Showing posts with label Mughniyah. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mughniyah. Show all posts
Thursday, August 7, 2008
The Mystery Behind a Syrian Murder
Note: I usually do not post materials from the corporate press on this blog, much less so one coming from, of all things, from the Time/CNN cesspool. Still, this article was mailed to be my a friend (thanks M.!) and it is interesting. Take a look (my comments are italicized):
The Mystery Behind a Syrian Murder
By Nicholas Blanford / Beirut
Syria on Wednesday broke its silence over the recent mysterious assassination of a senior army general and top aide to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, a killing that has provoked a storm of speculation over internal rifts within the Assad regime.
Brigadier General Mohammed Suleiman, 49, was shot dead last Friday at his chalet in the Rimal al-Zahabieh luxury resort nine miles north of the port city of Tartous on the Mediterranean. Press reports in the Arab world claimed that the assassin had fired the shots from a boat out at sea, thus evading security at the prestigious holiday resort regularly frequented by top regime figures. Some analysts, however, suspect that the killer fired from close range — they note the fact that Suleiman was hit in the head, neck and stomach, and also the difficulty of firing that accurately from a bobbing boat. (Note: the sniper on the boat hypothesis is extremely unlikely not only because of the bobbing boat, but because of the difficulty of estimating the air motion over the sea water, the land and the boundary between the two. Also, placing three shots on target is not something which a sniper is likely to achieve. Thus, a close-up execution is far more likely. VS)
The slain general was buried on Sunday at his home village of Draykish, 15 miles east of Tartous, in a funeral attended by Maher al-Assad, younger brother of the President. Bashar al-Assad, who is said to be deeply upset by Suleiman's murder, stuck to his schedule and flew to Tehran on Saturday for talks with top Iranian officials, followed by a trip to Turkey. And the government initially remained silent on the assassination, while the Syrian media ducked the issue. But on Wednesday for the first time, Buthaina Shaaban, an advisor to President Assad, confirmed Suleiman's death.
"Mohammed Suleiman, an officer in the Syrian Arab Army, has been assassinated," Shaaban told reporters. "An investigation is underway." She offered no further details.
As for the identity and motive of the killer, there is no shortage of speculation in Syria. Nicknamed "the imported general" by his friends because of his fair complexion and foreign looks, Suleiman had been a key aide to Assad since the mid-1990s, when Bashar was being groomed to succeed his father, Hafez al-Assad, as president. Suleiman, who comes from the same Alawite religious sect as the Assad family, supervised several portfolios, and oversaw Syria's weapons research and development program. After Assad became president in 2000, Suleiman handled his intelligence affairs and was reportedly also in charge of arms transfers from Syria to Hizballah in neighboring Lebanon. (Elsewhere Suleiman is reported to be the intelligence liason officer to Hezbollah. VS)
Suleiman's murder comes at a critical time for Syria, which is presently engaged in a delicate balancing act of pursuing indirect peace talks with Israel and improved ties to the West, at the same time as maintaining its relations with Hizballah and Iran. In exchange for the return of the Golan Heights, captured by Israel in 1967, the Israeli government demands that Syria curtails its strategic alliance with Iran and its backing for Hizballah and for Palestinian militant groups. Still, since Syria and Israel revealed in May that they are negotiating via Turkish mediation, Damascus has paradoxically strengthened its military and economic alliance with Tehran (Nonsense. What Syria is doing is trying to placate Iran over its gradual sell-out of the Palestinians and Hezbollah. Futile. VS).
Some Syria watchers believe that while Assad has a firm grip on power, the pressure of juggling relations with Israel and Iran is causing stresses within the regime.
"There is talk now about moving to direct peace negotiations between the Syrians and Israelis, but it's hard to reconcile those talks when Syria's military and security apparatus is so heavily supported by Iran," said Andrew Tabler, a Damascus-based Syria analyst. "I can't imagine how they are going to square all that." (They are not. But the idea that there are two "currents" inside the Syrian elites is an interesting one. VS)
A well-informed Syrian source told TIME that Suleiman's death could be connected to the fallout surrounding the assassination in Damascus last February of Hizballah's top military commander, Imad Mughniyah, who was killed by a car bomb (You betcha! There is absolutely no way in the world Mughniyeh could have been killed without the assistance of the Syrian Mukhabarat. The only question is what part of the regime was involved. VS)
Regime insiders indicate that the Mughniyah killing, which caused the Syrian leader serious embarrassment with his Iranian and Hizballah allies, touched off a purge in the senior ranks of Syria's intelligence services. Some speculate that these purges may have created a revenge motive for Suleiman's killing (There is another option here: if Hezbollah's investigation revealed that Suleiman played a key role in the Mughniyeh murder he might have been killed by Hezbollah operatives in a revenge operation. Alternatively, he might have been made into the fall guy and executed on Assad orders, if only to make it look to Hezbollah that he is not personally involved. VS)
"It's a very delicate question. I think that how the regime reacts to the assassination will be more significant than the assassination itself," the source said.
