Strait History and Iran’s Options

by Soraya Sepahpour-Ulrich

George Santayana wisely said: “"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." Oblivious to history and its lessons, America and its Western allies are repeating their actions of the 1950’s -- that of imposing an oil embargo on Iran. The American-led alliance has forgotten the past.

Iran remembers.

When under the leadership of the nationalist Dr. Mossadegh, Iran opted to nationalize its oil industry, the British Royal Navy blocked Iran’s oil exports to forcefully prevent if from nationalizing its oil. In retaliation to Iran’s nationalistic ambitions, and to punish Iran for pursuing its national interests, the British instigated a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil.

In the 1950’s, Iran did not have the military might to retaliate to the oil embargo and the naval blockade was aimed at crushing the economy in order to bring about regime change. The subsequent events is described in The New York Times1 article as a “lesson in the heavy cost that must be paid” when an oil-rich Third World nation “goes berserk with fanatical nationalism.” Iran learnt that sovereignty and nationalism necessitate tactical/military strength and determination.

Not heeding the aftermath of the 1950’s, the American-led Western allies have once again imposed an oil embargo on Iran. In retaliation, Iran has drafted a bill to stop the flow of oil through its territorial waters – the Strait of Hormuz, to countries which have imposed sanctions against it. This bill is not without merit and contrary to the previous oil embargo, it would appear that Tehran has the upper hand and the heavy cost associated with the embargo will not be borne by Iran alone.

Iran’s Legal Standing 

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that vessels can exercise the right of innocent passage, and coastal states should not impede their passage. Although Iran has signed the Treaty, the Treaty was not ratified, as such, it has no legal standing. However, even if one overlooks the non-binding signature, under UNCLOS framework of international law, a coastal state can block ships from entering its territorial waters if the passage of the ships harms “peace, good order or security” of said state, as the passage of such ships would no longer be deemed “innocent”2.

Even if Iran simply chooses to merely delay the passage of tankers by exercising its right to inspect every oil-tanker that passes through the Strait of Hormuz, these inspections and subsequent delays would maintain or contribute to higher oil prices. While higher oil prices would benefit Iran and other oil-producing countries, they would further destabilize the European economy which is already in crisis.

The Military Option 

Although American-led Western allies are flexing their muscles by sending battle ships to the Persian Gulf, Washington’s own war game exercise, The Millennium Challenge 2002 with a price tag of $250 million, underscored America’s inability to defeat Iran. Oblivious to the lesson of its own making, by sending more warships to the Persian Gulf, the United States is inching towards a full scale conflict. The inherent danger from the naval buildup is that unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis, the forces in the Persian Gulf are not confined to two leaders who would be able to communicate to stop a run-away situation. Nor would the consequences of such a potential conflict be limited to the region.

Given that 17 million barrels of oil a day, or 35% of the world’s seaborne oil exports go through the Strait of Hormuz, incidents in the Strait would be fatal for the world economy. While only 1.1 millions barrels per day goes to the United States, a significant amount of this oil is destined for Europe. Surely, one must ask why the United States demands that its “European allies” act contrary to their own national interest, pay a higher price for oil by boycotting Iranian oil and running the risk of Iran blocking the passage of other oil-tankers destined for them?

Again, history has the straight answer. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the United States and not the oil-producing countries has used oil as a weapon. Some examples include the pressure the United States put on Britain in the 1920s to share its oil concessions in the Middle East with U.S. companies. Post World War II, the United States violated the terms of the 1928 Red Line Agreement freezing the British and the French out of the Agreement.

In 1956, the United States made it clear to Britain and France that no oil would be sent to Western Europe unless the two aforementioned countries agreed to a rapid withdrawal from Egypt. The U.S. was not opposed to the overthrow of Nasser, but as Eisenhower said: “Had they done it quickly, we would have accepted it"3.

Demonstrably, although Europe is a major trade partner of the United States, the U.S. does not concern itself with Europe’s well being when it comes to executing its foreign policy. This should come as no surprise, especially since the United States sacrifices its own national interest to promote the Israeli agenda and that of the military industrial complex. But this does not explain why Europe would shoot itself in the foot at a time when its economical woes have passed the crisis point.

It is possible that the leaders of Western European countries are beholden to special interest groups – the pro-Israel lobbies, as the United States is, or they believe Iran will not call their bluff by ratifying the bill passed by Majlis and their oil will be delivered unhindered; perhaps both. Either way, they are committing financial suicide and their demise may well come before Iran’s resolve is shaken.

Soraya Sepahpour-Ulrich is a Public Diplomacy Scholar, independent researcher and blogger with a focus on U.S. foreign policy and the role of lobby groups.
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1 THE IRANIAN ACCORD”, The New York Times, Aug 6,1954, cited by S. Shalom

2 Martin Wahlisch, The Yale Journal of International Law, March 2012, citing UNCLOS, supra note 12, , art. 19, para1, and art. 25, para1. 

3 Stephen Shalom; The Iran-Iraq War citing Kennett Love, Suez: the Twice-Fought War, New York: McGraw Hill, 1969, p. 651 

Saker comment:

My good friend Soraya is making a lot of very interesting points, in particular one which is wholly overlooked by the corporate media: that Iran's legal position about the what constitutes "innocent passage" is rock solid.  Check out what Article 19 of Section 3 of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea actually says:

1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international law.
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activities:

(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.

