rooms with fancy computers and communication gear. I sincerely think that this latter perspective is something this blog sorely needed and I am delighted to be able to share it with you today.
A big thank you to "Juan" for agreeing to share his views with all of us!
The Saker
The conflict in the Ukraine as seen by a professional solider:
Introduction:
I have been asked by The Saker to share my view of the current conflict in the Ukraine. I will provide no information that is not publicly available if one wants to dig and one is observant with the many videos available on the internet amongst other places. I will give my opinion on the fighting capabilities of Russian soldiers (By Russian Soldiers I mean ethnic Russians and citizens of the Russian Federation serving in the Russian Army. This includes most, but not all, on both sides of the Donbas and Lugansk fighting. It is meant as neither a compliment nor a denigration.) but I will not answer any questions, that will be up to the Saker, although he is free to consult me about questions. I am apolitical publicly but I will give an opinion in private. I have served. We will leave it at that with the exception of stating while Saker was safely ensconced under more than a few inches of concrete and steel, I was boots in the mud, therefore he and I have a totally different view of events, his world wide, mine what I could see through my weapon sights and not much more.
I will give my assessment of the military situation and forces arrayed against each other in the Donbas and Lugansk Oblasti but first I will say a little something about War. War is not a nice vocation, it is not a nice event. War is almost always, operative term being almost, a result of failed diplomacy. War is in essence an extension of diplomacy and as such is almost always political one way or another. Politics be damned, to us who have been to war, to us who have fought, actually fought, we hate war more than anyone. For those of you who have not been to war, and don't mean those of you who have served in one way or another in your army, but those of you who never picked up your weapon and went nose to nose with the proclaimed enemy, fought him and won, you have no idea what it is like. You see the videos, you see the AAR's (After Action Reviews, the synopsis of what went right and want went wrong and why.), you read the endless pontifications of the talking heads in the news media and the politicians, but you have never seen real War unless you have stood and fought, watched your enemy fall, watched your comrades fall, seen the toll on civilians, walked the field after a battle, seen the destruction, smelled the smells, heard the sounds, felt the fear (We are always afraid before combat. It is our training and experience that allows us to hide the fear from our comrades and the younger men in the unit.). No, unless you have stood in the line you don't know War.
For most of you War is an abstract happening, something to talk about, to play video games about, to laugh and joke about in the cafe or bar after work, to urge one side or the other to attack, fight, do something. If you only knew the reality of combat you would never even whisper the word 'war', you would hang your politicians from the nearest lamp post at the first beat of the war drums. We are soldiers. You ask us to do this and we do this for you. In the West we are as likely to be spit upon as thanked. When the war clouds gather you scream for us to help you, to save you. We do what you ask and for this many of you denigrate us. In Russia we are honored, welcomed home, thanked for what we did. Yes, we who have been to war, who have stood in the line and fought, we hate war. We also understand more than most that there times, much as we hate it, that one must fight. In my opinion this is one of those times when men have to fight for Donbas and Lugansk.
One more thing before I turn to the topic at hand: If you want to understand Russia, Russians and Russian culture you must start by studying Byzantium, it's history, culture, politics and religion. Russia and ethnic Russians are the inheritor of this culture and religion lock, stock and barrel, and study of Byzantium explains a very great deal about Russia and Russians and points you in the direction of further studies.
The context
The events in Kiev starting in very late November and going on to today. The current government in Kiev came to power by way of a coup d'etat in late February of this year. Shortly after that coup the citizens of Crimea and Sevastopol felt threatened by the new government and seized power in Crimea and Sevastopol. Shortly after seizing power the citizens ask Russia for help and protection. Russian responded with alacrity and within a few days Russian forces landed in and around Kerch from Novorossiysk. The assistance to Crimea was a bloodless accomplishment but in the event all the Ukrainian Army, Navy and Air Force based in Crimea were surrounded and cut off. Many immediately surrendered and the soldiers and sailors were offered the choice of repatriation to Ukraine with their families or to join the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Roughly 80% of the soldiers and sailors, both officers and rankers, opted to join the Russian Armed Forces. This tells a great deal about the morale of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. For 23 years the various Ukrainian governments had treated the armed forces budgets as a cash cow to be milked to oblivion. The soldiers and sailors for the most part in Crimea, and in reality of all Ukraine, were poorly equipped, poorly trained, poorly fed and many of the lower ranks had not been paid since November. Their armored vehicles, equipment, weapons and ships were a disgrace. At least 8 of the Ukraine Navy ships were refused repatriation by Kiev and are in the bone yard at Inkerman being cut up for scrap as I write or scheduled to be towed there shortly. Some tanks, BTR's and BMP's had not moved for literally years and had to be towed to the rail heads for repatriation to Ukraine. Of the 39 aircraft at Belbek Air Base 4 were airworthy. The others could not fly and some had been cannibalized to keep the 4 serviceable aircraft flying.
After Crimea voted to become part of the Russian Federation and were accepted in the Federation, several regions in the east of Ukraine became dissatisfied with the new government in Kiev and started to demand more autonomy from Kiev, in other words they wanted to elect their own leaders and administration heads and do away with the Kiev appointed heads of same as was the practice for 20 odd years. Kiev refused and Donetsk Oblast and Lugansk Oblast then seized their local governments, ousted most of the appointed department heads and declared themselves independent. Kiev promptly sent units of the Ukraine Army to quell the unrest and most of the units refused to fight their fellow countrymen and in some cases changed sides and turned their armored vehicles over to the new Donbas Republic's armed forces. This is to be expected in an army where most of the lower ranks are conscripts, in for a year or two and then gone. The main fallacy of the Ukraine Armed Forces is they do not have a professional non commissioned officer corp, in other words sergeants, as a general rule. In the basic infantry units the sergeants are generally a conscript who has a bit more education or other attributes that set him a slight cut above the average conscript. He is selected and usually but not always sent to a short 'sergeant school', returns to his assigned unit and is then out when his conscription term us over. Sergeants are the backbone of a modern army and have been for well over 100 years. They are the 'shop supervisors' so to speak and translate the officer's orders in to words and actions the troops understand and perform. Without professional and long service sergeants the junior and senior lieutenants have to do the sergeant's work in addition to their own work. This adversely affects the work of the lieutenants and often results in their captains doing some of the lieutenant's work, which in turn adversely affects the captains work.
Basic weapons
The basic infantry weapon in the Ukraine Army is the AK 47 and it's later derivative the AK 74.
The AK 47 is an old design but reliable to an extreme. The weapon was designed as an automatic rifle for a very large conscript army and is quite simple and inexpensive to manufacture. It is easy and simple to field strip and maintain and it generally is not affected by the dirt and debris present on all battlefields. I have no idea how many rounds of ball and blank I have fired from one but it is certainly in the many thousands in both training and operations and I have never had that weapon fail to operate reliably nor have I had a single instance of the weapon jamming and failing to fire.
I have also seen many other varieties of rifles and automatic hand held weapons, most notable being in one video an SKS semi automatic rifle was seen dating from, if my memory is correct, right after the second world war, a PPSh41 of World War 2 fame, short, stubby and with a round drum magazine attached to the bottom of the weapon and basically a lead hose that is not much use at ranges over 200m if that, and a Maxim machine gun on a metal two wheeled hand pulled carriage probably dating from the first world war. I did not see any ammunition for the Maxim so it may have been just for show. The first two I have seen in the hands of both the Federalists and the Kiev troops.
Both the Federalists and the Ukraine Army use the Automat Kalashnikov in it's many variants, both the 47 and the 74.
The medium machine guns generally seen in the Donbas and Lugansk area are mostly of the PK variety. The PK went in service in the early 1960's and and is still standard issue today. The weapon was designed by Mikhail Kalashnikov of AK fame. It is a reliable and simple machine, easy to use, clean and maintain and quite robust. It feeds from the right side using either open belted ammunition or boxed belts, the box attached to the bottom of the weapon receiver housing. The weapon fires the standard Russian round of 7.62 x 54 size, ever so slightly longer than the NATO round of the same caliber. Cyclic rate is between 700 and 800 rounds per minute and range is optimistically listed at 100 to 1500 meters. The weapon fires from the 'open bolt' system. When you release the trigger the weapon fires the round in the chamber and the bolt locks open rather than staying closed as on the AK variants. This it to facilitate belt changes when milliseconds count. The weapon is usually seen with a bipod attached to the front of the barrel but is also capable of being used on a tripod.
When listing the cyclic rate of an automatic weapon, in particular a machine gun, while the instruction sheet tells you that for instance the weapon will deliver up to 800 rounds per minute, the gunner does not want to fire that many rounds in one minute. The normal gunners rate of fire is in 3 to 6 round bursts. The only time you will hear sustained firing of a machine gun is generally when there is either a massive target of opportunity or if the bad guys are close enough to see the whites of their eyes. To fire a sustained burst of 800 rounds in one minute will lead to rapid barrel erosion and overheating and may well jam the weapon. This can put you in a decidedly awkward situation when the bad guys hear the weapon go silent.
Again, both the Federalists and the Ukraine Army use this weapon in several variants.
Tactics and morale
I have watched as much as time allows the videos and read both news reports and reports from other sources about the situation in the two oblasti. I will neither give the Kiev regime advice by publicly telling what I think they are doing wrong tactically nor will I reveal all I see that the Federalists are doing correctly beyond what is publicly available via news or the internet.
The coup government in Kiev was taken aback when some of the first Ukraine Army units arrived in Donbas and promptly refused to fight. Not only did they refuse to fight but some units went over to the Federalist side bringing with them their weapons and BMP light armored tracked fighting vehicles. These events were a tremendous psychological and morale boost for the Federalists. The young soldiers and their officers had been told they would be fighting 'terrorists' and 'separatists' and they were shocked when in the villages they passed through or near the local citizens, dozens of them, came unarmed and physically blocked the light armored units advancing in the direction of Slavyansk with their very bodies. After sometimes extended negotiations the units would either go over the the Federalists or simply turn around and return to their base or lager. In some instances this return to lager move had fatal consequences for some of the soldiers as they were executed by Right Sector operatives that very day. These executions were a mild variant on the old French philosophy of 'we'll execute a few soldiers for the encouragement of the others'. Reality is all armies have done this from time to time, either openly or, as the saying goes, 'accidents happen'.
The reluctance to fight their visibly unarmed fellow citizens who were obviously not terrorists and insisted to the boys that they were not separatists but simply wanted more autonomy and had no intention of leaving Ukraine was a turning point in the Donbas situation. I don't know what the coup government expected but obviously they have precisely zero experience in motivating soldiers and in tactics and strategy.
Some Ukraine Army units have fought, albeit not too well from what I know. Will the remains of the Ukraine Army fight in what is to be the final push tomorrow and Saturday? I do not know the answer to that question. Only time will tell.
Now, the 'national guard'. These units are almost exclusively right sector, the 'victors' of maidan. They have had some of the best advisors money can buy, all supplied from The West. Some of them have been trained in musketry in their extensive system of training camps in the west of Ukraine but most do not have any real military training or experience. Those who signed up for the 'national guard' units were given a crash course in 'soldier 101' lasting two weeks at best and generally less, uniformed after a fashion, armed and sent east. Will they fight? I don't know. I do know they are quite good at appearing in towns and villages suddenly and in numbers, heavily armed but never have I personally seen or heard of them actually fighting in a stand up fight. They seem to be pretty good at spreading terror amongst unarmed citizens and not much else. Most of them are highly motivated and believe in what they are doing. It remains to be seen how well they will fight when their adversaries are shooting back. They do have some numbers on their side.
The overall situation with the Ukraine Army is everything they have is now in the East. They have large numbers of BMP and BTR light armored infantry carriers and fighting vehicles. They have brought just about every tank they have that will run and some of them, while aging platforms, have been extensively upgraded and modernized with the latest night vision devices and weapon sights and quite good reactive armor packages. Most of the serviceable artillery, both towed and self propelled
Air assets are thin. When the Ukrainians first began to use their Mi24 attack helicopters, which is an excellent close support, anti personnel and anti vehicle weapon, they lost several in two days. Ukraine also has several Sukhoi ground attack aircraft and some, actual number serviceable unknown, Migs of various types. The comment of air assets being 'thin' is a bit misguiding in that the Federalists have no air assets.The Federalists do have at least a few shoulder fired anti aircraft missiles and that is what brought down the 5 known destroyed Mi24 helicopters.