Ultimately, the truth may turn out to be much simpler, or perhaps even more convoluted than the most convoluted conspiracy theory. With Syria, you can never tell. (Well gee, typical clueless journalistic conclusion. This is Time/CNN after all. VS)
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Commentary: I am amazed that there is one factor which everybody assumes to be certain: Assad is personally untouchable. I don't believe that at all. My guess is that Hezbollah (and/or the Iranians) can reach deep inside Syria and Assad's regime and that an Assad assassination is not at all something impossible. Consider this: Hezbollah and Iran have been "preparing the battlefield" for, literally, *years*; Iran and Hezbollah have (by far) the most sophisticated intelligence capabilities of the Middle-East (both in analysis and operations); lastly, neither Iran nor Hezbollah could have any illusions at all about the loyalties of a Baathist like Assad. Add this all up and it is overwhelmingly probable that both Iran and Hezbollah have deeply infiltrated the Syrian regime and that they are ready, if needed, to strike at at. Do I know any of this for a fact? No, of course not. But this hypothesis is far more likely than the totally unbelievable idea that this would not have happened.
I believe that Assad was in a great deal of personal danger as soon as Mughniyeh was murdered, regardless of whether he personally was involved or not (and my guess is that he was). The assassination of Suleiman by a long sniper based on a boat is just nonsense. It is far more likely that he was executed by the Syrians themselves. If not, than the only one with the reach to kill him would be Hezbollah and/or Iran.
What do you think?
The Saker
The Mystery Behind a Syrian Murder
By Nicholas Blanford / Beirut
Syria on Wednesday broke its silence over the recent mysterious assassination of a senior army general and top aide to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, a killing that has provoked a storm of speculation over internal rifts within the Assad regime.
Brigadier General Mohammed Suleiman, 49, was shot dead last Friday at his chalet in the Rimal al-Zahabieh luxury resort nine miles north of the port city of Tartous on the Mediterranean. Press reports in the Arab world claimed that the assassin had fired the shots from a boat out at sea, thus evading security at the prestigious holiday resort regularly frequented by top regime figures. Some analysts, however, suspect that the killer fired from close range — they note the fact that Suleiman was hit in the head, neck and stomach, and also the difficulty of firing that accurately from a bobbing boat. (Note: the sniper on the boat hypothesis is extremely unlikely not only because of the bobbing boat, but because of the difficulty of estimating the air motion over the sea water, the land and the boundary between the two. Also, placing three shots on target is not something which a sniper is likely to achieve. Thus, a close-up execution is far more likely. VS)
The slain general was buried on Sunday at his home village of Draykish, 15 miles east of Tartous, in a funeral attended by Maher al-Assad, younger brother of the President. Bashar al-Assad, who is said to be deeply upset by Suleiman's murder, stuck to his schedule and flew to Tehran on Saturday for talks with top Iranian officials, followed by a trip to Turkey. And the government initially remained silent on the assassination, while the Syrian media ducked the issue. But on Wednesday for the first time, Buthaina Shaaban, an advisor to President Assad, confirmed Suleiman's death.
"Mohammed Suleiman, an officer in the Syrian Arab Army, has been assassinated," Shaaban told reporters. "An investigation is underway." She offered no further details.
