While Nazi death squads are roaming around the Donbass and murdering civilians and "their own" soldiers the Kremlin's response seems to be limited to two aspects: denouncing the atrocities on the ground and providing truthful information to the Ukrainian population (via the Russian media) and the world (via RT). This is good, but not enough.
I am pretty confident that the GRU knows all the Ukrainian unit commanders down to the company commander (usually a Senior/First Lieutenant). This is standard practice for any military intelligence agency. They most definitely know (or should know) all the names of the brigade HQ officers and above. Finally, I would also bet that all the names of the senior Right Sector and various death squads commanders are also known to the GRU.
So why not leak them to the media?
Let it be know that if you give a criminal order your name will become public which, while not as unpleasant as a court-martial for war crimes, could still be very, very unpleasant for the folks thus singled out.
The Russians could begin by a small leak, just a few names, and then make it known that "more names shall be leaked as circumstances warrant it". This would create quite a panic, at least amongst regular Ukrainian army commanders, the pilots of rotary or fixed wing aircraft, artillery battery commanders, especially if the penalty for being put on such a list is left deliberately vague. And it could save a lot of lives.
Alas, it appears that the traditional GRU mania for secrecy is still the rule and that the appointment of a relatively young GRU Chief (Igor Sergun) has not heralded a new era in this traditionally most conservative branch of the Russian military.
But maybe another, more forward looking agency, could make a few suggestions to the right people?
The Saker
Showing posts with label GRU. Show all posts
Showing posts with label GRU. Show all posts
Friday, May 23, 2014
Thursday, November 11, 2010
The "fake Russian spies" were not fake at all! (UPDATED!)
Remember the case of the fake Russian spies including the sexy Anna Champan?
If not, check out my piece The proof that the 11 Russian spies were not spies at all.
First, all the so-called "evidence" that they guys were spies? It was all nonsense. The FBI had no proof at all. The FBI had something far better and more precious, something they chose to hide as best they could. The FBI had an absolutely unique agent inside the super-secret department of the Russian Intelligence Service which deals with "illegals": the "S" Directorate of the SVR. Kommersant found out the real name, rank and position of this traitor: Colonel Shcherbakov, head of the US Direction of the "S" Directorate of the SVR. In terms of intelligence, this is a nuclear bomb. This means that the person who betrayed these illegals was basically the top man for all illegals in the USA. I would say that a betrayal by a person in such a position is worse than Robert Hanssen, Ana Belen Montes, John Walker and Aldrich Ames combined, not so much in terms of compromised secrets, but in terms of the US being able to penetrate the "Holy of Holies" of the SVR.
Let me immediately add here that there are no details of how Shcherbakov became an US mole. My personal opinion is that, as is the case with the vast majority of high-level spies, he was not recruited but that he was a so-called "walk-in" - a person who deliberately approaches a foreign intelligence service and offers his/her services. Still, even if Shcherbakov was a walk-in, the fact that the FBI could maintain a contact with him for about 10 years is an absolutely monumental failure for the SVR.
To make things even worse, it now appears that the SVR also managed not to notice that Shcherbakov's daughter was studying in the USA and that his other son suddenly left the country right before Medvedev's visit to the USA.
And while everybody was focused on the sexy Anna Chapman, it was another spy, much less noticed, which had a stellar career which was compromised by Shcherbakov's betrayal: "Juan Lazaro", whose real name was Mikhail Anatolevich Vasenkov (see photo), who had spend his entire career undetected. Born in 1945, he was infiltrated into the West sometime in 1961 and he was given the right to retire with the rank of General, but he turned down the offer and continued to collect valuable information (in particular photographic). After his arrest, he was tortured by the FBI who broke several of his ribs and one leg, yet he did not say a single word under interrogation. The mere fact that the FBI could shadow these 11 spies for a decade without ever finding out any proof of their activities is in itself a testimony to their skills.
This is why Shcherbakov's betrayal hurts the SVR so much.
According to Kommersant, this total debacle in the SVR has triggered an enormous rage amongst the SVR cadre and the rest of the government. One SVR official openly told Kommersant that a killer team has been send out to execute Shcherbakov and that "heads and epaulets" will be "torn off". Rumors also abound that the SVR will be re-subordinated to the FSB thereby re-creating a real "KGB-successor" agency. A massive investigation is now under way and many officials will loose their jobs or be investigated for criminal actions.
Now that this story has broken into the open the FBI has no more reasons to feed the public all sorts of lame fairy tales about invisible ink, Anna Chapman calling daddy in Moscow and the rest of the nonsense we were told. Still, we will not be told too much: according to Kommersant, this entire affair is so huge that both sides chose to tone it down to a minimum to avoid tensions between Russia and the USA.
What is certain is that a major crisis is now affecting at least two of the key elements of the Russian state: the Ministry of Defense and the SVR. And its not like the military intelligence service can gloat over the SVR's current misery. They had their own super-traitor, GRU Major-General Dimitry Poliakov (another walk-in) who worked for the FBI from 1960 until his retirement in 1980 (he was finally caught in 1986 and executed in 1988). The GRU, by the way, is also in a crisis due to various pressures to downsize it or even re-subordinate it.
The Russian government is in a mess, and there are no signs at all that Medvedev has any ideas as to how to fix it.
