After a bad start, ceasefire appears to be holding

It appears that after a bad start, the ceasefire is now more or less generally respected.  The intensity of the shooting has dramatically fallen and the front is generally quiet.  We shall see how long this will last.

The Saker

Ukrainian forces break ceasefire 1 hour after it has started

Here is footage of the Ukrainian artillery strikes:

The useless agreement which everybody wanted

I have to say that I am both amused and appalled at the completely over-the-top reaction of most commentators to what we might as well call the Mink-2 Agreement (M2A).  Apparently, analysis has been abandoned altogether and has now been replaced with hyperbole and vociferous but empty statements.  Reading some of the comments made here one could be forgiven for thinking that somehow the war in the Ukraine was over and that the AngloZionist Empire, aided by Putin, Surkov and an anonymous but sinister army of Russian oligarchs, has just inflicted a terrible and final blow to the Novorussian dream.

What is going on here?  Has everybody just gone crazy?

In part, this is due that one could read anything, everything and its opposite into this agreement (more about that later) and also to the fact that the western media simply had to present any agreement as a triumph of western willpower, diplomacy and sanctions.  This is all utter nonsense, of course, but that is what you get for exposing yourself to the corporate media.  So let's set aside all the loud clamoring and use our brains to actually *think*.

First, I would remind everybody that the junta as broken every single agreement it committed to.  Every single one.  And there is absolutely no reasons at all to believe that this time around this will change.

Second, Poroshenko can promise all he wants, but the real power in the "independent Ukraine" is held by Uncle Sam and by the "Maidanites" he controls.

Third, why do you think that Merkel and Hollande suddenly felt a powerful urge to "scratch their diplomatic itch" and decided to intervene?  Could that sudden urge to negotiate have a little something to do with a place called Debaltsevo?  If yes, what does the M2A say about Debaltsevo?  Exactly. *Nothing*.

Fourth, the agreement not even signed by Poroshenko, but by Kuchma on behalf of the Ukraine.

Fifth, check out this section:

9. Restoration of full control over the state border of Ukraine by the government throughout the conflict zone, which should begin on the first day after the local elections and be completed after a comprehensive political settlement (local elections in some areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions on the basis of the Law of Ukraine and constitutional reform) at the end of 2015, subject to paragraph 11 — in consultation and agreement with the representatives of individual areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions in the framework of the Three-Party Contact Group. 

Do you see what I see?  Nevermind that the border is supposed to get back under Kiev's control only after "something" happens, but check out the "something" itself: constitutional reform in consultation and agreement with Novorussian leaders!!!!  Does anybody seriously believe that the Rada will participate in anything even remotely looking like this?  Liashko?  Farion?  Tsiagnibok and Iarosh all working together with the "subhuman colorads" from the Donbass to change the Ukrainian Constitution?  Of course not!

So so far, let's sum this up.  M2A was:

1) signed by a person with no authority
2) on behalf of a junta with no powers
3) it does not say a word about the main reason for the meeting in Minsk
4) it contains clearly impossible sections

How is that for a brilliant text?

In truth, there is a short section of the document which does contain one realistic elements: a ceasefire followed by a withdrawal of heavy weapons.  That's it.  The rest is nonsense.  See for yourself

#4: local elections organized by the junta and Novorussians together. Nonsense
#5: pardons and amnesties.  Blanket amnesty for all the war crimes (including MH-17 and Odessa "barbecue").  Disgusting.
#6: exchange of "all for all".  Except that most folks in the junta hands are long dead.
#7: humanitarian assistance. Empty statement, the assistance is already coming in.
#8: payment of pensions: the junta does not have the money anyway.  Will not happen.
#9: Constitutional reform.  Will not happen
#10: Withdrawal of all foreign forces.  Nonsense: those who are there (NATO countries) will stay, those who are not there (9000 Russian soldiers) cannot "leave" since they are not there to begin with. 
#11: Constitutional reform including the creation of "The creation of people’s militia".  LOL - apparently, that will be the new name for the Novorussian armed forces.
#12: Elections if all of the above happens first.  Since it ain't, they won't.
#13: Creation of "working groups".  Right. Keep dreaming.