Tactics on the part of the Ukriane Army have been poor. While few if any of the actual Ukraine Army units have attacked the Federalists, the Mi24 choppers do seem to be piloted by airmen who will, indeed, attack. I have watched a slow but steady incremental increase of types of attacks and weapons used by the 'national guard' units attacking the Federalists. On 17 May the first mortar shells were fired, just a few and of 82 mm caliber, fired at a Fed blocking post. Kiev nervously looked over their shoulders at the Russian Army glowering at them from across the border, saw no repercussions to the first mortar bombardment, and decided to up the ante the next day, 18 May. That day the first 12 cm mortars were used in addition to the 82 mm mortars of the day before. Also that day the first patently civilian targets were hit and one single 12 cm howitzer shell was fired. Again, no reaction from Russia.
By 20 May, with no visible reaction from Russia concerning the increasing use of heavy weapons against both civilian targets and the Federalist positions, Ukraine began to systematically bombard targets of their choosing. The number of patently civilian casualties from 15 May to 23 May numbers over 50, some dead, most wounded.
On 22 May the first overt attack by 'national guard' units against a Ukraine Army unit that refused to attack civilians occurred near Volnovakha. The tactics used by the national guard were interesting but almost standard for them of late. They arrived at the Ukraine Army lager outside the village in lime green vans and at least one white van, announced they were 'friends' and then started shooting at the Ukraine Army soldiers. While they managed to kill and wound most of the Army unit some did survive and most, after the initial surprise, fought back with spirit. Casualties in the Army unit seem to be in excess of 60 dead and wounded, on the national guard unit not as many but more than a few.After the fighting stopped and the wounded from both sides were removed, two Mi24 attack helicopters identified as 'national guard' helicopters, attacked the area and destroyed most of the trucks, ambulances and BMP's of the Ukraine Army unit and the damaged national guard vans left in place. An entire Ukraine Army armored company was thus destroyed by 'national guard' units for refusing what in reality was an illegal order, to wit, attack an unarmed village full of civilians.
This incident alone will have very serious repercussions for the Kiev government, although the international community is dead silent about the killings. It shows that if you do not do what the Kiev government tells you to do you will be killed. Every unit in the entire Ukraine Army knew of this incident within an hour of it's happening. This will adversely affect the morale and combat effectiveness of the Ukraine Army from top to bottom. It is very possible that some Ukraine units may either attack 'national guard' units or simply change sides. That remains to be seen, but it is a fact that soldiers can not be made to attack with weapons pointed at their backs from the rear. They will be just as likely to turn on the enforcers as they are to attack the perceived 'enemy'. There are already, as of 08:15 local time on 23 May, unconfirmed but reliable reports of two Ukraine Army units going over to the Federalist side.
On the Federalist side, tactics have been developed ad hoc using the available units and soldiers. They have several advantages in that most are local boys and they know the surrounding areas like the backs of their hands, having grown up there. After seizing several weapons storages in both Donetsk and Lugansk Oblast the Federalists are now reasonably well armed and supplied with ordinance including anti air missiles and anti tank weapons, antitank being both missiles and RPG's plus a few old but as new condition antitank rifles which have no trouble ventilating any BTR or BMP.
It is obvious from their tactics that they hold no area that they are willing to fight to the last man for at this moment that has been aggressed by the Kiev forces. From what I have seen on the scattered but continuous attacks on their 'blocking posts' they will generally withdraw at the first sign of national guard presence in attack mode, sit back and wait. The national guard unit will then take the post, do the obligatory 'burn the barricade' drill, take what food is lying around and leave. The Feds then return, rebuild the barricade, sit back and have lunch. The Feds have lost men in these raids but the losses have been low.
The Federalists do often attack national guard units and the one Ukraine Army unit that does seem willing to fight. The national guard units, being generally on the defensive de facto, are in the position of having to defend a large area and lack the manpower required to do that. The Nats (I will do a name change now, or a shortening of names. The Federalists will be known as the Feds, the national guard and their allies will be known as the Nats) do have many strong positions in some areas that the Feds are smart enough to not attack. However, from readily available information it is obvious that the Feds to attack and/or ambush Nat units often. They use the classic tactic of having a local preponderance of force or, as the Confederate General P. G. T. Beauregard said 150 years ago, 'I got there fustus with the mostus', in other words local superiority at the moment. Local superiority does not necessarily mean superior numbers, it can, and often does, mean local surprise and instant domination of the battle area by fire. The Feds do this drill by day or night.
These tactics seem to be working, at least for now. The Nats casualties for the last month are well in excess of 600 dead and a like number of wounded, wounded meaning anyone who is hurt one way or another badly enough to be off duty for a time to full blown intensive care. For the Feds casualties are not reliably known but have not been anywhere near the numbers of Nat casualties. Civilian casualties there are no reliable numbers for but from reliable sources do run over 200 dead and wounded in the last month in the two oblasti.
If the Kiev regime manages to attack throughout the entire area at one time they will probably win this campaign as they seem to be perfectly willing to accept civilian and military casualties and damage that would not be looked well upon if known or reported by national and international news media. The Feds are seriously, read vastly, outnumbered and woefully under equipped. The Feds have but a very few BMP light armored vehicles and a few captured BTR vehicles, almost no artillery and zero air assets. They do have excellent morale and do believe strongly in their cause.
Strategically, I don't know. I'm not bad at tactics, being just a lowly veteran sergeant, but from what I see Kiev is in the position of having to attack and attack strongly on 23 and 24 May. Their masters are adamant that they solve 'this problem' before the election scheduled for 25 May. I have no doubts that at least some, not all but some, a goodly number of 'some', of the Federalists will fight to the end to hold their very few strategic locations.In reality they have no other option, either fight to the death or be killed after the fact. Is Kiev and their international backers and masters willing to do the massive fighting this will entail in civilian areas and with the very large civilian casualties this act will entail? I think so. Will Russia intervene? I don't know and conjecture is useless on whatever actions Russia may or may not take.
Only time will tell how this unfolding tragedy will end, but my thoughts are that Ukraine as it was last October is dead and gone, never to arise again as we knew it.
(To be continued)
A big thank you to "Juan" for agreeing to share his views with all of us!
The Saker
*******
The conflict in the Ukraine as seen by a professional solider:
Introduction:
I have been asked by The Saker to share my view of the current conflict in the Ukraine. I will provide no information that is not publicly available if one wants to dig and one is observant with the many videos available on the internet amongst other places. I will give my opinion on the fighting capabilities of Russian soldiers (By Russian Soldiers I mean ethnic Russians and citizens of the Russian Federation serving in the Russian Army. This includes most, but not all, on both sides of the Donbas and Lugansk fighting. It is meant as neither a compliment nor a denigration.) but I will not answer any questions, that will be up to the Saker, although he is free to consult me about questions. I am apolitical publicly but I will give an opinion in private. I have served. We will leave it at that with the exception of stating while Saker was safely ensconced under more than a few inches of concrete and steel, I was boots in the mud, therefore he and I have a totally different view of events, his world wide, mine what I could see through my weapon sights and not much more.
I will give my assessment of the military situation and forces arrayed against each other in the Donbas and Lugansk Oblasti but first I will say a little something about War. War is not a nice vocation, it is not a nice event. War is almost always, operative term being almost, a result of failed diplomacy. War is in essence an extension of diplomacy and as such is almost always political one way or another. Politics be damned, to us who have been to war, to us who have fought, actually fought, we hate war more than anyone. For those of you who have not been to war, and don't mean those of you who have served in one way or another in your army, but those of you who never picked up your weapon and went nose to nose with the proclaimed enemy, fought him and won, you have no idea what it is like. You see the videos, you see the AAR's (After Action Reviews, the synopsis of what went right and want went wrong and why.), you read the endless pontifications of the talking heads in the news media and the politicians, but you have never seen real War unless you have stood and fought, watched your enemy fall, watched your comrades fall, seen the toll on civilians, walked the field after a battle, seen the destruction, smelled the smells, heard the sounds, felt the fear (We are always afraid before combat. It is our training and experience that allows us to hide the fear from our comrades and the younger men in the unit.). No, unless you have stood in the line you don't know War.
For most of you War is an abstract happening, something to talk about, to play video games about, to laugh and joke about in the cafe or bar after work, to urge one side or the other to attack, fight, do something. If you only knew the reality of combat you would never even whisper the word 'war', you would hang your politicians from the nearest lamp post at the first beat of the war drums. We are soldiers. You ask us to do this and we do this for you. In the West we are as likely to be spit upon as thanked. When the war clouds gather you scream for us to help you, to save you. We do what you ask and for this many of you denigrate us. In Russia we are honored, welcomed home, thanked for what we did. Yes, we who have been to war, who have stood in the line and fought, we hate war. We also understand more than most that there times, much as we hate it, that one must fight. In my opinion this is one of those times when men have to fight for Donbas and Lugansk.
One more thing before I turn to the topic at hand: If you want to understand Russia, Russians and Russian culture you must start by studying Byzantium, it's history, culture, politics and religion. Russia and ethnic Russians are the inheritor of this culture and religion lock, stock and barrel, and study of Byzantium explains a very great deal about Russia and Russians and points you in the direction of further studies.
The context
The events in Kiev starting in very late November and going on to today. The current government in Kiev came to power by way of a coup d'etat in late February of this year. Shortly after that coup the citizens of Crimea and Sevastopol felt threatened by the new government and seized power in Crimea and Sevastopol. Shortly after seizing power the citizens ask Russia for help and protection. Russian responded with alacrity and within a few days Russian forces landed in and around Kerch from Novorossiysk. The assistance to Crimea was a bloodless accomplishment but in the event all the Ukrainian Army, Navy and Air Force based in Crimea were surrounded and cut off. Many immediately surrendered and the soldiers and sailors were offered the choice of repatriation to Ukraine with their families or to join the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Roughly 80% of the soldiers and sailors, both officers and rankers, opted to join the Russian Armed Forces. This tells a great deal about the morale of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. For 23 years the various Ukrainian governments had treated the armed forces budgets as a cash cow to be milked to oblivion. The soldiers and sailors for the most part in Crimea, and in reality of all Ukraine, were poorly equipped, poorly trained, poorly fed and many of the lower ranks had not been paid since November. Their armored vehicles, equipment, weapons and ships were a disgrace. At least 8 of the Ukraine Navy ships were refused repatriation by Kiev and are in the bone yard at Inkerman being cut up for scrap as I write or scheduled to be towed there shortly. Some tanks, BTR's and BMP's had not moved for literally years and had to be towed to the rail heads for repatriation to Ukraine. Of the 39 aircraft at Belbek Air Base 4 were airworthy. The others could not fly and some had been cannibalized to keep the 4 serviceable aircraft flying.
After Crimea voted to become part of the Russian Federation and were accepted in the Federation, several regions in the east of Ukraine became dissatisfied with the new government in Kiev and started to demand more autonomy from Kiev, in other words they wanted to elect their own leaders and administration heads and do away with the Kiev appointed heads of same as was the practice for 20 odd years. Kiev refused and Donetsk Oblast and Lugansk Oblast then seized their local governments, ousted most of the appointed department heads and declared themselves independent. Kiev promptly sent units of the Ukraine Army to quell the unrest and most of the units refused to fight their fellow countrymen and in some cases changed sides and turned their armored vehicles over to the new Donbas Republic's armed forces. This is to be expected in an army where most of the lower ranks are conscripts, in for a year or two and then gone. The main fallacy of the Ukraine Armed Forces is they do not have a professional non commissioned officer corp, in other words sergeants, as a general rule. In the basic infantry units the sergeants are generally a conscript who has a bit more education or other attributes that set him a slight cut above the average conscript. He is selected and usually but not always sent to a short 'sergeant school', returns to his assigned unit and is then out when his conscription term us over. Sergeants are the backbone of a modern army and have been for well over 100 years. They are the 'shop supervisors' so to speak and translate the officer's orders in to words and actions the troops understand and perform. Without professional and long service sergeants the junior and senior lieutenants have to do the sergeant's work in addition to their own work. This adversely affects the work of the lieutenants and often results in their captains doing some of the lieutenant's work, which in turn adversely affects the captains work.
Basic weapons
The basic infantry weapon in the Ukraine Army is the AK 47 and it's later derivative the AK 74.
The AK 47 is an old design but reliable to an extreme. The weapon was designed as an automatic rifle for a very large conscript army and is quite simple and inexpensive to manufacture. It is easy and simple to field strip and maintain and it generally is not affected by the dirt and debris present on all battlefields. I have no idea how many rounds of ball and blank I have fired from one but it is certainly in the many thousands in both training and operations and I have never had that weapon fail to operate reliably nor have I had a single instance of the weapon jamming and failing to fire.
