Showing posts with label Putin electoral program. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Putin electoral program. Show all posts
Friday, March 2, 2012
Russia and the changing world
by Vladimir Putin
In my articles I have already mentioned the key challenges that Russia is facing internationally today. Yet this subject deserves a more detailed discussion and not only because foreign policy is an integral part of any national strategy. External challenges and the changing world around us affect our economic, cultural, fiscal and investment policies.
Russia is a part of the big world, economically, culturally and in terms of information flow. We cannot be isolated, and we do not want to be isolated. We expect our openness will bring the people of Russia more prosperity and culture and will promote trust, an item that has been in short supply lately.
At the same time, everything we do will be based on our own interests and goals, not on decisions other countries impose on us. Russia is only treated with respect when it is strong and stands firm on its own two feet. Russia has practically always had the privilege of pursuing an independent foreign policy and this is how it will be in the future. Furthermore, I strongly believe that the only way to ensure global security is by doing it together with Russia, not by trying to “demote” it, weaken it geopolitically or undermine its defensive potential.
The goals of our foreign policy are strategic rather than short-term. They reflect Russia’s unique role in international affairs, in history and in the development of civilization.
We will certainly continue our active and constructive efforts to strengthen global security, to avoid confrontation and effectively neutralize such challenges as nuclear proliferation, regional conflicts and crises, terrorism and drugs. We will do all we can to help Russia obtain the latest technological advances and help our businesses achieve a decent position on the global market.
We will also seek to avoid unnecessary shocks as a new world order emerges based on the new geopolitical reality.
Who undermines trust?
As before, I think that indivisible security for all nations, unacceptability of the disproportionate use of force, and unconditional compliance with the fundamental principles of international law are indispensable postulates. Any neglect of these norms destabilizes the world situation.
It is in this light that we view certain aspects of US and NATO activities that do not follow the logic of modern development and are based on the stereotypes of bloc mentality. Everybody knows what I am alluding to. It is NATO expansion, including the deployment of new military infrastructure and the bloc’s (US-sponsored) plans to set up a missile defense system in Europe. I could have ignored the subject had not they been playing their games in the immediate proximity of Russia’s borders, undermining our security and upsetting global stability.
We have presented our arguments more than once, and I will not repeat them in detail here. But unfortunately our Western partners ignore and dismiss them.
We are concerned because, even though it is not yet clear how our “new” relationship with NATO will work, they are creating facts on the ground. This definitely does not promote trust. Furthermore, this kind of conduct has a negative effect on global issues, as it prevents us from developing a positive agenda in international relations and stalls the process of readjusting them in a constructive vein.
A string of armed conflicts under the pretext of humanitarian concerns has undermined the principle of national sovereignty, which has been observed for centuries. A new type of vacuum, the lack of morality and law, is emerging in international affairs.
We often hear that human rights are more important than national sovereignty. This is definitely true, and crimes against humanity should be punished by an international court. But if this principle is used as an excuse for a presumptuous violation of national sovereignty, and if human rights are protected by foreign forces and selectively, and if, while “protecting” those rights, they violate the rights of many other people, including the most fundamental and sacred right, the right to life, this is no longer a noble effort. This is merely demagoguery.
It is important for the UN and its Security Council to be able to offer effective resistance to the dictate of a few countries and to lawlessness in international affairs. Nobody has the right to hijack the prerogatives and powers of the UN, especially as regards the use of force with vis-à-vis sovereign nations. I am referring primarily to NATO, which seeks to assume a new role that goes beyond its status of a defensive alliance. All these matters are extremely serious. We remember how the nations that fell victim to “humanitarian” operations and the export of “airstrike democracy” appealed in vain to international law and even simple decency. Nobody listened, and nobody wanted to listen.
It seems that NATO countries, and especially the United States, have developed a peculiar understanding of security which is fundamentally different from our view. The Americans are obsessed with the idea of securing absolute invulnerability for themselves, which, incidentally, is a utopia, for both technological and geopolitical reasons. But that is exactly where the root of the problem lies.
Absolute invulnerability for one nation would mean absolute vulnerability for everybody else. We cannot agree to this. Of course, many nations prefer not to raise this question openly for a variety of reasons. But Russia will always call a spade a spade and speak openly about such matters. I would like to stress once again that violation of the principle of common and indivisible security (accompanied by repeated assurances that they are still committed to it) may have extremely serious consequences. Sooner or later, those consequences will also affect the nations that initiate such violations, whatever their reasons are.
The Arab Spring: lessons and conclusions
A year ago the world witnessed a new phenomenon – nearly simultaneous demonstrations against authoritarian regimes in many Arab countries. The Arab Spring was initially received with hope for positive change. People in Russia sympathized with those who were seeking democratic reform.
However, it soon became clear that events in many countries were not following a civilized scenario. Instead of asserting democracy and protecting the rights of the minority, attempts were being made to depose an enemy and to stage a coup, which only resulted in the replacement of one dominant force with another even more aggressive dominant force.
Foreign interference in support of one side of a domestic conflict and the use of power in this interference gave developments a negative aura. A number of countries did away with the Libyan regime by using air power in the name of humanitarian support. The revolting slaughter of Muammar Gaddafi – not just medieval but primeval – was the manifestation of these actions.
No one should be allowed to employ the Libyan scenario in Syria. The international community must work to achieve an internal Syrian reconciliation. It is important to achieve an early end to the violence no matter what the source, and to initiate a national dialogue – without preconditions or foreign interference and with due respect for the country's sovereignty. This would create the conditions necessary to introduce the measures for democratization announced by the Syrian leadership. The key objective is to prevent an all-out civil war. Russian diplomacy has worked and will continue to work toward this end.
Sadder but wiser, we oppose the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions that may be interpreted as a signal to armed interference in Syria's domestic development. Guided by this consistent approach in early February, Russia and China prevented the adoption of an ambiguous resolution that would have encouraged one side of this domestic conflict to resort to violence.
In this context and considering the extremely negative, almost hysterical reaction to the Russian-Chinese veto, I would like to warn our Western colleagues against the temptation to resort to this simple, previously used tactic: if the UN Security Council approves of a given action, fine; if not, we will establish a coalition of the states concerned and strike anyway.
The logic of such conduct is counterproductive and very dangerous. No good can come of it. In any case, it will not help reach a settlement in a country that is going through a domestic conflict. Even worse, it further undermines the entire system of international security as well as the authority and key role of the UN. Let me recall that the right to veto is not some whim but an inalienable part of the world's agreement that is registered in the UN Charter – incidentally, on US insistence. The implication of this right is that decisions that raise the objection of even one permanent member of the UN Security Council cannot be well-grounded or effective.
I hope very much that the United States and other countries will consider this sad experience and will not pursue the use of power in Syria without UN Security Council sanctions. In general, I cannot understand what causes this itch for military intervention. Why isn't there the patience to develop a well-considered, balanced and cooperative approach, all the more so since this approach was already taking shape in the form of the aforementioned Syrian resolution? It only lacked the demand that the armed opposition do the same as the government; in particular, withdraw military units and detachments from cities. The refusal to do so is cynical. If we want to protect civilians – and this is the main goal for Russia – we must make all the participants in the armed confrontation see reason.
And one more point. It appears that with the Arab Spring countries, as with Iraq, Russian companies are losing their decades-long positions in local commercial markets and are being deprived of large commercial contracts. The niches thus vacated are being filled by the economic operatives of the states that had a hand in the change of the ruling regime.
One could reasonably conclude that tragic events have been encouraged to a certain extent by someone's interest in a re-division of the commercial market rather than a concern for human rights. Be that as it may, we cannot sit back watch all this with Olympian serenity. We intend to work with the new governments of the Arab countries in order to promptly restore our economic positions.
Generally, the current developments in the Arab world are, in many ways, instructive. They show that a striving to introduce democracy by use of power can produce – and often does produce – contradictory results. They can produce forces that rise from the bottom, including religious extremists, who will strive to change the very direction of a country's development and the secular nature of a government.
Russia has always had good relations with the moderate representatives of Islam, whose world outlook was close to the traditions of Muslims in Russia. We are ready to develop these contacts further under the current conditions. We are interested in stepping up our political and trade and economic ties with all Arab countries, including those that, let me repeat, have gone through domestic upheaval. Moreover, I see real possibilities that will enable Russia to fully preserve its leading position in the Middle East, where we have always had many friends.
As for the Arab-Israeli conflict, to this day the "magic recipe" that will produce a final settlement has not been invented. It would be unacceptable to give up on this issue. Considering our close ties with the Israeli and Palestinian leaders, Russian diplomacy will continue to work for the resumption of the peace process both on a bilateral basis and within the format of the Quartet on the Middle East, while coordinating its steps with the Arab League.