UPDATE1: President Medvedev has essentially confirmed the information published by Kommersant by stating that: "As far as I am concerned, what was published in Kommersant was not news. I found out about it on the day it happened, with all its attributes, but there has to be an examination of this. Life goes on. The relevant lessons from it will be studied," Medvedev said at a G20 summit press conference. Medvedev refused to comment on the situation within the SVR but said a thorough investigation into the episode had been launched. "We would not want to comment on our further decisions. This is a question for those bodies concerned with this matter"
UPDATE2: According to Argumenty i Fakty, SVR officials denied that they ever had a "traitor Shcherbakov" in their ranks. Not only that, but the SVR sources AiF spoke to denied literally every single aspect of the story published by Kommersant. They probably were not told that their President thought otherwise.
Friday, April 24, 2009
Who is purging the Russian military intelligence and why?
For several months already, rumors have abounded about the reported conflict between the head of the Russian military intelligence service (GRU), Valentin Korabelnikov, and President Medvedev. Today, the Russian media announced that Korabelnikov had been replaced by one of his deputies, Alexander Shliakhturov.
Of all the intelligence and security services of the former Soviet Union and Russia, the GRU was by far the most secretive. It was also one of the most influential ones, and it is not surprising that many strange events surrounding the GRU have taken place over the past years which were almost never reported (such as the streak of "accidental" deaths of quite a few top GRU officials in Moscow several years ago). This time again, there is little real info on what is going on, but rumors persistently point to what might be a major purge of the GRU and forces subordinated to it.
According to these rumors, the GRU itself might loose its virtual autonomy and become a department of the Ministry of Defense, while most of its cadre would be transferred to the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Other rumors claim that several GRU Spetsnaz brigades will be disbanded (along with the 106 Airborne Division). If any of these rumors are true, then what is taking place in Russia is nothing short of a massive breakup, if not breakdown, of the most elite segment of the Russian armed forces.
All this is taking place in the midst of a much-needed (and much delayed!) reform of the Russian armed forces. Thus, these rumors might reflect not so much the real plans of the Kremlin as the worst fears of the top brass of the Ministry of Defense.
Still, for a purely pragmatic point of view, disbanding the GRU or re-subordinating as a department of the Ministry of Defense makes absolutely no sense whatsoever. True, the GRU was the least reformed of all the institutions and agencies of the former Soviet Union, and quite of few of its officers were found guilty of a wide range of criminal offences (corruption, racketeering, trafficking, murders, etc.). Furthermore, the GRU was probably a bloated institution in need of streamlining. So the basic principle of reforming the GRU is probably sound. However, what is taking place today appears to be far more than just a shake-up and clean-up operation.
The elimination of one or even two Spetsnaz Brigades, however, is rather bizarre. Frankly, I suspect that what is taking place is a massive reallocation of resources from the military special forces to the special forces of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs. Keep in mind that the term "Spetsnaz" simply means "special purpose" and does not, in itself, denote any one structure. In the former Soviet Union, both the military and the KGB had special purpose units, but by and large it was the Spetsnaz forces of the GRU which made the word "Spetsnaz" famous. In the years of total anarchy under the presidency of Boris Eltsin, many more units, departments and forces declared themselves to be "Spetsnaz". I would not be surprised to learn that some construction battalion in the Ural Mountains also claims the "Spetsnaz" status and the fancy badge which comes along (or so they would believe)....
Anyway, along the *real* special forces of the GRU and the KGB, a number of new special purpose units were formed, including in various police departments, the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and even in the prison system. Since Putin and, later, Medvedev came to power the Russian media has been filled with not-so-subtle quasi-propaganda reports about the "heroic" "Spetsnaz" of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). A large number of fancy (and costly!) schools and training camps have now been opened for these forces. The fact that the performance of the MVD units in, for example, Chechnya was less than stellar did not have any negative consequences for their funding. Even more puzzling is that the one type of unit which performed rather well in Chechnya (the rapid reaction "SOBR" forces) were simply disbanded.
So a rather strange dynamic began to take place in the last decades: When real, tough, fighting was called for the Kremlin sent in the Spetsnaz GRU, the KGB special purpose forces "Alpha" and "Vympel", Paratroopers from the Airborne Forces, Marines from Navy and even Border Guard (many of which were at least as good as any other Spetsnaz forces) units were typically sent in. Then, once the mean and ugly fighting was over, all sorts of police forces were sent in to clear and control the terrain taken by the military. They manned checkpoints, seized suspected insurgents, interrogated prisoners, etc. They were also almost universally disliked by the military who had done the real fighting.
Simply put - Spetsnaz operators are not cops. These two cultures are fundamentally different and deeply antagonistic and what is taking place today in Russia might well be an attempt by the Russian cops to finally get rid of those whom they have always perceived as their main competitors. Likewise, it is quite possible that the former KGB people around Medvedev are now using the reform of the Russian armed forces as a convenient pretext to finally crush the influence of the GRU once and for all.
If so, than this is a potential disaster for Russia. The fact is that if a military is reduced in size or substantially reorganized, its intelligence component must be *strengthened* and not weakened. Simply put, the need for a high quality military intelligence service is inversely proportional to the capabilities of the armed forces: the weaker these forces are, the stronger the military intelligence must be.
While the wars in Chechnya and in Georgia have shown that while the Russian military can prevail - brilliantly in the case of Georgia - there still a dire need to reform these forces before the existing cracks in organization, training, command and control, etc. become insurmountable. The Air Force, for example, is now in truly urgent need of new aircraft and the Ground Forces need a major upgrade of its aging command and control infrastructure.
If the Kremlin is serious about reforming the military then it simply cannot do that while allowing the GRU and the forces subordinated to the GRU to become the victim of a purge. Not only would that eliminate any chance for the creation of the planned "mobile forces" (which have been discussed since at least 20 years now), but it would even transform the much needed reform of the armed forces into a disaster at a time when Russia can least afford it.
