Iran and the Balkans: Russia Risks Making the Same Mistakes

by Pyotr Iskenderov for the Strategic Culture Foundation

The recent UN Security Council resolution slapping new sanctions on Iran is likely to become the worst defeat suffered by the Russian diplomacy over the past years. Its negative impact may be persistent and more serious than that of the proclamation of Kosovo's independence to which Russia continues objecting. What we are witnessing seems to be an unexpected recurrence of the syndrome of unilateral concessions to the West which eroded Russia's international politics, especially its Balkan part, in the 1990ies. Following the Western lead in dealing with Iran, Russia is risking to lose both its positions in a region much more extensive than the Balkans and its hard-earned key role in the raising multipolar world.

Commenting on the vote in the UN Security Council (where Russia's BRIC peer Brazil and NATO member Turkey voted against the sanctions), the influential Tehran Times wrote: “The fact that Turkey and Brazil, two U.S. allies, voted against the resolution provides further proof that the actions against Iran and the latest decision of the Security Council are based on secret deals struck by the major powers. Thus, those who say the U.S. abandoned its Eastern European missile shield plan in order to win the support of Russia were probably correct”.

In 2009, the Russian foreign ministry was on a number of occasions forced to deny that — as Western media kept suggesting — there existed a «missile defense for Iran» swap deal. Indeed, it probably did not exist as a formalized agreement, but the truth is that at a certain moment Russia adopted a much tougher stance on Iran and froze its arms transactions with the country (suspending the supply of the S-300 air defense systems), as well as that currently Moscow risks loosing its strategic partner in the Middle East without any visible reasons for such sacrifice. Can the invisible reason be an obscure deal with US President B. Obama?

Recent developments signal a complicated array of shifts in the region and outside of it. The mediation successfully undertaken by Turkey and Brazil in the talks over the enrichment of Iran's uranium stockpile outside of the country, the escalation in the Middle East, the tensions between Turkey and Israel, new geopolitical maneuvers around the Karabakh settlement and related energy projects (in which Turkey, Iran, and Azerbaijan, the country with a special position, are to play the key roles) altogether confront the US with the threat of isolation and loss of leadership. As for Iran, it is no secret that the three rounds of sanctions imposed on the country in 2006-2008 failed to undermine its capability to implement a nuclear program, which has become an element of the Iranian national identity. There are no indications that the situation is going to change from Iran's perspective this time.

The situation is going to change from Russia's perspective, though, and certainly for the worse. Loosing Iran, demonstratively distancing itself from the Turkish-Brazilian mediation (for which President Medvedev expressed support previously), and siding with the US Moscow put in jeopardy the political gains of the recent years such as independence and assertiveness in international politics and the clarity of geopolitical priorities. Voting for new sanctions and constructing the nuclear power plant in Bushehr at the same time is an example of the very double standards that Moscow justly rebelled against whenever it encountered them in Western policies.

Russia evidently tried to recoup some of its geopolitical losses immediately after the vote in the UN Security Council. Russia's foreign ministry promptly posted an extensive comment saying: “However, we can’t ignore the signals indicating that some partners intend, almost immediately after the decision in New York, to move to considering additional sanctions against Iran, more stringent than those provided by the UNSC resolution. We regard this as the manifestation of a policy that runs counter to the principles of joint work within the Six and the UNSC format. Unacceptable to us are attempts in such a way to place oneself “above” the Security Council. We also categorically reject any national decisions on the imposition of “extraterritorial sanctions,” i.e., restrictive measures under one’s own legislation with regard to individuals and legal entities in third countries. Such decisions, should they affect Russian legal entities or individuals, would entail retaliatory response by us.

The new resolution leaves extensive room for further cooperation with Iran in the trade and economic field and on energy, transport and peaceful space exploration. As applied to Russian-Iranian bilateral ties, all of these areas have significant potential and growth opportunities. Of fundamental importance for us is the further development of cooperation with Iran in the construction of light water reactors”.

The arguments seem OK but still reek of an attempt to save face. It is unlikely that the US and the EU, overwhelmed with gratitude to Russia, will in the future show greater respect for its interests or adapt to the Russian foreign ministry's position on Iran. The Russian diplomacy's pledges to go on cooperating with Iran would have been more credible if Russia at least abstained during the UN Security Council vote, as, for example, did Lebanon.