I have also seen many other varieties of rifles and automatic hand held weapons, most notable being in one video an SKS semi automatic rifle was seen dating from, if my memory is correct, right after the second world war, a PPSh41 of World War 2 fame, short, stubby and with a round drum magazine attached to the bottom of the weapon and basically a lead hose that is not much use at ranges over 200m if that, and a Maxim machine gun on a metal two wheeled hand pulled carriage probably dating from the first world war. I did not see any ammunition for the Maxim so it may have been just for show. The first two I have seen in the hands of both the Federalists and the Kiev troops.
Both the Federalists and the Ukraine Army use the Automat Kalashnikov in it's many variants, both the 47 and the 74.
The medium machine guns generally seen in the Donbas and Lugansk area are mostly of the PK variety. The PK went in service in the early 1960's and and is still standard issue today. The weapon was designed by Mikhail Kalashnikov of AK fame. It is a reliable and simple machine, easy to use, clean and maintain and quite robust. It feeds from the right side using either open belted ammunition or boxed belts, the box attached to the bottom of the weapon receiver housing. The weapon fires the standard Russian round of 7.62 x 54 size, ever so slightly longer than the NATO round of the same caliber. Cyclic rate is between 700 and 800 rounds per minute and range is optimistically listed at 100 to 1500 meters. The weapon fires from the 'open bolt' system. When you release the trigger the weapon fires the round in the chamber and the bolt locks open rather than staying closed as on the AK variants. This it to facilitate belt changes when milliseconds count. The weapon is usually seen with a bipod attached to the front of the barrel but is also capable of being used on a tripod.
When listing the cyclic rate of an automatic weapon, in particular a machine gun, while the instruction sheet tells you that for instance the weapon will deliver up to 800 rounds per minute, the gunner does not want to fire that many rounds in one minute. The normal gunners rate of fire is in 3 to 6 round bursts. The only time you will hear sustained firing of a machine gun is generally when there is either a massive target of opportunity or if the bad guys are close enough to see the whites of their eyes. To fire a sustained burst of 800 rounds in one minute will lead to rapid barrel erosion and overheating and may well jam the weapon. This can put you in a decidedly awkward situation when the bad guys hear the weapon go silent.
Again, both the Federalists and the Ukraine Army use this weapon in several variants.
Tactics and morale
I have watched as much as time allows the videos and read both news reports and reports from other sources about the situation in the two oblasti. I will neither give the Kiev regime advice by publicly telling what I think they are doing wrong tactically nor will I reveal all I see that the Federalists are doing correctly beyond what is publicly available via news or the internet.
The coup government in Kiev was taken aback when some of the first Ukraine Army units arrived in Donbas and promptly refused to fight. Not only did they refuse to fight but some units went over to the Federalist side bringing with them their weapons and BMP light armored tracked fighting vehicles. These events were a tremendous psychological and morale boost for the Federalists. The young soldiers and their officers had been told they would be fighting 'terrorists' and 'separatists' and they were shocked when in the villages they passed through or near the local citizens, dozens of them, came unarmed and physically blocked the light armored units advancing in the direction of Slavyansk with their very bodies. After sometimes extended negotiations the units would either go over the the Federalists or simply turn around and return to their base or lager. In some instances this return to lager move had fatal consequences for some of the soldiers as they were executed by Right Sector operatives that very day. These executions were a mild variant on the old French philosophy of 'we'll execute a few soldiers for the encouragement of the others'. Reality is all armies have done this from time to time, either openly or, as the saying goes, 'accidents happen'.
The reluctance to fight their visibly unarmed fellow citizens who were obviously not terrorists and insisted to the boys that they were not separatists but simply wanted more autonomy and had no intention of leaving Ukraine was a turning point in the Donbas situation. I don't know what the coup government expected but obviously they have precisely zero experience in motivating soldiers and in tactics and strategy.
Some Ukraine Army units have fought, albeit not too well from what I know. Will the remains of the Ukraine Army fight in what is to be the final push tomorrow and Saturday? I do not know the answer to that question. Only time will tell.
Now, the 'national guard'. These units are almost exclusively right sector, the 'victors' of maidan. They have had some of the best advisors money can buy, all supplied from The West. Some of them have been trained in musketry in their extensive system of training camps in the west of Ukraine but most do not have any real military training or experience. Those who signed up for the 'national guard' units were given a crash course in 'soldier 101' lasting two weeks at best and generally less, uniformed after a fashion, armed and sent east. Will they fight? I don't know. I do know they are quite good at appearing in towns and villages suddenly and in numbers, heavily armed but never have I personally seen or heard of them actually fighting in a stand up fight. They seem to be pretty good at spreading terror amongst unarmed citizens and not much else. Most of them are highly motivated and believe in what they are doing. It remains to be seen how well they will fight when their adversaries are shooting back. They do have some numbers on their side.
The overall situation with the Ukraine Army is everything they have is now in the East. They have large numbers of BMP and BTR light armored infantry carriers and fighting vehicles. They have brought just about every tank they have that will run and some of them, while aging platforms, have been extensively upgraded and modernized with the latest night vision devices and weapon sights and quite good reactive armor packages. Most of the serviceable artillery, both towed and self propelled
Air assets are thin. When the Ukrainians first began to use their Mi24 attack helicopters, which is an excellent close support, anti personnel and anti vehicle weapon, they lost several in two days. Ukraine also has several Sukhoi ground attack aircraft and some, actual number serviceable unknown, Migs of various types. The comment of air assets being 'thin' is a bit misguiding in that the Federalists have no air assets.The Federalists do have at least a few shoulder fired anti aircraft missiles and that is what brought down the 5 known destroyed Mi24 helicopters.
Tactics on the part of the Ukriane Army have been poor. While few if any of the actual Ukraine Army units have attacked the Federalists, the Mi24 choppers do seem to be piloted by airmen who will, indeed, attack. I have watched a slow but steady incremental increase of types of attacks and weapons used by the 'national guard' units attacking the Federalists. On 17 May the first mortar shells were fired, just a few and of 82 mm caliber, fired at a Fed blocking post. Kiev nervously looked over their shoulders at the Russian Army glowering at them from across the border, saw no repercussions to the first mortar bombardment, and decided to up the ante the next day, 18 May. That day the first 12 cm mortars were used in addition to the 82 mm mortars of the day before. Also that day the first patently civilian targets were hit and one single 12 cm howitzer shell was fired. Again, no reaction from Russia.
By 20 May, with no visible reaction from Russia concerning the increasing use of heavy weapons against both civilian targets and the Federalist positions, Ukraine began to systematically bombard targets of their choosing. The number of patently civilian casualties from 15 May to 23 May numbers over 50, some dead, most wounded.
On 22 May the first overt attack by 'national guard' units against a Ukraine Army unit that refused to attack civilians occurred near Volnovakha. The tactics used by the national guard were interesting but almost standard for them of late. They arrived at the Ukraine Army lager outside the village in lime green vans and at least one white van, announced they were 'friends' and then started shooting at the Ukraine Army soldiers. While they managed to kill and wound most of the Army unit some did survive and most, after the initial surprise, fought back with spirit. Casualties in the Army unit seem to be in excess of 60 dead and wounded, on the national guard unit not as many but more than a few.After the fighting stopped and the wounded from both sides were removed, two Mi24 attack helicopters identified as 'national guard' helicopters, attacked the area and destroyed most of the trucks, ambulances and BMP's of the Ukraine Army unit and the damaged national guard vans left in place. An entire Ukraine Army armored company was thus destroyed by 'national guard' units for refusing what in reality was an illegal order, to wit, attack an unarmed village full of civilians.
This incident alone will have very serious repercussions for the Kiev government, although the international community is dead silent about the killings. It shows that if you do not do what the Kiev government tells you to do you will be killed. Every unit in the entire Ukraine Army knew of this incident within an hour of it's happening. This will adversely affect the morale and combat effectiveness of the Ukraine Army from top to bottom. It is very possible that some Ukraine units may either attack 'national guard' units or simply change sides. That remains to be seen, but it is a fact that soldiers can not be made to attack with weapons pointed at their backs from the rear. They will be just as likely to turn on the enforcers as they are to attack the perceived 'enemy'. There are already, as of 08:15 local time on 23 May, unconfirmed but reliable reports of two Ukraine Army units going over to the Federalist side.
On the Federalist side, tactics have been developed ad hoc using the available units and soldiers. They have several advantages in that most are local boys and they know the surrounding areas like the backs of their hands, having grown up there. After seizing several weapons storages in both Donetsk and Lugansk Oblast the Federalists are now reasonably well armed and supplied with ordinance including anti air missiles and anti tank weapons, antitank being both missiles and RPG's plus a few old but as new condition antitank rifles which have no trouble ventilating any BTR or BMP.
It is obvious from their tactics that they hold no area that they are willing to fight to the last man for at this moment that has been aggressed by the Kiev forces. From what I have seen on the scattered but continuous attacks on their 'blocking posts' they will generally withdraw at the first sign of national guard presence in attack mode, sit back and wait. The national guard unit will then take the post, do the obligatory 'burn the barricade' drill, take what food is lying around and leave. The Feds then return, rebuild the barricade, sit back and have lunch. The Feds have lost men in these raids but the losses have been low.
The Federalists do often attack national guard units and the one Ukraine Army unit that does seem willing to fight. The national guard units, being generally on the defensive de facto, are in the position of having to defend a large area and lack the manpower required to do that. The Nats (I will do a name change now, or a shortening of names. The Federalists will be known as the Feds, the national guard and their allies will be known as the Nats) do have many strong positions in some areas that the Feds are smart enough to not attack. However, from readily available information it is obvious that the Feds to attack and/or ambush Nat units often. They use the classic tactic of having a local preponderance of force or, as the Confederate General P. G. T. Beauregard said 150 years ago, 'I got there fustus with the mostus', in other words local superiority at the moment. Local superiority does not necessarily mean superior numbers, it can, and often does, mean local surprise and instant domination of the battle area by fire. The Feds do this drill by day or night.
These tactics seem to be working, at least for now. The Nats casualties for the last month are well in excess of 600 dead and a like number of wounded, wounded meaning anyone who is hurt one way or another badly enough to be off duty for a time to full blown intensive care. For the Feds casualties are not reliably known but have not been anywhere near the numbers of Nat casualties. Civilian casualties there are no reliable numbers for but from reliable sources do run over 200 dead and wounded in the last month in the two oblasti.
If the Kiev regime manages to attack throughout the entire area at one time they will probably win this campaign as they seem to be perfectly willing to accept civilian and military casualties and damage that would not be looked well upon if known or reported by national and international news media. The Feds are seriously, read vastly, outnumbered and woefully under equipped. The Feds have but a very few BMP light armored vehicles and a few captured BTR vehicles, almost no artillery and zero air assets. They do have excellent morale and do believe strongly in their cause.
Strategically, I don't know. I'm not bad at tactics, being just a lowly veteran sergeant, but from what I see Kiev is in the position of having to attack and attack strongly on 23 and 24 May. Their masters are adamant that they solve 'this problem' before the election scheduled for 25 May. I have no doubts that at least some, not all but some, a goodly number of 'some', of the Federalists will fight to the end to hold their very few strategic locations.In reality they have no other option, either fight to the death or be killed after the fact. Is Kiev and their international backers and masters willing to do the massive fighting this will entail in civilian areas and with the very large civilian casualties this act will entail? I think so. Will Russia intervene? I don't know and conjecture is useless on whatever actions Russia may or may not take.
Only time will tell how this unfolding tragedy will end, but my thoughts are that Ukraine as it was last October is dead and gone, never to arise again as we knew it.
(To be continued)
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
Three military analyses of the 4 day war between Russia and Georgia
The August War between Russia and Georgia
http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2008/item3/article1/
Mikhail Barabanov
Initially, Georgia's attack on the capital of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia on August 8, 2008, seemed like it would lead to yet another bloody, drawn out Caucasus war. However, the quick, energetic, and sustained intervention of Russia (the guarantor of peace in South Ossetia since 1992) escalated by August 11 into a powerful blitzkrieg against Georgia proper. Commentators who until recently described the Georgian Army as the “best” in the post-Soviet space were at a loss for words.