The Arab Spring has graphically demonstrated that world public opinion is being shaped by the most active use of advanced information and communications technology. It is possible to say that the Internet, social networks, cell phones etc. have turned into an effective tool for the promotion of domestic and international policy on a par with television. This new variable has come into play and gives us food for thought – how to continue developing the unique freedoms of communication via the Internet and at the same time reduce the risk of its being used by terrorists and other criminal elements.
The notion of "soft power" is being used increasingly often. This implies a matrix of tools and methods to reach foreign policy goals without the use of arms but by exerting information and other levers of influence. Regrettably, these methods are being used all too frequently to develop and provoke extremist, separatist and nationalistic attitudes, to manipulate the public and to conduct direct interference in the domestic policy of sovereign countries.
There must be a clear division between freedom of speech and normal political activity, on the one hand, and illegal instruments of "soft power," on the other. The civilized work of non-governmental humanitarian and charity organizations deserves every support. This also applies to those who actively criticize the current authorities. However, the activities of "pseudo-NGOs" and other agencies that try to destabilize other countries with outside support are unacceptable.
I'm referring to those cases where the activities of NGOs are not based on the interests (and resources) of local social groups but are funded and supported by outside forces. There are many agents of influence from big countries, international blocs or corporations. When they act in the open, this is simply a form of civilized lobbyism. Russia also uses such institutions like the Federal Agency for CIS Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, International Humanitarian Cooperation, the Russkiy Mir Foundation and our leading universities who recruit talented students from abroad.
However, Russia does not use or fund national NGOs based in other countries or any foreign political organizations in the pursuit of its own interests. China, India and Brazil do not do this either. We believe that any influence on domestic policy and public attitude in other countries must be exerted in the open; in this way, those who wish to be of influence will do so responsibly.
New challenges and threats
Today, Iran is the focus of international attention. Needless to say, Russia is worried about the growing threat of a military strike against Iran. If this happens, the consequences will be disastrous. It is impossible to imagine the true scope of this turn of events.
I am convinced that this issue must be settled exclusively by peaceful means. We propose recognizing Iran's right to develop a civilian nuclear program, including the right to enrich uranium. But this must be done in exchange for putting all Iranian nuclear activity under reliable and comprehensive IAEA safeguards. If this is done, the sanctions against Iran, including the unilateral ones, must be rescinded. The West has shown too much willingness to "punish" certain countries. At any minor development it reaches for sanctions if not armed force. Let me remind you that we are not in the 19th century or even the 20th century now.
Developments around the Korean nuclear issue are no less serious. Violating the non-proliferation regime, Pyongyang openly claims the right to develop "the military atom" and has already conducted two nuclear tests. We cannot accept North Korea's nuclear status. We have consistently advocated the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula – exclusively through political and diplomatic means – and the early resumption of Six-Party Talks.
However, it is evident that not all of our partners share this approach. I am convinced that today it is essential to be particularly careful. It would be inadvisable to try and test the strength of the new North Korean leader and provoke a rash countermeasure.
Allow me to recall that North Korea and Russia share a common border and we cannot choose our neighbors. We will continue to conduct an active dialogue with the leaders of North Korea and to develop good-neighborly relations with it, while at the same time trying to encourage Pyongyang to settle the nuclear issue. Obviously, it would be easier to do this if mutual trust is built up and the inter-Korean dialogue resumes on the peninsula.
All this fervor around the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea makes one wonder how the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation emerge and who is aggravating them. It seems that the more frequent cases of crude and even armed outside interference in the domestic affairs of countries may prompt authoritarian (and other) regimes to possess nuclear weapons. If I have the A-bomb in my pocket, nobody will touch me because it's more trouble than it is worth. And those who don't have the bomb might have to sit and wait for "humanitarian intervention."
Whether we like it or not, foreign interference suggests this train of thought. This is why the number of threshold countries that are one step away from "military atom" technology is growing rather than decreasing. Under these conditions, zones free of weapons of mass destruction are being established in different parts of the world and are becoming increasingly important. Russia has initiated the discussion of the parameters for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
It is essential to do everything we can to prevent any country from being tempted to obtain nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation campaigners must also change their conduct, especially those that are used to penalizing other countries by force without letting the diplomats do their job. This was the case in Iraq and its problems have only become worse after an almost decade-long occupation.
If the incentives for becoming a nuclear power are finally eradicated, it will be possible to make the international non-proliferation regime universal and firmly based on existing treaties. This regime would allow all interested countries to fully enjoy the benefits of the "peaceful atom" under IAEA safeguards.
Russia would stand to gain much from this because we are actively operating in international markets, building new nuclear power plants based on safe, modern technology and taking part in the formation of multilateral nuclear enrichment centers and nuclear fuel banks.
The probable future of Afghanistan is alarming. We have supported the military operation on rendering international aid to that country. However, the NATO-led international military contingent has not met its objectives. The threats of terrorism and drug trafficking have not been reduced. Having announced its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, the United States has been building, both there and in neighboring countries, military bases without a clear-cut mandate, objectives or duration of operation. Understandably, this does not suit us.
Russia has obvious interests in Afghanistan and these interests are understandable. Afghanistan is our close neighbor and we have a stake in its stable and peaceful development. Most importantly, we want it to stop being the main source of the drug threat. Illegal drug trafficking has become one of the most urgent threats. It undermines the genetic bank of entire nations, while creating fertile soil for corruption and crime and is leading to the destabilization of Afghanistan. Far from declining, the production of Afghan drugs increased by almost 40% last year. Russia is being subjected to vicious heroin-related aggression, which is doing tremendous damage to the health of our people.
The dimensions of the Afghan drug threat make it clear that it can only be overcome by a global effort with reliance on the United Nations and regional organizations – the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the CIS. We are willing to consider much greater participation in the relief operation for the Afghan people but only on the condition that the international contingent in Afghanistan acts with greater zeal and in our interests and that it will pursue the physical destruction of drug crops and underground laboratories.
Invigorated anti-drug measures inside Afghanistan must be accompanied by the reliable blocking of the routes of opiate transportation to external markets, financial flows and the supply of chemical substances used in heroin production. The goal is to build a comprehensive system of anti-drug security in the region. Russia will contribute to the effective cooperation of the international community for turning the tide in the war against the global drug threat.
It is hard to predict further developments in Afghanistan. Historical experience shows that foreign military presence has not brought it peace. Only the Afghans can resolve their own problems. I see Russia's role as follows – to help the Afghan people, with the active involvement of other neighboring countries, to develop a sustainable economy and enhance the ability of the national armed forces to counter the threats of terrorism and drug-related crime. We do not object to the process of national reconciliation being joined by participants of the armed opposition, including the Taliban, on condition they renounce violence, recognize the country's constitution and sever ties with Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. In principle, I believe it is possible to build a peaceful, stable, independent and neutral Afghan state.
The instability that has persisted for years and decades is creating a breeding ground for international terrorism that is universally recognized as one of the most dangerous challenges to the world community. I'd like to note that the crisis zones that engender a terrorist threat are located near Russian borders and are much close to us than to our European or American partners. The United Nations has adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy but it seems that the struggle against this evil is conducted not under a common universal plan and not consistently but in a series of responses to the most urgent and barbarian manifestations of terror – when the public uproar over the impudent acts of terrorists grows out of proportion. The civilized world must not wait for tragedies like the terrorist attacks in New York in September 2001 or another Beslan disaster and only then act collectively and resolutely after the shock of such cases.
I'm far from denying the results achieved in the war on international terror. There has been progress. In the last few years security services and the law-enforcement agencies of many countries have markedly upgraded their cooperation. But there is still the obvious potential for further anti-terrorist cooperation. Thus, double standards still exist and terrorists are perceived differently in different countries – some are "bad guys" and others are "not so bad." Some forces are not averse to using the latter in political manipulation, for example, in shaking up objectionable ruling regimes.
All available public institutions – the media, religious associations, NGOs, the education system, science and business – must be used to prevent terrorism all over the world. We need a dialogue between religions and, on a broader plane, among civilizations. Russia has many religions, but we have never had religious wars. We could make a contribution to an international discussion on this issue.
The growing role of the Asia-Pacific Region
One of our country's neighbors is China, a major hub of the global economy. It has become fashionable to opine about that country's future role in the global economy and international affairs. Last year China moved into second place in the world in terms of GDP and it is poised to surpass the US on that count, according to international – including American – experts. The overall might of the People's Republic of China is growing and that includes the ability to project power in various regions.
How should we conduct ourselves in the face of the rapidly strengthening Chinese factor?
First of all, I am convinced that China's economic growth is by no means a threat, but a challenge that carries colossal potential for business cooperation – a chance to catch the Chinese wind in the sails of our economy. We should seek to more actively form new cooperative ties, combining the technological and productive capabilities of our two countries and tapping China's potential – judiciously, of course – in order to develop the economy of Siberia and the Russian Far East.