The fact is that what is the most interesting about M2A is not what it says, but what it does NOT say:

1) not a word about Debaltsevo
2) not a word about the junta actually sitting down to negotiate with the Novorussian authorities
3) not a word about the future status of the Ukraine
4) not a word about the Ukrainian economy (which is still in free fall)
5) not a word about any peacekeepers (which are indispensible to make any ceasefire stick)
6) not even a word about the fact that the Novorussians are not "terrorist" but people seeking national independence.  Poroshenko has still not spoken to them directly.

It is possible that these issues were, in fact, discussed, but that this will not be revealed to the general public.  There might be secret clauses to M2A.  However, it is at least as likely that these issues were discussed and that no agreement whatsoever was found, hence they were set aside.

But if nothing really important was decided, why did everybody participate to this exercise?  Simple: everybody got something from it (assuming any parts M2A are actually implemented):

1) The Novorussians:
a) a stop of the terror attacks by the junta on Novorussian cities.
b) the recognition of the line of contact
c) the assurance that Voentorg remains open (control of border)
d) time to mobilize and train their planned 100'000 extra men
e) the recognition by all parties (including the Europeans) that they deserve a special status

2) Poroshenko:
a) the apparent and symbolic support for world leaders
b) a stop of the Novorussian advance
c) a vague hope that junta forces will be allowed to leave the Debaltsevo cauldron
d) money from the IMF (not nearly enough, but better than none).

3) Merkel and Hollande:
a) the illusion of relevance of a EU foreign policy
b) the (probably misguided) hope to stop the crazy Americans
c) the hope to an easing of the economic war with Russia (Mistrals?)

4) Putin:
a) the right to control the border until the constitutional reforms are made, in other words ad aeternam.
b) the recognition that without him no solution can be found
c) the hope for some easing of sanctions

Everybody got what they wanted and left with a smile on their face.  Good for them, but none of that does anything to really settle the conflict or even begin to seek a solution.

The reality is that nothing at all happened in Minsk, at least nothing of any importance.  The Novorussians won the latest battle (yet again) so they came in a position of strength and they got the junta to promise to stop the crazy shelling, and since Debaltsevo was not even mentioned, it looks to me that the junta forces there will be allowed to quietly withdraw as long as they leave their weapons behind.  So the Debaltsevo cauldron will be controlled by Novorussia.  Putin got political recognition and the hope of at least no more sanctions (remember after Minsk 1 the EU immediately imposed more sanctions on Russia).  The Europeans got a little something too, mainly some good PR, and the big loser is most definitely Poroshenko who will now have the highly unenviable task of "selling" M2A to a totally crazy Rada (which, by the way, is currently considering an law proposed by Poroshenko's party to make the denial of the Russian aggression against the Ukraine a criminal offense).

Conclusion:

Just like in a chess game, time is a critical factor.  M2A gave everybody a little time-out, but the conflict will resume and the only thing which will stop this conflict will be a double collapse of the Ukrainian economy and armed forces which I believe will most probably happen this summer.  Until then, the conflict will be more or less frozen, though I will believe in a junta withdrawal of heavy weapons systems only if/when I see it.  Also - remember that one can very well fight with tanks, mortars and infantry.

Nazi Baderastan and Novorussia are two civilizationally different project which cannot and will never coexist under one roof.  Yes, for tactical reasons there might be the need to pretend that this is possible, but the reality is that it will not.  The only way to keep Novorussia inside the Ukraine is to denazify the latter and until that is done, Novorussia will never really return to the Ukraine.  That is a hard fact which nobody in the West is willing to accept.  In Kiev, they fully understand that, but their "solution" is to empty Novorussia form Novorussians and to give this much needed Lebensraum to the "Ukr" Master Race of western Ukraine.  And that is something which Russia will never allow.  Which leaves only two possible outcomes: the EU gives up and the Ukraine is denazified, or the US starts a full-scale war against Russia in a desperate attempt to prevent that outcome.