As for the identity and motive of the killer, there is no shortage of speculation in Syria. Nicknamed "the imported general" by his friends because of his fair complexion and foreign looks, Suleiman had been a key aide to Assad since the mid-1990s, when Bashar was being groomed to succeed his father, Hafez al-Assad, as president. Suleiman, who comes from the same Alawite religious sect as the Assad family, supervised several portfolios, and oversaw Syria's weapons research and development program. After Assad became president in 2000, Suleiman handled his intelligence affairs and was reportedly also in charge of arms transfers from Syria to Hizballah in neighboring Lebanon. (Elsewhere Suleiman is reported to be the intelligence liason officer to Hezbollah. VS)
Suleiman's murder comes at a critical time for Syria, which is presently engaged in a delicate balancing act of pursuing indirect peace talks with Israel and improved ties to the West, at the same time as maintaining its relations with Hizballah and Iran. In exchange for the return of the Golan Heights, captured by Israel in 1967, the Israeli government demands that Syria curtails its strategic alliance with Iran and its backing for Hizballah and for Palestinian militant groups. Still, since Syria and Israel revealed in May that they are negotiating via Turkish mediation, Damascus has paradoxically strengthened its military and economic alliance with Tehran (Nonsense. What Syria is doing is trying to placate Iran over its gradual sell-out of the Palestinians and Hezbollah. Futile. VS).
Some Syria watchers believe that while Assad has a firm grip on power, the pressure of juggling relations with Israel and Iran is causing stresses within the regime.
"There is talk now about moving to direct peace negotiations between the Syrians and Israelis, but it's hard to reconcile those talks when Syria's military and security apparatus is so heavily supported by Iran," said Andrew Tabler, a Damascus-based Syria analyst. "I can't imagine how they are going to square all that." (They are not. But the idea that there are two "currents" inside the Syrian elites is an interesting one. VS)
A well-informed Syrian source told TIME that Suleiman's death could be connected to the fallout surrounding the assassination in Damascus last February of Hizballah's top military commander, Imad Mughniyah, who was killed by a car bomb (You betcha! There is absolutely no way in the world Mughniyeh could have been killed without the assistance of the Syrian Mukhabarat. The only question is what part of the regime was involved. VS)
Regime insiders indicate that the Mughniyah killing, which caused the Syrian leader serious embarrassment with his Iranian and Hizballah allies, touched off a purge in the senior ranks of Syria's intelligence services. Some speculate that these purges may have created a revenge motive for Suleiman's killing (There is another option here: if Hezbollah's investigation revealed that Suleiman played a key role in the Mughniyeh murder he might have been killed by Hezbollah operatives in a revenge operation. Alternatively, he might have been made into the fall guy and executed on Assad orders, if only to make it look to Hezbollah that he is not personally involved. VS)
"It's a very delicate question. I think that how the regime reacts to the assassination will be more significant than the assassination itself," the source said.
Ultimately, the truth may turn out to be much simpler, or perhaps even more convoluted than the most convoluted conspiracy theory. With Syria, you can never tell. (Well gee, typical clueless journalistic conclusion. This is Time/CNN after all. VS)
--------
Commentary: I am amazed that there is one factor which everybody assumes to be certain: Assad is personally untouchable. I don't believe that at all. My guess is that Hezbollah (and/or the Iranians) can reach deep inside Syria and Assad's regime and that an Assad assassination is not at all something impossible. Consider this: Hezbollah and Iran have been "preparing the battlefield" for, literally, *years*; Iran and Hezbollah have (by far) the most sophisticated intelligence capabilities of the Middle-East (both in analysis and operations); lastly, neither Iran nor Hezbollah could have any illusions at all about the loyalties of a Baathist like Assad. Add this all up and it is overwhelmingly probable that both Iran and Hezbollah have deeply infiltrated the Syrian regime and that they are ready, if needed, to strike at at. Do I know any of this for a fact? No, of course not. But this hypothesis is far more likely than the totally unbelievable idea that this would not have happened.
I believe that Assad was in a great deal of personal danger as soon as Mughniyeh was murdered, regardless of whether he personally was involved or not (and my guess is that he was). The assassination of Suleiman by a long sniper based on a boat is just nonsense. It is far more likely that he was executed by the Syrians themselves. If not, than the only one with the reach to kill him would be Hezbollah and/or Iran.
What do you think?
The Saker
Saturday, February 16, 2008
Analysts expect Hizbullah to deal major blow to "Israel"
Source: Daily Star via Islamic Resistance in Lebanon
By Michael Bluhm
BEIRUT: Wednesday's assassination of Hizbullah senior commander Imad Moghnieh will spark a new round of violence in the region, as Hizbullah is certain to retaliate in spectacular fashion, thereby provoking further security fallout in Lebanon, a number of analysts told The Daily Star on Friday.
The aftershocks of Moghnieh's killing could even increase the chances for civil strife here, said Ahmad Moussalli, a professor of political science and Islamic studies at the American University of Beirut.