Interesting, no?  All the US saber-rattling and assorted threats against Iran would, in fact, legally allow Iran to prevent the passage of US ships through the strait.  Of course, considering the wholesale disregard and systematic violation of pretty much any and all forms of international law by the US and Israel such legal trivialities will make no difference to them.  The only thing that will matter them is whether or not Iran can shut down the Strait of Hormuz or not.  Unlike most observers, I do not believe it can.   As for the 2002 Millennium Challenge exercise, it was a very controversial exercise designed to validate concept of network centric warfare and not a rehearsal of actual US strike plans on Iran.  Furthermore, from a military point of view any military exercise in which the "good" sides "looses" is a perfect opportunity to learn the important lessons before the real shooting begins.  It would be foolish to expect the USN to attack Iran exactly according to the main lines of a scenario it fully knows will results in a defeat.  In fact, we can be darn sure that having learned all the lessons from that exercise the USN will strike in a very different manner than what was tested already a full decade ago.

I agree that Iran would have the full right to shut down the strait to any vessel deemed in violation of the UNCLOS, and I agree that Iran would be able to shut down the Strait if Hormuz, but what I don't believe in is Iran's capability to maintain the Strait closed for a extended period of time.  Finally, I am also very concerned that any Iranian move to close down the Strait of Hormuz would offer the Zionists a perfect pretext to further demonize Iran and paint it as an enemy of the rest of mankind.

As I wrote in 2007 in my piece Iran's asymmetrical response options, I believe that Iran better asymmetrical responses than closing down the Strait of Hormuz (the 2007 article is in some aspects dated today - in particular in what regards US deployments in Iraq and the Gulf - but its basic rationale still holds, I believe) which could be summed up as "the strategic version of Hezbollah's tactics in 2006": ride out the strikes and reply with missiles on US regional targets.

FYI: here is what shipping in the SOH looks on a typical day (click on image for full size) - already chaotic without any missiles flying; just imagine the panic which would result from any US strike on Iran even without the Iranians taking defensive action at all.

Shipping density in the SOH on 7/5/2012

US "mega base" at Al Udeid, Qatar: an ideal target?

OPERATION “FIRE SWARM”

by General Fabio Mini

Anyone who thought that the green light for the Israeli-American attack against Iran would come from the American Congress, was wrong. Equally wrong were those who thought that a president like Bush, so frustrated by the Iraqi chaos, the Afghan deadlock and the industrial lobbies’ pressures, would wind up making the decision on his own. The attack against Iran will take place thanks to the newly-appointed French Foreign Minister Kouchner. In these years of threats and counter-threats, of pretexts to make war, the only “revealing” words have been those from the laconic phrase “we must prepare ourselves for the worst.” Many have taken these words as a slip of the lip, others have regarded them as a bad luck-dispelling provocation, others as an instigation and still others as a submission to an ineluctable event. It could be that the sentence contains all of this, but the profound essence of Kouchner’s words is different.

Strange connections and affinities have come into being in these last 15 years of worldwide military interventions of different kinds. Armies have been integrated with private soldiers, visionaries with mercenaries, business with ideology, and truth has gotten so imbued with lies that the propaganda’s logic can’t account for either. And one of the most unusual connections is the one that has been established between military staff, humanitarian workers and foreign policy, to such an extent that each of the three components can pass itself off as the other two. The main cement of this union is the emergency concept. Foreign politics has lost its nature of continuity in the relations between states and in the sphere of international organizations. It has been devoting itself for a while to running emergency relations, meaning extemporaneous relations connected to temporary and changeable interests or positions that are transitory and changeable to variable geometries.

At the end of the day, emergency politics is the only kind that allows a limited and selective commitment. Moreover, it can be done or undone at one’s will, since the dimension of the emergency can be manipulated or interpreted. Following the same manner of reasoning, the armies of these last 15 years have exclusively devoted themselves to emergency situations, preferably abroad and for so-called humanitarian reasons, in order to guarantee themselves consensus and support. There are no longer any armies able to defend their own territories or to provide defence in case of war. It’s increasingly difficult to find a state threatened with war by another state and today all the world’s armies rely on a minimum 12-month notice allowing them to mobilise the resources for national defence. Therefore, they have become specialized in emergency in the respect of both the kind and the timing of the interventions.

When Kouchner candidly states that we “must prepare ourselves for the worst” he simply interprets a philosophy which doesn’t have as its objective the searching for the best, less traumatic solution, but which instead calls on the political class to manage the emergency, the military means and the humanitarian organizations which have by now become inseparable. It’s also about the recognition of the political class’s incapacity itself to think of and find enduring solutions. It is about the military instruments and their incapacity in managing conflict situations until their complete stabilization, and the incapacity of the humanitarian organizations in settling the problems of the people in more long-term perspective than the one offered by emergency. Finally, Kouchner also admits that the summation of these incapacities leads inevitably to war.

Then, war it will be.

