Serbia’s sovereignty under attack: EU calls on recognition of Kosovo’s independence

by Anna Filimonova for the Strategic Culture Foundation

The EU’s project on the Western Balkans, which implies the final settlement of the Kosovo problem (namely: the integration of Northern Kosovo where most of the population are Serbs, into “Prsitina government authorities”) is entering its final stage.

On July 8, the European parliament adopted the resolution, which welcomes the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by the EU. The resolution, adopted by 455 votes to 155 calls on the EU member-states to stick to the single position on Kosovo and on the International Court (in late July the court is expected to bring its verdict on the legitimacy of the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence).

The resolution calls on the European Commission and member states to take practical steps to make the benefits of EU cooperation more tangible to people in Kosovo – such as allowing visa liberalization for its citizens once the necessary criteria have been met. It also urges reforms against corruption and organized crime to decentralization and transformation of the administrative system.

Earlier during the discussion on Kosovo and Albania European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Štefan Füle expressed his support to the resolution. Seeing that not all the EU member-states share the same view on Kosovo’s status. (five countries do not recognize its independence), the European parliament decided to take the matter fully under its control and to use as a geopolitical reference point - “common European future of Kosovo and Western Balkans”.

Füle expressed confidence that the work with “Pristina authorities” will continue whatever the decision of the International Court on the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence is. The EU wants Pristina to fulfill a number of conditions, first of all “to return displaced persons in satisfactory manner”; and what is required from Serbia is “pragmatic approach to the status of Kosovo”.

Greek deputy Takis Hadjigeorgiou opposed the resolution of the European parliament, saying on behalf of the United Leftists that its adoption is impossible, just like it is impossible to call on all EU members states to recognize the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence. An independent deputy from Austria pointed out to the fact that the resolution of UN Security Council N 1244 is still effective and the EU has no right to force the recognition of Kosovo’s independence (1).

The West has a plan regarding Northern Kosovo. It is likely that the future verdict by the International Court is already known because once it is announced the talks will begin on the status of Northern Kosovo. The plan implies giving Kosovo Serbs a special status similar to the models applied in Tyrol and Northern Ireland. But the plan excludes an option of talks on the status and division of Kosovo. It claims that Northern Kosovo will not be fully divided from Serbia and the Serbs in the north of Kosovo will enjoy a “wide autonomy”, wider than it was envisaged by the plan of Martti Ahtisaari, with Pristina and Belgrade acting as guarantors of this autonomy.

What is special about the current approach of the Western diplomacy towards Serbia is that the recognition of Kosovo’s independence is not an obligatory condition – what is required is a “constructive position” concerning the participation of Pristina authorities in regional institutions - in other words in means everything except the official recognition of the independence. In return the European Parliament promises Serbia (that has become a sad tradition since 1991) to facilitate its entry in the EU.

The EU proposed Belgrade to jointly elaborate a draft resolution on Kosovo after the International court brings its verdict. But the Serbian authorities rejected the proposal and said they would work out their own draft resolution and submit it to the UN General Assembly in September.

For almost 20 years Serbia has facing threats and this time Germany, France and Great Britain warned it that any attempts to start talks on the status of Kosovo would be prevented. They see the Serbian draft resolution for UN General Assembly as a “campaign of the General Skupstina in the UN against the EU members”, which will have “inevitable consequences” for Serbia’s plans to enter the EU”. But if Serbia obeys, Berlin, Paris and London promise to initiate the procedure of Serbia’s entry into the EU in September (2).

The feelings run high. On July 6, the UN Security Council held an emergency session on the request of Serbian President Boris Tadic. The session was held following following last week's grenade explosion at a flashpoint area in the country's north. An unknown assailant threw two bombs at a demonstration of about 1,000 Kosovo Serbs protesting Pristina's move to open a community service centre in the ethnically-divided town of Mitrovica. A Bosniak paediatrician ( M. Jekovic), who did not attend the rally, was killed in the attack. Eleven others, all ethnic Serb protesters, were wounded. Later one more attack took place in which “Kosovo parliament deputy” representative of the Serbian Independent Liberal Party Petar Miletic was wounded.

The opening of Pristina’s community service centre is seen as characterizes as the first practical step to establish executive power in order to integrate the region of North Mitrovica. “Kosovo Prime Minister” Hasim Taci said that the attack was “an act by Serbian extremists”, “Kosovo Foreign Minister” Skender Hyseni accused Serbs and Belgrade of what had happened. He expressed confidence that “the community service center as part the Kosovo government will function” because “Kosovo government is determined to establish its power on the entire territory of Kosovo”.

At the session of the UN Security Council the US supported Pristina saying that its move was a “legitimate step of a sovereign state”, the assault in North Mitrovica was “a purely criminal act and not a terrorist attack” and that Miletic was wounded by local Serbs. France's representative at the session said that was a “local scale incident”, the situation in Kosovo is “stable” and that “the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, (EULEX) is successful in keeping peace and order in Kosovo”. The resolution adopted by the European parliament on July 8, states that this last attack in Mitrovica was an act done by uncertain radical groups and organized criminal gangs.