We are close to a major conflict," he said. "We are at a point of some kind of war. It's very dangerous. You will see Hizbullah hardening its [domestic] position, rather than softening."
Hizbullah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's words at Moghnieh's funeral on Thursday about an "open war" between Hizbullah and "Israel" were not a mere fulmination fueled by the moment, Moussalli added.
"It is a declaration of war, kind of," he said. "The whole ballgame now is different. I don't think it was just rhetoric and emotion. It's not just venting his anger."
On the other hand, Nasrallah's proclamation of an ongoing, open war represents only an explicit admission of the reality dating to the emergence of Hizbullah in late 1982 to fight against the "Israeli" occupation of South Lebanon, said retired General Elias Hanna, who teaches political science at Notre Dame University. For example, after Hizbullah's then-Secretary General Abbas Moussawi was assassinated by "Israeli" helicopters in February 1992, a car bomb killed 29 at the "Israeli" Embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992, although Hizbullah has never claimed responsibility for the attack.
"It never was a closed war," Hanna said. "It is not something new. There is no cease-fire. It was a declared war a long time ago. It's not one point out of context. It's a continuation of the same war."
Nasrallah's fiery language at the funeral in Rweiss was to be expected, as an effort to bolster spirits and guarantee the continuity of Moghnieh's work, Hanna added. "First, he is trying to keep the morale high [and] then to reassure the resistance Imad Moghnieh accomplished everything he was assigned to," Hanna said.
For Hizbullah, Moghnieh's assassination takes precedence over the maneuvering in the 15-month-old domestic political deadlock with the March 14 governing coalition, meaning the Shiite group will step away for some time from street protests or talks over the presidential vacuum, Hanna added. With all the political actors awaiting Hizbullah's response to the killing, the further direction of the political crisis "is in Hizbullah's hands - Mar Mikhael is secondary, the [presidential] election is secondary," Hanna said, referring to the investigation of the deaths of seven opposition supporters on January 27 in Beirut's Mar Mikhael-Shiyyah district.
Hizbullah will first focus on striking back at the Jewish state - which Hizbullah blames for the assassination - in a retaliatory attack on a meaningful target, said Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, visiting scholar at the Carnegie Middle East center. "It will deal a major blow to "Israel"," she said. "Hizbullah assumes that this is war. According to Hizbullah, the war is ongoing. It sees [the assassination] as part of the war."
Nasrallah's comments about "Israel" expanding that war "outside our natural battleground" by killing Moghnieh in Damascus were the most significant element of his speech, Saad-Ghorayeb said, as a signal that Hizbullah would act likewise.
"He was giving an advance claim of responsibility for an operation that Hizbullah will conduct," she said. "In Hizbullah's history, it has never claimed responsibility for any operation against "Israel" or Jewish targets overseas."
Hizbullah will seek out a substantial target as a reflection of the importance of Moghnieh's importance to Hizbullah, Hanna said. "It's going to be big," Hanna said, because Moghnieh "is irreplaceable. He is a co-founder of Hizbullah.
"When you see [Iranian Foreign Minister] Manouchehr Mottaki in Lebanon attending the funeral, it tells you what the importance of this guy is."
The retaliation will probably not take place in Lebanon, as the Blue Line offers few appetizing targets and is now patrolled by a beefed-up UN peacekeeping force, Hanna said. "The dynamics of the South do not let Hizbullah wage an open war" there, he said.
Once Hizbullah hits back, Lebanon will have to face the consequences of the inevitable "Israeli" counter-strike, although the violence could amount to only a series of isolated intelligence operations, Hanna said.
"Maybe this will become a security war, tit for tat," Saad-Ghorayeb said, or it could erupt into a regional conflict involving other states. Saad-Ghorayeb pointed out Nasrallah's "unprecedented" vow that Moghnieh's death marks the beginning of a battle that will lead to the eradication of "Israel".
"That implies that Nasrallah is talking about ... a wider regional war," she said, adding that Hizbullah might have interpreted Moghnieh's killing as a desire on the part of "Israel" and the US to reignite a war against Hizbullah. In this context, Mottaki's presence at the funeral signals Iran's backing for whatever steps Hizbullah takes, she said.
"Mottaki's appearance was very important," she said. "It underlines the strategy and ideological relationship between Hizbullah and Iran. This lends support to whatever Nasrallah said and gives added support to Nasrallah's threats."
