Threats from the House of Saud: real or hot air?

Last week, HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf bin Abdulaziz al Saud, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Britain and a member of the House of Saud, wrote an op-ed piece in the New York Times entitled "Saudi Arabia Will Go It Alone".  Besides the usual ideological propaganda statements and a predictable litany of Saudi complaints about the West not doing enough, the piece contains a definite though vague threat:

The foreign policy choices being made in some Western capitals risk the stability of the region and, potentially, the security of the whole

Arab world. This means the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has no choice but to become more assertive in international affairs: more determined than ever to stand up for the genuine stability our region so desperately needs.  (...)  We will act to fulfill these responsibilities, with or without the support of our Western partners. Nothing is ruled out in our pursuit of sustainable peace and stability in the Arab World as King Abdullah — then Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince — showed with his leadership of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (...)  We continue to show our determination through our support for the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian opposition. It is too easy for some in the West to use the threat of Al Qaeda’s terrorist operations in Syria as an excuse for hesitation and inaction. Al Qaeda’s activities are a symptom of the international community’s failure to intervene. They should not become a justification for inaction. The way to prevent the rise of extremism in Syria — and elsewhere — is to support the champions of moderation: financially, materially and yes, militarily, if necessary (...) Saudi Arabia will continue on this new track for as long as proves necessary.

Much is said here, much is alluded to and much remains unsaid.  Let's parse this text for the key words: more assertive, nothing ruled out, determined to support the "Syrian opposition" financially, materially and militarily.  Sounds impressive, but is it really?  What can the Saudis really do?  Let's look at their options:

1) Continue to pour money into the international Jihadist gang which has been waging war on Syria for several years: yes, that is an option, but that is nothing new, the Saudis, and their allies, have already been doing that for a long while and it did not help the insurgency.  Pouring even more money into a largely defeated insurgency will really only serve to foster corruption and infighting and won't do anything to reverse the situation.

2) Continue to send weapons to the insurgency: just as with money, the Saudis and their allies have already been doing this too, and it did them no good.  Why?  Because the insurgency has enough light weapons anyway, whereas bigger, more complex, weapons systems are harder to deliver and they need trained personnel to operate.  Even more importantly, a few canons, tanks or multiple rocket launchers cannot be used effectively unless there is a full system of support around them: logistics, ammunition, intelligence, forward artillery controllers, etc.  There is a reason why even when they could seize such weapons from government forces insurgencies rarely could use them effectively.

3) Directly intervene in Syria: well, he did say that "nothing is ruled out", didn't he?  So could the Saudis simply send their military across the border and attack the government forces?  Nope.  Why?  Simply because they do not share a common border and to get to Syria the Saudis would have to cross through western Iraq or Jordan.  Could the Saudis send their air force to provide support to the insurgency? Yes but, again, that would mean overflying Iraq or Jordan, and the Saudis could only do that with the agreement of CENTCOM which is highly unlikely, to say the least (more about that later).

4) Attack Iran or let the Israelis use Saudi airfields for an attack on Iran: sounds crazy, doesn't it?  But think about again.  First, after decades of semi-secret collaboration the Saudis and the Israelis have recently upgraded their relationship to something looking like a semi-official love story.  And, look at the example of "nothing is ruled out" which Prince Mohammed gives in his text: the Saudi 2002 "Peace Initiative" offered to Israel.  So if really "nothing is ruled out" then we should not rule out a sudden "strategic rapprochement" between the two crazy religious and racist regimes in the Middle East: the KSA and the Israel. Neither should we rule out a possible joint action against Iran by these two rogue states who now make no secret that feel that the Obama Administration is letting them down.  Scary though?  Yes, but considering the lunatics involved, one which we need to consider.

What is the main impediment for an Israel attack on Iran?  Distance.

Sure, the Israelis could use ballistic or cruise missiles, but they would not provide the kind of flexible capabilities needed to severely degrade Iranian nuclear facilities and associated research centers.  That is a job for the air force.  The problem for the Israeli Air Force is not only that it does not have a common border with Iran and that they would need to get all sorts of authorizations to cross the airspace between Israel and Iran, but also that considering the distances involved an airstrike would require air-to-air refueling which, in turn, would require even more aircraft in the air to protect strike force.  To make things worse, Iran is a big country, so several strike groups should be sent to different target groups to hit them and each strike group would have to be refueled, protected, and allowed to penetrate into Iranian airspace by dedicated suppression of enemy air defenses aircraft, including strike and electronic warfare aircraft.  Bottom line - it would be a huge operation and one which the Israelis simply cannot carry out.  But what if we assume that they could use Saudi airfields?