Speaking at the session of UN Security Council Boris Tadic called on the implementation of the Six Points Plan proposed by the UN Secretary General in November 2008, and supported by the UN Security Council. Tadic accused the International civilian service headed by Pieter Feith of establishing an illegal and undesirable regime, said that the attempt to open a service of Kosovo government in Mitrovica was a provocation. He also said that the position of the US which supported the move as “arousing deep concern”. According to Tadic, Serbia will have to reconsider its attitude to the presence of the international mediators in Kosovo if they do not stop to support Pristina’s steps on destabilization. He said that EULEX should investigate all the attacks against Serbs while NATO should keep a certain number of its servicemen in Serbian monasteries to protect Serbian people. He said that Belgrade won't tolerate the establishment of any centers, courts and telecommunication network of temporary Pristina administration in the region. He added that Kosovo problem cannot be resolved beyond the contexts of the region’s status and it is necessary to resume talks with Albanians in order to find a comprehensive compromise solution. (3).

The UN Security Council characterized the attack as a terrorist attack of Albanian separatists and said that Pieter Feith as the head of the International civil service was responsible for it. It said that the terrorists must be punished and any attempts to open temporary institutions of Kosovo administration should be prevented because they threaten the stability of Kosovo Mitrovica and the entire region.

However, “the international presence” itself represented by the administration of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, (EULEX) – urged restraint. Their presence did not hamper the complete integration of Kosovo’s South into “Pristina government institutions”. The main danger is first of all that the “Kosovo style” integration also means assimilation abandoning the national identity (the language, the culture, the history). Besides that, among those who have power in the Republic of Kosovo are the people whose names are connected with severe crimes – murders, tortures, kidnapping; these people took part in the war against the Serbian state and in the expelling of Serbs from Kosmet. Over 11 years the north of Kosovo has been a “non-integrated territory”, plus it is linked with Serbia geographically. But despite angry statements of the Serbian President in reality the Serbian authorities provide almost no help to the Serbian communities of Kosovo (first of all economically and in terms of human personnel), though it is here where the educational and health care institutions are located which are not subordinate to the international authorities in Kosmet. In general the most important and difficult ethnical and state issue – the Kosovo issue – is not the priority on the agenda of domestic and foreign policy of the Serbian government.

Secondly, “Pristina’s integration process” is not limited by Kosmet. The Albanian side is now paying attention to “the problem of Presehvo-Buyanovats-Medvezhya” naming this region the Eastern Kosovo, as well as to the western Skopje, Tetovo and Kumanovo in Macedonia (where Albanian campaigns are regularly held with the demonstration of symbols of the Kosovo Liberation Army), and right to the Montenegrin region of Lake of Scadar…

The goal of the project of “the international community” declared by the current resolution of the European parliament to show that Northern Kosovo cannot be separated from the rest of its territory and the relevant “reforms” should be carried out on the entire territory of Kosovo (first of all on decentralization of the North) with the prospect of the integration, which would inevitably lead to the assimilation of the Serbian population.

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(1) http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Srbija/734458/Dve+godine+rada+Vlade.html

(2) http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Srbija/734700/Poseban+status+za+sever+Kosova%3F.html

(3) http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Srbija/733802/Savet+bezbednosti+o+severu+Kosova.html

Iran and the Balkans: Russia Risks Making the Same Mistakes

by Pyotr Iskenderov for the Strategic Culture Foundation

The recent UN Security Council resolution slapping new sanctions on Iran is likely to become the worst defeat suffered by the Russian diplomacy over the past years. Its negative impact may be persistent and more serious than that of the proclamation of Kosovo's independence to which Russia continues objecting. What we are witnessing seems to be an unexpected recurrence of the syndrome of unilateral concessions to the West which eroded Russia's international politics, especially its Balkan part, in the 1990ies. Following the Western lead in dealing with Iran, Russia is risking to lose both its positions in a region much more extensive than the Balkans and its hard-earned key role in the raising multipolar world.

Commenting on the vote in the UN Security Council (where Russia's BRIC peer Brazil and NATO member Turkey voted against the sanctions), the influential Tehran Times wrote: “The fact that Turkey and Brazil, two U.S. allies, voted against the resolution provides further proof that the actions against Iran and the latest decision of the Security Council are based on secret deals struck by the major powers. Thus, those who say the U.S. abandoned its Eastern European missile shield plan in order to win the support of Russia were probably correct”.

In 2009, the Russian foreign ministry was on a number of occasions forced to deny that — as Western media kept suggesting — there existed a «missile defense for Iran» swap deal. Indeed, it probably did not exist as a formalized agreement, but the truth is that at a certain moment Russia adopted a much tougher stance on Iran and froze its arms transactions with the country (suspending the supply of the S-300 air defense systems), as well as that currently Moscow risks loosing its strategic partner in the Middle East without any visible reasons for such sacrifice. Can the invisible reason be an obscure deal with US President B. Obama?