Second, China's conduct on the world stage gives no grounds to talk about its aspirations to dominance. The Chinese voice in the world is indeed growing ever more confident, and we welcome that, because Beijing shares our vision of the emerging equitable world order. We will continue to support each other in the international arena, to work together to solve acute regional and global problems, and to promote cooperation within the UN Security Council, BRICS, the SCO, the G20 and other multilateral forums.
And third, we have settled all the major political issues in our relations with China, including the critical border issue. Our nations have created a solid mechanism of bilateral ties, reinforced by legally binding documents. There is an unprecedentedly high level of trust between the leaders of our two countries. This enables us and the Chinese to act in the spirit of genuine partnership, rooted in pragmatism and respect for each other's interests. The model of Russian-Chinese relations we have created has good prospects.
Of course, this is not to suggest that our relationship with China is problem-free. There are some sources of friction. Our commercial interests in third parties by no means always coincide, and we are not entirely satisfied with the emerging trade structure and the low level of mutual investments. We will also closely monitor immigration from the People's Republic of China.
But my main premise is that Russia needs a prosperous and stable China, and I am convinced that China needs a strong and successful Russia.
Another rapidly growing Asian giant is India. Russia has traditionally enjoyed friendly relations with India, which the leaders of our two countries have classified as a privileged strategic partnership. Not only our countries but the entire multipolar system that is emerging in the world stands to gain from this partnership.
We see before our eyes not only the rise of China and India, but the growing weight of the entire Asia-Pacific Region. This has opened up new horizons for fruitful work within the framework of the Russian chairmanship of APEC. In September of this year we will host a meeting of its leaders in Vladivostok. We are actively preparing for it, creating modern infrastructure that will promote the further development of Siberia and the Russian Far East and enable our country to become more involved in the dynamic integration processes in the "new Asia."
We will continue to prioritize our cooperation with our BRICS partners. This unique structure, created in 2006, is a striking symbol of the transition from a unipolar world to a more just world order. BRICS brings together five countries with a population of almost three billion people, the largest emerging economies, colossal labor and natural resources and huge domestic markets. With the addition of South Africa, BRICS acquired a truly global format, and it now accounts for more than 25% of world GDP.
We are still getting used to working together in this format. In particular, we have to coordinate better on foreign policy matters and work together more closely at the UN. But when BRICS is really up and running, its impact on the world economy and politics will be considerable.
In recent years, cooperation with the countries of Asia, Latin America and Africa has become a growing focus of Russian diplomacy and of our business community. In these regions there is still sincere goodwill towards Russia. One of the key tasks for the coming period, in my view, is cultivating trade and economic cooperation as well as joint projects in the fields of energy, infrastructure, investment, science and technology, banking and tourism.
The growing role of Asia, Latin America and Africa in the emerging democratic system of managing the global economy and global finance is reflected in the work of the G20. I believe that this association will soon become a strategically important tool not only for responding to crises, but for the long-term reform of the world's financial and economic architecture. Russia will chair the G20 in 2013, and we must use this opportunity to better coordinate the work of the G20 and other multilateral structures, above all the G8 and, of course, the UN.
The Europe factor
Russia is an inalienable and organic part of Greater Europe and European civilization. Our citizens think of themselves as Europeans. We are by no means indifferent to developments in united Europe.
That is why Russia proposes moving towards the creation of a common economic and human space from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean – a community referred by Russian experts to as "the Union of Europe," which will strengthen Russia's potential and position in its economic pivot toward the "new Asia."
Against the background of the rise of China, India and other new economies, the financial and economic upheavals in Europe – formerly an oasis of stability and order – is particularly worrying. The crisis that has struck the eurozone cannot but affect Russia's interests, especially if one considers that the EU is our major foreign economic and trade partner. Likewise, it is clear that the prospects of the entire global economic structure depend heavily on the state of affairs in Europe.
Russia is actively participating in the international effort to support the ailing European economies, and is consistently working with its partners to formulate collective decisions under the auspices of the IMF. Russia is not opposed in principle to direct financial assistance in some cases.
At the same time I believe that external financial injections can only partially solve the problem. A true solution will require energetic, system-wide measures. European leaders face the task of effecting large-scale transformations that will fundamentally change many financial and economic mechanisms to ensure genuine budget discipline. We have a stake in ensuring a strong EU, as envisioned by Germany and France. It is in our interests to realize the enormous potential of the Russia-EU partnership.
The current level of cooperation between Russia and the European Union does not correspond to current global challenges, above all making our shared continent more competitive. I propose again that we work toward creating a harmonious community of economies from Lisbon to Vladivostok, which will in the future evolve into a free trade zone and even more advanced forms of economic integration. The resulting common continental market would be worth trillions of euros. Does anyone doubt that this would be a wonderful development and that it would meet the interests of both Russians and Europeans?
We must also consider more extensive cooperation in the energy sphere, up to and including the formation of a common European energy complex. The Nord Stream gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea and the South Stream pipeline under the Black Sea are important steps in that direction. These projects have the support of many governments and involve major European energy companies. Once the pipelines start operating at full capacity, Europe will have a reliable and flexible gas-supply system that does not depend on the political whims of any nation. This will strengthen the continent's energy security not only in form but in substance. This is particularly relevant in the light of the decision of some European states to reduce or renounce nuclear energy.
The Third Energy Package, backed by the European Commission and aimed at squeezing out integrated Russian companies, is frankly not conducive to stronger relations between Russia and the EU. Considering the growing instability of energy suppliers that could act as an alternative to Russia, the package aggravates the systemic risks to the European energy sector and scares away potential investors in new infrastructure projects. Many European politicians have been critical of the package in their talks with me. We should summon the courage to remove this obstacle to mutually beneficial cooperation.
I believe that genuine partnership between Russia and the European Union is impossible as long as there are barriers that impede human and economic contacts, first and foremost visa requirements. The abolition of visas would give powerful impetus to real integration between Russia and the EU, and would help expand cultural and business ties, especially between medium-sized and small businesses. The threat to Europeans from Russian economic migrants is largely imagined. Our people have opportunities to put their abilities and skills to use in their own country, and these opportunities are becoming ever more numerous.
In December 2011 we agreed with the EU on "joint steps" toward a visa-free regime. They can and should be taken without delay. We should continue to actively pursue this goal.
Russian-American affairs
In recent years a good deal has been done to develop Russian-American relations. Even so, we have not managed to fundamentally change the matrix of our relations, which continue to ebb and flow. The instability of the partnership with America is due in part to the tenacity of some well-known stereotypes and phobias, particularly the perception of Russia on Capitol Hill. But the main problem is that bilateral political dialogue and cooperation do not rest on a solid economic foundation. The current level of bilateral trade falls far short of the potential of our economies. The same is true of mutual investments. We have yet to create a safety net that would protect our relations against ups and downs. We should work on this.
Nor is mutual understanding strengthened by regular US attempts to engage in "political engineering," including in regions that are traditionally important to us and during Russian elections.
As I've said before, US plans to create a missile defense system in Europe give rise to legitimate fears in Russia. Why does that system worry us more than others? Because it affects the strategic nuclear deterrence forces that only Russia possesses in that theatre, and upsets the military-political balance established over decades.
The inseparable link between missile defense and strategic offensive weapons is reflected in the New START treaty signed in 2010. The treaty has come into effect and is working fairly well. It is a major foreign policy achievement. We are ready to consider various options for our joint agenda with the Americans in the field of arms control in the coming period. In this effort we must seek to balance our interests and renounce any attempts to gain one-sided advantages through negotiations.
In 2007, during a meeting with President Bush in Kennebunkport, I proposed a solution to the missile defense problem, which, if adopted, would have changed the customary character of Russian-American relations and opened up a positive path forward. Moreover, if we had managed to achieve a breakthrough on missile defense, this would have opened the floodgates for building a qualitatively new model of cooperation, similar to an alliance, in many other sensitive areas.
It was not to be. Perhaps it would be useful to look back at the transcripts of the talks in Kennebunkport. In recent years the Russian leadership has come forward with other proposals to resolve the dispute over missile defense. These proposals still stand.
I am loath to dismiss the possibility of reaching a compromise on missile defense. One would not like to see the deployment of the American system on a scale that would demand the implementation of our declared countermeasures.
I recently had a talk with Henry Kissinger. I meet with him regularly. I fully share this consummate professional's thesis that close and trusting interactions between Moscow and Washington are particularly important in periods of international turbulence.
In general, we are prepared to make great strides in our relations with the US to achieve a qualitative breakthrough, but on the condition that the Americans are guided by the principles of equal and mutually respectful partnership.