Washington pursued its own interests without exceptions throughout the Russian-US debates over Iran. Obama's decision against deploying missile defense infrastructures in Poland and the Czech Republic was predictable due to purely economic regards and did not take Russia's consent to sanctions against Iran. In fact, the missile defense program is still on but will employ more advanced technologies ensuring radar surveillance over a greater area. In the foreseeable future Russia will be confronted with an evasive network of mobile systems instead of two undisguised stationary installations. The Persian Gulf zone and the Black Sea region will be given key roles in the framework of the initiative. It did not go unnoticed that the US Administration carefully avoided linking any of the provisions of the New Start treaty with the state of the US missile defense program.

The most alarming aspect of the current situation is the analogy it invokes with the 1990-ies — early 2000i-es Balkan developments. In that epoch Russia also demanded on the formal level that all sides in the Balkan conflicts equally abide by the international law, called for compromises, and voted for sanctions in the UN Security Council, holding that this was the only way to stop escalations. The overall result was progressing imbalance in the Balkan and broader European security architecture. The norms declared were supposed to be mandatory for all nations, but the Serbs invariably ended up disadvantaged. The format of the international contact group which handled Balkan crises is frighteningly similar to that currently employed in dealing with Iran (the six-party talks). Russia was defeated in the five-party talks on Kosovo when it consented to the so-called three principles, one of them being that the situation should not revert to the 1999 condition. The provision was eventually used by the proponents of Kosovo independence to justify its unilateral declaration.

Now Russian envoys quite reasonably blame the UN and its Secretary General for being either reluctant or unable to address the Kosovo problem and charge the EU and the US with bias and unilateralism. But isn't the West demonstrating bias and acting unilaterally when it consents to the nuclear statuses of India and Pakistan, shields Israel from criticism over its nuclear program, but keeps pushing for ever tighter sanctions to be imposed on Iran?

The Balkan settlement has shown the inadequacy of international negotiating formats like five-party or six-party talks and the pointless character of UN discussions. In practice, the West relies entirely on its own mechanisms to promote its own geopolitical interests. Russia chose to be on the side of the US and the EU instead of strengthening its commercial ties with Iran (including the Caspian Sea delimitation and the energy projects), involving countries with unbiased positions in the talks over the Iranian nuclear dossier, and supporting the independent and successful mediation contributed by Turkey and Brazil. Will the US and the EU return the favor — for example, in the form of concessions in Kosovo, Caucasus, or energy politics? Based on the Balkan experience, it is clear that they will not.

Petr Iskenderov is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Science and an international commentator at Vremya Novstey and the Voice of Russia

Macedonian government collapses

(thanks to AA for this contribution)

Balkaninsight.com reports: 12 March 2008 Skopje The Democratic Party of Albanians, DPA, the key Albanian partner in the ruling centre-right coalition lead by VMRO-DPMNE, is leaving government, the party leader told media Wednesday.

Menduh Taci explained that the party leadership will confirm its decision by the end of the day.

The move comes after Prime Minister and VMRO-DPMNE head Nikola Gruevski previously rejected a list of demands the DPA chief, had given him on Monday.

“If you ask me, the decision is definite,” Taci told media, after he informed the United States and European Union ambassadors, Gillian Milovanovic and Erwan Fouere respectively, of his party's move.

Taci blamed its coalition partner for “irresponsible behaviour” in times when Macedonia faces the threat of a Greek veto on its bid to join NATO at the alliance's Bucharest Summit in April.

The DPA will not be accomplice in such “irresponsible politics,” Taci said.

The country is under increased diplomatic pressure to reach a quick compromise with neighbouring Greece over the “name” dispute in order to avoid a Greek veto of its membership bid. Read more at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/8466/

Previously, on Monday, the party gave two days to Gruevski to change his mind and accept their demands.

The DPA wanted guarantees from Gruevski for the quick completion of six key issues, including the immediate closure of cases against former ethnic Albanian guerrillas that fought Macedonian security forces during a short conflict in 2001. Read more at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/8343/

The party also insisted on state pensions for former ethnic Albanian guerrillas, on making Albanian an official language across the country and on the wider integration of ethnic Albanians into public office.

In addition, DPA demanded further concessions on the use of the Albanian flag in municipalities where they form a large proportion of the population and urged swift recognition of neighbouring Kosovo's independence.

“The government is running normally with full capacity”, government spokesman Ivica Bocevski briefly told media Wednesday after his chief, Gruevski avoided commenting for the media.