This option does not solve all problems, but it does address a lot of the worst problems involved in a direct attack from Israel.  First, if the Israelis were allowed to refuel in Saudi Arabia, they would not need to rely on always very complicated and dangerous air-to-air refueling.  That would immediately free many aircraft for other tasks.  Second, taking off from Saudi Arabia would place all of Iran well within the reach of Israeli strike aircraft which could then be "spread" all over the Iranian airspace to support each other.  The Israelis could even deploy helicopters to rescue

any downed pilot.  Third, taking off from Saudi Arabia would make it possible to attack some key Iranian targets with little or no warning since they are literally across the Persian Gulf.  The nuclear site at Bushehr could be revisited many times by successive waves from strike aircraft until the bomb damage assessment confirms that the target has been destroyed.  Furthermore, if the KSA takes the decision to offer its airfields to the Israeli Air Force it might as well offer military support, if only to protect itself.  If the Saudi Air Force decided to support the Israeli attack - especially with its AWACs and F-15s - it would make a huge difference.  The bottom line is this: if the Saudis and the Isarelis really decided to join forces they could strike Iran in a way which the Israelis alone could never hope for.  This would probably be a done deal by now if not for one big problem: CENTCOM.

All the fancy scenarios about a joint KSA-Isareli attack have to assume that the US CENTCOM would, at the very least, stand by and let such an attack proceed without taking any action.  This is highly unlikely because the Americans understand perfectly that any Iranian retaliatory strike would be primarily directed at them at which point the US would be as involved as the KSA or Israel.  From the American point of view, it would make no sense at all to let the Israelis and the Saudis start a war which would immediately result in the USA being involved.  At that point, the USA would be far better off starting the war by itself not only because the USAF and Navy are far more powerful and capable than the combined forces of Israel and the KSA, but primarily because the USA would be in control of the time, scope and manner of execution of the attack.  The USA, however, is clearly not interested in starting a war with Iran.

Knowing the Israelis, I am sure that they have carefully considered the option of simply ignoring Washington and going ahead with their customary chutzpah: let's start the war for the goyim - they won't dare stopping us anyway - and then see how they handle it.

Sounds crazy?  Yes, of course.  Because it is.  Too crazy for the Saudis and the Israelis?  I am not so sure.  The Saudis fully understand that if Assad remains in power this would make the so-called "Shia crescent" even more powerful than before the war against Syria started.  They also understand that if Assad is allowed to remain in power, the chances of a US attack on Iran will dramatically decrease, leaving them terrified of what their powerful neighbor might do.  The same goes for Israel which, for its own reasons, is also terrified of the Shia alliance of Hezbollah - Syria - Iran.  There can be no doubt at all that the Israelis and the Saudis would do anything for the Americans to get rid of the Shia threat against them.  But it appears that at least for the time being the USA does not want to comply with their crazy wish.

But would the Americans dare to use force to stop an Israeli attack on Iran?

That is really the key question and while we will only have a definitive answer to that if such a situation happens, I personally strongly believe that yes, the Americans would basically tell the Israelis to "turn back or else..."

Why?

Because what is at stake here is much more than just a local fight between Shia, Wahabis and Zionists: a US-Iranian war would inflame all of the Middle-East and possible spread way beyond this region.  According to some models, it could even result in a World War.  And that is something which Obama or, rather, those who put Obama into the White House do not want.  For all his long list of failings and screw-ups, there is one thing of significance which did do: he got rid of most of the Neocons and now the "Israel Firsters" have been replaced by "USA Firsters" and the latter have absolutely no intention to risk it all for the benefit of two rogue states lead by psychopaths.  It is impossible to prove it, but my guess is that, if really pushed into a corner by the usual Israeli arrogance, the Americans will use force to prevent an unauthorized Israeli attack on Iran.