Indeed, upon his seizure of power in the “Rose Revolution” of 2003, Mikhail Saakashvili devoted exceptional efforts to the creation of a fighting armed force that could return the separatist autonomous republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the Georgian fold. Moreover, Saakashvili wagered on the broadest possible alliance with the United States and NATO, and on the formation of the Georgian Army according to Western models, with significant US military assistance. Significant funding went into force generation: during Saakashvili's rule, Georgia broke world records for defense spending, which grew by 33 times to reach about $1 billion per year in 2007-2008. Last year's defense budget was 8 percent of the Georgian GDP. Only Saudi Arabia, Oman, and North Korea spend more as a proportion of their national wealth. Georgia has recently made massive purchases of military equipment, including Soviet-made arms from Ukraine and Eastern Europe, as well as modern Western and Israeli equipment. A significant part of the new Georgian army got real field experience in Iraq, in cooperation with the US Army.
The creation of Saakashvili's army was accompanied by a powerful PR campaign within Georgia and abroad. The Internet was inundated with photos and videos of maneuvers and combat preparations by young Georgian men in American uniforms and helmets. Saakashvili himself took great pleasure in participating in military parades of battalions dressed in American uniforms, marching in an American style along the streets of Tbilisi with American rifles in their hands. The virtual image of a modern “Western Army” was created, just like in Hollywood films. Georgia became a kind of window display for military reform in the Western style.
In the end, Saakashvili seems to have become the victim of his own militaristic self-advertising, convinced that the new Georgian military machine was sufficiently effective, capable, and powerful to impose a final solution on the rebellious autonomous regions. The temptation to use his pretty toy soldiers became increasingly hard to resist; indeed, overwhelming, when he launched upon his fateful military adventure in South Ossetia in August.
The attack on South Ossetia was not spontaneous. Over the course of several days in early August, the Georgians appear to have secretly concentrated a significant number of troops and equipment (the full 2th, 3th and 4th Infantry Brigades, the Artillery Brigade, the elements of the 1th Infantry Brigade, the separate Gori Tank Batallion – total the nine light infantry and five tank battalions, up to eight artillery battalions – plus special forces and Ministry of the Internal Affairs troops – all in all, up to 16,000 men) in the Georgian enclaves in the South Ossetian conflict zone, under cover of providing support for the exchange of fire with Ossetian formations. On August 7, at about 22:00, the Georgians began a massive artillery bombardment of Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, and by dawn the next day began an attack aimed at capturing Tskhinvali and the rest of the territory of South Ossetia. By 08:00 on August 8, Georgian infantry and tanks had entered Tskhinvali and engaged in a fierce battle with Ossetian forces and the Russian peacekeeping battalion stationed in the city.
In these conditions, on the morning of August 8, the Russian Government, headed by Vladimir Putin and Dmitriy Medvedev, decided to conduct an operation to prevent the seizure by Georgia of South Ossetia, characterized as a “peace enforcement” mission. Later that day, three tactical battalion groups from the 135th, 429th, and 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division (stationed in Vladikavkaz) of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District were deployed in battle formation to Java and Gufta, and by the end of the day had cleared the roads and heights around Kverneti, Tbeti, and Dzari districts, and as far as the western edge of Tskhinvali. Russian Air Force also took action.
Meanwhile, Georgian forces were engaged in positional battles in Tskhinvali and its environs, but with the entry of Russian forces they stood no chance of success. Nonetheless, the slow passage of Russian forces toward Tskhinvali through the narrow Roki tunnel and along the narrow mountain roads, as well as the difficulties of quickly concentrating a significant quantity of Russian troops from various regions of the North Caucasus, created the impression of slow Russian deployment and the clumsiness of the Russian command. The fact is that they were compelled by circumstances to introduce their forces into battle batallion by batallion. For this reason, on Saturday, August 9, a fierce battle took place in the region of Tskhinvali, and the Georgians were able to mount several counterattacks, including some with tanks. They even resorted to ambush and partisan tactics, which succeeded in wounding the commander of the 58th Army Lieutenant General A. Khrulyov.
By the morning of August 10, the Georgians had captured almost the whole of Tskhinvali, forcing the Ossetian forces and Russian peacekeeping battalion to retreat to the northern reaches of the city. However, on this very day the accumulation of Russian forces in the region finally bore fruit, and the fighting in South Ossetia reached a turning point. Toward the evening of August 10, Tskhinvali was completely cleared of Georgian forces, which retreated to the south of the city. Georgian forces were also repelled from the key Prisi heights. The bulk of Georgia’s artillery was defeated. Meanwhile, Ossetian forces, with the support of Russian divisions, took Tamarasheni, Kekhvi, Kurta, and Achabeti on the approach to Tskhinvali from the north. Georgian forces in several of Georgian enclaves were eliminated.
By the evening of August 10, Russia had seven full regimental tactical groups (135th, 429th, and 503rd and 693rd Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division from North Ossetia, the 70th and 71th Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division from Chechnya, and one regiment of the 76th Pskov Air Assault Division), units of the 45th Reconnaissance Paratroop Regiment and the 10th and 22nd Special Forces Brigades, as well as significant artillery and air-defense forces. Two Chechen companies from the Zapad and Vostok battalions and regimental tactical groups of the 98th Ivanovo Airborne Division, deployed to the battle zone too. The total number of Russian forces in South Ossetia reached about 10,000 men and 150 tanks.
At the same time, Russia opened a “second front” in Abkhazia, deploying up to 9,000 men from the 7th Novorossiysk and 76th Pskov Air Assault Aivisions, the elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division and two batallions of the Black Sea Fleet Marines. With their support, Abkhaz forces began to dislodge the Georgian forces from the Kodori Gorge.
The Russian Black Sea Fleet left Sevastopol on the evening of August 8 and established a de-facto sea blockade of the Georgian coast. The Russian Task Force included the Moskva guide missile cruiser, the Smetlivy destroyer (Kashin class), the Mirazh (Nanuchka III class) guide missile corvette, the R-239 and R-334 (Tarantul III class) guide missile corvettes, the Aleksandrovets and Murmanets (Grisha V class) corvettes, three minesweepers, three large tank landing ships, a transport, and a rescue ship. On the evening of August 9, the Mirazh corvette probably sank one Georgian patrol cutter with two Malakhit (SS-N-9) anti-ship missiles in what amounted to the Russian Navy's first real sea battle since 1945.
Russia's Air Force carried out attacks on military targets all across Georgian territory, completing several hundred sorties using Su-24M Fencer frontal bombers, and Su-25 Frogfoot attack planes, and the Tu-22M3 Backfire long-range bombers. That said, the use of air power was limited by political considerations. There were no attacks on Georgian infrastructure, transport, communications or industry, nor any on government buildings. The distance of targets from Russian bases also complicated matters. In addition, Russian helicopters had a hard time flying over the Caucasus passes, and thus extensive use of helicopters by Russia began only after August 10-11, once a temporary landing/take-off strip was set up in South Ossetia. The overall losses of Russian Air Force amounted to one Tu-22M3 long-range bomber, one Su-24M Fencer frontal bomber, one Su-24MR Fencer E reconnaissance plane, and four Su-25 attack planes. Moreover, the Russian Army launched 15 Tochka-U (SS-21) short-range ballistic missiles against military targets and a few new Iskander (SS-26) short-range theater ballistic missiles.
Having lost its control over the bulk of South Ossetian territory, Georgian forces began to regroup at Gori. Meanwhile, Georgian units and artillery continued to shell Tskhinvali from a number of high points, and displayed fierce resistance in a number of Georgian enclaves. However, by the end of August 11 South Ossetia was completely cleared of Georgian forces, and Russian units had moved into Georgia proper by the next morning, establishing a demilitarized buffer zone as much as 25 km wide to prevent any further artillery attacks on South Ossetia. Georgian units resisted stubbornly in the area around the village of Zemo-Nikozi, repelling the Russian attack for a short time, but were soon wiped away.
Georgian defenses and the entire army soon began to collapse. From the morning of August 12 onward, the Georgian army began to retreat toward Gori, a retreat which soon grew into a panicked flight from Gori, almost all the way to Tbilisi. Along the way, the Georgians abandoned a significant quantity of ammunition and military equipment, especially the artillery brigade.
On August 11, Russian forces entered Georgia proper from Abkhazia virtually unopposed. Having taken the city of Zugdidi, Russian units (paratroops from the 7th Division) spread across almost all of Western Georgia on raids aimed at destroying heavy weapons at Georgian military bases in Senaki and Poti.
At midday on August 12, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev decided to cease the active phase of the peace-enforcement operation. That evening, Saakashvili signed a preliminary ceasefire agreement that French President Nikolas Sarkozi had just brought from Moscow. Russian formations concentrated along the southern borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, exercising partial control of the demilitarized zone. Meanwhile, active raids on Georgian territory to capture and destroy Georgian weapons, and the “demilitarization of the Georgian armed forces,” continued. From August 13 to 15, Russian paratroops raided Poti again and again, destroying almost all of the docked ships and boats of the Georgian Navy, and took away a quantity of valuable military equipment. The same day, Russian forces entered Gori and began to seize rich trophies from Georgia’s military bases. Other Russian raiding units neared within 20 km of Tbilisi. This all occurred in the context of the complete paralysis of a demoralized Georgian Army, and the conclusion of individual agreements with local Georgian authorities and commanders on nonresistance against the Russian forces. The remaining combat-capable units of the Georgian Army (including the 1st Infantry Brigade hurried back from Iraq) concentrated at the northern approach to Tbilisi in expectation of a Russian attack on the capital. The morale of even these troops was reportedly extremely low.
As announced on end of August, the Russian armed forces sustained official losses of 71 dead, five POW (including two pilots) and 356 injured. However, these figures do not include losses to Ossetian forces and various volunteers (probably, up 150 died). Russian and Ossetian forces lost a few tanks and infantry combat vehicles. Losses to the Georgian side are not yet clear, but estimated at over 500 killed and up to 1,500 injured, with more than 100 POW (though the Russians have acknowledged taking only 15).
Georgia has entirely lost its air and naval forces and air-defense systems. Reportedly, Russian forces captured and destroyed a significant portion of the Georgian army's arsenals. The Russians seized up to 150 units of Georgian heavy weaponry, including 65 T-72 tanks (including 44 in operational condition), 15 BMP armoured infantry fighting vehicles, a few dozen armored perconnel carriers, vehicles, guns and SAM systems. Russia seized a large quantity of automobiles and small arms, including American M4A3 carbines. Several Georgian tanks, armored vehicles, and guns were completely destroyed in battle.
Thus, not only did Saakashvili's adventure end in total failure, but Georgia suffered a heavy military defeat. The new Georgian Army clearly did not live up to the ambitious hopes of its leaders. While Georgian servicemen displayed an adequate level of military training and perseverance at the tactical level, at higher levels of command the performance of the Georgian Army was less than satisfactory. The tenacity of the Georgians in South Ossetia can be explained by local and ethnic motivation, typical of interethnic conflicts. But once the ethnic motivation is gone, servicemen quickly lose morale. Typical Caucasus emotionality quickly turned into panic and demoralization when faced with a clearly superior enemy. The unit command of the Georgian Army was unable to maintain discipline, and lost control when under stress and when its communications were attacked. A widespread sense of the futility of fighting against the powerful Russian Armed Forces may also have contributed to the collapse of morale.
A clear analogy can be drawn between the fate of the Georgian Army and the collapse of the armed forces of South Vietnam in 1975. Like the Georgian Army, the South Vietnamese Army was built, trained, according to the American model and was well equipped. However, when they fought against the forces of North Vietnam, which combined local combat techniques with Soviet and Chinese organization and tactics, the outwardly impressive South Vietnamese forces proved to be much less effective than expected and fell apart after several defeats. In Georgia, as in South Vietnam, the imitation of Western methods of organization and force generation failed to match Western levels of military effectiveness. The creation of an effective national military machine requires long-term work on the part of the state, and an ability to take national characteristics into account. In and of themselves, “Western” standards of force generation do not guarantee superiority over “non-Western” armies. Those who believe in the a-priori superiority of the West in military affairs have learned yet another unpleasant lesson from the Georgian affair.
But one should not, however, discount the strength of the Georgian Army, in spite of what happened. On the whole, the Saakashvili regime developed Georgia's military capacity in a sensible manner, showing an admirable concern for the armed forces. From a technical point of view, the focus on acquiring heavy, self-propelled artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems and air-defense systems proved to be entirely justified, and it was precisely these weapons that inflicted the greatest damage on the Ossetian and the Russian forces. The acquisition of UAVs was similarly justified, along with night vision, modern communications, radio-technical reconnaissance and electronic warfare equipment. In these categories, the Georgian Army was perhaps even better equipped than Russian Army. The emphasis placed by Western military instructors on the individual training of soldiers also seems to have paid off. But, on the whole, the Georgian Army needed more time to ripen. Saakashvili's rash decision to throw this army into battle prematurely, leading to confrontation with the Russian Armed Forces, led to its fateful demise.