The break up of coalition would leave VMRO-DPMNE with insufficient seats in parliament to form government on their own since it controls only 40 of the 120 seats in the assembly.

The DPA has 11 deputies.

The main Albanian opposition party, the Democratic Union for Integration, DUI, may fill the gap in government, local media speculate, but the party has so far expressed reluctance over such a move.

“The process is more important than the technicality,” DUI leader Ali Ahmeti told media as he answered questions on whether his party considers entering the government.

Meanwhile the U.S. Embassy has issued a statement urging political parties in the country to focus on Macedonia’s NATO bid rather on their quarrels.

Macedonia has a “Golden opportunity to enter NATO”, the statement said, noting that “the political stability in the country is essential” for such a bid.

The head of the country’s main opposition Social Democrats, Radmila Sekerinska, said the government partners are acting “utterly irresponsibly” just twenty days ahead of a “key” NATO summit.

The current government was formed in 2006.

The War Empire Forgot

by Nebojsa Malic The September morning six years ago that saw three hijacked jetliners slam into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon has often been called "the day everything changed." What really changed was Americans’ skepticism of their own government – a fact that has been abused ever since. The man from Crawford who campaigned on the promise of a "more humble foreign policy" and against Clintonian "nation-building" quickly became Emperor George, launching two foreign wars in rapid succession and asserting the right to attack anyone, anywhere, for any reason. The rest of the world was either "with us or against us," and the same stark choice was given to the American people. All of this was justified by a perpetual "war on terrorism." That war, it turned out, was against many things – but terrorism was not one of them. These Are Not The Jihadists You Are Looking For Once it was established that Islamic militants were behind 9/11, many analysts believed that Emperor Bush would start paying attention to the Balkans. The presence of mujahedin – "holy warriors" engaged in jihad for Islam – in Bosnia has been one of the best-known secrets of the 1992-95 war. Not only did the regime of Islamic fundamentalist Alija Izetbegovic welcome thousands of "Afghans" and other jihadist volunteers, it established domestic mujahedin units and encouraged the foreigners to settle in Bosnia after the war. Izetbegovic’s government also designated all Bosnian Muslim soldiers who died in the war as shaheed, "martyrs for the faith." The U.S. not only knew about this, but also actively aided the Bosnian regime, turning a blind eye to illegal arms shipments from Iran. Several Clinton administration officials got a slap on the wrist during the 1996 Congressional investigations, but nothing more. Bush’s "War on terror" never came to Bosnia, though. Evidence of terrorist activities, connections, training camps, financing and recruitment was handled quietly, swept under a rug, or simply ignored. In August 2005, Bosnian Muslim weekly Slobodna Bosna quoted Jacques-Paul Klein, a senior U.S. official in Bosnia, "as having confirmed to the Security Council that Islamic terrorists were active in Bosnia, but added that it was good they were concentrated in one place, because ‘the rest of the world would be safe.’" Emboldened by this neglect, the radical Islamist elements in Bosnia have grown stronger over time. Last month, U.S. deputy viceroy Raffi Gregorian met with a hailstorm of protest from the Muslim community for even suggesting there were terrorist sympathizers in Bosnia. Meanwhile, Bosnian Muslim "political scientists" have developed a new definition of terrorism, according to which Islamic terrorism cannot – and therefore, does not – exist! Keys To Understanding Jihad Two recently published books argue that Bosnia – and the Balkans in general – is crucial to understanding modern jihad. Similar works in the past – Evan Kohlmann’s Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe was published in 2004 – met with wall of silence, and the mainstream media is certainly treating John R. Schindler’s Unholy Terror and Chris Deliso’s The Coming Balkan Caliphate the same way. Schindler used to be an NSA analyst and counterintelligence officer, and now teaches at the Naval War College. His Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qaeda and the Rise of the Global Jihad argues that Bosnia "played the same role for al-Qaeda in the 1990s that Afghanistan did in the 1980s," providing a training ground for a generation of jihadists. Deliso, who runs Balkanalysis.com and has been a columnist for Antiwar.com as well, goes beyond al-Qaeda and Islamic terrorism, examining the penetration of radical Islam throughout the Balkans, from Bosnia and Kosovo, the Serbian province of Raska, as well as Bulgaria and Macedonia. His work also quotes testimonies from UN and NATO insiders, showing that the West has deliberately turned a blind eye to Islamic activities in the Balkans, as Muslim