Economic diplomacy
In December of last year, Russia finally concluded its marathon accession to the WTO, which had lasted for many years. I must mention that, in the finishing stretch, the Obama administration and the leaders of some major European states made a significant contribution to achieving the final accords.
To be honest, at times during this long and arduous journey we wanted to turn our backs on the talks and slam the door. But we did not succumb to emotion. As a result, a compromise was reached that is quite acceptable for our country: we managed to defend the interests of Russian industrial and agricultural producers in the face of growing external competition. Our economic actors have gained substantial additional opportunities to enter world markets and uphold their rights there in a civilized manner. It is this, rather than the symbolism of Russia's accession to the World Trade "club", that I see as the main result of this process.
Russia will comply with WTO norms, as it meets all of its international obligations. Likewise, I hope that our partners will play according to the rules. Let me note in passing that we have already integrated WTO principles into the legal framework of the Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
Russia is still learning how to systematically and consistently promote its economic interests in the world. We have yet to learn, as many Western partners have, how to lobby for decisions that favor Russian business in foreign international forums. The challenges facing us in this area, given our priority of innovation-driven development, are very serious: to achieve equal standing for Russia in the modern system of global economic ties and to minimize the risks arising from integration in the world economy, including Russia's membership in the WTO and its forthcoming accession to the OECD.
We are badly in need of broader, non-discriminatory access to foreign markets. So far, Russian economic actors have been getting a raw deal abroad. Restrictive trade and political measures are being taken against them, and technical barriers are being erected that put them at a disadvantage compared with their competitors.
The same holds for investments. We are trying to attract foreign capital to the Russian economy. We are opening up the most attractive areas of our economy to foreign investors, granting them access to the "juiciest morsels," in particular, our fuel and energy complex. But our investors are not welcome abroad and are often pointedly brushed aside.
Examples abound. Take the story of Germany's Opel, which Russian investors tried and failed to acquire despite the fact that the deal was approved by the German government and was positively received by German trade unions. Or take the outrageous examples of Russian businesses being denied their rights as investors after investing considerable resources in foreign assets. This is a frequent occurrence in Central and Eastern Europe.
All this leads to the conclusions that Russia must strengthen its political and diplomatic support for Russian entrepreneurs in foreign markets, and to provide more robust assistance to major landmark business projects. Nor should we forget that Russia can employ identical response measures against those who resort to dishonest methods of competition.
The government and business associations should better coordinate their efforts in the foreign economic sphere, more aggressively promote the interests of Russian business and help it to open up new markets.
I would like to draw attention to another important factor that largely shapes the role and place of Russia in present-day and future political and economic alignments – the vast size of our country. Granted, we no longer occupy one-sixth of the Earth's surface, but the Russian Federation is still the world's largest nation with an unrivaled abundance of natural resources. I am referring not only to oil and gas, but also our forests, agricultural land and clean freshwater resources.
Russia's territory is a source of its potential strength. In the past, our vast land mainly served as a buffer against foreign aggression. Now, given a sound economic strategy, they can become a very important foundation for increasing our competitiveness.
I would like to mention, in particular, the growing shortage of fresh water in the world. One can foresee in the near future the start of geopolitical competition for water resources and for the ability to produce water-intensive goods. When this time comes, Russia will have its trump card ready. We understand that we must use our natural wealth prudently and strategically.
Support for compatriots and Russian culture in the international context
Respect for one's country is rooted, among other things, in its ability to protect the rights of its citizens abroad. We must never neglect the interests of the millions of Russian nationals who live and travel abroad on vacation or on business. I would like to stress that the Foreign Ministry and all diplomatic and consular agencies must be prepared to provide real support to our citizens around the clock. Diplomats must respond to conflicts between Russian nationals and local authorities, and to incidents and accidents in a prompt manner – before the media announces the news to the world.
We are determined to ensure that Latvian and Estonian authorities follow the numerous recommendations of reputable international organizations on observing generally accepted rights of ethnic minorities. We cannot tolerate the shameful status of "non-citizen." How can we accept that, due to their status as non-citizens, one in six Latvian residents and one in thirteen Estonian residents are denied their fundamental political, electoral and socio-economic rights and the ability to freely use Russian?
The recent referendum in Latvia on the status of the Russian language again demonstrated to the international community how acute this problem is. Over 300,000 non-citizens were once again barred from taking part in a referendum. Even more outrageous is the fact that the Latvian Central Electoral Commission refused to allow a delegation from the Russian Public Chamber to monitor the vote. Meanwhile, international organizations responsible for compliance with generally accepted democratic norms remain silent.
On the whole, we are dissatisfied with how the issue of human rights is handled globally. First, the United States and other Western states dominate and politicize the human rights agenda, using it as a means to exert pressure. At the same time, they are very sensitive and even intolerant to criticism. Second, the objects of human rights monitoring are chosen regardless of objective criteria but at the discretion of the states that have "privatized" the human rights agenda.
Russia has been the target of biased and aggressive criticism that, at times, exceeds all limits. When we are given constructive criticism, we welcome it and are ready to learn from it. But when we are subjected, again and again, to blanket criticisms in a persistent effort to influence our citizens, their attitudes, and our domestic affairs, it becomes clear that these attacks are not rooted in moral and democratic values.
Nobody should possess complete control over the sphere of human rights. Russia is a young democracy. More often than not, we are too humble and too willing to spare the self-regard of our more experienced partners. Still, we often have something to say, and no country has a perfect record on human rights and basic freedoms. Even the older democracies commit serious violations, and we should not look the other way. Obviously, this work should not be about trading insults. All sides stand to gain from a constructive discussion of human rights issues.
In late 2011, the Russian Foreign Ministry published its first report on the observance of human rights in other countries. I believe we should become more active in this area. This will facilitate broader and more equitable cooperation in the effort to solve humanitarian problems and promote fundamental democratic principles and human rights.
Of course, this is just one aspect of our efforts to promote our international and diplomatic activity and to foster an accurate image of Russia abroad. Admittedly, we have not seen great success here. When it comes to media influence, we are often outperformed. This is a separate and complex challenge that we must confront.
Russia has a great cultural heritage, recognized both in the West and the East. But we have yet to make a serious investment in our culture and its promotion around the world. The surge in global interest in ideas and culture, sparked by the merger of societies and economies in the global information network, provides new opportunities for Russia, with its proven talent for creating cultural objects.
Russia has a chance not only to preserve its culture but to use it as a powerful force for progress in international markets. The Russian language is spoken in nearly all the former Soviet republics and in a significant part of Eastern Europe. This is not about empire, but rather cultural progress. Exporting education and culture will help promote Russian goods, services and ideas; guns and imposing political regimes will not.
We must work to expand Russia's educational and cultural presence in the world, especially in those countries where a substantial part of the population speaks or understands Russian.
We must discuss how we can derive the maximum benefit for Russia's image from hosting large international events, including the APEC Leaders' Meeting in 2012, the G20 summit in 2013 and the G8 summit in 2014, the Universiade in Kazan in 2013, the Winter Olympic Games in 2014, the IIHF World Championships in 2016, and the FIFA World Cup in 2018.
*****
Russia intends to continue promoting its security and protecting its national interest by actively and constructively engaging in global politics and in efforts to solve global and regional problems. We are ready for mutually beneficial cooperation and open dialogue with all our foreign partners. We aim to understand and take into account the interests of our partners, and we ask that our own interests be respected.
original Russian text: http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/18252/
English translation: http://rt.com/politics/official-word/putin-russia-changing-world-263/
Monday, February 20, 2012
Being strong: National security guarantees for Russia
by Vladimir Putin
The world is changing, and the transformations underway could hide various risks, often unpredictable risks. In a world of economic and other upheaval, there is always the temptation to resolve one’s problems at another’s expense, through pressure and force. It is no surprise that some are calling for resources of global significance to be freed from the exclusive sovereignty of a single nation, and that this issue will soon be raised as a “matter-of-course.”
There will be no possibility of this, even a hypothetical one, with respect to Russia. In other words, we should not tempt anyone by allowing ourselves to be weak.
It is for this reason that we will under no circumstances surrender our strategic deterrent capability, and indeed, will in fact strengthen it. It was this strength that enabled us to maintain our national sovereignty during the extremely difficult 1990s, when, lets’ be frank, we did not have anything else to argue with.
Obviously, we will not be able to strengthen our international position, develop our economy or our democratic institutions if we are unable to protect Russia – if we fail to calculate the risks of possible conflicts, secure our military-technological independence and prepare an adequate military response capability as a last-resort response to some kind of challenge.
We have adopted and are implementing unprecedented development programmes for our armed forces and for the modernisation of Russia’s defence industry. All in all, we will allocate something like 23 trillion roubles for these purposes over the next decade.
