El Murid: To the Militia, Eventual Victory is a Statement of Fact

Original: El Murid LiveJournal (Anatoliy Nesmeyanov)
Translated from Russian by Gleb Bazov

My status in Donetsk was entirely uncertain. Igor Ivanovich permitted me to be present virtually everywhere (with the exception of the places that were absolutely off bounds, and which I had no knowledge of in any event). Just in case, I was given a Paper that said pretty much the same thing – identity unknown, but assistance is compulsory.

All this enabled me to be really quite free in taking a look at everything within my reach. Mainly, it allowed me to speak freely with people of all ranks. And here my impression is entirely unequivocal – all these people are not simply certain of their victory, but also understand it in exactly the same way. All of them are sure that they will finish this war in Kiev. They say this without pathos and without slogans – they simply say it as a statement of fact. None of them have any doubts that this is how the war will end.

With respect to Russia, the opinions I encountered varied widely. If we were to generalize – they continue to hope for Russia’s aid, but no longer expect it. With respect to Crimea, the opinion of the vast majority was also quite solidary – all of them tend to think that Russia’s key mistake was that after Crimea it chose not to march on Kiev and did not close this matter once and for all when the Junta was still extremely weak.

At the same time, the image of the “Vatniks”, so cherished by the Maidan propaganda, on closer inspection turned out to be a myth. In the Militia there is a multitude of people with higher education. And these are not managers-lawyers, but techies and practicians. Strelkov’s aide is a math teacher; the favourite past time of his personal guard is not cards, but chess, and, in my amateur opinion, at a fairly high level. Although officers and commanders visually appear quite unpresentable, which is not surprising, given their daily field activities, their sound judgment and fairly decent knowledge of a multitude subjects would put to shame any Moscow or Kiev kreakl [Note: a Russianized portmanteau of the words “creative” and “class”, used primarily in a sarcastic manner].

In contrast to those who painstakingly create an image of the Militia as gangs of some kind of Vlasovtsy, the people that encountered spoke little of politics. Their personal views and preferences are hidden and subordinated to the main goal – winning this war. To them, all the rest is at this time absolutely irrelevant.

Strelkov has introduced awards and ranks – and he distributes them rather sparingly. Only the really heroic feats get recognized. At the same time, these awards have yet to find many of the heroes. It was literally during my trip to the border that my escort made attempts to call Donetsk and asked urgently to award a fighter that, over the course of three months of fighting, shot down 4 (four) enemy aircraft. As I understood, this was two helicopters, a drone and an airplane. For all of this he was given an award of a thousand hryvnia. My escort urged that the callsign of the fighter be recorded, so that he could be awarded the Cross of St. George.

In general, as it always happens in a Russian army, the shortages of everything are fully compensated for with regular everyday heroism. Commanders take care of their men, and any wounded becomes the concern of all. I cannot say that I saw everything, but here I am talking about my personal impressions.

I was also able to have a discussion with a Ukrainian serviceman. He was, in fact, Ukrainian military – a captain of the Ukrainian armed forces. I cannot say that he is a fanatical Banderovets, but he is absolutely sure that he is fighting Russia. He is not at all thrilled with the Kiev authorities, and he does not hide his attitude toward them, but he will obey his orders to the end. Perhaps this is an isolated fact, unsuitable for making far-reaching conclusions, but I had no other interaction with the Ukrainian military.

As for the common people, I can only say that they have gotten used to the war. Same as with every cataclysm. We stopped over in Torez and spoke to a local grandma who was carrying something to her daughter and grandson. She hates Kiev with all her heart. She hates the war and the Banderovtsy too. Considering that even in peacetime Torez looks like a ghost town, her fatalism is to some extent understandable. The war made the lives of these people dangerous, but their lives were hopeless even without war.