Of all the intelligence and security services of the former Soviet Union and Russia, the GRU was by far the most secretive. It was also one of the most influential ones, and it is not surprising that many strange events surrounding the GRU have taken place over the past years which were almost never reported (such as the streak of "accidental" deaths of quite a few top GRU officials in Moscow several years ago). This time again, there is little real info on what is going on, but rumors persistently point to what might be a major purge of the GRU and forces subordinated to it.
According to these rumors, the GRU itself might loose its virtual autonomy and become a department of the Ministry of Defense, while most of its cadre would be transferred to the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Other rumors claim that several GRU Spetsnaz brigades will be disbanded (along with the 106 Airborne Division). If any of these rumors are true, then what is taking place in Russia is nothing short of a massive breakup, if not breakdown, of the most elite segment of the Russian armed forces.
All this is taking place in the midst of a much-needed (and much delayed!) reform of the Russian armed forces. Thus, these rumors might reflect not so much the real plans of the Kremlin as the worst fears of the top brass of the Ministry of Defense.
Still, for a purely pragmatic point of view, disbanding the GRU or re-subordinating as a department of the Ministry of Defense makes absolutely no sense whatsoever. True, the GRU was the least reformed of all the institutions and agencies of the former Soviet Union, and quite of few of its officers were found guilty of a wide range of criminal offences (corruption, racketeering, trafficking, murders, etc.). Furthermore, the GRU was probably a bloated institution in need of streamlining. So the basic principle of reforming the GRU is probably sound. However, what is taking place today appears to be far more than just a shake-up and clean-up operation.
The elimination of one or even two Spetsnaz Brigades, however, is rather bizarre. Frankly, I suspect that what is taking place is a massive reallocation of resources from the military special forces to the special forces of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs. Keep in mind that the term "Spetsnaz" simply means "special purpose" and does not, in itself, denote any one structure. In the former Soviet Union, both the military and the KGB had special purpose units, but by and large it was the Spetsnaz forces of the GRU which made the word "Spetsnaz" famous. In the years of total anarchy under the presidency of Boris Eltsin, many more units, departments and forces declared themselves to be "Spetsnaz". I would not be surprised to learn that some construction battalion in the Ural Mountains also claims the "Spetsnaz" status and the fancy badge which comes along (or so they would believe)....
Anyway, along the *real* special forces of the GRU and the KGB, a number of new special purpose units were formed, including in various police departments, the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and even in the prison system. Since Putin and, later, Medvedev came to power the Russian media has been filled with not-so-subtle quasi-propaganda reports about the "heroic" "Spetsnaz" of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). A large number of fancy (and costly!) schools and training camps have now been opened for these forces. The fact that the performance of the MVD units in, for example, Chechnya was less than stellar did not have any negative consequences for their funding. Even more puzzling is that the one type of unit which performed rather well in Chechnya (the rapid reaction "SOBR" forces) were simply disbanded.
So a rather strange dynamic began to take place in the last decades: When real, tough, fighting was called for the Kremlin sent in the Spetsnaz GRU, the KGB special purpose forces "Alpha" and "Vympel", Paratroopers from the Airborne Forces, Marines from Navy and even Border Guard (many of which were at least as good as any other Spetsnaz forces) units were typically sent in. Then, once the mean and ugly fighting was over, all sorts of police forces were sent in to clear and control the terrain taken by the military. They manned checkpoints, seized suspected insurgents, interrogated prisoners, etc. They were also almost universally disliked by the military who had done the real fighting.
Simply put - Spetsnaz operators are not cops. These two cultures are fundamentally different and deeply antagonistic and what is taking place today in Russia might well be an attempt by the Russian cops to finally get rid of those whom they have always perceived as their main competitors. Likewise, it is quite possible that the former KGB people around Medvedev are now using the reform of the Russian armed forces as a convenient pretext to finally crush the influence of the GRU once and for all.If so, than this is a potential disaster for Russia. The fact is that if a military is reduced in size or substantially reorganized, its intelligence component must be *strengthened* and not weakened. Simply put, the need for a high quality military intelligence service is inversely proportional to the capabilities of the armed forces: the weaker these forces are, the stronger the military intelligence must be.
While the wars in Chechnya and in Georgia have shown that while the Russian military can prevail - brilliantly in the case of Georgia - there still a dire need to reform these forces before the existing cracks in organization, training, command and control, etc. become insurmountable. The Air Force, for example, is now in truly urgent need of new aircraft and the Ground Forces need a major upgrade of its aging command and control infrastructure.
If the Kremlin is serious about reforming the military then it simply cannot do that while allowing the GRU and the forces subordinated to the GRU to become the victim of a purge. Not only would that eliminate any chance for the creation of the planned "mobile forces" (which have been discussed since at least 20 years now), but it would even transform the much needed reform of the armed forces into a disaster at a time when Russia can least afford it.
Sunday, March 30, 2008
Russian Military Intelligence Sees U.S. Military Buildup on Iran Border
THE FOLLOWING IS A ONE YEAR OLD REPORT PICKED UP BY MISTAKE:
MOSCOW, March 27 (RIA Novosti) - Russian military intelligence services are reporting a flurry of activity by U.S. Armed Forces near Iran's borders, a high-ranking security source said Tuesday.
"The latest military intelligence data point to heightened U.S. military preparations for both an air and ground operation against Iran," the official said, adding that the Pentagon has probably not yet made a final decision as to when an attack will be launched.