It’s obvious that, under these conditions, some exaggerations are required in order to assure the accomplishment of the emergency and the intervention of the various components: something has to happen: ­what the observers call the “trigger”­ so that it may provoke the political emergency, there has to be an immediate danger for the security of everyone and a humanitarian catastrophe has to be in sight (the bigger, the better). There has to be, in other words, a manageable apparatus capable of “inventing” the emergency, as well inventing its conclusion that will allow disengagement and the end of the commitment whether or not there has been any solution of these problems. The attack against Iran falls perfectly within this scenario and, looking at it carefully, it’s by now a nearly completed picture.

There are multiple pretexts available for the attack.

The idea that Iran intends upon developing a nuclear bomb and to destroy Israel is by now widely recognized by everyone. What’s missing are confirmations and evidence beyond poor empty boasting, but in the past we have witnessed terroristic boasting that has at any rate, come about and nobody is willing to run the risk of underestimating it, not even for truth’s sake. An Iranian or Iranian-supported attack against the American forces in Iraq, this too without a scrap of proof, has started to persuade even the most sceptical people. Sooner or later, after much speaking about it and evoking it, it will be taken as an invitation or a challenge and it will really be carried out. The support Iran gives to Hamas and Hezbollah makes Teheran extremely vulnerable. An excess or mistake by one of these formations is sufficient to set off an immediate military intervention.

The foreign policy of the most major nations, Europe included, is by now used to the idea that a military intervention is able to bring Iran back to the positions it was in 20 years ago. Moreover, what’s starting to be accepted is the idea that the purpose isn’t only that of preventing a nuclear power from rising but also that of terminating the country as a regional player which embodies oil and strategic interests in every part of south central Asia.

Regarding the military planning aspect, everything has already been prepared for a while. The plans for the attack date back to 1979, at the time of the US embassy crisis, and they have been updated with new technologies and strategies ever since. The thesis that it’s about an attack basically aimed at the atomic installations with no collateral damage for the civil population is only a miserable fantasy from those who have by now become used to telling lies. Even the idea that it may be restricted to Iranian soil is suspicious to say the least, since the end of the stubbornness and the boastfulness of the Ayatollahs, on one side, and by the Israeli-Americans, on the other, has to do with interests and ambitions which go far beyond the Persian Gulf.

Whatever the kind of attack it may be, it will produce heavy military and civil casualties regardless of whether or not a nuclear emergency fall-out or a radiation leak is triggered. Any kind of attack must have as its premise the destruction of defence structures: air and missile bases, deposits, mobile ramps, military ports, naval units, radars and anti-aircraft artilleries, land and armoured units, communication and command headquarters will have to be eliminated before or during the attack against the nuclear installations.

Many of these structures are located near the most densely populated areas. Even taking into account the most sophisticated cruise missiles, the “intelligent” bombs directed against the targets by the Israeli and American commandos, who have already been operative for some time in Iran, a quite high margin of collateral effects remains. Were mini nuclear fission bombs or neutron bombs to be used instead of the conventional “bunker busting” bombs, the damage percentage might rise, even thought not as greatly as many expect.

Also the thesis that precise attacks may be carried out with only one component, the aerial and missile one, is a deception. A complex operation, as they say they want to realize, that aims at bringing the Iranian bellicose potential back to the stone age, requires multiple attack actions, with many forces, from many directions and in short lapses of time in order to prevent, as colonel Boyd used to say, any capability of decision, reaction and counter-strategy by the enemy. The multiple action has to also prevent the direct retaliation by the Iranian air and naval forces against the oil installations and cargos in the Persian and Oman Gulfs. It has to neutralise the missile threats against the American military bases in Central Asia and the Middle East. It has to prevent indirect Iranian strategic operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, the Caucasus area and anywhere else a Shia may represent trouble. Moreover, Teheran controls the northern coast of the Hormuz Straits and closing this seaway to oil cargos might cause oil prices to skyrocket to levels between 200 and 400 dollars per barrel. The same would happen if Iran turned sabotage actions and bombings against the oil installations of other countries in the area.

The military strategy of the attack against Iran can’t therefore be entrusted to a surgical attack or to one single component. It can be nothing but that of “Swarm Warfare” (or Horde Warfare), unearthed by Arquilla and Ronfeld after the unmatchable realization by Gengis Khan. In modern terms, this strategy makes all the components of war­land operative, naval, air, missile, space, virtual and information ones­ on multiple settings and levels. To achieve all this, it’s necessary that the “swarm” of the various components and actions, which develop by focusing on one place and then by spreading to other directions and places, be are at least sufficient enough in order to prevent any sort of reaction. The hordes entrusted with destroying the targets materially have to get integrated and to focus on targets along with the virtual hordes of diplomatic actions, of psychological warfare and with those of the manipulation of information.

The military actions have to be aimed at creating a humanitarian emergency that allows the international organizations to intervene in Iranian territory. Obviously, the responsibility for the catastrophe must be pinned on the Iranians themselves. Even in this respect, everything is ready or practically ready, not least after Kouchner’s exhortation. International agencies and NGOs are already looking forward to going to Iran to set women free from their chadors. If they are given the chance to intervene so as to gather refugees, to treat the wounded, to do the counts of the dead and to call elections every month, there will be a rush to bring democracy to Iran.