Two more things I want to mention here:

In purely military terms the withdrawal of heavy systems is entirely to the Novorussian advantage.  Remember that Kiev used these systems to try to terrorize the Novorussian population while the Novorussians used their artillery to try to suppress the junta's artillery.  The Novorussians could never use their artillery to attack because they were liberating their own land and did not want to murder their own civilians.  So, in other words, if both sides really withdraw their heavy guns the junta will lose a crucial capability while the Novorussians will lose an almost useless one.

Short message to the "Putin sold out" folks: guys, I have been ignoring your mantric repetition of unsubstantiated slogans about Putin "selling out" and "backstabbing" and all the rest, but I will tell you that not a single one of you has ever been capable of making a coherent, fact based and logically supported analysis proving your point.  I think that mantras are great for yoga, but on this blog, they don't make you look any smarter.  I let you post them here "because why not?" but please don't mistake that with a sign of respect for the nonsense you have spewing.  The main reason why I don't debunk your nonsense is that time will do a much better job then I could, and that it will hurt you more when you are proven wrong not by my reasoning, but by undisputed facts on the ground (just like those who screamed that Putin betrayed Assad and Syria by making them, quote, "give up their only deterrence against Israeli nuclear weapons").  Anyway, if you must, keep on with the mantra but please be aware that they only make you look very sophomoric.  And considering that there are still a few blogs out there taking the same position (though less and less), you might want to consider posting there.  There each slogan, especially when expressed with a virile and categorical lack of nuances, will get you a standing ovation.  Why suffer here when there are those "heavens of consensus" out there?  Just think about it :-)

Okay, that's it for now.  I am going to be on the road all day tomorrow, so please take this also as an "open thread" and "see you" all on Saturday, God willing.

Cheers,

The Saker

PS: this was sent to me by a friend today:
(cheer up guys, we will win!!)

The Minsk "Agreement"

by Alexander Mercouris

Already there is debate about who has "won" and who has "lost" in the Minsk talks.

The short answer is that as the German foreign minister Steinmeier correctly said there is no breakthrough but the Russians and the NAF have made progress.

One point needs to be explained or reiterated (since I have explained it already and many times).

The agreement does not make provision for federalisation or autonomy for the Donbass but still only refers to the grant of a law according the Donbass temporary special status within the Ukraine.

There could not be an agreement for federalisation out of the Minsk negotiations because they are primarily a summit meeting of five powers - Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, German and France. The Russians have always insisted that this is an internal conflict and civil war within the Ukraine and between Ukrainians and it is for the Ukrainians and them alone to resolve their internal differences between them through negotiations.

Given that this is Russia's stance, Russia and the other powers cannot impose a federalisation scheme on the Ukrainians and they have not - at least overtly - sought to do so. What the stated objective of the Minsk talks is - at least from the Russian point of view - is to set up conditions and a process for the constitutional negotiations that the Russians have been pushing for (and which were supposedly agreed on 21st February 2014 and on 17th April 2014 and 5th September 2014) to take place.

The Russians have been insisting on these negotiations since the February coup. The Russians are not publicly pre-ordaining the outcome of those negotiations because were they to do so they would not be negotiations at all. Whatever a negotiation is, it is by definition not something whose outcome is preordained.

If the Russians sought to preordain the outcome of the negotiations by insisting on federalisation as the outcome they would be imposing their views on the parties and would be admitting that they are a party to the conflict, which is what they have consistently said they are not. They would in effect be doing what the US has tried to do in the Syrian conflict, which is insist on an outcome to negotiations (Assad's resignation) before negotiations even take place. The Russians have always opposed this sort of behaviour and they are being consistent in not openly adopting it now.