As for the performance of the Russian Armed Forces, the speed of their reaction was clearly unexpected, not only by the Georgians, but by the West as well, not to mention a few pessimistic observers within Russia itself. Three tactical battalion groups from level-ready units were introduced into South Ossetia in a matter of hours. Within three days, a powerful alignment of forces and equipment was assembled under extremely difficult natural conditions, capable of effective action and inflicting quick defeat on a numerically equivalent enemy. The Russian forces may have demonstrated insufficient coherence at the tactical level, but their superiority over the Georgian forces in terms of combat capability and effectiveness is indisputable. Russia has thus demonstrated that it has units and groups ready for combat operations, as well as an effective military command.
The traditionally weak aspects of the Russian Army, such as night operations, reconnaissance, communications, and rear support, remained as before, though in view of the enemy's weakness these weak points did not play a significant role. There is no doubt that these issues will have to be examined as a first priority in view of the results of the campaign, as well as issues concerning counter-battery combat.
Victory over the Georgian Army during the peace-enforcement operation of August 2008 should not be a cause for euphoria in Moscow, but rather a stimulus to accelerate military transformation and the mass procurement of modern armaments for the Russian Armed Forces.
Georgia's Air Defense in the War with South Ossetia
http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2008/item3/article3/
Said Aminov, Editor of the Air Defense News website: www.pvo.su
The Georgian air-defense system represents a symbiosis of what it inherited from the collapse of the Soviet Union and new acquisitions from former Warsaw Pact and Soviet successor states.
During Soviet times, the 19th Tbilisi Air-Defense Army of the Soviet Air-Defence Troops was deployed in Georgia (reduced to an Air-Defense Corps in 1991). It included three SAM brigades in Tbilisi, Poti, and Echmiadzin, armed with S-75 (SA-2) and S-125 (SA-3) SAM systems, a separate SAM regiment armed with S-75 SAM systems (SA-2, deployed in Gudauta, Abkhazia), and a separate SAM regiment near Tbilisi, equipped with S-200 (SA-5) long-range SAM systems, as well as two radar brigades. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some of the Soviet Armed Forces, including air defense, did not fall under Georgian jurisdiction, but remained under Russian control. During the early 1990s, all of the aforementioned air-defense divisions on Georgian territory were dismantled and their equipment transferred to Russia for scrapping. Nonetheless, Georgian forces seized some air-defense equipment from the Russian military, including at least one S-75 and two S-125 SAM battalions, as well as a few P-18 Spoon Rest radars. These systems were put into service to form the base of the air defenses of the Georgian armed forces. The Georgians used the S-75 SAM battalions in the war with Abkhazia in 1992-1993 and shot down a Russian Su-27 fighter near Gudauta on March 19, 1993.
The S-75 battalion was removed from service in Georgia, but the two S-125 Neva-M low- to high-altitude SAM systems battalions was deployed in Tbilisi and Poti (a total of seven quadruple rail launchers) and those in service with the Georgian Air Force had been modernized by Ukrainian specialists by 2005.
Georgian Army received several short-range air-defense systems in the first half of the 1990s from the arsenals of the former Soviet Army located in Georgia but transferred to Russian jurisdiction. These included KS-19 100-mm anti-aircraft guns, S-60 57-mm anti-aircraft guns, ZU-23-2 twin 23-mm anti-aircraft guns, ZSU-23-4 Shilka quad 23-mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems, Strela-2M (SA-7), Strela-3 (SA-14), and Igla-1 (SA-16) man-portable SAM systems (MANPADS). However, a significant proportion of these arms was lost by Georgia during its unsuccessful war with Abkhazia. Some of the ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns were mounted on MT-LB armored multipurpose tracked vehicles.
With Mikhail Saakashvili's assumption of power in 2003, Georgia began the rapid development of its military capacities with the aim of acquiring the means to regain the separatist Abkhazian and South Ossetian regions. To neutralize Russia's potential to interfere in its operations against Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia began to purchase modern air-defense systems.
First, Georgia acquired a 9К37М1 Buk-M1 (SA-11) battalion of low- to high-altitude self-propelled SAM systems composed of three batteries (each battery includes two self-propelled launcher mounts and one self-propelled loader-launcher) from Ukraine in 2007. These were delivered together with 48 9М38М1 surface-to-air missiles.
Georgia noted this transfer in its official report for 2007 to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Other than Russia and Ukraine, only Finland, Cyprus, and Egypt possess Buk systems in several different versions. The Russian army is currently acquiring the latest version, the Buk-M2 (SA-17), and a large export contract of Buk-M2E to Syria is in the pipeline. According to subsequent internet reports from Ukraine, the Buk-M1 systems were delivered by sea to Georgia on June 7, 2007. In July 16, 2008, photos of Georgian Buk-M1 systems used during tactical training in Western Georgia dating from August 2007 appeared on the Internet. According to a Ukrainian source, on June 12, 2008, another battery of Buk-M1 systems was delivered to Georgia.
Second, Ukraine delivered eight self-propelled launcher vehicles 9К33М2 Osa-AK (SA-8B) low-altitude SAM systems (two batteries) and six (ten, according to some sources) 9К33М3 Osa-АKM self-propelled launcher vehicles update SAM systems. The Buk-M1 and Osa-AK/AKM systems were deployed by the Georgian Air Force in Gori, Senaki, and Kutaisi.
Third, Ukraine sold Georgia two modern 36D6-M radars that were deployed in Tbilisi and Savshevebi near Gori. The 36D6-М is a mobile, 3-D air surveillance radar, developed by the Iskra company in Zaporizhzhya, Ukraine. The 36D6-M radar is a deep modernization of the ST-68U (19Zh6) Tin Shield radar, taken into service in 1980 and used with the S-300P (SA-10) SAM system. The 36D6-M radar has a range of up to 360 km.
Fourth, Ukraine delivered at least one Kolchuga-M passive electronic monitoring radar system, capable of passively detecting modern aircraft, including those using stealth technology. According to information published recently in Ukraine, it is possible that another four Kolchuga-M and one Mandat electronic warfare systems, all produced in Donetsk at the SKB RTU and the Topaz Company, were delivered to Georgia in May of 2008. Earlier, Ukraine was severely criticized by the United States for having sold Kolchuga systems to China, Iraq, and Iran.
Fifth, the Ukrainian company Aerotekhnika upgraded the obsolete Georgian P-18 Spoon Rest radars to the P-180U version, which amounts to a qualitatively new and modern 2-D air surveillance radar system. At the time when it attacked South Ossetia, the Georgian Air Force had four P-180U radars deployed in Alekseyevka (near Tbilisi), Marneuli, Poti, and Batumi.
In 2006, company Aerotekhnika united Georgian military and four civilian air-traffic-control radars and the Kolchuga-M system into a single Air Sovereignty Operations Center (ASOC) early warning and command control tactical system. The central command center of the ASOC was located in Tbilisi, and as of 2008 was connected to a NATO Air Situation Data Exchange (ASDE) through Turkey, which allowed Georgia to receive data directly from the unified NATO air-defense system.
According to the Russian Defense Ministry, Ukraine either delivered or planned to deliver 50 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16) man-portable SAM systems and 400 9М313 surface-to-air missiles, with missile seekers, upgraded by the Ukrainian Arsenal plant.
Several East European states also participated in the renewal of the Georgian air defense system. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, Bulgaria delivered 12 ZU-23-2М twin 23-mm anti-aircraft guns and 500 9М313 surface-to-air missiles for Igla-1 man-portable SAM systems. According to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, Poland delivered 30 Grom man-portable SAM systems (a improved Igla-1) and 100 surface-to-air missiles, and it is possible that such deliveries took place in 2008 as well. Reports have circulated that Georgia acquired Soviet era man-portable SAM systems from other countries as well.
Finally, there are reports that Georgia acquired one battery of the new Israeli Spyder-SR short-range self-propelled SAM system in 2008. The Spyder-SR SAM system, developed by Rafael company, uses Python 5 and Derby air-to-air missiles in a surface-to-air role. There has been no official confirmation of any such deliveries to Georgia, but Jane's Missiles & Rockets magazin cited a Rafael representative to report that the “Spyder-SR has been ordered by two export customers, one of whom now has the system operational.”
The Russian Ministry of Defense also reported that the Georgian Army acquired the Skywatcher army air-defense early-warning and command control tactical system produced by the Turkish Aselsan Company in 2008.
Thus, by the time Georgia invaded South Ossetia, its air defenses had acquired significant capability to detect, locate, and destroy air targets. The Georgian forces that advanced into South Ossetia were the equivalent of about a large division (nine light infantry and five tank battalions, up to eight artillery battalions, plus special forces and Ministry of the Internal Affairs troops), were protected by an air defense echelon that included one Buk-M1 SAM system battalion, up to three Osa-AK/AKM SAM system batteries, a large number of man-portable SAM systems, as well as a few С-60 57-mm anti-aircraft guns, ZU-23-2 twin 23-mm anti-aircraft guns, and ZSU-23-4 Shilka quad 23-mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems. Thus, the air-defense system of Georgian attack groups was about the equivalent of a best frontline Soviet divisions during the late 1980s - early 1990s.
The confrontation with Georgia's air-defense system proved to be a serious trial for Russia's military aviation, especially since it seems that its capabilities were initially underestimated. Meanwhile, Georgia's air defenses reportedly relied on data received from the Kolchuga-M passive electronic monitoring radar systems, minimizing the use of active radar, while the Georgian Buk-M1 and Osa-AK/AKM self-propelled SAM systems used ambush tactics. This made it more difficult to defeat the Georgian air-defense systems. According to unofficial reports, the Georgian Buk-M1 SAM systems shot down four Russian aircraft on the first day of battle on August 8: three Su-25 Frogfoot attack planes and one Tu-22M3 Backfire long-range bomber.
Moreover, according to unofficial sources, Russia lost another three airplanes (one Su-24MR Fencer E reconnaissance plane on August 8, one Su-24M Fencer frontal bomber on August 10 or 11, and one Su-25 attack plane on August 9) as well as perhaps one Mi-24 attack helicopter.
Both Su-24 were probably shot down by Georgian Osa-AK/AKM SAM systems or man-portable SAM systems, and the Su-25, according to several reports, fell victim to friendly fire from a MANPAD wielded by Russian servicemen. Aсcording to the Sukhoi Company, three Russian Su-25s also was hit by Georgian SAM and MANPAD missiles but was able to return safely to base. For their part, Russian Army air-defense forces claimed shot down three Georgian Su-25 attack planes.
From the crews of the downed planes, two Russian pilots (of the Su-24MR and the Tu-22M3) were taken hostage, and exchanged for Georgian prisoners on August 19. According to unofficial reports, another five Russian pilots (of the Su-25 shot by friendly fire, the navigator of the Su-24MR, and three crew from the Tu-22M3) died.
At the time of writing, the Russian Defense Ministry officially recognized the loss of only three Su-25 attack planes and one Tu-22M3 long-range bomber, and considered them defeated by Buk-M1 SAM systems. The training of Georgian personnel in the use of the Buk-M1 SAM systems took place in Ukraine, and Ukrainian military instructors may have supervised their use in combat.
Although the Russian press and even high-level Russian military officials have made statements about the possible transfer of S-200 long range SAM systems and modern Tor (SA-15) low-to-medium altitude self-propelled SAM systems, such reports have not been confirmed.
One can conclude that following the unpleasant surprise arising from Georgia's effective use of Soviet-made SAM systems on August 8, the Russian armed forces threw all of the resources at their disposal against Georgia's SAM and radar systems. Both S-125M SAM battalions, the majority of Georgia's military and civilian radars, as well as the most part Buk-M1 and Osa-AK/AKM SAM systems were destroyed. It would appear that the only remaining threat to Russian planes and helicopters in the last days of combat came from Georgian MANPADs.
Russian forces were able to seize five Osa-AKM self-propelled launch vehicles, a few ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns and a few ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems as trophies from the retreating Georgian forces. Near Gali and Senaki, Abkhaz and Russian forces captured minimum one Buk-M1 battery, as witnessed by published photos. According to one unofficial source, Russian forces were able to capture or destroy almost all of the self-propelled launcher mounts for the Georgian Buk-M1 SAM systems.