This scenario’s complexity shouldn’t lead one to think that it’s necessary to deploy a huge amount of forces. The Israeli and American flight formations’ bombing capacities are so high that they can cover multiple targets with a limited amount of jets. The naval missiles are by now technological weapons that don’t require mass interventions to carry out precise or wide-scale destruction. If anything, the variety of the plans and the kinds of intervention will bring about coordination, command and control problems, yet nothing out of the ordinary. The US and Israel have been cooperating for half a century and the matters of pseudo-authorizations from third countries about flying over or troops’ transit are by now overcome both by political accords with concerned countries and by the two powers’ inclination to ignore any objections.

What remains is the serious and important unknown of the post-emergency. The doubt about the future of a state which retains imperial origins and outlooks and which finds itself being turned from “rogue state” into “loser state” and being regarded as a political and strategic black hole after having been considered as aspiring to the role of regional power. Deep uncertainty remains not so much for the reaction to the defeat or the reduction of its aspirations but for the reaction to the humiliation. What can’t be ruled out is just what they want to avoid, that is, Iran’s nuclearization, still to be proved and implemented, which might instead be favoured with the help of foreign powers as a reaction to the humiliation.
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Originally published (in Italian) by the Expresso Republica and later translated into English by Diego Traversa and Mary Rizzo and published by Tlaxcala

Iran's asymmetrical response options

By Vineyard Saker - an Axis of Logic exclusive

International public opinion is clearly worried about the prospects of a US aggression against Iran and many observers point to the risk to the world economy, of an Iranian attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz. Some also fear that Iran might sink a US aircraft carrier using some combination of missiles, submarines and small attack craft. It also is often suggested that Israel could become the first victim of such an Iranian counter-attack and that Iran could “rain missiles on Israel”. To be sure, most of these are possible Iranian responses, as unlikely as this may be. However, there are good reasons to doubt that the Iranian leadership would choose to respond to a US attack in that way.

One of the Planet's Most Vital Waterways, the Strait of Hormuz Has Iran on One Side, and the Gulf States of the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the Other.

The Strait of Hormuz Option

First, let's consider the “Strait of Hormuz” option. In a previous article called How they might do it, I outlined how the Pentagon could try to wage war on Iran while preventing the Iranians from shutting down the Strait of Hormuz:

"The first phase would begin by 2-3 days of combined cruise missile and air strikes. The aim would be to degrade, as much as possible, Iranian C3I capabilities and more importantly, to isolate the Iranian coastal areas from the main command centers and resupply routes. This degradation of Iranian air defense capabilities would be followed by intense bombardments and strikes all along the Iranian coast and the straight of Hormuz, combined with an effort to destroy all Iranian Kilo-class, advanced diesel, attack submarines. It's reasonable to expect "boots on the ground" *before* this phase will have been completed: U.S. Marines forces with Navy and Air Force Forward Air Controllers would land at key positions along the coast and surround pockets of resistance. Once beachheads have been secured, US Army troops would land heavy equipment and establish forward bases. The end goal of this first phase would be to control (but not necessarily occupy) most (but not necessarily all) of the Iranian coast, with the hope of protecting the Persian-Arabian Sea lines of communications from a threat of Iranian attack. This goal would need to be reached within 4-6 weeks to achieve the desired effect."

Once enough counter-battery capabilities have been concentrated along the coast (and to a depth of about 10-20km depending on terrain) and once Iranian active/passive detection capabilities have been sufficiently degraded, the USA could announce that the sea lanes are safe, open and protected from any further strikes.

The second phase would include strikes at the "national infrastructure" (read: terrorizing the civilian population into submission with the invader’s hope that the people would revolt against their leaders) and proactive support for various anti-government forces (Kurds, etc.) and an air/land/sea blockade against the remaining part of Iran. This second phase could be sustained for a very long time. In another article entitled Pentagon plans according to Scott Ritter (and the Saker), I added:

"The Strait of Hormuz is indeed narrow, and Iran does have mines and missiles capable of striking tankers in the strait. Iran also has very good Kilo-class Russian submarines which, in many ways, are better suited to coastal and 'green water' operations than AmericanSSNs. The problem is targeting: in terms of weapon- reach, the Strait of Hormuz is tiny, in terms of targeting it is huge."

To deploy mines Iran can use either small craft or submarines. The US Navy is, however, more than capable of finding and destroying such mine-laying craft. Missiles need to be fed targeting data, you cannot just shoot them across the strait and hope to hit a tanker, and in the event of an attack, this is exactly where the US Navy will lay down a huge electronic warfare blanket on the entire waterway combining both electronic countermeasures (such as jamming) and strikes (with anti-radiation missiles). Lastly, the Iranians could use coastal artillery (anything fromMRL to dug-in artillery positions). This is were the 17000 Navy Personnel currently sitting off the Persian coast come in: by physically taking over key sections of the Iranian coast and a number of islands in the strait, the US Navy would hope to make it much harder for the Iranians to close down the traffic. Once the strait is declared "safe", the Empire could then take its time to beat the Iranian "regime" (in US parlance all the governments not controlled by the White House are "regimes") into surrender or, as the Neocons always hope, to trigger a popular revolt against the "Mullahs" (again, US parlance for anybody inside the Iranian government).