Frankly speaking, there have been plenty of discussions regarding the size and timeliness of such sizable allocations. I am convinced that they fully correspond to the country’s potential and resources. And, most important, we cannot put off the goal of creating modern armed forces and of comprehensively strengthening our defensive potential.
It is not a question of militarising Russia’s budget. In effect, allocating these funds now means we are “paying our bills” for the years when the army and the navy were chronically underfunded, when we procured very few new weapons, while other countries were steadily building up their military might.
A smart defence against new threats
We need a response system for more than just current threats. We should learn to look “past the horizon,” and estimate threats 30 or even 50 years away. This is a serious objective and requires mobilising the resources of civilian and military science and reliable standards for long-term forecasting.
What kinds of weapons will the Russian army need? What technical requirements will be established for our defence industry? In effect, we need to develop a qualitatively new and smart system for military analysis and strategic planning, for prescribed approaches with prompt implementation by our security-related agencies.
So what is the future preparing for us?
The probability of a global war between nuclear powers is not high, because that would mean the end of civilisation. As long as the “powder” of our strategic nuclear forces created by the tremendous efforts of our fathers and grandfathers remains dry, nobody will dare launch a large-scale aggression against us.
However, it should be borne in mind that technological progress in many varied areas, from new models of weaponry and military hardware to information and communications technology, has dramatically changed the nature of armed conflicts. Thus, as high-precision long-range conventional weapons become increasingly common, they will tend to become the means of achieving a decisive victory over an opponent, including in a global conflict.
The military capability of a country in space or information countermeasures, especially in cyberspace, will play a great, if not decisive, role in determining the nature of an armed conflict. In the more distant future, weapons systems based on new principles (beam, geophysical, wave, genetic, psychophysical and other technology) will be developed. All this will, in addition to nuclear weapons, provide entirely new instruments for achieving political and strategic goals. Such hi-tech weapons systems will be comparable in effect to nuclear weapons but will be more “acceptable” in terms of political and military ideology. In this sense, the strategic balance of nuclear forces will play a gradually diminishing role in deterring aggression and chaos.
We see ever new regional and local wars breaking out in the world. We continue to see new areas of instability and deliberately managed chaos. There also are purposeful attempts to provoke such conflicts even within the direct proximity of Russia’s and its allies’ borders.
The basic principles of international law are being degraded and eroded, especially in terms of international security.
Under these circumstances, Russia cannot fall back on diplomatic and economic methods alone to settle contradiction and resolve conflict. Our country faces the task of developing its military potential as part of a deterrence strategy and at a sufficient level. Its armed forces, special services and other security-related agencies should be prepared for quick and effective responses to new challenges. This is an indispensable condition for Russia to feel secure and for our partners to heed our country’s arguments in various international formats.
Together with our allies, we should also strengthen the capabilities of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, including the Collective Rapid Response Force. The CSTO is ready to fulfil its mission as a guarantor of stability in Eurasia.
The rapid development of its armed forces, nuclear and space industries, the defence industry, military training, fundamental military science and applied research programmes will remain a key priority in Russia’s future policies.
The army saved Russia
The break-up of a single unified country, as well as the economic and social upheaval of the 1990s, dealt a serious blow to all of the state’s institutions. The Russian armed forces also faced serious challenges. Combat training programmes virtually disappeared. Elements of the First Strategic Echelon were hastily withdrawn from Eastern Europe and then deployed in areas lacking infrastructure. The full-strength units that were the most combat-ready were disbanded because the country lacked funding to maintain them and for the construction of military cantonments, bases, training centres and housing.
Officers received no wages for months on end. To be honest, the country even had trouble feeding its military personnel. Tens of thousands of officers and soldiers were being discharged. The number of generals, colonels, lieutenant colonels and majors exceeded that of captains and lieutenants. Many defence industry companies stood idle, accumulated debt and lost their most valuable and unique specialists.
The media was harsh with the armed forces. Day after day, a few “activists” considered it imperative to “kick” and humiliate the army in the most painful manner and to defile everything linked with such concepts as the oath of allegiance, the call to duty, service to the Motherland, patriotism and this country’s military history. Actually, they believed that any day when this wasn’t done, was lost in vain. I have thought about this, and I still consider it a real moral crime and an act of treason.
We must always remember that the country owes a lot to the officers and men who preserved the armed forces in the extremely difficult 1990s against all odds, and who facilitated the combat readiness of military units in times of crisis. Those officers and soldiers fought whenever necessary. They lost their comrades and won. That’s the way things were in the North Caucasus, in Tajikistan and in other “hot spots.” These people preserved the army’s spirit and honour, as well as Russia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Moreover, they defended the safety of Russian citizens making it impossible to humiliate this country and to “write” it off.
Still, the country had to pay dearly for the mistakes made during the numerous and inconsistent reforms, which frequently stipulated nothing more than automatic reductions.
In 1999, terrorist gangs unleashed a direct aggression against Russia, a tragic situation. We had to put together a 66,000-strong military formation virtually piecemeal from combined battalions and separate detachments. Although the basic Russian armed forces had more than 1,360,000 personnel, they lacked full-strength units capable of accomplishing their objectives without additional training.
But the army accomplished its objective. Russian officers, sergeants and soldiers fulfilled their duty. They considered their oath of allegiance to the Motherland to be more important than their lives, health and well-being. And, most importantly, Russian society once again came to realise the simple truth that it must support its armed forces. We must strengthen them otherwise we will end up feeding a foreign army on our soil, or we will even become slaves to thugs and international terrorists.
On the road back, we first prioritised the most urgent projects. We reinstated the system of elementary social guarantees for military personnel and eliminated those ignominious wage arrears. Year after year, we spent increasingly more on the development of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. This was in sharp contrast with those periods when high-priority projects lacked funding.
I remember in 2002 when the Chief of the General Staff proposed liquidating a base for strategic ballistic missile submarines on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Understandably, this proposal was motivated by dire circumstances. This would have deprived Russia of its naval presence in the Pacific Ocean. I decided against this. Due to the lack of the required budgetary funding, we had to ask private companies for help. I would like to thank them for that. Both Surgutneftegaz and TNK stepped up to provide the required funding for the base’s initial reconstruction. Budgetary allocations were later disbursed. Today, we have a modern base in Vilyuchinsk where next-generation Borei class submarines will soon be deployed.
Permanent readiness units comprising contract soldiers were established in every strategic sector. Self-contained formations were also deployed. It was one such formation that forced Georgia to sue for peace in August 2008 and who defended the people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
But previous experience proved that the potential for developing the military system inherited from the Soviet Union had become depleted. And by the way, what did that system look like? It comprised thousands of bases, depots, arsenals, numerous headquarters and cadre-strength units. In effect, all of that system’s elements were needed to deploy a mobilisation-type 20th century army with millions of officers and soldiers.
It was not possible to build up the military simply by adding personnel and equipment partly because it didn’t solve the inefficiency problem and partly because the country lacked both the human and financial resources. Most importantly, that system did not meet contemporary and long-term requirements. We could eventually have lost our entire military potential, and we could have lost our armed forces as an efficient mechanism.
There was only one way out. We had to build a new army. We had to establish a modern and mobile army which could maintain permanent combat readiness. This is a very difficult process affecting tens of thousands of people. The inevitable mistakes, grudges and disagreements are all linked with this process. This resulted in a negative public response, including from some military personnel. This reform is not being implemented by one or two people. A very complex institution, which had amassed many problems, is now being overhauled. Setbacks, excesses on the part of “executors,” inadequate informational support, the lack of proper “feedback” channels and the formalistic fulfillment of specific directives can all be called real problem areas in the ongoing reform. Our task is to understand these problem areas and to modify our decisions accordingly, while facilitating a system-wide transformation of the armed forces.
Achievements to date
There are no undermanned units in the Russian armed forces any more. The Army has over 100 combined and special brigades. These are full-scale military units with the requisite personnel and equipment. Their alert reaction time is one hour and they can be deployed to a potential theatre of war within 24 hours.
In the past, it took up to five days to prepare for combat readiness. The deployment and equipment of all the armed forces to wartime conditions could take nearly a year, even though most armed conflicts now last from a few hours to several days.
Why have we chosen the brigade as the main tactical unit? First of all, we have relied on our own experience in the Afghan and other wars, where mobile combat and assault groups reinforced with air and other support units have proved more efficient than regiments and divisions.
The new brigades are smaller than divisions in the number of personnel but have a bigger strike capability, better firepower and support, including artillery, air defence, reconnaissance, communications, and so on. Brigades can operate both autonomously and jointly with other units. I admit that the quality is not perfect in all instances. We need to achieve the required standards in the near future.
The Russian army is getting rid of economic management, community service and other non-core and auxiliary functions. Military personnel now spend nearly all their time on combat training. This is the only way to turn new recruits into professional soldiers, since they are only conscripted for 12 months. Soldiers and officers should carry out their direct duty – intensive combat training. This should also have a positive effect on discipline and law and order in the armed forces and will ultimately improve the prestige of conscription military service.