radical have been considered allies against the evil Serbs. This perception of Islamic radicals as allies of the U.S. in the geopolitical sense cannot be stressed enough. Recall that Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s National Security Advisor, boasted of his brilliant idea to support a fanatical Islamic movement in Afghanistan in the 1970s as a way to hurt the Soviet Union. Afghanistan did hurt the Soviets, but it also gave birth to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. U.S. policy in the Balkans – on the surface absurd and arbitrary – begins making a twisted sort of sense if Bosnia and Kosovo are seen as the modern Afghanistan, and Serbs as the surrogate Russians… Further food for thought along these lines can be found in "The Bosnian Connection" by UK journalist Brendan O’Neill, which argues that both modern liberal imperialism and al-Qaeda’s jihad were forged in the fires of Bosnia, with each side manipulating the facts of the war to bolster their own narrative. This explains both why liberal-imperialists like Tom Lantos (D-Ca.) believe they can purchase the friendship of the Muslim world by holding forth Bosnia and Kosovo as examples where America "saved Muslims from genocide," and why the jihadists just don’t care. Interventionists in the West, knowing little or nothing about Islam, assumed the Islamic world would react to their support of Izetbegovic and the KLA as they would have reacted. Instead, Islamic militants saw Bosnia and Kosovo as instances of the "Crusaders" standing idly by while Muslims were slaughtered wholesale – an idea, ironically enough, bolstered by the hysterical propaganda and "advocacy journalism" of mainstream news outlets in the West. The 'War' at Home Even as Emperor Bush and his supporters have argued that "we’re fighting terrorists over there so we don’t have to fight them over here," jihad has already arrived on American shores. Last week, the Salt Lake City police closed their investigation of Sulejman Talovic’s February 2007 rampage, without establishing a motive for the attack. The Deseret Morning News quoted Chris Burbank, SLC police chief, as saying that the motive "may have died" with Talovic. This is the same Burbank who said, back in February, that he had ruled out jihad as the motive, considered that notion "hate speech," and intended to fire anyone who dared investigate along those lines. On Valentine’s Day, Talovic shot nine people at the Trolley Square mall, five of them fatally, before getting killed by an off-duty police officer that happened to be on the scene. As soon as it was established that the shooter was a Bosnian Muslim refugee, the media went into overdrive – while information about the victims was virtually nonexistent, Talovic himself was subject of many three-handkerchief pieces about his suffering at the hands of evil Serbs in Bosnia, fully exploiting the fact that his family passed through Srebrenica (in 1993) on its way to the US. This Stockholm syndrome went so far that citizens of Salt Lake City took up donations for Talovic’s family, which paid for Talovic to be flown to Bosnia and buried in a splendid Islamic ceremony. Detective Burbank’s determination to see no jihad was rewarded with a promotion. The massacre was ruled a "mystery" – to anyone who refuses to see the obvious, anyway. In May 2007, six men were arrested in a FBI sting on charges of plotting a terror attack on Fort Dix, New Jersey. Four of them were ethnic Albanians – a fact that emerged only after several days of media obfuscation, in which they were called "Yugoslavs" or even "Serbian citizens." One of the suspects was a member of the KLA, while the other three were illegal immigrants from western Macedonia. These are all examples of non-Arab terrorists, the "white al-Qaeda" of which Balkans sources have warned for years. But because such facts do not fit the official narrative – namely, that Muslims (Bosnian, Albanian, etc.) are solely the innocent victims of evil Serbs – the warnings have fallen on deaf ears. Self-Deception Could the reason for this be what Chris Deliso says is "Serbian lobby’s tendency to sensationalize and even provide false information incriminating the Albanians"? A handful of blogs that wax hyperbolic does not a lobby make, though. And either way, the Serbs’ propensity to see jihad everywhere certainly doesn’t excuse the tendency of Western media to see no jihad at all. In the aftermath of the Fort Dix arrests, a rare voice of protest arose from the Washington Times, where an editorial (no longer accessible online) fired a broadside at American journalists: "But when a fact – ‘Albanian’ – emerges, report it. The public has a right to know. The sanitization of language is at war with the public’s right to an understanding of the facts. […] ‘Yugoslav’ is a sanitizer. […] As long as our news organizations fail to report the facts they know to be true, they are failing to do their job. They should not engage in ‘perception management’." In this day and age this comes across as quaint. The media have done nothing but "perception management," particularly when it came to jihad, or the Balkans.