The war in South Ossetia marked the first time when air power faced off against new-generation SAM systems, like the Buk-M1, which were brought into service in the 1980s. In all previous military campaigns, such as the War in Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967, 1973, and 1982, combat actions in Chad and Libya in the 1980s, the NATO campaigns in the former Yugoslavia of 1994 and 1999, and the Wars in the Persian Gulf of 1991 and 2003, the air-defense systems in question were all designed in the 1950s and 1960s (this excludes, of course, the use of modern MANPADs). Moreover, in Georgia, the Russian Air Force for the first time in its history fought against modern air-defense systems, and relatively modern and numerous SAM systems at that.
This unprecedented experience of Russian aviation over a territory protected by a range of air-defense systems will be studied in detail, and should serve as a stimulus for the cardinal modernization of the Russian armed forces. It is obvious that the Russian Air Force must devote greater attention to the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), including the renewal of tactics, electronic weapons and increased military training in this area.
The Ossetian War
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=140546
by “Gene”
We begin by setting the stage. The region of South Ossetia is largely surrounded by nearly insurmountable mountains. Except for groups of mountain infantry without much by way of heavy equipment, and the odd mountain goat, the eastern and western sides of the roughly oval-shaped quasi-republic are quite impenetrable. In the south, a single pass leads into the region from the Georgian town of Gori, coincidentally Iosif Stalin's birthplace; this pass eventually exits into a hilly countryside and empties into something like a bowl-shaped depression, in the middle of which lies Ossetia's capital city of Tskhinvali (also pronounced "Tskhinval") - pre-war population of between 20 and 30 thousand. Beyond Tskhinvali, a single road leads north towards the only route navigable across the region's northern border by any sort of transport - the Rok Tunnel, which had been cut through miles of rock back during the Soviet days and connects directly with North Ossetia, an autonomous region of the Russian Federation. The remainder of South Ossetians are scattered in villages around Tskhinvali, although before the war several ethnic Georgian enclaves also remained.
To the west, across the mountains, lies Abkhazia. It, too, has only a single navigable route leading into it from both the north and south, although the region's western border is the Black Sea itself, easing navigation somewhat. The southern route crosses the Kodori Gorge into Georgia proper, where it first encounters the town of Sugdidi.
Georgia itself is also roughly oval-shaped; to the south and west of Sugdidi are the main ports of Poti and, further south still, Batumi, which is especially vital to Georgia's oil transportation industry, while about 50 kilometers to the east of Gori is Georgia's capital, Tbilisi. From Gori to Tskhinvali to the Rok Tunnel is another 50 kilometers at the most - similarly from the regional center of Kutaisi to Sugdidi, through the Kodori Gorge and into the Abkhazi capital of Sukhumi. Finally, it should be noted that much of Georgia proper - from Poti and Batumi in the west to Tbilisi in the east - the terrain is generally even - far more suitable for mobile operations than the hilly Ossetia ringed by mountain ridges.
Deployment of the opposing sides prior to the conflict was as follows.
The Georgian military before the conflict numbered approximately 20,000 combat troops, with another 10,000 logistical and administrative personnel and a further 7,000 of Interior Ministry troops (glorified SWAT teams with armored vehicles). Equipment was generally of Soviet make, with official pre-war strength at 82 T-72 and 110 T-55 tanks of all marks with first-generation ERA (Explosive Reactive Armor); about 150 BMP armored fighting vehicles, another 80-100 medium and heavy APCs and at least 100 light wheeled APCs; roughly 40-50 self-propelled (all 152mm) and 130 towed (about 100 122mm, the rest 152mm) artillery pieces, plus 35-45 multiple rocket launch systems; 15-20 combat aircraft plus another 15 light jet trainers and roughly 80 helicopters of all types.
That's the official Georgian data per Tbilisi's various disclosures, e.g. to the UN. Unofficially, the numbers vary somewhat; for example, Russian data as of July 20 suggested that the Georgians had 165 T-72s (75 T-72M, the rest T-72 B1 and AV; the AV model has first-generation ERA, the T-72M is the export version with downgraded weapon systems, and the B1 has improved armor and fire control systems plus ERA but drops the ATGM capability) and 40 T-55-AM tanks (the modernized version but with a weaker engine than the current upgrade of T-55s), rather than 82 and 110, respectively ; 373 artillery pieces of all types excluding multiple rocket launchers rather than the 170-180 implied above; just over 20 combat aircraft (mostly Su-25s) plus 33 light attack aircraft (L-159 ALCA) and 25-26 rather than 80 combat helicopters; and a number of missile boats and patrol ships.
The numbers above should also be viewed in light of the following disclosures about arms shipments to Georgia over 2004-2008: 10 UH-1-H helicopters and 230 wheeled vehicles (including 15 Hummers delivered by AM General, LLC - a firm whose financials I know as intimately as is possible...) from the U.S., with 15 UH-60 Blackhawks on tap; 7 152mm self-propelled guns, 16 ZSU-23 AAA guns, and 300 RPG-7s, 500 "Igla" MANPADS (man-portable air defense systems) and 150 "Kornet" and "Konkurs" ATGMs, 4 SU-25 attack aircraft, two light troop ships, 10 thousand crates of AK-47 assault rifles and RPG 22s plus ammunition, and 650 tons of ammunition from Bulgaria; 66 APCs, 1186 AMD-65 assault rifles, 44 PKM machine-guns, 600 82mm mortar rounds and an unspecified amount of 7.62mm ammunition from Hungary; 1 missile boat and 2 patrol ships plus 60 mortars from Greece; 14 thousand AK assault rifles from Lithuania; 60 RN-94 APCs, 2 UH-1 helicopters, one patrol ship, 2,500 MP5A1(k) SMGs, 1,500 G3 A3 assault rifles, 4,000 122mm rockets and 20,000 155mm artillery shells, plus a large amount of 7.62mm ammunition and hand grenades from Turkey; one multiple rocket launcher with 4 Mirage fighter aircraft, 2 missile boats and upwards of 60-65 "Mistrale" and "Mistrale-2" MANPADS from France; 120 T-54 or T-55 and 55 T-72 tanks, plus 24 "Dana" 152mm self-propelled artillery vehicles, 25 M-75 120mm mortars, 200 "Strela" MANPADs and more than 40 tons of ammunition of all types from the Czech Republic; 8 "Hermes-450" and "Skylark" unmanned recon aircraft from Israel; 45 120mm and 25 82mm mortars plus 500 262mm rockets from Bosnia & Herzegovina; 20 million 7.62mm bullets, plus 1,000 HEAT and 1,690 APFSDS tank shells and other ammunition from Serbia; 31 T-72s, 20 BTR-80s, 40 BMP-2s, 12 152mm "Akatsia" self-propelled artillery vehicles, 9 Mi-24, 2 Mi-8MT and 2 Mi-4 helicopters, 40 tons of ammunition, multiple other specialist vehicles and at least three "Buk"-M1-2 medium-range mobile SAM systems (basically a next-generation version of the SA-11) from the Ukraine.
I'm not including hundreds of radios, a SIM-3C-10 computer platoon training simulator from Estonia, tons of spare parts, assorted odds and ends like engineering equipment, and, of course, training. The U.S. alone still had 95 advisors and 130 "civilian contractors" in Georgia when things broke out.
The bottom line is - we're talking about potentially enough heavy equipment for a U.S. mechanized division plus some "walking" infantry formations (or, put differently, five mechanized brigades - which, coincidentally, corresponds to the nubmering that the Georgian army uses, i.e. 1st Brigade through 5th Brigade). Not inclusive of the 2,000 or so troops sent to Iraq at some point in the past few years (one of the five brigades, but without most of its heavy equipment). Precise comparison is difficult to make due to the variations in just how many AFVs and IFVs the Georgians could have had at the outset. Plus a small-ish airforce, almost all of it ground-attack oriented; it should be noted that during the Soviet days, Tbilisi was the home of the USSR's main Su-25 manufacturing plant, which explains why such a small republic had 20 of the things still operational (at least 5 upgraded by the Israelis with new avionics and targeting systems). [For those who don't know - the Su-25 is the Soviet version of the A-10 Warthog ground attack aircraft, except it looks more like a conventional fighter-bomber, and has had considerably more combat experience. Specifically, flying 60,000 sorties for 21 combat losses during the Afghanistan bru-ha-ha in the 1980s, then thousands more during the many wars that followed the USSR's collapse, e.g. the two Chechen conflicts, as well as 900 sorties during the Iran-Iraq War. Basically very effective at wiping out ground troops and armor when the pilot has any degree of skill, but not a totally unforgiving bird either.]
On the other side of the mountains, we have Abkhazia with between 5,000 and 10,000 regular troops (the number varies year-to-year) plus 28,000 reservists; roughly 60 tanks, about 40 of them T-72s and the remainder T-55s; 116 APCs and BMP IFVs; 85 artillery pieces and mortars (total); 5 SU-25 aircraft, about a half-dozen other fixed-wing and 2 rotary aircraft, and 21 patrol boats. Think - a brigade, maybe two, with modest armor and artillery support.
Finally, pre-war South Ossetia - a region with a total population of significantly lower than 120,000 (just how much lower depends on whether one counts the ethnic Georgians, most of whom have now surely fled; 70,000 to 80,000 is likely the "real" number here) - had 3,000 regular troops and 15,000 reservists (pretty much any male old enough to hold a gun and not yet so old as to preclude him from using it effectively), plus 200 "militarized SWAT" and 900 police; nominally 75 T-72s and 12 T-55s, 80 BMP-1 and BMP-2 IFVs and 85 BTR-70 and BTR-80 APCs; 42 122mm and 152mm "Gvozdika" and "Akatsia" self-propelled artillery vehicles plus another 80 towed artillery and mortar pieces; a few ZSU-23 "Shilka" and towed 100mm AAA, plus "Igla" MANPADS, an unspecified amount of RPG-7 and RPG-22 weapons, and 4 Mi-8 helicopters. There may have been a few more combat helicopters, including - ground reports indicate - at least 3 American UH-1s (don't ask me how they got there...). Basically, one brigade, plus or minus. As it turned out, "minus", due to the issue with Ossetia's tanks and BMPs (see below).
These are totals, of course. Recall that the leading edge of any engagement actually involves considerably fewer troops and tanks on either side.
And oh yes - the Russians. The Russians, as it happened, had designated the entire area as the "Caucasus Military District", with the bulk of the military forces therein provided by the 58th Army, with air support provided by the 4th Air and Air Defense Army. The 58th's somewhat-dated OOB included the 19th Motor Rifle Division, the 205th Motor Rifle Brigade, the 136th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, the 135th Motor Rifle Regiment, the 291st Artillery Brigade (equipped with towed 152mm 2A65 guns); the 943rd Multiple Rocket Launcher Regiment (220mm "Uragan" MRLS); the 1128th Anti-tank Regiment; the 67th AA Rocket Brigade (first- and next-generation SA-11); and the 487th Helicopter Regiment (Mi-8 and Mi-24 "Hind" helos). The 19th Motor Rifle includes 3 Motor Rifle regiment (each with a tank battalion), a separate tank regiment (mostly T-72s, I believe), an "Akatsia" 152mm SP artillery regiment; and organic air defense. Prior to the conflict, apparently the 58th Army was reinforced with some of the newer weapon systems in the Russian arsenal, such as the S-300 long-range SAM, the new MRLS system (forgot the designation, but makes the 220mm Uragan pale by comparison), etc. The 4th Air Army has several regiments of Mig-29 (F-16-like) and Su-27 (F-15-like) fighters as well as Su-24 (F-111 equivalent), Su-25 (A-10-like) and Tu-22 bombers and recon aircraft, plus Mi-24 Hinds and a bunch of transport helicopters.
Oh yes - the final piece of the puzzle were the peacekeeper battalions - 500 Russians and 500 Georgians deployed in each "separatist region" - lightly armed, with only a few BMPs and transport helicopters in each.
Prior to August 8, the Georgians moved two combat brigades with perhaps half the republic's total number of tanks and IFVs, and what looks to be most of their artillery (certainly all of their MRLS systems) up from Gori and towards the gorge that led to Tskhinvali. Additional light infantry forces were activated in the Georgian enclaves inside South Ossetia proper. By this time, there had already been sporadic exchanges of fire between Georgia, Abkhazia and Ossetia for roughly a week, though nothing serious; the Abkhazians did, however, shoot down at least three of the Georgians' unmanned recon aircraft. Meanwhile, the Russians, not being blind, moved five battalions from the 19th Motor Rifle Division closer to the Russian entrance of the Rok Tunnel, and placed the remainder of the 58th Army on yellow alert. Apparently, several other Russian units were activated at this time, namely the two ethnic Chechen battalions ("East" and "West") and certain air assault formations. In addition, about half of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, having recently conducted maneuvers off the Abkhazian and Russian coastlines, remained in the area, within a few hours of the Georgian ports.