The militiamen at the checkpoint in Snezhnoye are by and large adults and serious men. Their hatred of Kiev and its butchers is almost palpable. The fact that they have taken up arms shows that they finally could not take it anymore. Almost every one of them has a grenade on the ready, which they consider to be their final argument. They entertain no possibility of surrender. There are also young woman and guys, but I think even they understand that this no longer is a play fight.

On one of the trips around the city and to the suburbs – in the direction of Maryinka – I was taken by a person who reads me and who volunteered his help. He is preparing to join the ranks of the Militia as soon as he puts his current affairs in order. He is not in good health, but he is ready to do any work that he is capable of.

There were also others who were more careful. More neutral, and sometimes even hostile to the DPR. They did not pour out their soul to me, but it was evident that they clearly did not support the new authorities. Nevertheless, I cannot say that I met many of them. Most live strictly in accordance with the famous song by Chaif, “Oy-yo” – On the TV they tell me how to live. I’ve had enough! It can’t be worse that it was before! – that is their main theme. Though it may well be that they are wrong.

The Extraordinary Importance of Strelkov and the Coming of the Banderite Caliphate—El Murid, August 9, 2014

Original: El Murid LiveJournal (Anatoliy Nesmeyanov)Translated from Russian by Gleb Bazov / Edited by @GBabeuf

Over the course of my stay in Donetsk I saw nothing that was markedly different from what is publicly known. Up close, however, many things certainly appeared completely different in detail.

When the Slavyansk Brigade came to Donetsk, almost immediately the question of cooperation among the units gathered in the city was raised. Two paths were evident: the creation of a centralized hierarchical command, or the establishment of a kind of 'Shura'—a council of commanders. The first option was fraught with the danger of a civil war within a civil war; the second one immediately made the process of creating an army a long-term affair.

The commanders chose the second path, especially since I did not observe any of them to have any particular disagreements with Strelkov. The question of the Vostok Battalion and Khodakovskiy was treated separately, although, as I understand it, a solution to this issue was also found.

At this moment in time, the Militia of Donetsk is comprised of three large brigades: the Slavyansk Brigade and the Oplot and Vostok Battalions. Apart from these, there are several self-sufficient militarized structures, such as police units. Among them all there is complete coordination and cooperation. The representatives of the Vostok Battalion categorically abstain from attending joint meetings; however, in spite of this, Strelkov has a mechanism for coordinating actions even with them—right in front of me, literally five minutes after getting disinformation concerning an attack on Yasinovataya by ten tanks [of the Ukrainian Army], Strelkov received information from Vostok that there were not ten, but three tanks, and, even so, that one of them was burned out, while the rest had retreated. Apart from the Donetsk military formations, there is an almost entirely self-sufficient unit commanded by Bezler; however, here also there are no problems of cooperation or coordination.

The system works quite effectively, even though certain problems naturally do exist. The independence of the Oplot and Vostok Battalions is due, first and foremost, to their independent supply channels. These units are practically independent from Strelkov also in this aspect; however, even in this regard, when the need arises, they manœuvre [and share] their available resources in the interest of their common struggle—all without any problems. Overall, the process of building the DPR [Donetsk People's Republic] Army is following a path that is fairly traditional in similar situations. It can be said that, at this stage, the most operationally capable management structure has been found.

Nonetheless, this structure has its weak link. The council of commanders recognizes Strelkov as their Commander-in-Chief; moreover, I noticed that this acceptance is unconditional. Although he is merely a first among equals, his role in the organization is extraordinarily important. And that is why the persistent efforts of the Moscow Nazis [Note: reference to Kurginyan and his sectarians, whose media attacks on Strelkov benefit the Ukrainian Junta] appear exceedingly dangerous from all points of view. In view of the chosen organizational form of command, there is no one else that the commanders will agree to subordinate to.