We are overhauling the system of military education. Ten research and education centres are being formed as a rigid vertical system where officers can improve their professional qualifications. In doing this we are relying both on our own traditions and on global experience.
It is only by relying on military research that military and military technical doctrines can be effective and the General Staff can work efficiently. We must restore the lost authority of our military institutions and integrate them into the system of military education, just as we are doing in the civilian sector of the economy. Military science must have a decisive influence on the formulation of the goals of the defence industry. Competent procurement mechanisms and the Defence Ministry departments responsible for military orders must ensure the efficient development of technical specifications for the design and production stages, as well as the specifications of weapons and military equipment.
There is no question that military research cannot develop properly without partnership with civilian science and without exploiting the potential of our leading universities and state research centres. Scientists must have sufficient information about the current status and development prospects of the army and weapons systems to be able to steer their prospective research in the right direction, and in particular to provide potential military uses for their products.
It should be added that the command agencies in the armed forces have been reduced by half. Four enlarged military districts – Western, Southern, Central and Eastern – have been established and have assumed command of the air force, air defence and naval forces. These are in fact operational and strategic commands. A new arm of the armed services, the Aerospace Defence Forces, became combat operational on December 1, 2011.
The Air Force now has seven large air bases with a powerful infrastructure. The network of airfields is being modernised. In the past four years we have upgraded 28 airfields, the first time this has happened in 20 years. Modernisation projects are planned at a further 12 military airfields.
We have greatly increased the capabilities of our early missile warning system. Tracking stations have been launched in the Leningrad and Kaliningrad Regions and in Armavir, and a similar facility is undergoing tests in Irkutsk. All aerospace defence brigades have been equipped with the Universal-1S automation systems, and the Glonass satellite group has been deployed.
The land, sea and air components of our Strategic Nuclear Forces are reliable and sufficient. The proportion of modern land-based missile systems has grown from 13% to 25% over the past four years. The rearmament of 10 missile regiments with the Topol-M and Yars strategic missile systems will be continued. Long-range aviation will maintain the fleet of strategic Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers; work is underway to modernise them. They will be equipped with a new long-range cruise missile system. Russia’s strategic aviation resumed combat patrols in their zone of responsibility in 2007. A new aircraft is being designed for strategic long-range aviation.
New-generation Borei class strategic submarines are being put on combat duty. These include the Yury Dolgoruky and Alexander Nevsky which are undergoing state trials.
The Russian Navy has resumed patrols of the strategic areas of the world's oceans, including the Mediterranean. We will continue with these displays of the Russian flag.
Goals for the coming decade
We have begun a large-scale programme to re-equip the Army and Navy and other national security forces. Our number one priorities are nuclear forces, aerospace defence, military communications, intelligence and control, electronic warfare, drones, unmanned missile systems, modern transport aviation, individual combat protection gear, precision weapons and defence capabilities against such weapons.
The training of combat and command personnel should become more intensive, comprehensive and of higher quality. Efforts will be focused on building effective inter-service groups of troops and forces and improving combat readiness.
Our professionals will have to work out a forward-looking ideology for the development of the different branches of the armed forces, and define clear goals and objectives for each of them in the relevant conceptual documents. It is already clear that nuclear deterrence will retain its leading role and importance in the structure of the Russian armed forces, at least until we develop new types of weapons, new-generation assault systems, including high precision weapons. These weapons, as I have already said, are capable of meeting combat goals that are comparable with the current role of the nuclear deterrence forces. In addition, the role of the Navy, the Air Force and the Aerospace Defence Forces will grow significantly over the coming years.
Today's challenges require us to take resolute steps to strengthen Russia’s air and space defence system. We are being pushed into action by the U.S. and NATO missile defence policies.
A global balance of forces can be guaranteed either by building our own missile defence shield – an expensive and to date largely ineffective undertaking – or by developing the ability to overcome any missile defence system and protect Russia’s retaliation potential, which is far more effective.
Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and air and space defence are designed to serve precisely this purpose. One cannot be “overly patriotic” about this. Russia’s military technical response to the U.S. global missile defence system and its segments in Europe will be effective even if disproportionate. But it will fully match U.S. steps in missile defence.
We aim to restore a blue-water (in the full sense of the word) navy, primarily in Russia’s North and Far East. The activities of the world’s leading military powers in and around the Arctic are forcing Russia to defend its own interests in the region.
In the coming decade, Russian armed forces will be provided with over 400 modern land and sea-based inter-continental ballistic missiles, 8 strategic ballistic missile submarines, about 20 multi-purpose submarines, over 50 surface warships, around 100 military spacecraft, over 600 modern aircraft including fifth generation fighter jets, more than 1,000 helicopters, 28 regimental kits of S-400 air defence systems, 38 battalion kits of Vityaz missile systems, 10 brigade kits of Iskander-M missile systems, over 2,300 modern tanks, about 2,000 self-propelled artillery systems and vehicles, and more than 17,000 military vehicles.
More than 250 military units, including 30 air squadrons, are already using advanced military equipment. By 2020, the proportion of new armaments should rise to at least 70%. The systems remaining in service will also be significantly upgraded.
So the goal for the next decade will be to equip our armed forces with advanced armaments, which have better visibility, higher precision, and faster response times than similar systems used by any potential enemy.
The social dimension
A modern army must employ qualified personnel with the skills to operate the most modern weapons systems. These professionals must have in-depth knowledge and a high level of education and culture. The individual requirements for each officer and soldier are increasing significantly today.
At the same time, servicemen are entitled to receive a full package of social benefits to match the huge responsibility that they bear. This includes access to healthcare services, rehabilitation treatment, health insurance, a decent pension and employment opportunities after retirement. In addition, their salary should be at the same level as for qualified professionals and managers in the leading industries, or even higher.
In 2007, we decided to increase military pay and pensions. At the first stage of the reforms, in 2009, the government launched a major initiative to raise the pay for those who shoulder a special responsibility for upholding Russia’s defences.
We have now taken the next step: from January 1, 2012 military pay has almost tripled. The Armed Forces have become much more competitive as an employer. This has improved the situation significantly. It has created an additional incentive to join the military forces.
Also on January 1, 2012, officers of the Interior Ministry were given a pay raise. Other branches of the military, law enforcement and special services will see their pay rise from January 1, 2013.
The pensions of all retired military servicemen, regardless of the sector of the forces they served in, went up by 60% from January 1, 2012. In the future, military pensions will go up every year by at least 2% above inflation.
In addition, we will introduce a special education certificate so that every retired serviceman will be able to receive education or enrol in a retraining programme at any Russian educational institution.
Housing is another major issue, which has been poorly addressed over many years. In the 1990s, at best the government provided only 6,000-8,000 flats or housing certificates a year. Very often, people retired without receiving any housing at all; they were simply put on the same waiting list along with civilians and had to wait their turn.
Looking back, we can see that housing for military servicemen started increasing significantly from 2000, up to an annual average of 25,000 flats for servicemen. Doing this however required a dramatic change in government policy and a shift to focus financial and organisational resources on to this problem.
The 15+15 Presidential Programme carried out in 2006-2007 was the first measure in this respect. Around 20,000 additional flats were provided to servicemen in the regions where the housing problems were more serious.
Between 2008 and 2011, some 140,000 flats were purchased or built for military personnel employed by the Defense Ministry, with another 46,000 service personnel properties provided beyond that. Nothing of this kind had happened before. We allocated money even during the financial crisis. However, despite the scale of the programme, which was even larger than initially planned, the problem has yet to be resolved.
We should be honest about the reasons for this. Firstly, the Defense Ministry has not kept proper records of the servicemen who need housing. Secondly, staffing arrangements were not directly linked to housing availability. We have to adjust this.
In 2012-2013, the provision of permanent housing to military personnel should be complete. In addition, a modern service housing fund must be created by 2014, which should resolve the “never-ending” problem of military housing.
By the end of 2012, we will provide flats to those service personnel who were discharged in the 1990s but never received housing and are still on municipal waiting lists. That’s over 20,000 people.
The personnel that signed contracts after 2007 will be provided with housing in accordance with plan through the savings and mortgage lending system. The number of people participating in this programme exceeds 180,000, with over 20,000 flats already purchased.
Another crucial issue is the fate of military towns and the thousands of people who live there. They are former service people and their families, pensioners and non-military professionals – all those who have served the armed forces, and thus, the country for many decades.