He said the Pentagon is looking for a way to deliver a strike against Iran "that would enable the Americans to bring the country to its knees at minimal cost."
He also said the U.S. Naval presence in the Persian Gulf has for the first time in the past four years reached the level that existed shortly before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
Col.-Gen. Leonid Ivashov, vice president of the Academy of Geopolitical Sciences, said last week that the Pentagon is planning to deliver a massive air strike on Iran's military infrastructure in the near future.
A new U.S. carrier battle group has been dispatched to the Gulf.
The USS John C. Stennis, with a crew of 3,200 and around 80 fixed-wing aircraft, including F/A-18 Hornet and Superhornet fighter-bombers, eight support ships and four nuclear submarines are heading for the Gulf, where a similar group led by the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower has been deployed since December 2006.
The U.S. is also sending Patriot anti-missile systems to the region.-------
Commentary: General Ivashev is an interesting figure whom I happen to know personally (although not intimately; we met in the mid nineties and I have not seen him in many years). On one hand, he is closely connected to the Russian military intelligence service (the GRU), while on the other he is definitely an outspoken critic of the USA and of NATO. He clearly would have an interest in spreading any information detrimental those whom he sees as implacable foes of his country
Also, I have to note here that even though General Ivashev has been warning of a US attack on Iran many times already, this attack has not happened so far. Of course, this could be due to the fact that it was called off at the latest moment (I believe that this exactly what happened on at least one occasion).
Whatever the motives of General Ivashev's most recent declaration, his warnings should be taken very seriously because he is *exactly* the type of figure which the GRU would use to leak out classified information. Here is why:
1) General Ivashev has numerous connections inside the otherwise highly secretive GRU.
2) General Ivashev is popular and trusted among many top GRU officers.
3) General Ivashev cannot be sanctioned or, for that matter, even investigated for being the source of any leaks
While General Ivashev is hated by the Imperial press corps for being a "hardliner" (which he definitely is not, I can vouch for that), and while his latest statements will be dismissed or ignored, I would take his warnings extremely seriously.
The Saker
Friday, November 16, 2007
Putin's legacy and the new Russia
Following Putin's investiture as Russia's next President after Boris Eltsin Russia underwent a dramatic transformation proving wrong those who had assumed that since Putin 'had been picked by Eltsin' the country would continue on its previous course. It is now obvious that the drunken Eltsin had not 'picked' anyone, but that powerful forces had imposed Putin as the successor to Elstin who was forced to announce his resignation on live TV on December 31, 1999.
Some of the changes which have occured are definitely due to the price of oil which, courtesy of the policies of the US Neocons, climbed dramatically since December 1999. Russia, now awash with cash, could not only start re-building much of what had been destroyed in the catastrophic nineties, but it could also start throwing around some of its newly aquired financial and political weight.
A number of factors have contributed to the new face of Putin's Russia:
Powerful intelligence and security agencies
First and foremost, Putin's accession to power was a major victory for what remained of the crippled the intelligence and security services of the former Soviet Union. All of them, with one very important exception, had been crippled by the so-called 'reforms' of the Eltsin era. Now, under Putin, this period of chaos and collapse has come to an end. There are still tensions between the various security agencies, but by and large the three "big ones" (SVR, foreign intelligence, FSB, internal security, GRU, military intelligence) have recovered much of their former capabilities and are not acting in a coordinated manner.
Putin, himself a former officier of the KGB's external intelligence directorate (PGU) has apparently even succeeded in getting powerful
GRU to fully support him. For example, he has built new high-tech luxury headquarters for the GRU (see photo) which can only be described as lavish and he personally came to inaugurate them.
This event was particularly remarkable for two reasons: not only had the GRU always been the arch-rival of the KGB (the two organizations purged each other in the past) but, unlike the KGB, it used to be a super-secret organization whose existence was never mentioned publicly (most Soviets did not even know its name). For the ex-PGU KGB officer Putin to come and inaugurate these new headwuarters in the presence of all the main Russian TV channels (see video here) was something quite extraordinary. Even more amazing is the fact that these new headquarters were far superior to anything the SVR foreign intelligence service had (in fact, these are probably the most luxurious and advanced headquarters for any military intelligence agency anywhere in the world).
At the inauguration, Putin made a very interesting speech (full text here) in which he praised the GRU for its excellent past performance and in which he stressed its importance, alongside all the other security and intelligence agencies, for the future security of Russia. His speech was a public commitment for an unwavering support of the GRU the future. The old enmity between the KGB and the GRU certainly seem over at last.
One might get the idea that the quasi total collapse of the Russian armed forces in the nineties should have equally affected the GRU, but that would be very mistaken: due to its secretive nature, the GRU was the only former Soviet intelligence/security agency which suffered very little during this period. While it lost some of its agents abroad and while some of its combat forces did go through difficulties (lack of funds, officers leaving to join organized crime, the war in Chechnia), its core capabilities were generally preserved and, in some ways, expanded.
The war in Chechnia proved particularly crucial for the GRU under whose control the Spetsnaz forces have remained and who proved invaluable in successfully suppressing the Chechen insurgency (note: there have been many (and often silly) things written about the many and various so-called 'Spetsnaz forces' existing in Russia today; I am only referring here to the ones under GRU control). In fact, Putin and his administration have fully realized that the conflict in Chechnia is far more likely to be a blueprint for future security challenges for Russia that a 'World War III' -type of scenario with large armored formations fighting or nuclear strikes exchanged. Consequently, while maintaining a minimal deterrent capability for such a major conflict, Russia has clearly defined intelligence and special operations has the top military security priority.