This strategy would “work” in a narrow sense: it would keep the sea lines of communications (SLOC) open. In a broader sense however, I think that this strategy is based on a number of mistaken assumptions, two of the main ones are the probable length of the conflict and the likely Iranian responses to a US aggression. I will return to this issue in a moment, but first let us look at the other two options which seem to worry so many pundits in the West.

Attacking a U.S. Carrier

Could Iran really sink a US carrier? To answer this question we need to remember what the US Navy's strategy was during the Cold War.

U.S. War Ships off the coast of Iran, May, 2007

Among other things, the US had decided that in case of war with the Soviet Union in Europe it was important, in fact crucial, to protect the SLOCs across the Atlantic and that in order to do that US aircraft carrier battle groups would need to be positioned in the North Atlantic, right across the (then) Soviet Kola Peninsula. The basic goal of this strategy was to “bring the fight to the Soviets” and to prevent them from flushing their submarines down into the Atlantic. This strategy would have required the US Navy to station its aircraft carrier within striking distance of Soviet supersonic bombers armed with advanced supersonic cruise missile (equipped with either conventional or even nuclear warheads). It was assumed that these bombers would be guided by AWACS aircraft and lurking submarines (themselves armed with deadly anti-ship cruise missiles and powerful torpedoes) and protected by long range advanced interceptors like the MiG-31 andSU -27. Lastly, it was also assumed that the Soviets would have the use of various kinds of satellites which would make it possible for them to track US naval forces. In other words, the US Navy trained for literally decades for an environment far more dangerous than anything the Iranians could ever hope to muster.

Truth be told, as a military analyst, I personally always considered this strategy to be utter folly - the kind of typical imperial hubris of the Reagan era, and so did many other analysts (including in the US Navy itself). Many told me, off the record, that saturation attacks by Soviet bombers had been simulated and that these simulations had consistently shown how vulnerable the US carriers would have been, had such a forward-deployed strategy actually been implemented. Some added that the US Navy commanders were not stupid and that such a strategy would never actually have been used in case of war. But politics and warfare are two very different arts, and at least officially the US Navy was planning to do just that and therefore, it practiced for this type of high-risk environment. A lot. So unless the US Navy is ordered to do something really insane, there is simply no way that the Iranians could come anywhere near theUSN's high value ships (which would be kept well away from the Iranian cost or the Strait of Hormuz itself anyway). The entire idea of Iran sinking a US carrier is in the realm of fantasy, not real naval warfare.

Rain of Missiles on Israel

That leaves the “rain of missiles on Israel” option. I would not totally discount the possibility of Iran sending a couple of missiles at TelAviv in retaliation for any Israeli participation in a US aggression on their country. This, however, would be a purely symbolic political gesture, and not a war fighting strategy. The Iranians fully understand that no military or political advantage could result for them from inflicting heavy damage or casualties on Israel. Simply put, Iran is not Hezbollah and Iran does have the sheer number of missiles which Hezbollah had last summer (and still has nowadays). For Hezbollah, shooting short range Katusha missiles on Israel made perfectly good sense as it forced the population of the northern third of the country to either hide in shelters of flee their homes, thereby extracting a heavy economic and political price from the Israelis for their war on Lebanon. Iran, in contrast, does not have the same number of missiles capable of firing into Israel and its missiles would be far better used elsewhere (more about that in a moment).

Hezbollah, of course, could start firing its many missiles at Israel just as it did last summer and it is certain that if Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah AliKhamenei made this request, Hezbollah would act on it: it is often mistakenly claimed that the spiritual leader of Hezbollah is Sayyid Hussein Fadlallah. That is not so. Hezbollah is a general movement and its Secretary General, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, in particular, are followers of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. They recognize him, and not Fadlallah, as the real supreme religious authority. However, it is my guess that Iranian leaders would keep such an option in store, if only because they have a choice of several far more effective options.

Broadly speaking, we see the Neocon Empire has having two options in an attack on Iran:

1. A short, limited, attack on some Iranian nuclear and government installations. The goals of that kind of attack would be solely political: to appear to have “done something”, give the despondent Americans and Israelis some flags to wave, to “show resolve” and “send a firm message” - the kind of State Department nonsense. If lucky, they could hope to kill some Iranian leaders (although what exactly that would achieve isanyone's guess). Lastly, it would punish the Iranians for their “bad behavior”.
   
   
2. A more significant military attack, which could not be limited to an air campaign and one which would have to include at least some insertion of ground forces. That would be similar to the strategy outlined in my How they might do it article. The goal of this option would be radically different from the first one:

“to punish the Iranian population for its support of ‘the Mullahs’ (as the expression goes in the USA) via the ballot box. This is exactly the same logic which brought the Israelis to hammer all of Lebanon with bombs, missiles and mines – the same logic by which they killed over 500 people in Gaza - the same logic by which the U.S. bombed all ofr Serbia and Montenegro and the same logic which explains the bizarre embargo of Cuba. The message here is: if you support the bad guys, you will pay for it.”