It is unacceptable that these towns with their problems are just discarded by the Defense Ministry and have to be handled solely by the regional or municipal officials. We must carry out a thorough inventory audit of real property that is owned by the armed forces and is to be transferred into the ownership of the civilian authorities. In other words, residential blocks, kindergartens, public utilities now owned by the Defense Ministry must be transferred to their respective municipalities, after renovation, and when they are fully functional, and – this is particularly important – funds should be supplied for their current maintenance.
Serious changes are planned for military strength acquisition. Currently, 220,000 officers and 186,000 soldiers and sergeants serve under contract. An annual increase of 50,000 service personnel is expected within the next five years. They will serve as sergeants, sergeant majors and military equipment specialists.
Selection will be strict and will consist of several stages. Marshal Georgy Zhukov used to say, “It’s me and the sergeants who command this army.” These “junior commanders” are the backbone of enforcement in the army. They follow through on order, discipline and proper military training. We need respectable people with the appropriate background, moral values and physical qualities for these positions. Not just the junior officers but all contract soldiers will be trained at special training centres and sergeant schools.
We expect that by 2017, 700,000 service personnel out of one-million will be “professionals” and include officers, military students, sergeants and contract soldiers. By 2020, the number of conscripts will decrease to 145,000.
The rationale behind these changes clearly shows that our objective is to create a fully professional army. At the same time, we need to be aware of the fact that a professional army is expensive. If we continue manning the armed forces with contract personnel and conscripts, we will be compromising between this objective and our national capabilities.
But compulsory military service will require qualitative adjustment as well. This is a mandatory requirement for military reform.
Military Police will be introduced to oversee discipline among the personnel. Public, veteran, religious and human rights organisations should be actively involved in the education of the servicemen and the protection of their rights and interests and for forming a healthy moral environment.
I believe we should think about developing the military clergy. Each military unit will have a military chaplain within the next few years.
We understand that there is an issue of social inequality within the current draft system. Conscripts are usually boys from low income and working class families or those who were not admitted to universities and could not apply for deferred service. We need to enhance the prestige of compulsory military service. It should become a privilege rather than a duty.
These measures could include additional privileges for those who serve in the army and want to enroll in the country’s best universities. Another option could be government support for those who want to take professional exams, or government scholarships for the graduates who served in the army and want to continue their education in the best business schools in Russia or abroad. They could also be eligible for preferential terms in applying for civil service posts or being included in the management reserves. The army should be returned to its traditional status as the most important social mobility engine.
In the long term, we should consider introducing stand-by reserve forces. As in many countries, this category of personnel would undergo regular drills and be prepared to serve in combat units if required.
There is no clear idea of a national reserve now. Our immediate task is to conceptualise this and suggest it for discussion. In particular, I would like to speak about the Cossacks. Millions of our fellow citizens today say that they are members of this social class. The Cossacks have historically been in the service of the Russian state, defending its borders and participating in the military campaigns of the Russian Army. After the 1917 revolution, the Cossacks were subjected to harsh reprisals that in essence amounted to genocide. But the Cossacks have survived and preserved their culture and traditions. The government’s task now is to help the Cossacks in every way it can. We must also get them involved in military service and the military and patriotic education of young people.
I think it important to stress the following. The army should definitely become a professional contract army. But we cannot eliminate the notion of honorable military duty for men. They must be ready to defend their Motherland when it comes under threat.
We need to raise the level of our work in organizing the military patriotic education of schoolchildren and promoting military-based sports and physical culture in general. Active military service lasts for twelve months, and a soldier has to concentrate exclusively on combat training. This means that he should join the army physically fit and tough, and better still, knowing how to handle motor vehicles, computers and information technology. In this connection I would like to emphasise the importance to the state of the work done by Russia’s Voluntary Association for Assistance to Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF).
The federal, regional and municipal authorities should do all they can to help this organisation achieve its goals. Government and public agencies should join hands. In this context, I am in favour of the idea of establishing a voluntary movement of the popular front in support of the army, navy, and the defence industry.
Our aims in the sphere of defence and national security cannot be achieved unless both servicemen and defence industry employees are highly motivated – and unless, let me add, the Russian public shows respect for the Armed Forces and military service.
New requirements of the Russian defence industry
The defence industry, our pride, boasts powerful intellectual and scientific capabilities. But we must also be honest in speaking about the problems that have built up. Russia’s defence research centres and production facilities have been slow to modernise over the last 30 years.
In the coming decade, we need to close this gap. We must regain the technological lead in the entire spectrum of modern military technologies. I would like to stress once again that we will put the task of re-equipping the armed forces firmly in the hands of Russia's defence industry and scientific infrastructure.
We will have to address several interconnected tasks at the same time: to increase by an order of magnitude the delivery of advanced and next-generation equipment; to form forward-looking scientific and technological capabilities, to develop and master technologies of critical importance to the manufacture of competitive military products; and, finally, to upgrade the technological base of the industries that specialise in the production of advanced weapons and military equipment. We should also build, modernise or re-equip our experimental and test infrastructure.
Today, Russia is firmly integrated into the global economy and open to dialogue with all its partners, including on matters of defence and in the sphere of military-technical cooperation.
But learning from the experience and trends of other countries does not mean that Russia will switch over to using borrowed models or give up the concept of self-reliance. Quite the contrary: to achieve steady socioeconomic development and guarantee national security, we must, while borrowing the best experience, build up and maintain Russia’s military-technological and scientific independence.
In this context, let me address the sensitive topic of buying military equipment from abroad. As is evident from global practice, all the key suppliers of the global arms market, all the most advanced technological and industrial powers are at the same time purchasers of various parts of systems, models, materials and technologies. This makes it possible to quickly solve the most pressing defence problems and, let us be frank, to stimulate domestic producers.
Besides, there is a fundamental difference between buying in order to own something and buying in order to abandon one’s own designs. I am convinced that no amount of “pin-point” purchases of military and scientific equipment can replace the production of our own weapons; these purchases can only serve as a source of technology and knowledge. Incidentally, a similar thing happened in the past. Let me remind you that an entire family of Russian tanks in the 1930’s was based on U.S. and British armoured vehicles. This experience led to the development of the T-34, the best tank of WW II.
In order to really improve this country’s defence capability, we need the world’s best state-of-the-art military equipment, not spending billions and trillions of roubles. It is unacceptable for the army to become a market for morale-sapping obsolescent weapons, technologies and research and development, especially if it is being paid for out of the public purse.
That is why we have made our defence plants and design bureaus comply with stringent requirements, have been encouraging competition and investing heavily in the modernisation of the defence industry, advanced technologies and training of specialists.
The activities of defence industry enterprises should concentrate on the mass production of high-quality weapons with the highest performance characteristics to meet both current and projected defence challenges. Moreover, it is only the latest weapons and military equipment that will enable Russia to strengthen and expand its foothold in the world arms markets, where the winner is the one who can offer the most advanced designs.
Reacting to present-day threats and challenges alone means being doomed to the role of someone who is always playing catch-up. We must do our best to gain a technological and organisational edge over any potential adversary. Such a stringent requirement should become the key criterion for us as we set targets for the defence industry. This will enable industries to engage in long-term planning and know for certain where they should direct resources allocated for technological modernisation and development of new types of weapons. Scientific centres and institutes will be given incentives and clear guidelines for the development of basic and applied research in the military and related areas.
We have made great headway in reforming the army. Now we must revise the principles behind the planning and implementation of the state weapons programme. To enable defence companies to make long-term plans, we have decided to stagger the state's defence order over three to five or even seven years. But I think that taking this step is not enough on its own.
We must start by linking military planning to the task of providing the army with weapons, military equipment, and other resources. Along with this we should consider establishing a single body responsible for the placement of and oversight of defence contracts. This body would be responsible for the execution of state defence orders in the interests of all agencies concerned.
Adjustments in the government defence order after it has been approved by the government must be kept to a minimum. We should also bear in mind that the purchase price in all cases has to be fair and sufficient to recover the costs of investments and also pay for development, modernisation, recruitment of skilled labour and staff training.
Another problem is that businesses and institutes in the defence industry lack a common database and often duplicate various research projects. We must do our best to create a “search engine,” a common database, common standards and a transparent mechanism of pricing for defence industry projects. We should work for more integration and cooperation between various companies, and we should also standardise production facilities.
At the same time, we need to promote competition, while making state purchases. We must reasonably encourage rivalries for increased quality, primarily during the conceptualisation and research stage. At the same time we must prioritise successful research projects during the creation of ready-made products, so as not to duplicate specific weapons systems.
The defence industry is in no position to calmly try to catch up with the latest developments. We must facilitate breakthroughs and become leading innovators and manufacturers.
To attain a leading global technological position in weapons manufacturing, we must reinstate the entire industrial cycle from modeling and design to commercial production, while specifying troop-level quality and subsequent elimination.