Simultaneously, the SVR has been directed to focus on political and economic intelligence, in particular throught its extensive penetration of and, to a certain degree, by the new Russian business elite and organized crime.
Lastly, the FSB has gradually been re-built into an effective internal security force thanks for far better funding and a restored public image.
Government, business and organized crime
It now is simply impossible to say where the legitimate Russian business community ends and where Russian organized crime begins. Furthermore, considering the mutual interpenetration of government, business and organized crime, Russia could be fairly be described as a "thugocracy". While this has arguably reached previously unheard of proportions, this is hardly something really new.
Since before the 1917 Revoltuion, Bolshevik Party was composed of two main elements: the ideologues (who openly advocated terror as a key political instrument) and regular criminals. These two groups, united in a common hatred of the traditional Russian culture, joined forces in overthrowing the corrupt and totally incompetent Provisional Government of Kerensky. Under Lenin, these two elements coexisted to a certain degree, but the top echelons of the Party where firmly in the ideologues' hands. After Lenin's death, the common thugs, lead by Stalin, gradually eliminated the ideologues in a series of bloody purges and secured their grip on power. The regular thugs remained in power until the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.
One illustration of this phenomenon can be found in the little-known fact that even the presumably omnipotent KGB was barred from even investigating members of the Central Committee (in contrast, under Lenin, the ChK (ancestor of the KGB) could investigate anyone it wanted, including top Party official). This situation was extremely conducive to large scale corruption and crime which always flourished in the former Soviet Union.
After 1991, a large section of the former Party elites simply plundered the country from all its resources and wealth and the size and power of the Russian mob simply exploded. Billions of dollars were taken out of the country. Eventually, most of the original 'oligarchs', mobsters and assorted 'New Russian businessmen' either emigrated, retired, were jailed or were killed by competitors. Those who remained, arguably the toughest and smartest, fused into the new power elite which now rules Russia.
The Russian intelligence community has made good use of this new situation and instead of relying mainly on diplomats, TASS correspondents or trade representatives as in the past, it now can conduct its operations thorough a vast and diverse array of Russians abroad which now also includes tourists, business people, NGO members, emigres, etc. As a result, Russian intelligence collection capabilities have been vastly improved.
Not so new ideologies revived to achieve popular support
The old communist ideology is not quite dead yet and some, mostly elderly, people still believe in it, but its political relevance is close to zero, in particular among the younger generation. Realizing that there was a need to fill this ideological vacuum, the new rulers of Russia have resurrected an old Stalinist favorite, the ideology of 'national-Bolshevism', and they adapted it to the new realities. The regime was greatly aided in this by the other Soviet era institution (besides the GRU) which had undergone no significant reform whatsoever: the Moscow Patriarchate, an old ally of the Soviet regime.
Immediately after Putin's arrival in the Kremlin the SVR foreign intelligence agency directed the Moscow Patriarchate to embark on a major campaign to attempt to lure the previously anti-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (sometimes called the "White Church") back into Moscow's fold. Aided by some sympathizers among the bishops of the emigre Church, this operation fully succeeded and, in May of 2007, the two previously hostile branches of the Russian Orthodox Church signed a union declaration which turned the former "White Church" into little more than a foreign branch of the Moscow Patriarchate. More importantly, Putin could now claim that the 'civil war was over' and that 'the entire Russian Orthodox Church supports the government'.
The dominant ideology of the new Russia is a strange mix of several 'shells' with very little substance to them: the appearance of democracy, mixed with an appearance of patriotism, mixed with an appearance of Orthodox Christianity - all packaged with a bizarre combination of pre-1917, old Soviet and "new Russian' symbols. An example of that is the 'new' Russian national anthem which kept the music of the old Soviet one, but which now features new lyrics.
In reality, of course, this new ideology is just a parody of the real thing, and the rulers of Russia are neither democratic, nor patriotic nor Orthodox: they are only about power. At the core, they are still simply thugs.
Still, traditional Russian flags are seen alongside red Soviet-style banners, ex-KGB officers are shown on TV attending church services, and 'patriotic values' are exalted in the official media. As a result, this more palatable ideological mixture, combined with improved government services, an objectively stronger Russian economy and vivid memories of the horrors on the nineties, provide a new propaganda machine (modeled on the US corporate media) with all the ingredients to make Vladimir Putin and his regime popular with many Russians.
Authoritarianism with a 'human face'?
The part of the old KGB which dealt with political dissent (the 5th Main Directorate) was rapidly disbanded after the end of the Soviet Union. It could never have dreamed of achieving what a Western-style propaganda machine did for Putin since 2000. Not only is Putin genuinely popular in Russia, but even the old KGB is seen by many as not nearly as bad as some would think. According to Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the author of the seminal "Gulag Archipelago", the Bolshevik terror in Russia killed an estimated 70'000'000 people. Still, Putin had no difficulties whatsoever when he created the official holiday of the "day of the workers of the security services of the Russian Federation" (день работников органов безопасности РФ), otherwise known as the "day of the Chekist", celebrated on the 20th of December each year, the date in which the ancestor of the KGB, the Cheka, was created by Vladimir Lenin immediately after the Bolshevik 'October Revolution'. In comparison with the chaos, terror and plunder of Russia under the 'democratic' Eltsin regime, the very real, if harsh, order most Soviets enjoyed under the watchful eye of the KGB seems preferable to most Russians. And just as in the United States, most Russians prefer the safety of a police state to, for example, the kind of horrors Chechen terrorists have perpetrated against innocent civilians.