Iran's response to a US attack would depend upon their analysis of the kind of attack to which they would be subjected in either scenario. The first option (a limited attack on Iran) has strong escalation-inhibiting factors built into it. It would offer the empire the ability of dramatically increasing the pace and nature of its operations against Iran with the second option. If the U.S. began with the second option, the only secondary response it would have would be the use of nuclear weapons. I will address the nuclear option last.

Iranian responses to a short, limited US/Israeli attack

Keeping in mind these two very different situations, let us now look at possible Iranian responses. There are two basic defensive strategies in any situation: denial and punishment. Denial is trying to prevent the enemy from hitting his targets, while punishment is simply payback for any attack.

In the case of a short and limited US/Israeli attack on Iran, the best option for Iran would be paradoxical: to ride out the attack and do nothing besides loud declarations of outrage. Certainly, the Iranians would have to try to use the “denial' response as best they could. For example, use of their (limited) air defenses or the capture of US forward air controllers would have their respective effects! Such action would be similar to what the Serbs did in Bosnia and would not represent more than a nuisance for the Imperial forces.

US already under siege in Iraq: As I write this the US forces in Iraq are already under siege in most of the country. The siege has been particularly effective in Sunni areas of Iraq where the Sunni insurgency has been very successful in its military operations against the occupation forces and its allies. In the Shia areas, there has been relative calm but tremendous tension. Moqtada al-Sadr has refused to be baited by the numerous US attempts to draw the Mahdi Army into a confrontation. In the Basra area the heavily protected US supply lines have been left open by the local Shia population. That, of course, could change overnight. Moqtada al-Sadr has already declared that his Mahdi Army would attack the US forces in Iraq in case of an attack against Iran. There can be no doubt that the Badr Brigades which, unlike the Mehdi Army, are truly extensions of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, would also join the Mehdi and Sunni forces into an all out “Yankee hunt”. By comparison, such a maneuver would make the current plight of the US forces seem like a vacation. In such a case, the US resupply lines from Kuwait would be either severely disrupted or totally severed and the US forces in Central Iraq would be cut-off from their main logistical lifeline. The Green Zone and the Baghdad Airport would turn into a bunker under siege and the “surged” US forces would spend most of their time in a totally defensive posture, doing their best to avoid being overrun. Again, for all this to happen the Iranians would not need to do anything at all other than express outrage at being attacked.

Weakness of a limited attack: The primary conceptual weakness of the “short and limited” option is the absence of any viable exit strategy and no clearly defined outcome. The obvious “okay, now that we've bombed the Iranians, what do we do next?” question receives no answer as there would be no incentive whatsoever for the Iranians to do anything at all including no incentive to comply with any official Imperial demands. The US cannot simply bomb Iranian nuclear objectives and some government offices and then expect the Iranians to promise to stop enriching uranium. Even the blindly arrogant Neocons cannot be that naive. Such a limited and short attack would only strengthen the resolve of the Iranian leaders and general population to resist any kind of Imperial demands.

Iranians are tough: A short digression is in order here to restate a well-known, but still often overlooked fact: the Iranians are extremely tough people. Once again, history is the teacher. During the Iran-Iraq war the Iranians, even though their country had been very shaken up by a bloody revolution and much internal turmoil, successfully resisted not only against Iraq, but against all the other countries whose bidding was being executed by Saddam Hussein at that time. The Iraqis had access to US, Soviet and French weapons, to Saudi money, to US satellite data, to US and Israeli intelligence reports while the Iranians were essentially fighting only with their courage, native intelligence and numbers. This war killed more than a million people, most on the Iranian side, but the Iranians still obtained a stalemate. There is exactly nothing the Empire can throw at them today with would “frighten” them, quite to the contrary. The Shias have a saying: “every day is Ashura, every place is Kerbala” which refers to the day (Ashura) and place (the city of Kerbala) of Imam Hussein's martyrdom at the hands of the Caliph Yazid's huge army in 680 and which is understood to mean that every pious Shia Muslim should be willing to die in defense of the truth anytime and anywhere. People like these are simply not going to be intimidated by an Empire whose highest expression of purpose is the “pursuit of happiness”. Last year it took Hezbollah, (who also has this ethos of resistance common to all Shias) less than 2000 fighters to defeat the empire-funded and supplied Israeli army in Lebanon. Iran's armed forces are over 500,000 strong (including at least 100,000 highly trained soldiers) backed by another 350,000 reserves and they can be increased to over 1,000,000 in case of full mobilization. Keep in mind that these are the people who trained Hezbollah in the first place.

In contrast, the Empire has already lost three wars in a row (Lebanon in 2006, Afghanistan and Iraq), has major political problems in Gaza and the Occupied Territories and is already hopelessly overstretched. Last, but not least, a strong majority of the US public opinion is clearly against the war in Iraq and wants a speedy return home of its soldiers. Time would not be on the Empire's side in any scenario.

Iran’s multiple alternatives in the event of a major, sustained US/Israeli war

Let us now look at what could happen in case of a major and sustained US war against Iran.