Hanna, on the contrary, said regional geopolitical strategy did not play a role in the timing of Moghnieh's assassination - an operation as complex as his killing is only part of the unceasing Hizbullah-"Israeli" war and not tied to any other messages or external factors.
"When you get the chance to hit, you hit," Hanna said.
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Commentary: Connecting the dots or how we could see a "Syrian Gulf of Tonkin"
While I do not agree with everything Hanna and Saad-Ghorayeb are saying they are correct in their assessment that Hezbollah's response is likely to trigger a war, possibly a major one. The question then is would such a war be in Hezbollah's interest?
The NIE is long gone and forgotten (after all, the new Indiana Jones has just been released!), the Republicans are likely to bite the dust, Olmert looks like a lame duck, the "Surge" in Iraq will sooner or later be discovered to be the abject failure it always was, the greenback is in free fall, the USA has just SNAFUed again in South America (Bolivia), the Russians dont' care in the least about the OSCE's rejection of the elections, Kosovo is about to blow up, Siniora, Abbas and Mubarak are clueless and desperate, Gaza is not showing any sign to imminently show great love for Fatah, the Russians are doubling their presence in Bushehr - wherever you look you can see signs of collapse of the Neocon dream of a new world order (again). For the Neocons, a big war in the Middle-East could provide the kind of "Gulf of Tonkin" pretext to simply remove all these issue from the political discourse and drawn it all in a wave of self-righteous patriotism.
I think that to provide such a pretext to the Empire would be a major mistake for Hezbollah whose leaders should remember two important facts:
1) High states of readiness are not sustainable over time
2) The longer a liberation war will be delayed, the weaker the Empire will be
Thus, Hezbollah and Iran should sit on their hands as long as possible. Still, that might not be enough.
In the current situation any terrorist act - whether "false flag" or real - will be attributed to Hezbollah and thus make an USraeli 'retaliation' seem legitimate in the eyes of the TV-watching public. Furthermore, the USraeli Empire can simply accuse Iran of assisting Hezbollah in whatever action Hezbollah is accused of taking and that, in turn, will justify both "preemptive" and "retaliatory" attacks on Iran.
I would be willing to bet that all this has already been choreographed in Jerusalem and Washington before Mughniyah was killed. Under those circumstances Hezbollah might also decide that since "retaliation" will happen anyway they might as well take the opportunity of a first shot. I guess that we will find out soon.
By Michael Bluhm
BEIRUT: Wednesday's assassination of Hizbullah senior commander Imad Moghnieh will spark a new round of violence in the region, as Hizbullah is certain to retaliate in spectacular fashion, thereby provoking further security fallout in Lebanon, a number of analysts told The Daily Star on Friday.
The aftershocks of Moghnieh's killing could even increase the chances for civil strife here, said Ahmad Moussalli, a professor of political science and Islamic studies at the American University of Beirut.
We are close to a major conflict," he said. "We are at a point of some kind of war. It's very dangerous. You will see Hizbullah hardening its [domestic] position, rather than softening."
Hizbullah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's words at Moghnieh's funeral on Thursday about an "open war" between Hizbullah and "Israel" were not a mere fulmination fueled by the moment, Moussalli added.
"It is a declaration of war, kind of," he said. "The whole ballgame now is different. I don't think it was just rhetoric and emotion. It's not just venting his anger."
On the other hand, Nasrallah's proclamation of an ongoing, open war represents only an explicit admission of the reality dating to the emergence of Hizbullah in late 1982 to fight against the "Israeli" occupation of South Lebanon, said retired General Elias Hanna, who teaches political science at Notre Dame University. For example, after Hizbullah's then-Secretary General Abbas Moussawi was assassinated by "Israeli" helicopters in February 1992, a car bomb killed 29 at the "Israeli" Embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992, although Hizbullah has never claimed responsibility for the attack.
"It never was a closed war," Hanna said. "It is not something new. There is no cease-fire. It was a declared war a long time ago. It's not one point out of context. It's a continuation of the same war."
Nasrallah's fiery language at the funeral in Rweiss was to be expected, as an effort to bolster spirits and guarantee the continuity of Moghnieh's work, Hanna added. "First, he is trying to keep the morale high [and] then to reassure the resistance Imad Moghnieh accomplished everything he was assigned to," Hanna said.