A quiet but dangerous foe for the USA
The contrast between Eltsin and Putin external policies could not have been greater. Where Eltsin, and his pathetic foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, did everything and anything demanded from them by their bosses and protectors in Washington, Putin and his foreign minister Sergei Ivanov (another ex-KGB officer) quietly re-oriented Russia's foreign policy towards a much more independent course.
With drunken Party bureaucrats and subservient lackeys finally gone, Russia's foreign policy immediately, if discreetly, distanced itself from Washington's imperial adventures. While the old, and admittedly often silly, anti-Western propaganda was not revived, Russia has gone to great pains to distance itself from the increasingly reviled Bush administration.
By its insistence that a 'multi-polar' international system needed to resist the 'hegemonic tendencies of some countries' (the nice way of referring to US imperial policies) Russia allied itself to many other countries which shared similar concerns including, most importantly China. Initially Russia had explored the possibility of a 'strategic partnership' with the USA but the crudely anti-Russian policies of the Neocons in the White House, in particularly in the Russian "near abroad" (the former Soviet republics) served to totally alienate Moscow from any such illusions. Now, instead of seeing the USA as a possible partner, Russia sees it as the "main adversary" just as it had in the Soviet era. The blame for this disastrous evolution, at least for the USA, can only be laid on the Bush administration whose Neocons probably hate anything Russian even more than they hate anything Islamic.
Unlike the old USSR, Putin's Russia will not engage in useless rhetorical attacks against the West and we will not see Putin banging his shoe at the UN anytime soon, but the new Russia will oppose the Empire far more effectively by becoming an invisible foe which will quietly act behind the scenes to weaken it in every possible way.
Russian elites are fully aware of the fact that all the main threats to Russia's national interests are directly linked to Washington's systematic support of anything anti-Russian. No matter how undemocratic, corrupt, cruel and otherwise abhorrent a despot is - if he is anti-Russian the US will provide him with aid and support.
The Russian also realize that they cannot overtly oppose Washington and that there is no need for them to do so: the self-defeating policies of the Neocon White House are already weakening the USA more than anything Moscow could do. Russia will thus quietly further develop its capabilities and wait for the USA to further corner itself into an impossible situation (which it is already doing in many places). All Russia needs to do now is avoid getting sucked in in the inevitable decline of the US Empire.
Russia and the coming US aggression against Iran
It has been suggested by some ill-informed commentators that Russia might actually use its military to defend Iran against a US attack. This is utter nonsense. Russia would have absolutely nothing to gain, and everything to loose, in getting militarily involved in a US-Iranian conflict. Considering that there is no way the USA can win a conflict with Iran (see my analysis of Iranian asymmetrical responses in my previous article on this issue) one could make the case that Russia actually has a lot to gain from a US attack on Iran (beginning with yet another dramatic rise in the price of oil). Furthermore, it is my belief that Russia has fundamentally given up the use of military force in any scenario besides self-defense. Whether by choice or as a result of a pragmatic analysis of its capabilities, the new Russian leaders have made no efforts whatsoever to maintain much of an offensive military capability against the USA. It appears that Russia will be quite content to remain a 'only' Eurasian military power and will just maintain enough of a strategic deterrent to prevent the USA from directly attacking it.
Conclusion
One does not need to be an admirer of Vladimir Putin (which I am most definitely not) to recognize his tremendous achievements in a relatively short period of time and under the most difficult of circumstances: the Russian economy is booming, Chechnia is firmly under the control of a pro-Moscow thug, the regime is undeniably popular, Russia is back on the international scene and does not take orders from Washington anymore, government services are gradually becoming functional again and the succession of Putin by his protege Ivanov seems a done deal. While there are still plenty of unresolved problems to deal with (poverty for the old and weak, corruption, legal reforms, the long delayed restructuring of the regular armed forces, social issues such as crime and substance abuse, etc.) none of them represent a major threat to the Russian thugocracy.
It has taken the ex-KGB men less than a decade to bring their version of Russia back on the world stage. This is truly a remarkable achievement.
Some of the changes which have occured are definitely due to the price of oil which, courtesy of the policies of the US Neocons, climbed dramatically since December 1999. Russia, now awash with cash, could not only start re-building much of what had been destroyed in the catastrophic nineties, but it could also start throwing around some of its newly aquired financial and political weight.
A number of factors have contributed to the new face of Putin's Russia:
Powerful intelligence and security agencies
First and foremost, Putin's accession to power was a major victory for what remained of the crippled the intelligence and security services of the former Soviet Union. All of them, with one very important exception, had been crippled by the so-called 'reforms' of the Eltsin era. Now, under Putin, this period of chaos and collapse has come to an end. There are still tensions between the various security agencies, but by and large the three "big ones" (SVR, foreign intelligence, FSB, internal security, GRU, military intelligence) have recovered much of their former capabilities and are not acting in a coordinated manner.
Putin, himself a former officier of the KGB's external intelligence directorate (PGU) has apparently even succeeded in getting powerful
GRU to fully support him. For example, he has built new high-tech luxury headquarters for the GRU (see photo) which can only be described as lavish and he personally came to inaugurate them.This event was particularly remarkable for two reasons: not only had the GRU always been the arch-rival of the KGB (the two organizations purged each other in the past) but, unlike the KGB, it used to be a super-secret organization whose existence was never mentioned publicly (most Soviets did not even know its name). For the ex-PGU KGB officer Putin to come and inaugurate these new headwuarters in the presence of all the main Russian TV channels (see video here) was something quite extraordinary. Even more amazing is the fact that these new headquarters were far superior to anything the SVR foreign intelligence service had (in fact, these are probably the most luxurious and advanced headquarters for any military intelligence agency anywhere in the world).