Depending on what the parties agree between them, the negotiations could in theory result in decentralisation, federalisation, a confederation or even outright independence for the Donbass (the Russians floated that idea as a serious possibility in the summer). The latter is not by the way contrary to the reaffirmation of respect or even support for the Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity that we saw in the statement today. If the internal parties to the conflict were to decide on a formal partition as the solution to the Ukraine's conflict, then international actors like Russia could recognise it without calling into question their previous declared support for the Ukraine's territorial integrity, as they previously did when Czechoslovakia split up.

In reality everybody knows that the Russians' preferred option is federalisation and the Europeans are now edging towards that solution. Whether it is a viable solution is another matter.

Once this key point is understood everything else starts to fall into place.

Last spring and summer the Russians sought a ceasefire so the constitutional negotiations could begin. The Europeans are now also demanding a ceasefire (they were less keen on the idea last spring and summer). There is now therefore an agreement for a ceasefire.

Back in August the Russians demanded the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the Donbass. There is now an agreement for the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the Donbass.

If that happens it will be a major weakening of the Junta's position in the Donbass because it is the Junta whose military has the big preponderance in heavy weapons. If the opposing sides are left with light infantry forces, the advantage on the ground will pass decisively to the NAF.

The political machinery that was supposed to have been agreed in Minsk on 5th September 2014 to create the conditions for the constitutional elections is being revived. Thus there is to be a law of special status for the Donbass pending the constitutional negotiations to clarify its current legal status and provide legal mechanisms for its internal administration by the NAF (Ukraine passed one previously and then reneged on it), more elections etc.

There is a new provision, which is the first indications of some sort of timeline for this process with the constitutional negotiations supposed to have been concluded by the end of the year.

There are also some ideas for a beefed up monitoring process via the OSCE.

Will any of this happen? Highly doubtful I would say. Consider what happened after the Minsk process of 5th September 2014. The Junta did not withdraw its heavy weapons. It did not retreat to the agreed boundary line. It imposed an economic blockade on the Donbass (it is now obliged to lift it). It rescinded the law on the Donbass's special status. It reinforced its army and in January it attempted to renew its offensive.

Is there any more prospect of this process succeeding than did the one that was agreed in Minsk in September?

The big difference between this process and the previous process is that the Europeans are now formally involved. Its success or failure ultimately depends on whether the Europeans are going to insist on the Junta fulfilling its obligations. They spectacularly failed to do so before and I have to say I think it is very unlikely they will do so now. If the Europeans fail to insist on the Junta fulfilling its obligations then the process will unravel as the previous Minsk process did and with the balance of advantage continuing to shift every day on the ground towards the NAF we will see a further renewal of the fighting and a further NAF advance in the spring.

In the meantime control of the border, disarmament of "illegal armed groups" etc are now overtly linked to the successful conclusion of the constitutional negotiations, which is supposed to happen before the end of the year. Of course if the constitutional negotiations succeed, then when all these things happen we will have a different Ukraine from the one we have now. At that point the control of border posts etc will be in the hands of differently constituted authorities from those that exist today.

Will those negotiations actually happen? Will they succeed if they do? I doubt it. The Junta will resist them tooth and nail if only because those negotiations put in jeopardy the whole Maidan project and by their mere fact call into question the Junta's legitimacy.

It depends in the end on what the Europeans do. This has been true of the conflict from the start.

That it depends on what the Europeans do is in itself a good reason to doubt this process will succeed. The probability is more conflict down the road but in the meantime Poroshenko's admission that there is "no good news for the Ukraine" from this process tells us who is winning.

Full text of the Minsk-2 agreement

According to the Financial Times, the following is based on a translation of the Russian document:

Complex of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreement

1. Immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain areas in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine and strict implementation of it starting at 00.00, Kiev time, February 15th

2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both parties at equal distances to create a security zone of at least 50km from each other for artillery systems of 100mm calibre or more, a security zone 70km wide for multiple-launch rocket systems and a security zone 140km wide for multiple-launch rocket systems Tornado, Uragan, Smerch and tactical missile systems Tochka.