For one thing, it is not too hard to conceal from the general public what really took place in the airspace over Saudi Arabia in the middle of the night.  Second, if the Americans actually open fire on the Israeli strike force, the Israelis will have no other option than to turn back.  Finally, the Americans also have a much simpler option: they can prevent the Israelis from refueling on the Saudi airfields.

In other words, this Saudi-Israeli attack ain't happening, at least as long as Obama or his allies are in the White House.

It appears that for all his grand statements about Saudi Arabia going at it alone, Prince Mohammed cannot back his words with some meaningful action.  The House of Saud and the Netanyahu can make all the bellicose statements they want - unless Uncle Sam allows it there is absolutely nothing they can do.  CENTCOM is the real master and overlord of the Middle-East and as long as CENTCOM does not want something - it ain't happening.

The Saker

Adm. Fallon Presses Case Against Iran

Bahrain (AP) -- The top U.S. military commander for the Middle East is pressing Arab allies to form a more united front against Iran, seen by Washington as the region's long-term threat.

At military compounds and royal reception halls across the Persian Gulf, Adm. William Fallon is delivering personal appeals to Arab leaders to counter Iran's ambitions to expand its regional influence and move ahead with its nuclear program.

Fallon has carefully avoided publicly discussing any war contingency plans or making any direct threats against Iran, which sits in his sphere of operations. As head of U.S. Central Command, he oversees forces in Central Asia, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.

His current 10-day trip, which began Saturday in Bahrain, was more about seeking to quietly galvanize Gulf leaders while letting others sharply escalate pressure on Tehran. On Sunday, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said the world should prepare for war if Iran obtains nuclear weapons.

"We are not looking for a new NATO-type alliance against Iran," Fallon told The Associated Press after talks with Bahrain's defense minister, Sheik Khalifa bin Ahmad Al Khalifa.

But the U.S. wants that "when they (Iran) look to the Gulf, they see a group united in response to Iranian hegemonic behavior," Fallon said.

That's not such a simple task.

Many of the small Gulf nations, including Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, have deep cultural, historical or business ties to Iran and increasingly look to Iran as a crucial source for oil and gas as their own fields begin to dwindle in coming decades. They also worry about angering local Shiite communities with affinity to Shiite heavyweight Iran.

In May, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was allowed by authorities in Dubai — the economic dynamo of the Emirates — to lead a rare anti-American rally a day after a visit by Vice President Dick Cheney aimed at countering Tehran's influence.

Still, strong forces pull Gulf states in Washington's direction.

The Gulf's main power, Saudi Arabia, worries about its regional rival Iran increasing its influence among Shiite Muslims, who form a majority in Iraq and have significant communities among the Sunni-dominated nations of the Gulf.

Washington also has forged close military alliances across the Gulf with about 40,000 U.S. troops on land bases — including Kuwait as a key staging ground for Iraq and an expanding presence in Bahrain as host of the U.S. 5th Fleet headquarters.

"These governments realize that they cannot make an enemy of Iran because they have to live with Iran right across the Gulf. On the other hand, they don't want to harm their ties with the United States, which has many interests in the neighborhood," said Ali al-Ahmed, director of the Institute for Gulf Affairs in Washington. "It's a very difficult spot."

Fallon carries the message that the Gulf states are an important front-line deterrent to Iran, which controls the entire northern coastline of the Gulf and could threaten critical oil tanker routes through the Strait of Hormuz.

Military officials with knowledge of Fallon's meetings also suggested that pressure from Gulf nations could dissuade Iranian naval forces from challenging U.S. and allies watching over Iraqi oil platforms and shipping lanes into Kuwait and Iraq. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the media.

They said small vessels of Iran's Revolutionary Guard — operating independently from the regular Iranian navy — have apparently been increasing patrols just inside Iran's maritime borders near Iraq's tiny Gulf coast. This is the area where 15 British soldiers and marines were seized in March and held for 13 days by Iran, which claimed the Britons strayed into its waters.

The United States and other nations, led by Britain and Australia, currently have more than two dozen ships in the Gulf region, including the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise and two amphibious ships with their strike groups.

The Enterprise arrived last month shortly after the departure of two carriers, USS John C. Stennis and USS Nimitz, which had been in the Gulf since February in a show of force against Iran.