For Hizbullah, Moghnieh's assassination takes precedence over the maneuvering in the 15-month-old domestic political deadlock with the March 14 governing coalition, meaning the Shiite group will step away for some time from street protests or talks over the presidential vacuum, Hanna added. With all the political actors awaiting Hizbullah's response to the killing, the further direction of the political crisis "is in Hizbullah's hands - Mar Mikhael is secondary, the [presidential] election is secondary," Hanna said, referring to the investigation of the deaths of seven opposition supporters on January 27 in Beirut's Mar Mikhael-Shiyyah district.
Hizbullah will first focus on striking back at the Jewish state - which Hizbullah blames for the assassination - in a retaliatory attack on a meaningful target, said Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, visiting scholar at the Carnegie Middle East center. "It will deal a major blow to "Israel"," she said. "Hizbullah assumes that this is war. According to Hizbullah, the war is ongoing. It sees [the assassination] as part of the war."
Nasrallah's comments about "Israel" expanding that war "outside our natural battleground" by killing Moghnieh in Damascus were the most significant element of his speech, Saad-Ghorayeb said, as a signal that Hizbullah would act likewise.
"He was giving an advance claim of responsibility for an operation that Hizbullah will conduct," she said. "In Hizbullah's history, it has never claimed responsibility for any operation against "Israel" or Jewish targets overseas."
Hizbullah will seek out a substantial target as a reflection of the importance of Moghnieh's importance to Hizbullah, Hanna said. "It's going to be big," Hanna said, because Moghnieh "is irreplaceable. He is a co-founder of Hizbullah.
"When you see [Iranian Foreign Minister] Manouchehr Mottaki in Lebanon attending the funeral, it tells you what the importance of this guy is."
The retaliation will probably not take place in Lebanon, as the Blue Line offers few appetizing targets and is now patrolled by a beefed-up UN peacekeeping force, Hanna said. "The dynamics of the South do not let Hizbullah wage an open war" there, he said.
Once Hizbullah hits back, Lebanon will have to face the consequences of the inevitable "Israeli" counter-strike, although the violence could amount to only a series of isolated intelligence operations, Hanna said.
"Maybe this will become a security war, tit for tat," Saad-Ghorayeb said, or it could erupt into a regional conflict involving other states. Saad-Ghorayeb pointed out Nasrallah's "unprecedented" vow that Moghnieh's death marks the beginning of a battle that will lead to the eradication of "Israel".
"That implies that Nasrallah is talking about ... a wider regional war," she said, adding that Hizbullah might have interpreted Moghnieh's killing as a desire on the part of "Israel" and the US to reignite a war against Hizbullah. In this context, Mottaki's presence at the funeral signals Iran's backing for whatever steps Hizbullah takes, she said.
"Mottaki's appearance was very important," she said. "It underlines the strategy and ideological relationship between Hizbullah and Iran. This lends support to whatever Nasrallah said and gives added support to Nasrallah's threats."
Hanna, on the contrary, said regional geopolitical strategy did not play a role in the timing of Moghnieh's assassination - an operation as complex as his killing is only part of the unceasing Hizbullah-"Israeli" war and not tied to any other messages or external factors.
"When you get the chance to hit, you hit," Hanna said.
-------
Commentary: Connecting the dots or how we could see a "Syrian Gulf of Tonkin"
While I do not agree with everything Hanna and Saad-Ghorayeb are saying they are correct in their assessment that Hezbollah's response is likely to trigger a war, possibly a major one. The question then is would such a war be in Hezbollah's interest?
The NIE is long gone and forgotten (after all, the new Indiana Jones has just been released!), the Republicans are likely to bite the dust, Olmert looks like a lame duck, the "Surge" in Iraq will sooner or later be discovered to be the abject failure it always was, the greenback is in free fall, the USA has just SNAFUed again in South America (Bolivia), the Russians dont' care in the least about the OSCE's rejection of the elections, Kosovo is about to blow up, Siniora, Abbas and Mubarak are clueless and desperate, Gaza is not showing any sign to imminently show great love for Fatah, the Russians are doubling their presence in Bushehr - wherever you look you can see signs of collapse of the Neocon dream of a new world order (again). For the Neocons, a big war in the Middle-East could provide the kind of "Gulf of Tonkin" pretext to simply remove all these issue from the political discourse and drawn it all in a wave of self-righteous patriotism.