For the Ukrainian troops these distances apply from the actual line of contact. For the armed forces of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine they apply from the contact line in accordance with the Minsk memorandum of September 19th, 2014.

Withdrawal of heavy weapons above shall begin no later than the second day after the start of the ceasefire and be completed within 14 days.

The OSCE, with the support of the Three-Party Contact Group, will contribute to this process.

3. The effective monitoring and verification of the ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons will be ensured from the side of the OSCE from the first day of the withdrawal, with the help of all necessary means including satellites, drones, radar systems etc.

4. On the first day after the withdrawal a dialogue is to begin on the modalities of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian law and [in particular] Ukrainian Law ‘On the temporary regime of local government in some areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions’, as well as on how these areas are to be run in the future on the basis of that law.

Immediately and not later than 30 days from the date of signing of this document, a resolution is to be adopted in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine indicating the territories covered by the special regime in accordance with the Ukrainian Law ‘On the temporary regime of local government in some areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions’, based on the line set in the Minsk memorandum of September 19th, 2014.

5. Pardons and amnesties will be granted through the enactment of a law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in some areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine.

6. Hostages and illegally detained persons will be released and exchanged based on the principle ‘all for all’. This process must be completed no later than the fifth day after the withdrawal.

7. Provide secure access, delivery, storage and distribution of humanitarian assistance to the needy on the basis of an international mechanism.

8. Determination of the modalities of the full restoration of socio-economic relations, including social transfers such as pensions and other payments (receipts and income, timely payment of all utility bills, renewal of taxation within the legal framework of Ukraine).

To this end, Ukraine will regain control of the parts of its banking system in conflict-affected areas, and there will possibly be an international mechanism to facilitate such transfers.

9. Restoration of full control over the state border of Ukraine by the government throughout the conflict zone, which should begin on the first day after the local elections and be completed after a comprehensive political settlement (local elections in some areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions on the basis of the Law of Ukraine and constitutional reform) at the end of 2015, subject to paragraph 11 — in consultation and agreement with the representatives of individual areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions in the framework of the Three-Party Contact Group.

10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under the supervision of the OSCE. Disarmament of all illegal groups.

11. Constitutional reform will be conducted in Ukraine, and a new constitution will enter into force by the end of 2015 which is intended as a key element of decentralisation (taking into account the special characteristics of certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions as agreed with representatives of these areas). Also a permanent law is to be adopted by the end of 2015 on the special status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions in accordance with the measures specified in Note [1].

12. On the basis of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the temporary regime of local government in some areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions’ questions regarding local elections will be discussed and agreed with certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions in the framework of the Three-Party Contact Group. Elections will be held in compliance with the relevant standards of the OSCE in monitoring by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

13. To intensify the activities of the Three-Party Contact Group, including through the establishment of working groups to implement the relevant aspects of the Minsk Agreement. They will reflect the composition of the Three-Party Contact Group.

Note 1:

Such measures, in accordance with the Law ‘On the temporary regime of local government in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions’ include the following:

— Exemption from punishment, harassment and discrimination of individuals associated with the events that took place in some areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

— The right to self-determination of language;

— Participation of local governments in the appointment of heads of prosecutors and courts in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

— The possibility for the central executive authorities to conclude with the relevant local authorities an agreement on economic, social and cultural development of certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

— The State shall support socio-economic development of certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

— Assistance from the central government for cross-border co-operation in selected areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions and the regions of the Russian Federation;

— The creation of people’s militia units to address local councils in order to maintain public order in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

— The powers of local council deputies and officers elected in early elections, appointed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on this law, cannot be terminated.

Signed by the participants of the Three-Party Contact Group:

Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini

The second President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma

Ambassador of the Russian Federation, to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov

Alexander Zakharchenko

Igor Plotnitsky
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Note: also see the Normandy Four Statement.