Recent developments signal a complicated array of shifts in the region and outside of it. The mediation successfully undertaken by Turkey and Brazil in the talks over the enrichment of Iran's uranium stockpile outside of the country, the escalation in the Middle East, the tensions between Turkey and Israel, new geopolitical maneuvers around the Karabakh settlement and related energy projects (in which Turkey, Iran, and Azerbaijan, the country with a special position, are to play the key roles) altogether confront the US with the threat of isolation and loss of leadership. As for Iran, it is no secret that the three rounds of sanctions imposed on the country in 2006-2008 failed to undermine its capability to implement a nuclear program, which has become an element of the Iranian national identity. There are no indications that the situation is going to change from Iran's perspective this time.

The situation is going to change from Russia's perspective, though, and certainly for the worse. Loosing Iran, demonstratively distancing itself from the Turkish-Brazilian mediation (for which President Medvedev expressed support previously), and siding with the US Moscow put in jeopardy the political gains of the recent years such as independence and assertiveness in international politics and the clarity of geopolitical priorities. Voting for new sanctions and constructing the nuclear power plant in Bushehr at the same time is an example of the very double standards that Moscow justly rebelled against whenever it encountered them in Western policies.

Russia evidently tried to recoup some of its geopolitical losses immediately after the vote in the UN Security Council. Russia's foreign ministry promptly posted an extensive comment saying: “However, we can’t ignore the signals indicating that some partners intend, almost immediately after the decision in New York, to move to considering additional sanctions against Iran, more stringent than those provided by the UNSC resolution. We regard this as the manifestation of a policy that runs counter to the principles of joint work within the Six and the UNSC format. Unacceptable to us are attempts in such a way to place oneself “above” the Security Council. We also categorically reject any national decisions on the imposition of “extraterritorial sanctions,” i.e., restrictive measures under one’s own legislation with regard to individuals and legal entities in third countries. Such decisions, should they affect Russian legal entities or individuals, would entail retaliatory response by us.

The new resolution leaves extensive room for further cooperation with Iran in the trade and economic field and on energy, transport and peaceful space exploration. As applied to Russian-Iranian bilateral ties, all of these areas have significant potential and growth opportunities. Of fundamental importance for us is the further development of cooperation with Iran in the construction of light water reactors”.

The arguments seem OK but still reek of an attempt to save face. It is unlikely that the US and the EU, overwhelmed with gratitude to Russia, will in the future show greater respect for its interests or adapt to the Russian foreign ministry's position on Iran. The Russian diplomacy's pledges to go on cooperating with Iran would have been more credible if Russia at least abstained during the UN Security Council vote, as, for example, did Lebanon.

Washington pursued its own interests without exceptions throughout the Russian-US debates over Iran. Obama's decision against deploying missile defense infrastructures in Poland and the Czech Republic was predictable due to purely economic regards and did not take Russia's consent to sanctions against Iran. In fact, the missile defense program is still on but will employ more advanced technologies ensuring radar surveillance over a greater area. In the foreseeable future Russia will be confronted with an evasive network of mobile systems instead of two undisguised stationary installations. The Persian Gulf zone and the Black Sea region will be given key roles in the framework of the initiative. It did not go unnoticed that the US Administration carefully avoided linking any of the provisions of the New Start treaty with the state of the US missile defense program.

The most alarming aspect of the current situation is the analogy it invokes with the 1990-ies — early 2000i-es Balkan developments. In that epoch Russia also demanded on the formal level that all sides in the Balkan conflicts equally abide by the international law, called for compromises, and voted for sanctions in the UN Security Council, holding that this was the only way to stop escalations. The overall result was progressing imbalance in the Balkan and broader European security architecture. The norms declared were supposed to be mandatory for all nations, but the Serbs invariably ended up disadvantaged. The format of the international contact group which handled Balkan crises is frighteningly similar to that currently employed in dealing with Iran (the six-party talks). Russia was defeated in the five-party talks on Kosovo when it consented to the so-called three principles, one of them being that the situation should not revert to the 1999 condition. The provision was eventually used by the proponents of Kosovo independence to justify its unilateral declaration.

Now Russian envoys quite reasonably blame the UN and its Secretary General for being either reluctant or unable to address the Kosovo problem and charge the EU and the US with bias and unilateralism. But isn't the West demonstrating bias and acting unilaterally when it consents to the nuclear statuses of India and Pakistan, shields Israel from criticism over its nuclear program, but keeps pushing for ever tighter sanctions to be imposed on Iran?

The Balkan settlement has shown the inadequacy of international negotiating formats like five-party or six-party talks and the pointless character of UN discussions. In practice, the West relies entirely on its own mechanisms to promote its own geopolitical interests. Russia chose to be on the side of the US and the EU instead of strengthening its commercial ties with Iran (including the Caspian Sea delimitation and the energy projects), involving countries with unbiased positions in the talks over the Iranian nuclear dossier, and supporting the independent and successful mediation contributed by Turkey and Brazil. Will the US and the EU return the favor — for example, in the form of concessions in Kosovo, Caucasus, or energy politics? Based on the Balkan experience, it is clear that they will not.

Petr Iskenderov is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Science and an international commentator at Vremya Novstey and the Voice of Russia