The Shahab-3 Missile is one of Iran's longest range missiles

Long Range Missiles: Iran would have additional alternatives to cutting-off the SLOCs which are available to the Iranian strategists in the Persian Gulf. The most obvious one would be to actively attack US forces and allies in neighboring countries with their missile forces. Iran has plenty of missiles which could strike at a range of targets including the Green Zone, US installations and forces in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, Turkey or anywhere on the Arabian Peninsula. For example, one of the longest range Iranian missiles, the Shahab -3, has a range of about 2,100km, enough to reach any country in the Middle-East, and a reported accuracy of this missile is anywhere between 2000 meters to 30 meters (depending on the version). That is enough to precisely hit and destroy even a well protected target. These are definitely not just another longer-range “Scud” type of missile like those fired by Iraq fired into Israel in the first Gulf War. According to some reports, these missiles even have steering nozzles on their re-entry vehicle which make them capable of evasive maneuvers disallowing interception by Patriot-like air defense systems. Considering the utter uselessness of the Patriot missiles used in the first Gulf War, this Shahab-3 capability might look like over-engineering; however, the Patriots have been substantially upgraded and improved since 1991 and would probably perform better nowadays.

The Shahab -3, has a range of about 2,100km, enough to reach any country in the Middle-East, and a reported accuracy of this missile is anywhere between 2000 meters to 30 meters.

Shorter Range Missiles: To hit US forces, Iran would not even need to use such advanced missiles: shorter range missiles could be used to attack US forces in central Iraq and Baghdad and even artillery could be used to engage US forces in the Basra region. In addition, Iranian ground forces could conceivably cross the border and directly engage US forces in southern Iraq. There is no doubt that any such operation would be met by a true firestorm from CENTCOM forces in the region and that there would be huge casualties among Iranian forces. The issue is not punishment, but rather whether CENTCOM could muster enough firepower to deny such an option to Iran. Inflicting heavy casualties upon Iranian forces will feel good, but will not be enough to prevent the fall of Basra and once the Pasdaran take up positions inside Basra (with the help of the local Shia militias) the US lines of supply would be gravely compromised and panic would overcome the Imperial High Command.

The fight in the dog: History is filled with examples of military operations which were deemed “impossible” right up to the moment that they were successfully executed by an unpredictable enemy. As the US saying says:” it is not the size of the dog in the fight, it is the size of the fight in the dog” which determines the outcome of a struggle. It should be remembered here that in 1991 the US dropped the 82nd Airborne in Saudi Arabia with no other option to back them in the event for an Iraqi armored attack across the Saudi border besides using tactical nuclear weapons. What would be Washington's response in case of an Iranian attack on US forces across the border? And what if such an attack is backed by heavy missile strikes against, say, US targets in Kuwait and Baghdad? Again – we will look at the nuclear option later, but we should keep these things in mind as we we consider each alternative.

Foreign Options for Iran: Another Iranian option which has been given no serious consideration would be for them to trigger a major crisis elsewhere, and I am not referring to some “Iranian terrorist attack” on Disneyland or any other such DHS imagined scenario. I am referring to Pakistan, the country which already has nuclear weapons and whose leader, General Musharraf, has already been the target of at least a dozen assassination attempts. All Iran would have to do to trigger a real panic in the Imperial High command would be to either kill or overthrow Musharraf. While it is unclear whether Iran has the means to do the latter, there can be little doubt that Iranian special forces, which are considered some of the very best in the world, could do the former. In fact, the extremely anti-Western Pakistani armed forces, the all-mighty intelligence service (ISI) and the various Salafi militias of Pakistan might even finally succeed in killing Musharraf without any Iranian help. What is certain is that whoever would succeed Musharraf would take an extremely virulent anti-US stance and that the war against the Taliban would immediately turn into a disaster with NATO fighting in Afghanistan and US forces possibly fighting yet another war (whether over or covert) against Pakistan and the various Salafi groups inside the country.

The Saudi Theatre: Iran could also attempt to trigger an insurrection inside Saudi Arabia whose overpaid armed forces are totally inept and whose only real combat force, the National Guard, is entirely dedicated to regime protection, i.e. shooting at civilians. In case of a war with Iran, Saudi Arabia would be totally relying on the USA for national defense. It just so happens that the key Saudi petrochemical targets are in northern Saudi Arabia, very close to Iran - an area where the population is mainly composed of Shia Muslims who have been brutally oppressed by the Saudi Wahabi regime for decades.

The Afghan Theatre: Another place where Iran could create a crisis is Afghanistan where the main political and military force, besides the Taliban, is the so-called Northern alliance. The Northern Alliance has very close ties with Iran. Right now, the Imperial puppet Hamid Karzai has so little power in Afghanistan that he is jokingly called the “mayor of Kabul” where he sits protected by NATO and US Special Forces. Karzai’s only real power base is the Northern Alliance which, while composed of Tadjiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, tolerates this Pashtun “President” and his YSL fashions, only to appease Washington. This can also change overnight.

The Iranians could even bribe, cajole and coerce the Pashtuns and the Northern Alliance to find some modus vivendi as long as NATO is thrown out of Kabul. Afghanistan has a long history of shifting alliances and corrupted leaders and since everybody there hates the Empire anyway (that includes the Northern Alliance leadership who is much closer to Tehran and Moscow than it is to Washington) some kind of deal might not be so hard to broker. You can count on the Iranians to know which strings to pull.