At the inauguration, Putin made a very interesting speech (full text here) in which he praised the GRU for its excellent past performance and in which he stressed its importance, alongside all the other security and intelligence agencies, for the future security of Russia. His speech was a public commitment for an unwavering support of the GRU the future. The old enmity between the KGB and the GRU certainly seem over at last.
One might get the idea that the quasi total collapse of the Russian armed forces in the nineties should have equally affected the GRU, but that would be very mistaken: due to its secretive nature, the GRU was the only former Soviet intelligence/security agency which suffered very little during this period. While it lost some of its agents abroad and while some of its combat forces did go through difficulties (lack of funds, officers leaving to join organized crime, the war in Chechnia), its core capabilities were generally preserved and, in some ways, expanded.The war in Chechnia proved particularly crucial for the GRU under whose control the Spetsnaz forces have remained and who proved invaluable in successfully suppressing the Chechen insurgency (note: there have been many (and often silly) things written about the many and various so-called 'Spetsnaz forces' existing in Russia today; I am only referring here to the ones under GRU control). In fact, Putin and his administration have fully realized that the conflict in Chechnia is far more likely to be a blueprint for future security challenges for Russia that a 'World War III' -type of scenario with large armored formations fighting or nuclear strikes exchanged. Consequently, while maintaining a minimal deterrent capability for such a major conflict, Russia has clearly defined intelligence and special operations has the top military security priority.
Simultaneously, the SVR has been directed to focus on political and economic intelligence, in particular throught its extensive penetration of and, to a certain degree, by the new Russian business elite and organized crime.
Lastly, the FSB has gradually been re-built into an effective internal security force thanks for far better funding and a restored public image.
Government, business and organized crime
It now is simply impossible to say where the legitimate Russian business community ends and where Russian organized crime begins. Furthermore, considering the mutual interpenetration of government, business and organized crime, Russia could be fairly be described as a "thugocracy". While this has arguably reached previously unheard of proportions, this is hardly something really new.
Since before the 1917 Revoltuion, Bolshevik Party was composed of two main elements: the ideologues (who openly advocated terror as a key political instrument) and regular criminals. These two groups, united in a common hatred of the traditional Russian culture, joined forces in overthrowing the corrupt and totally incompetent Provisional Government of Kerensky. Under Lenin, these two elements coexisted to a certain degree, but the top echelons of the Party where firmly in the ideologues' hands. After Lenin's death, the common thugs, lead by Stalin, gradually eliminated the ideologues in a series of bloody purges and secured their grip on power. The regular thugs remained in power until the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.
One illustration of this phenomenon can be found in the little-known fact that even the presumably omnipotent KGB was barred from even investigating members of the Central Committee (in contrast, under Lenin, the ChK (ancestor of the KGB) could investigate anyone it wanted, including top Party official). This situation was extremely conducive to large scale corruption and crime which always flourished in the former Soviet Union.
After 1991, a large section of the former Party elites simply plundered the country from all its resources and wealth and the size and power of the Russian mob simply exploded. Billions of dollars were taken out of the country. Eventually, most of the original 'oligarchs', mobsters and assorted 'New Russian businessmen' either emigrated, retired, were jailed or were killed by competitors. Those who remained, arguably the toughest and smartest, fused into the new power elite which now rules Russia.
The Russian intelligence community has made good use of this new situation and instead of relying mainly on diplomats, TASS correspondents or trade representatives as in the past, it now can conduct its operations thorough a vast and diverse array of Russians abroad which now also includes tourists, business people, NGO members, emigres, etc. As a result, Russian intelligence collection capabilities have been vastly improved.
Not so new ideologies revived to achieve popular support
The old communist ideology is not quite dead yet and some, mostly elderly, people still believe in it, but its political relevance is close to zero, in particular among the younger generation. Realizing that there was a need to fill this ideological vacuum, the new rulers of Russia have resurrected an old Stalinist favorite, the ideology of 'national-Bolshevism', and they adapted it to the new realities. The regime was greatly aided in this by the other Soviet era institution (besides the GRU) which had undergone no significant reform whatsoever: the Moscow Patriarchate, an old ally of the Soviet regime.
Immediately after Putin's arrival in the Kremlin the SVR foreign intelligence agency directed the Moscow Patriarchate to embark on a major campaign to attempt to lure the previously anti-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (sometimes called the "White Church") back into Moscow's fold. Aided by some sympathizers among the bishops of the emigre Church, this operation fully succeeded and, in May of 2007, the two previously hostile branches of the Russian Orthodox Church signed a union declaration which turned the former "White Church" into little more than a foreign branch of the Moscow Patriarchate. More importantly, Putin could now claim that the 'civil war was over' and that 'the entire Russian Orthodox Church supports the government'.
The dominant ideology of the new Russia is a strange mix of several 'shells' with very little substance to them: the appearance of democracy, mixed with an appearance of patriotism, mixed with an appearance of Orthodox Christianity - all packaged with a bizarre combination of pre-1917, old Soviet and "new Russian' symbols. An example of that is the 'new' Russian national anthem which kept the music of the old Soviet one, but which now features new lyrics.
In reality, of course, this new ideology is just a parody of the real thing, and the rulers of Russia are neither democratic, nor patriotic nor Orthodox: they are only about power. At the core, they are still simply thugs.