For their part, the Ossetians placed their forces on red alert and began evacuating civilians from the region (especially Tskhinvali) during the last few days before the war; while the Abkhazi activated their military units but did nothing else for the moment.
August 8-9.
The conflict began some time after midnight on August 8. The Georgians claim that they crossed into South Ossetia in response to an Ossetian attack; even if this had been the case, then the massed Georgian forces had been waiting for just such an opportunity - given their carefully prepared plans (see below).
The precise sequence of events here diverges based on whom one asks; the Georgians maintain that they first atempted to rush Tskhinvali with a column of troops and tanks, while the Ossetians suggest that the artillery and rocket barrage hit the town first. Notably, the Georgian artillery was already in position to open fire on Tskhinvali at the first sign of resistance before the conflict began, and so the Ossetian version rings truer. Regardless, it is indisputable that in the dawn hours of August 8, parts of Tskhinvali were pounded by Georgian artillery and rocket launchers deployed on the heights east, south, and west of the town, while a large group of Georgians smashed their way in along the southern road. Simultaneously, at least one or two reinforced battalions of the Georgians, plus an unspecified number of "Georgian special forces" (in practice, as it turned out, Georgian soldiers who had been trained not only how to march in time but also to fire their weapons in the general direction of a target) and a couple of artillery batteries attempted to cut the Tskhinvali-Rok Tunnel road some 10-20 kilometers north of the town itself. Other Georgian forces fanned out to attack Ossetian villages around Tskhinvali.
Georgia's plan was, per maps and documents that were later captured by the advancing Russians, to capture Tskhinvali within the first 5-6 hours of the conflict (another reason for why I would think the artillery barrage preceded the column that went into the town, since theoretically that makes more sense than calling in massed artillery bombardments after you're already enmeshed in street battles), establish a firm roadblock north of the town, use the daylight hours of August 8 to rush through most of the remaining Ossetian territory, and present the presumably stunned and bamboozled Russians not only with a fait accompli but also with the daunting proposition of having to smash their way into South Ossetia through a blocked-off choke-point under fire from tanks and artillery. At which point, too, they would be under untold political pressure from the U.S. to keep their paws off the "Democratic (capital D) Republic of Georgia".
It was a sound plan. It was a cunning plan. It was, for lack of a better descriptor, a stunningly brilliant plan. With only a few minor problems.
Problem 1. The Ossetians themselves.
It should be noted at this point that the Ossetians as a whole are a very proud people. Martially so, as well. It is said that during World War 2, the Ossetians earned the distinction of having the highest number of Heroes of the Soviet Union per capita, out of all of the USSR's 100 plus nationalities, including the Russians themselves. [The "Hero of the Soviet Union" is the rough equivalent of the Victoria Cross or the Congressional Medal of Honor - with potentially half or more of the awards being made posthumously.] Separately, the Ossetians are not a stupid people, certainly not in matters of war.
Somehow or another, it turned out that virtually all of Ossetia's armored vehicles were in "parade" mode, i.e. not battle-ready. Most were blown up by the Ossetians themselves in the first hours of the conflict, or else "evacuated" to the north ahead of time. This left roughly 3,000 light infantry with some marginal artillery and helicopter support. Still, this 3,000 would fight, most likely to the death, which was something the Georgian planners ought to have considered before tasking roughly two combat brigades with securing (securing!!) an area of nearly 4,000 square kilometers in under 18 hours. Even without any resistance (and believe you me, the Osseti population would most definitely attempt to resist, given the ethnic component of the conflict), this would probably have been a somewhat strenuous task, in particular given the limitations of having to move reinforcements and supplies into the region via a single not-very-wide roadway, to say nothing of Ossetia's hilly and less-than-tank-friendly terrain.
Problem 2. The plan's sheer brilliance.
Let's see. Time is of the essence. Speed is of the utmost importance. So let's send the main thrust of our attack straight into the enemy's main city.
Let me rephrase that. Let's ignore the fact that said city can be relatively easily bypassed and blasted to bits by tanks and artillery deployed on the heights around it. No. Let's go straight into the damn place. And actually capture every square inch of it. In about 5-6 hours.
You know, back during World War 2, the Russians learned very well the place of cities in strategic and operational warfare; speed traps. Actually storming one cost a lot of time and blood, while bypassing one and racing into the enemy's operational rear usually meant that a given garrison would be compelled to flee of its own volition. The Germans trying to physically capture Stalingrad, just as the Russians storming Kiev, Koenigsberg or Berlin, resulted in a total exhaustion of the besiegers; while bypassing all those cities and towns in Belorussia during the June 1944 Soviet offensive meant that the Germans barely had the time to abandon their heavy equipment and race to the rear; similar to what the Germans did to the Russians in June of 1941, before they bogged down in reducing centers of Soviet resistance.
Not that this means that there are no times in war when sieges and clearing operations need to be conducted - preferably by the second-echelon troops with ample artillery support (while the first echelon continues to mangle the enemy's operational depths). Yet in this case, speed was the key to the Georgian plan - Ossetia had to be defeated within scant hours, the road north cut and the Rok Tunnel sealed off, with nothing for anyone else to do other than bemoan the Georgian Blitzkrieg.
Ah. But instead, we're going to send our main column into an urban battle, granted, inside a town of 20,000 rather than a large city like Stalingrad. Still, narrow streets are bottlenecks and deathtraps to armored vehicles no matter what the scale.
Absolutely brilliant.
Problem 2.5 - the brilliance continues.
On top of everything said above, the Georgians also had to devise a way of dealing with the 500 Russian peacekeepers deployed in South Ossetia. So what did they decide? Bypass and isolate? No no - surround and assault! Presumably hoping that only a portion of a single combat brigade would suffice to overrun a full battalion of albeit lightly-armed (assault rifles, machine-guns, a few RPGs, a couple of BMP IFVs) peacekeepers while the rest of the force could proceed to subjugate South Ossetia while sticking to the Brilliant Master Plan's schedule.
Problem 3.
Absolutely no margin of error assuming a scintilla of intelligence on the side of the Russians. For, you see, any delay in the Grand Plan of Ossetian Subjugation meant that the Russians could (and did) race down the road from the Rok Tunnel and turn a would-be "fait accompli" into an actual slugfest. See Problems 1 and 2 above for potential sources of said delays.
Problem 4.
Apparently this whole concept of the Russian 4th Air Army was not even remotely considered. Let's see. A force with 20-50 ground attack aircraft, some helos and no meaningful AA except for three (3!!) systems which can actually touch medium-to-high altitude Russian aircraft and some ZSU-23s, taking on 3 whole fighter regiments and who knows how many ground attack aircraft. In daylight, for that matter. This definitely fell under the "brilliant idea" heading, unless, of course, the thought process was - we'll secure Ossetia so fast, that the Russians won't have time to get any birds up in the air.
I'm not even mentioning the whole "Black Sea Fleet" issue. With Russian marines onboard. And numerous surface-to-surface missiles.
Problem 5.
Ah. Problem number five. You see, the Georgians clearly had assumed that their brave troops, trained by equally brave Western advisors (the U.S., Britain, Turkey - the Ukraine, even - all pitched in to one degree or another), as well as their brave officers, would actually conduct themselves with a modicum of tactical skill. Because, you see, a lack of said skill could present a problem insofar as any Blitzkrieg goes. Especially if they happen to run smack into veteran enemies. Put differently, in a conflict involving a Panamanian Army Battalion and a USMC Battalion you'd want to be on the side of the USMC, not the brave Panamanians. In theory, at least.
These problems delineated, we return to the action of August 8-9.
As mentioned previously, one way or another the Georgians barged their way into Tskhinvali while pounding the city from the heights above. Meanwhile, a second column lunged to cut the road north of Tskhinvali to the Rok Tunnel.
The Ossetians were not idiots. They expected pretty much this exact turn of events. Roughly 300 "kamikaze" light infantry remained in Tskhinvali itself, their job to keep the Georgian main column busy for as long as possible. Meanwhile, virtually every other man under arms and every functioning piece of equipment was thrown at the smaller Georgian force attempting to cut the road to the Rok Tunnel.
By midday on August 8 (or thereabouts), this smaller Georgian force (quite likely outnumbered by the Ossetians attacking it, though certainly not outgunned) was pushed back away from the north road, though the Georgians could still subject portions of it to artillery and sniper fire. In Tskhinvali, the 300 "Spartans" fought a vicious battle as the Georgians barged their way into town, nearly reaching its center before becoming bogged down in street combat. At least some of the Georgian tanks became separated from their supporting infantry, with three being destroyed in the first hours of the fighting. The total Georgian force - estimated at 3,500-4,000 men - milled about largely in the southern half of the town while artillery pounded the northern side.
The Russian peacekeepers around Tskhinvali also proved a tough nut to crack; most of the battalion's buildings and vehicles were destroyed quite quickly, however a good three quarters of the troops remained combat capable and putting up whatever resistance were possible in the face of tank and self-propelled artillery fire over open sights. Still, the battalion CO gave the order to destroy all documents and radios, clearly expecting to be overrun sooner rather than later.
In the air, the Georgians sent the occasional SU-25 flight to drop bombs on Tskhinvali or the surrounding villages. The Ossetians' one military airfield, however, remained largely unmolested, and their helicopters began raiding Georgian reinforcement columns. Thus, by some time in the afternoon on August 8, a column of 3 Georgian tanks and 8 APCs or IFVs was completely destroyed from the air as it approached the Georgian group in Tskhinvali. Field reports at this juncture indicate that the Georgians aren't following basic "air security" procedures; their vehicle columns are streaming forward with no AA protection of any kind, while their artillery and MRLS crews are piling stacks of shells and rockets right next to the guns and launchers themselves, such that one cannon burst in the general direction of the firing position was usually enough to completely obliterate the gun or launcher and its crew. At the same time, reports also surfaced that the 300 "Spartans" in Tskhinvali managed to somehow trap a chunk of the Georgian force in the town, and had even captured a few of their BMPs and one Humvee (suggesting that the Georgian soldiers had fled rather than put up a fight against an outnumbered and outgunned enemy). The announcement of a captured Hummer drives the Russian general public (as represented by Internet postings of all shapes and sizes) even more up a wall than it had already been. Of course, the "Spartans" are pretty jumpy - the 3 UH-1s beloging to the Ossetians seem to all be shot down by friendly fire from the captured BMPs (who, in turn, had thought that these were Georgian attack helos making a run).
By around 1400-1500 hours local time, the Russian 19th Motor Rifle Division - mobilized that morning - begins to rush through the Rok Tunnel and south towards Tskhinvali. The delay took place partly because it took until morning to determine that this was a full-scale Georgian attack rather than just an especially powerful raid - and because the UN meetings called at Russia's behest could not meet much earlier. By this time, of course, Russian television channels were broadcasting full-on images of frightened Ossetian civilians fleeing the area or digging themselves out from under the rubble of Tskhinvali, crying into the camera about lost loved ones and begging for help. How I love effective TV blitzes...
At any rate, by late afternoon on August 8, the Russians engaged the Georgians, first linking up with the Ossetian troops on the northern road and detaching a force to contain the smaller Georgian column, and then pushing into the northern outskirts of Tskhinvali itself. Meanwhile, Russian aircraft and helicopters - plus artillery detachments - began counterbattery fire against the heights around Tskhinvali, although this was not extremely successful.
By midday on August 9, the situation in South Ossetia had changed dramatically. Russian and Ossetian troops surrounded and began to reduce the Georgian pocket in the north, as well as a portion of the Georgian troops in Tskhinvali proper. Meanwhile, the first Russian reinforcements reached the peacekeeper battalion further south, and Russian artillery and aircraft continued to pound the heights around the city. Georgian reinforcement columns were also vigorously attacked.