All this simply shows that any US aggression against Iran could have unforeseen consequences for which it is very hard to plan. In its unparalleled incompetence, the Neocon Empire has managed to eliminate all the main obstacles to Iranian hegemony in the Middle-East: Saddam Hussein (ousted!), the Talibans (ousted!) and the US CENTCOM forces now bogged down and highly vulnerable in Iraq and the rest of the region. It is no wonder now that having put all the advantages on Teheran's side the Empire is left with no viable military option against Iran. Which brings up the issue of the use of tactical nuclear weapons against Iran.

A Nuclear Attack on Iran

What would be the advantages of using tactical nuclear weapons against Iran?

Let us consider two situations:

1. the use of nuclear munitions by Israel
   
   
2. the use of such munitions by the USA (no other country would ever contemplate such folly anyway, not even Britain).

An Israeli nuclear strike

For the Israeli government, a nuclear strike on Iran would have many positive aspects. A nuclear strike by Israel:

• would not involve the already overstretched US forces (at least not officially);
  
  
• would provide the Olmert administration with a much-needed “victory”;
  
  
• would serve as a show of power and resolve on the part of the humiliated Israeli military and
  
  
• would cater to the dearly held belief by many Israelis that “Arabs only understand force” (nevermind that the Iranians are Persians, not Arabs).

The political price for Israel to pay for such an aggression would really be minimal:

Israel is already the most hated country on the planet and the only country whose public opinion would matter to the Israeli leaders would be the USA where the mantric repetitions of the word “Holocaust”, “new Hitler” and “existential threat” will immediately “bring on board” the entire US corporate media and all of Congress. The American public might not be fully convinced this time, but since the Neocons have an iron grip on both political parties the public would have little to say about it.

The main problem for Israel is that it can only execute a very limited nuclear strike which, while possibly destroying some deeply buried Iranian installation or killing some Iranian leaders, would really fail to achieve anything significant beyond the short-term. Horrible as this may sound, an Israeli nuclear strike on Iran would probably be a combination of psychotherapy for its hapless leaders and of a public relations gambit for the confused and frustrated Israeli population. I really doubt that the Israeli military commanders would go along with that even if the political leadership demands it.

A U.S. nuclear strike

A nuclear strike by the USA would be of a much different nature. For one thing, it could be part of an overall military strategy aimed at destroying some very hardened targets (leadership, nuclear or other). Of course, nobody in the White House actually believes that Iran is developing nuclear weapons right under the noses of the IAEA inspectors – that kind of nonsense is only for public consumption. However, destroying high-value civilian nuclear objectives could very much be a part of a campaign aimed at bombing Iran “back to the stone age” (to use James Baker's threat to Tarek Aziz in 1991). Not only that, I would not put it past the Neocons to assume that somehow the use of nuclear weapons would scare the Iranians into submission. At the very least, such a use of nuclear weapons would serve as a “firm sign of resolve to the Iranian Mollahs”. No matter how misguided such a logic might seem pragmatically, the Neocons have repeatedly shown their skills at denying the obvious (just getting bogged down in Iraq will probably be consigned into history books as the single worst foreign policy decision in US history).

Unlike Israel, the USA is not the most hated nation on earth (it only holds the second position). Nonetheless, there are huge political risks for the Neocons in using nuclear weapons against Iran. While I personally predict a rather typically lame European response to a US aggression against Iran, the European public opinion would, I believe, react with such a level of outrage at a non-provoked nuclear attack on any nation on earth that EU leaders would have to strongly react or find themselves in a massive political crisis. The same goes for Asia and South America where a US nuclear strike on Iran would trigger a political chain reaction which would immensely damage US interests. Simply put, if Israel can rely on the USA to unconditionally bail it out from any crisis, who will bail out the USA?

While I do believe that a US nuclear attack on Iran is a possibility, I am also quite confident that such an attack would also result in a general political, economic and even military collapse of the Neocon Empire. Currently, while most of the world hates the USA, this hatred is still primarily directed at the person of Bush The Lesser and his administration. Should the USA actually ever be the first to use nuclear weapons in any war, the entire USA, as a nation, would achieve a pariah status worldwide and would fatally undermine its own vital political and economic interests.

Note that a US nuclear strike on Iran would in no way undermine or weaken the Iranian political leadership, quite to the contrary, it would likely to unify all Iranians into a formidable and enraged block which would wage all-out war against Imperial interest in the entire Middle-East. In such a situation a massive Hezbollah attack in Israel would be virtually certain.

Conclusions

In conclusion we can see that Iran would not have to proactively do anything to make the Empire pay for an short and limited attack. Riding out the attack and letting the Neocons pay the political price for their folly would be the most likely Iranian response. In case of a long term major Imperial war against Iran, the Iranians would have a broad variety of “asymmetrical” options from which to choose, none of which would involve shutting down the Strait of Hormuz or chasing US aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf.

In any scenario, time would always be on the Iranian side while the Empire would very rapidly run out of options to try force an acceptable outcome.

This lack of a viable “exit strategy” would rapidly force the time-pressed Imperial High Command to consider the use of nuclear weapons to avoid getting bogged down in a rapidly worsening situation. Any actual use of nuclear weapons would result into a general collapse of the entire Neocon empire of a magnitude similar to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In other words, there are no possible winning strategies for an Imperial aggression against Iran.

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