Still, traditional Russian flags are seen alongside red Soviet-style banners, ex-KGB officers are shown on TV attending church services, and 'patriotic values' are exalted in the official media. As a result, this more palatable ideological mixture, combined with improved government services, an objectively stronger Russian economy and vivid memories of the horrors on the nineties, provide a new propaganda machine (modeled on the US corporate media) with all the ingredients to make Vladimir Putin and his regime popular with many Russians.
Authoritarianism with a 'human face'?
The part of the old KGB which dealt with political dissent (the 5th Main Directorate) was rapidly disbanded after the end of the Soviet Union. It could never have dreamed of achieving what a Western-style propaganda machine did for Putin since 2000. Not only is Putin genuinely popular in Russia, but even the old KGB is seen by many as not nearly as bad as some would think. According to Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the author of the seminal "Gulag Archipelago", the Bolshevik terror in Russia killed an estimated 70'000'000 people. Still, Putin had no difficulties whatsoever when he created the official holiday of the "day of the workers of the security services of the Russian Federation" (день работников органов безопасности РФ), otherwise known as the "day of the Chekist", celebrated on the 20th of December each year, the date in which the ancestor of the KGB, the Cheka, was created by Vladimir Lenin immediately after the Bolshevik 'October Revolution'. In comparison with the chaos, terror and plunder of Russia under the 'democratic' Eltsin regime, the very real, if harsh, order most Soviets enjoyed under the watchful eye of the KGB seems preferable to most Russians. And just as in the United States, most Russians prefer the safety of a police state to, for example, the kind of horrors Chechen terrorists have perpetrated against innocent civilians.
A quiet but dangerous foe for the USA
The contrast between Eltsin and Putin external policies could not have been greater. Where Eltsin, and his pathetic foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, did everything and anything demanded from them by their bosses and protectors in Washington, Putin and his foreign minister Sergei Ivanov (another ex-KGB officer) quietly re-oriented Russia's foreign policy towards a much more independent course.
With drunken Party bureaucrats and subservient lackeys finally gone, Russia's foreign policy immediately, if discreetly, distanced itself from Washington's imperial adventures. While the old, and admittedly often silly, anti-Western propaganda was not revived, Russia has gone to great pains to distance itself from the increasingly reviled Bush administration.
By its insistence that a 'multi-polar' international system needed to resist the 'hegemonic tendencies of some countries' (the nice way of referring to US imperial policies) Russia allied itself to many other countries which shared similar concerns including, most importantly China. Initially Russia had explored the possibility of a 'strategic partnership' with the USA but the crudely anti-Russian policies of the Neocons in the White House, in particularly in the Russian "near abroad" (the former Soviet republics) served to totally alienate Moscow from any such illusions. Now, instead of seeing the USA as a possible partner, Russia sees it as the "main adversary" just as it had in the Soviet era. The blame for this disastrous evolution, at least for the USA, can only be laid on the Bush administration whose Neocons probably hate anything Russian even more than they hate anything Islamic.
Unlike the old USSR, Putin's Russia will not engage in useless rhetorical attacks against the West and we will not see Putin banging his shoe at the UN anytime soon, but the new Russia will oppose the Empire far more effectively by becoming an invisible foe which will quietly act behind the scenes to weaken it in every possible way.
Russian elites are fully aware of the fact that all the main threats to Russia's national interests are directly linked to Washington's systematic support of anything anti-Russian. No matter how undemocratic, corrupt, cruel and otherwise abhorrent a despot is - if he is anti-Russian the US will provide him with aid and support.
The Russian also realize that they cannot overtly oppose Washington and that there is no need for them to do so: the self-defeating policies of the Neocon White House are already weakening the USA more than anything Moscow could do. Russia will thus quietly further develop its capabilities and wait for the USA to further corner itself into an impossible situation (which it is already doing in many places). All Russia needs to do now is avoid getting sucked in in the inevitable decline of the US Empire.
Russia and the coming US aggression against Iran
It has been suggested by some ill-informed commentators that Russia might actually use its military to defend Iran against a US attack. This is utter nonsense. Russia would have absolutely nothing to gain, and everything to loose, in getting militarily involved in a US-Iranian conflict. Considering that there is no way the USA can win a conflict with Iran (see my analysis of Iranian asymmetrical responses in my previous article on this issue) one could make the case that Russia actually has a lot to gain from a US attack on Iran (beginning with yet another dramatic rise in the price of oil). Furthermore, it is my belief that Russia has fundamentally given up the use of military force in any scenario besides self-defense. Whether by choice or as a result of a pragmatic analysis of its capabilities, the new Russian leaders have made no efforts whatsoever to maintain much of an offensive military capability against the USA. It appears that Russia will be quite content to remain a 'only' Eurasian military power and will just maintain enough of a strategic deterrent to prevent the USA from directly attacking it.
Conclusion
One does not need to be an admirer of Vladimir Putin (which I am most definitely not) to recognize his tremendous achievements in a relatively short period of time and under the most difficult of circumstances: the Russian economy is booming, Chechnia is firmly under the control of a pro-Moscow thug, the regime is undeniably popular, Russia is back on the international scene and does not take orders from Washington anymore, government services are gradually becoming functional again and the succession of Putin by his protege Ivanov seems a done deal. While there are still plenty of unresolved problems to deal with (poverty for the old and weak, corruption, legal reforms, the long delayed restructuring of the regular armed forces, social issues such as crime and substance abuse, etc.) none of them represent a major threat to the Russian thugocracy.
It has taken the ex-KGB men less than a decade to bring their version of Russia back on the world stage. This is truly a remarkable achievement.
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