I think that to provide such a pretext to the Empire would be a major mistake for Hezbollah whose leaders should remember two important facts:
1) High states of readiness are not sustainable over time
2) The longer a liberation war will be delayed, the weaker the Empire will be
Thus, Hezbollah and Iran should sit on their hands as long as possible. Still, that might not be enough.
In the current situation any terrorist act - whether "false flag" or real - will be attributed to Hezbollah and thus make an USraeli 'retaliation' seem legitimate in the eyes of the TV-watching public. Furthermore, the USraeli Empire can simply accuse Iran of assisting Hezbollah in whatever action Hezbollah is accused of taking and that, in turn, will justify both "preemptive" and "retaliatory" attacks on Iran.
I would be willing to bet that all this has already been choreographed in Jerusalem and Washington before Mughniyah was killed. Under those circumstances Hezbollah might also decide that since "retaliation" will happen anyway they might as well take the opportunity of a first shot. I guess that we will find out soon.
Syria denies joint Syria/Iran/Hezbollah investigation
From the Palestinian Pundit blog:
"DAMASCUS, Syria - Syria denied Iranian claims that the two countries would conduct a joint investigation into the assassination of a top Hezbollah commander, the Syrian state news agency reported.
Imad Mughniyeh, who was one of the world's most wanted fugitives, was killed in a car bomb in the Syrian capital Tuesday night. He was accused of masterminding attacks that killed hundreds of Americans in Lebanon in the 1980s.
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Reza Sheik Attar announced the joint probe on Friday, according to Iran's official news agency.
But a Syrian official dismissed the report as "totally baseless" and said Damascus would conduct the investigation alone, Syria's state-run news agency reported late Friday. It did not name the official.....
Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki met with senior Syrian officials in Damascus on Thursday and Friday to discuss Mughniyeh's assassination. Attar said Friday that Iran and Syria agreed to the joint investigation during Mottaki's visit....."
***
This is rather interesting. Earlier it was announced that not only Iran, but also Hizbullah were involved in the investigation. For example Al-Jazeera reported this: Hezbollah security team in Syria.
It seems that the Syrian regime has something to hide; otherwise why not cooperate with Hizbullah and Iran?
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Commentary: ok, now things are getting clearer. Assad probably got a call from his bosses in Jerusalem or Washington and is now reneging on his promise. He must have received some security guarantees to take such a risky step and openly defy Iran and Hezbollah. From the sorry scumbag who sold out the PKK and Ocalan to the Turks such duplicity was to be expected: why not kill Mughniyah and backstab Hezbollah? Except that Mughniyah was not Ocalan and Hezbollah is not the PKK: Hezbollah can - and will - fight back and retaliate. Ditto for Iran. And if Assad really thinks that the Empire can help and protect him he is as stupid as he is duplicitous.
"DAMASCUS, Syria - Syria denied Iranian claims that the two countries would conduct a joint investigation into the assassination of a top Hezbollah commander, the Syrian state news agency reported.
Imad Mughniyeh, who was one of the world's most wanted fugitives, was killed in a car bomb in the Syrian capital Tuesday night. He was accused of masterminding attacks that killed hundreds of Americans in Lebanon in the 1980s.
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Reza Sheik Attar announced the joint probe on Friday, according to Iran's official news agency.
But a Syrian official dismissed the report as "totally baseless" and said Damascus would conduct the investigation alone, Syria's state-run news agency reported late Friday. It did not name the official.....
Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki met with senior Syrian officials in Damascus on Thursday and Friday to discuss Mughniyeh's assassination. Attar said Friday that Iran and Syria agreed to the joint investigation during Mottaki's visit....."
***
This is rather interesting. Earlier it was announced that not only Iran, but also Hizbullah were involved in the investigation. For example Al-Jazeera reported this: Hezbollah security team in Syria.
It seems that the Syrian regime has something to hide; otherwise why not cooperate with Hizbullah and Iran?
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Commentary: ok, now things are getting clearer. Assad probably got a call from his bosses in Jerusalem or Washington and is now reneging on his promise. He must have received some security guarantees to take such a risky step and openly defy Iran and Hezbollah. From the sorry scumbag who sold out the PKK and Ocalan to the Turks such duplicity was to be expected: why not kill Mughniyah and backstab Hezbollah? Except that Mughniyah was not Ocalan and Hezbollah is not the PKK: Hezbollah can - and will - fight back and retaliate. Ditto for Iran. And if Assad really thinks that the Empire can help and protect him he is as stupid as he is duplicitous.
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