It may well be that the well-known political analyst [Note: Kurginyan] and his pro-Nazi sect nourish the hope that, by removing Strelkov and installing at the head of the Militia a commander controlled by them, following victory they will gain the right to construct a simulacrum of themselves in Novorossiya. The problem is that there is no visible path to victory in such a scenario—the Militia will never subordinate itself to anyone else. The breakdown of the control structure would be inevitable, and then, in order to restore at least some control, war would have to be waged between former allies. In this case, the result of such infighting looks quite problematic for the Moscow Nazis—it is the Slavyansk Brigade that is the most powerful force in the Militia. Nevertheless, all of this still does not change the fact that [Kurginyan’s] sect operates strictly in the interests of Kiev.

More likely than not, the Moscow oligarchs that sent the fulminating political analyst to Donetsk see the situation in the correct light and hope, by removing Strelkov, finally to bury the idea of Novorossiya—followed by a coup in Moscow. It is difficult to tell whether the 'Guru of Treason' understands this. It may be that he is being used without his knowledge [Gleb: Yes, and my right foot is green, while the left one changes colour daily...].

One way or another—but any attempts to create problems for the Militia by undermining the current command structure will at this stage lead to a defeat. Essentially, this is the main thing that I finally was convinced of in Donetsk.

It is true that an army built on the basis of oral agreements is not, strictly speaking, an army. And the need to establish a fully-fledged command structure, which is not dependent on the identity of the Commmander-in-Chief, will inevitably arise. At this time, however, there are not the slightest prerequisites for this to happen. The value of the DPR’s political component today is at best zero, if not negative. The construction of a fully-fledged political and economic management system has, so far, been unsuccessful. The constant shuffling of premiers and deputy premiers is the best evidence of this fact. This structure is only beginning to be formed; appropriate candidates are being identified, base principles of the DPR’s political programme are being formulated.

And that is precisely why even an army based on oral agreement is the only structure that provides the necessary stability to the DPR. Undermining this army by discrediting its Commander-in-Chief and the targeted attacks on him by corrupt politicians and their insane sectarians represent deliberate attempts to destroy the entire idea of the Donbass uprising. At this time, there is no other way to characterize or understand these assaults on Strelkov.

Kurginyan: Let him tell me why he surrendered the city!        Strelkov: Why don't you go and fight yourself?                   Kurginyan: I better stay here, on the couch.

I say this not because I am acquainted with him or because I experience feelings of friendship for him—in this case, all such considerations are absolutely irrelevant. There is an entirely objective situation that dictates its own rules of engagement. Essentially, I returned to Moscow now, and not later, because the danger posed by these attacks is currently exceedingly high. Their intensity is increasing, and there are signs of this not only in the public domain. I did not come alone, and we will try to convey this message to the highest of offices and to the widest possible audience. At the moment, this is what is most important.

At the same time, the military prospects of the DPR at this time I would characterize as clearly 'non-zero' [Note: i.e. positive]. Kiev does not appear to have any strategy to suppress the uprising that would generate results in the short term. A war of attrition would be ruinous for Novorossiya—particularly in a context where Russian aid remains largely symbolic in nature and manifests itself primarily as humanitarian and private deliveries.

Even so, Kiev also does not have a wide berth for manœuvre in such a field—its situation appears no longer just critical, but catastrophic. The solution may become a coup and the establishment of an openly Nazi military dictatorship, which would then crush any and all unrest in the territory of Ukraine, enabling it to continue the war in the previous format even in the context of a complete collapse.

Whether or not the Europeans would risk giving the go-ahead for the creation of such a state is a difficult question to answer. So far, Poroshenko’s regime, despite all its pro-Nazi orientation, still appears to the West to be fairly controllable. However, the creation of a Banderite 'Caliphate' in the middle of Europe could completely change the situation on the continent—just as the situation in the Middle East was transformed by the creation of the ISIS 'Caliphate', which completely unshackled itself from its creators.

At the same time, the United States may well go along with this course of events—it does not scare them in the least. And that is why the likelihood of a coup in Kiev and the coming to power of radicals is quite high.