The lack of incentives for the development of companies that might generate breakthrough ideas, the receding relationships between universities, departmental institutes and defence industry businesses creates a lag in defence industry research, as well as the disintegration of science institutes and science-intensive sectors. All this cannot evolve by itself. The state is unable to simply hold tenders and to award contracts.
The state must persistently look for breakthrough R&D projects and find teams of researchers who can implement the respective backlogs in a given sphere. Moreover, the state must promote a healthy competition during R&D projects. This includes unorthodox ideas that might be generated by teams of young enthusiasts.
All countries with a well-developed defence industry prioritise defence-related research as a powerful driving force of innovation growth. It is precisely defence-related research projects receiving large and sustained state funding, which make it possible to implement many breakthrough technologies which would never exceed the profit margin in the civilian sector. The civilian sector manufactures such ready-made products and adapts them to its own needs.
We need modern companies acting as a kind of broker between military, industrial, scientific and political circles. Such companies must be able to single out and support the best aspects of national innovation projects, while circumventing excessive bureaucracy involving too many discussions. Optimal models for these kinds of companies are currently being developed and will soon be initiated.
Several days ago, I met with telecommunications and IT specialists in Novosibirsk. Notably, we discussed leading US universities which have won a reputation for themselves by implementing defence contracts and research projects. I think we must also more actively involve the potential of civilian universities in implementing programmes for the modernisation of the defence industry. Large-scale defence contracts can be another source of university and research centre development.
Sometimes critics claim that rebuilding the defence industry is a yoke for the Russian economy and a back-breaking burden which ruined the Soviet Union in its time. I am confident that this is a misconception.
The Soviet Union collapsed because it suppressed natural free-market development in the economy, and because it neglected people’s interests for too long. It disintegrated as a result of a fruitless attempt to force the entire country to work as one single factory. This inevitably resulted in the loss of control even in the defence industry. In Soviet times, they would simultaneously test and adopt several rival weapons systems. Moreover, the government even failed to facilitate the transfer of elementary technology to civilian use.
We must not repeat our past mistakes here. The huge resources invested in the renewal of the defence industry and in the rearmament programme must facilitate the modernisation of the entire Russian economy. They must serve as a major incentive for quality growth where state spending creates jobs, facilitates market demand and “feeds” science. This implies the accomplishment of the very same effects being stipulated by current modernisation programmes. The only thing is that the defence industry will facilitate a much larger effect than we have previously attained.
The renewal of the defence industry will facilitate the development of the most diverse sectors, including metallurgy, engineering, the chemical and radio-electronic industries, as well as the entire range of information technologies and telecommunications. Enterprises in these sectors will also receive the required resources to renew their production facilities. They will receive new engineering solutions. This will promote the stability of many research teams, as well as their presence in the civilian research market.
A balance has developed in the modern world of the mutual influence of defence and civilian technologies. In certain industries, such as telecommunications, innovative materials and information and communication technologies, it is the civilian technologies that are the driving force behind the burgeoning development of military equipment; in others, such as aviation and space technology, military designs lead the way for innovations in civilian sectors. This situation calls for innovative approaches towards the principles underlying the exchange of information and the revision of obsolete approaches to the protection of state secrets. We should be very rigorous about protecting a limited number of truly important secrets, while at the same time exchanging all other scientific and technical information between all those who are able to use it effectively.
In so doing, it is crucial to ensure the availability of a counter flow of innovations and technologies between the defence and civilian sectors. The intellectual property created in the defence sector should be properly assessed. Such an assessment should take into account the potential of civilian commercialisation and prospects for the transfer of technology. We should manufacture civilian products at defence plants, but avoid repeating the sad experience of the defence industry conversion, in which defence plants were making titanium saucepans and shovels. We already have a good example in the serial production of the first digitalised Russian civilian aircraft, the Sukhoi Superjet.
Clearly, we need to thoroughly revise the economic activities that military and industrial complex enterprises are pursuing. They are plagued by numerous inefficiencies, such as vast unjustified expenses, overhead costs which often run into the thousands of percentage points, as well as tangled and obscure relations with contractors, where a parent company is balancing on the brink of bankruptcy and its subsidiaries and suppliers are generating profits running into two or three figures.
We will aggressively combat corruption in the defence industry and the Armed Forces and hold fast to the principle of the unavoidability of punishment. Indeed, corruption in the sphere of national security amounts to no less than high treason.
Excessive protectiveness has already resulted in our reduced competitiveness, sharp increases in prices for defence products, generation of windfall profits that are being used for personal enrichment of individual businessmen and officials rather than the upgrading of the industry. Open auctions should be held in all instances where they don’t contradict national interests and pose no threat to the safety of state secrets. Defence purchases should be carried out under close public control, and punishment for violations in the sphere of defence government contracting should be toughened.
We will be building the single operating algorithm for vertically integrated entities which shouldn’t be headed by lobbyists representing a particular enterprise. At the same time, we should start breaking departmental stereotypes and engage civilian enterprises and private businesses in the manufacturing of military equipment and defence engineering.
The development of the military-industrial complex by the state alone is already ineffective and will cease to be economically viable in the mid-term. It is important to promote the partnership between the state and private businesses in the defence industry and make the procedures involved in establishing new defence enterprises less complicated. Private companies are prepared to invest their capital, expertise and know-how in the defence industry. We believe that we will have our own entrepreneurs of the calibre of Demidov and Putilov.
The leading manufacturers of armaments and military equipment in the United States and Europe are not run by the state. A fresh look at the industry and innovative business approaches to the organisation of manufacturing processes will give Russian weapons a new breath of life and improve the competitiveness of Russian weapons on international markets. Certainly, employment at privately-run defence enterprises should require security clearance. However, this should not become a barrier to establishing such enterprises or to their participation in state defence contracting. It is precisely such new private companies that may provide technological breakthroughs capable of drastically changing the industry.
The problem is that our private investors do not know exactly which of their capabilities may be used by the defence industry or areas where they can apply their energy or capital. An open information source must be established that clearly states the current needs of the defence industry for private businesses and investment.
Legacy enterprises that were established in Soviet times need to be upgraded. Manufacturing processes should be streamlined in order to be able to use advanced technologies. This work should be performed by highly skilled managers, process engineers and technical officers from private business. Quality management at defence enterprises should be enhanced and reporting should be introduced on spending under state defence contracts.
In addition, national mobilisation needs should be reviewed. The existing system is in many ways antiquated. Today, we don’t need production facilities that just churn out old armaments and ammunition. The defence industry and the mobilisation reserve should be based on the latest high-tech manufacturing facilities capable of making competitive high-quality products. They can be based on existing plants and enterprises that need to be upgraded, or built from the ground up.
Of course, we need to raise the prestige of defence industry occupations. Therefore, it would be wise to provide additional social guarantees, or even privileges, to defence sector employees. In addition, average salaries at state-run defence enterprises and R&D centres should be comparable to military service pay.
Education and on-the-job personnel training should be a focus of particular attention. Many enterprises have run into an acute shortage of technicians and highly skilled workers, which interferes with the timely execution of government orders and with the expansion of manufacturing capacities.
Specialised higher education institutions, including applied bachelors programmes, and vocational schools of general education, whose graduates often go on to work at defence enterprises, should play the key role in resolving this issue. I believe that future employment can be arranged through three-way agreements signed between the educational institution, a sectoral concern and a student. Work at an enterprise should begin when students are still pursuing their studies in college and should take the form of practical training and on-the-job training. In addition to gaining working experience, students will have the opportunity to earn good money and will be motivated to acquire necessary skills. Of course, such on-the-job training should be integrated into curricula.
The prestige of technical specialties is on the rise. Defence enterprises should become the focus of attraction for talented youth and should provide – as was the case in the Soviet Union – broad opportunities for creativity in the sphere of engineering, research and technology.
I believe that we should consider sending young employees of the defence sector and senior students of technical colleges to receive on-the-job training at leading Russian and international labs, institutes and enterprises. Managing modern equipment calls for superior skill sets, deep knowledge, and ongoing training. Therefore, professional advancement programmes at enterprises should absolutely be maintained and supported.
* * *
In the process of building our defence policy and modernising the Armed Forces, we should keep up with the latest trends in the military sphere. To fall behind these trends means becoming vulnerable and putting at risk our country and the lives of our soldiers and officers. We cannot afford repeating the tragedy of 1941, when a lack of readiness of the state and the Army for war led to the vast loss of human lives.
The unprecedented scale of the armaments programme and upgrading of the defence industry re-affirms the seriousness of our intentions. We understand that Russia will have to spend a lot in order to be able to implement these plans.
Our goal is to build an Army and a defence industry that will strengthen, not deplete, our national economy, and that is capable of securing Russia’s sovereignty, the respect of its partners and lasting peace.
source:
original Russian text: http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/20/putin-armiya.html
original Russian text: http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/20/putin-armiya.html
English translation: http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18185/
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