The Georgian troops from the main column - those who had not been trapped in Tskhinvali, at least - began their retreat almost as soon as they saw the Russians entering the town. Certainly some detachments stood and fought, but the majority went back to their "second line" positions to regroup. During the night, the artillery duel continued, and by the morning of August 9 several Georgian tank and infantry attacks had been launched to reach both the trapped Georgian detachments (the one in Tskhinvali and the one alongside the road north); these proved unsuccessful, with the Georgians losing 12 tanks in one attack on Tskhinvali proper. The Georgian government began to move reserves into position, although reports indicate that by this time, the bulk of these were "reservists" who did not have much fight in them. Some ethnic Georgians also began to flee South Ossetia, fearful of reprisals (justifiably so). All throughout, detachments of Georgian troops that had fanned out to the villages on either side of Tskhinvali continued to raze them to the ground with tanks and artillery; mass executions of the civilian populations were reported but not independently confirmed.
August 10-11.
On August 10, the main Russian forces were still semi-stuck around Tskhinvali, trying to push the Georgians off the heights while reducing the pockets of resistance in the town proper. The Ossetian troops by now were largely moved to help with securing Tskhinvali and with escorting refugees out of the city and the surrounding areas. In addition to the 19th Motor Rifle Division, several Paratrooper detachments (from the 58th Air Assault Division, I believe) were arriving by aircraft while Russian marines landed in Abkhazia, ostensibly to support the Russian peacekeepers there. Other 58th Army units were also streaming into the area, as were the two Chechen battalions (whose arrival was a welcome surprise some time around the morning of August 10). The Chechen battalions quickly managed to capture enough Georgian BMPs to ferry themselves about and launched an attack towards Gori, which ran into a massive Georgian ambush that caused few casualties but took most of the day to resolve.
By this juncture, the 4th Air Army had had enough and began to bomb and strafe airfields in Georgia proper while also patrolling the skies with Su-27 fighters. Reports of solitary Georgian Su-25 aircraft ineffectually strafing Ossetian and Russian positions continued through August 11, however these may have been able to sneak in "through" the overall aircraft traffic in the region (given that both sides were relying primarily on Su-25s for ground attack mission at this point, not entirely surprising); it is at this juncture that the Russians discover, to their considerable displeasure, that the Georgians are fielding next-generation SA-11 SAMs (one of which brought down a Tu-22 bomber flying a reconnaissance mission, although the crew was, apparently, extricated one way or another). These are presumably hunted down and suppressed over the next couple of days, together with their (presumably Ukrainian - because the Georgian army simply did not have any qualified or "trained-up" personnel to use these systems) crews, as well as any other air defenses in the region, but the Russians still lose about a half-dozen birds in the process. Nevertheless, massive strafing of Georgian reinforcements continues.
Tactically, Russian infantry is content to follow tanks and 152mm "Akatsias" firing over open sights while helicopters support from overhead; the Georgians are unbelievably outgunned on just about every front.
To make matters worse for the Georgians, on August 10 or thereabouts, the Abkhazi begin moving troops into the contested Kodori gorge (prior to which the Russian peacekeeper battalion deployed there politely moved out of the way), with tanks and artillery leading the way, at precisely the point when the Georgians were shifting all available troops and equipment (right down to cramming men of draft or reservist age into buses, threatening them with 4-year jail terms if they "desert" and driving them to the front) to try and stabilize the South Ossetia front. Much unpleasantness ensues. Also by August 10, the Russian Black Sea Fleet takes positions around the Georgian coastline, sinking initially one Georgian missile boat and eventually two or three more before the next day dawns.
By August 11, the Georgian army in South Ossetia is completely and thoroughly routed; its artillery and heavy equipment blown away or abandoned, its troops suffering massive casualties from air and artillery attacks. The pockets in Tskhinvali and along the northern road pretty much cease all resistance, though to date there is no word on prisoners. The Georgians' two combat brigades thrown into the assault at the start effectively cease to exist, while the remaining army and reservists - those who were back in Georgia or had managed to escape to Gori - continue fleeing. The remaining Georgian regular army is pulled back to protect Tbilisi itself, while most Georgian military installations are being abandoned; the brigade that had been stationed in Iraq is being flown back in (reportedly in U.S. transport aircraft), however it, too, is positioned primarily to defend Tbilisi against a Russian strike.
Meanwhile, the Russians continue to push south, as do the Abkhazi. The latter clear out the Georgian defenses (and 11 villages) on the southern side of the Kodori Gorge and dig in against any counter-assault. The Russians launch a full-scale air and sea bombardment of just about any military structure or facility in Georgia - the port facilities of Poti are damaged (though not Batumi - which is a city not of ethnic Georgians but of a recently-"pacified" pro-Russian Adjari minority); Russian aircraft blow up the military depots in Gori (the secondary explosions from which damage the surrounding civilian buildings, which are then showcased in CNN and BBC reports on the subject of "Russian airstrikes against innocent civilians"); Russian troops move towards Gori and Sugdidi. Georgians are leaving Tbilisi to the east, hoping to escape to a somewhat-more friendly Azerbaijan.
Conclusion of combat operations.
By August 11-12, it was only a matter of when a cease-fire would be signed, and on what terms. The terms, essentially, were dictated by the Russians. Militarily speaking, the Russians continued to bomb, shell and otherwise attack Georgian military infrastructure; moreover, Russian platoon- and company-sized detachments race towards now largely-abandoned Georgian military basis, e.g. the one in Gori, and proceed to methodically destroy or dismantle any piece of military or other equipment therein. This process was ongoing through at least August 14-15 if not later, prompting Western cries about "Russian occupation". Radar installations, ammunition depots, armored vehicles - everything was and is being either destroyed or "appropriated for the benefit of the Russian state", while the Georgian military is reduced to a collection of regulars and reservists, largely in the form of light infantry with few remaining vehicles. The Georgian Navy and Air Force, such as they are, have apparently ceased to exist by this juncture. While there is no word on Georgian military or civilian casualties, at least the former can be estimated at upwards of several thousand. Russian losses through August 11-12 are comprised of 70-75 KIA, 19 MIA, and roughly 190-200 WIA; these totals include 15 KIA and more than 100 WIA from the Georgian initial atack on the peacekeeper battalion. Russian tank and equipment losses are less well-known, but are probably in single digits in all categories; those of the Georgians are probably pushing 75%-100% of all units of a given type.
Lessons learned.
One. Tactical proficiency. The Georgian troops showed themselves to be a) less than well-versed in unit tactics (e.g. getting surrounded, with units carved up, by a much smaller force; being ignorant of air support; not being able to follow through on a suburban ambush of a Russian vehicle column and instead being pounded into dust over the next few hours; etc.); b) prone to running away at the first sign of trouble (the very fact of captured undamaged BMP infantry fighting vehicles - in large enough numbers to be used as mounts for entire battalions - is very illustrative); and c) only include a small proportion of troops who are at least capable of putting up something resembling a fight (once the initial two brigades were ground down, Georgia effectively had no trained troops left - and two brigades does not even cover its standing army).
Clearly the Georgian army looked better on paper than in practice. One only wonders what all those American and British (and Ukrainian, and Turkish...) advisors were doing all this time.
The Ossetians showed the most tactical prowess merely by the fact that they managed to hold the road open while a very small force turned Tskhinvali into something of a major annoyance for the Georgians' main column. Considering that we're talking about mostly light infantry attacking large combined-arms forces with, initially, little by way of air cover, the feat does seem quite impressive. Even when adjusted for the Georgian troops' apparent less-than-competence.
The Russians were the Russians - on the one hand, perceived by their opponents as lumbering drunkards with a penchant for mass attacks, and, on the other hand, actually quite happily and aggressively using their armor, artillery and mechanized infantry to carve up and smash an already bogged down enemy. Not that a huge degree of tactical skill was needed, of course - a substantial firepower advantage offsets many a shortcoming. The 4th Air Army, in fact, underperformed, given that, at least on paper, it should have shut down all Georgian air traffic on the first day of fighting, not on the third or thereabouts. Although here one does not know precisely when the rules of engagement were revised to allow it to strike into Georgia proper - nor is it clear just how many aircraft did it or could it deploy to the area.
Two. Operational execution. The Georgians had set ridiculous, by my understanding of the various factors involved (terrain, opposition, etc.), objectives for their troops, and, of course, failed miserably to do much more than lunge into Tskhinvali on the first day. They then continued to make the situation ever more untenable for themselves by not giving up, retreating to their jump-off points and asking for a ceasefire, but instead launching attack after attack to relieve their surrounded troops - against a rapidly mounting opposition. Secondly, something must be said for the fact that when things really began to go against the Georgians, their commanders did not clog up the narrow pass in front of Gori with defenders, but instead pulled back all the way to Tbilisi, effectively leaving the republic's underbelly wide-open. Theoretically, the Russians could have just loped off most of Georgia leaving a rump state of Tskhinvali - as it turned out, they are content to range around smashing military hardware up with relative impunity.
The Ossetians had one job to do - stall the Georgians. After that, their role became almost "humanitarian" (i.e. centered on assisting civilians rather than pressing the attack); not that they didn't want to be at the forefront of the Russian columns, it's just that the Russians were in no mood to watch the Ossetians exact revenge from Georgian towns and villages.
The Russians did quite well, given the logistical constraints (e.g. one road leading into the region). STRATFOR, in fact, came out with a report where it professed amazement at the rapidity and extreme effectiveness of the Russian counter-assault. Granted, the heights around Tskhinvali took time to clear, but again, given the difficulty of moving a single division into the place (while refugees are streaming out along the same road - more than 20,000 registered with Russian Immigration Services on the northern side of the tunnel by August 10, and who knows how many more had gone in unregistered). Besides which, the 58th Army's operational task encompasses the entirety of the Caucasus region, which means that only a portion of it could be detached at a given point in time (though this is where Russian paras and the Chechen battalions came into play).
Three. Strategic outcomes.
The Georgians must have been smoking crack and watching 1930s-era German propaganda films when they concocted this little stunt of theirs. Tactically and operationally, not only was the whole affair deemed to fail - but, as it turned out, Georgia had no reserves to even form a line of defense once the attacking brigades were ground up. Throwing everything you have, effectively, on a gamble like this, bespeaks strategic foolishness of the extreme kind. Especially if your closest friend and ally (represented by Condi Rice) told you, to your face, to step off about three weeks before you got started.
The Ossetians - and the Abkhazi - were sly devils who were prepared for the eventuality. The Ossetians couldn't have just concocted a response plan like the one actually executed overnight; and the Abkhazi waited for the precise moment when the Georgians became fully engaged in Ossetia - then launched a limited Blitzkrieg of their own, smashing the Georgian troops in the Kodori Gorge and, theoretically speaking, establishing themselves in a prime position from which to threaten Sugdidi, the regional center Kutaisi, and most of the Georgian plain. Should such a threat be required by political considerations.
The Russians had to have known something was coming. And had to have planned their response, such that the only thing left was, really, the determination of when the troops could go based, among other things, on when could the Russians convene the UN Security Council in New York (the 8-hour time difference makes for awkward timing). Kudos to Russian Intel (which, nevertheless, had missed the SA-11s...), and points to the Kremlin for planning this operation ahead of time - and for executing it more or less according to plan. By the time the Russians are finished, Georgia will have been reduced to...well, militarily a non-entity, and strategically a very difficult proposition for the U.S. (which still wants the place "on its side" given the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline route). One only wonders what other "contingency plans" they may already have in place, whether one agrees with what they are doing or not.
The Americans, on the other hand, were far too surprised to make me congratulate them. They clearly seemed to be in shock to see the Georgians actually launch the operation; and were in an even greater shock at the Russian response. Somebody at the State Department - or the CIA, or the Pentagon, or all of the above - seems to be operating under the assumption that this is still the 1990s, Russia is still politically and militarily impotent, and America's "friends and allies" necessarily know what they are doing. [Point of fact, I would fully expect the State Department to "encourage" Georgia's opposition parties to, erm, "democratically replace" the republic's current leadership in the wake of this catastrophe.] But this is really getting away from the military side of the discussion. Suffice it to say, strategically, the U.S. would have gained more - assuming it wanted military action in the first place - for the Georgian offensive to have been launched at a later date, with better preparation, more consistent objectives...although on the other hand, what else could the Georgians really do? The whole thing seems like a suicide operation, more or less...
So this is where we are. Almost certainly additional facts and detailed chronologies of the combat will be published by the various sides in due time. In the meanwhile - the Georgians lost, as well they should have, because I still cannot believe that they had honestly expected to a) win to begin with and b) to have any shot once they saw Russian tanks and aircraft swarm over the mountains and start smashing up forward Georgian units (remember, for a good 24-36 hours after the Russians became engaged, the Georgians kept launching attacks - straight at them).
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