Fallon's predecessor, retired Gen. John Abizaid, said in Washington on Monday that U.S. forces have the power to "deter Iran should it become nuclear."

"We want to send Iran a message that there are no cracks between the U.S. and its allies here," Fallon said.

His views have the ear of some of the top members of the Gulf's royal families.

In Bahrain, Fallon expressed support for a possible $300 million upgrade for the nation's F-16 fleet and met with Crown Prince Sheik Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, who also serves as commander in chief of the nation's military forces.

Fallon was in the United Arab Emirates on Tuesday. Later in the day, he headed to Oman, and his tour will also take him to Qatar, Kuwait, Afghanistan and Iraq.
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So much for any hopes that Fallon opposes a war against Iran; looks like he jumped ship after all - VS

Iran Slams Kouchner comments and reiterates threat to US forces

TEHRAN -- Iranian media launched a blistering attack on France Monday after its foreign minister warned the world to brace for war.

Kouchner said Sunday his country must prepare for the possibility of war against Iran over its nuclear program.

The French minister also told RTL radio and LCI television that the world's major powers should use further sanctions against Iran.

Kouchner said France had asked French firms not to bid for tenders in the Islamic Republic.

The Israeli occupying regime was quick to welcome the acerbic remarks by Kouchner, describing them as "positive".

The Zionist regime is the Middle East's sole nuclear power, which is believed to possess more than 200 atomic warheads.

In an editorial, Iran's IRNA news agency said, "The new occupants of the Elysee want to copy the White House," referring to the French presidential palace.

It said that since Nicolas Sarkozy took over as president from Jacques Chirac and promoted closer ties with the US, "he has taken on an American skin".

"The French people will never forget the era when a non-European moved into the Elysee," it said.

Sarkozy has himself bluntly warned that Iran risks being bombed if the nuclear standoff is not resolved

In Sunday's interview, Kouchner said, "We have to prepare for the worst, and the worst is war."

IRNA added: "The occupants of the Elysee have become the executors of the will of the White House and have adopted a tone that is even harder, even more inflammatory and more illogical than that of Washington."

France has economic interests in Iran, especially in the oil and automobile industries, but its line on the nuclear standoff has hardened considerably since Sarkozy came to power.

Iran has said it will never initiate any attack but will respond with crushing force if any strike is launched on its territory.

A top general in the Revolutionary Guards said that Iran's missiles could hit a range of targets belonging to US troops operating in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan.

"Today the Americans are around our country but this does not mean that they are encircling us. They are encircled themselves and are within our range," General Mohammad Hassan Koussechi told IRNA.

"If the United States is saying that they have identified 2,000 targets in Iran, then what is certain is that it is the Americans who are all around Iran and are equally our targets."

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(Note: this is the third time that a senior Pasdaran commander openly threatens to retaliate against US forces in the Middle East. Before General Mohammad Hassan Koussechi the same threat was previously made by Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Jaafari, the recently appointed commander of the Pasdaran, and by Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, former commander of the Pasdaran and currently Senior Advisor to the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei for Military Affairs. It is worth remembering here that the Pasdaran control Iranian missile forces and that they are directly subordinated to the Supreme Leader)

UPDATE:

The chief UN nuclear inspector criticized talk of attacking Iran as hype Monday, invoking the war in Iraq and saying such options should only be considered as a last resort and only if authorized by the UN Security Council.

"I would not talk about any use of force," said Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in an indirect response to French warnings that the world had to be prepared for the possibility of war in the event that Iran obtains atomic weapons.

(...)

Saying only the UN Security Council could authorize the use of force,
ElBaradei urged the world to remember Iraq before considering any similar
action against Tehran.

"There are rules on how to use force, and I would hope that everybody would have gotten the lesson after the Iraq situation, where 70,000 innocent civilians* have lost their lives on the suspicion that a country has nuclear weapons," ElBaradei told reporters.

He was alluding to a key U.S. argument for invading Iraq in 2003, that
Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear arms.
Four years later, no such arsenals have been found.

ElBaradei, speaking outside a 144-nation meeting of his agency, urged both sides to back away from confrontation, in comments addressed both to Iran and the U.S.-led group of nations pressing for new U.N. sanctions on Tehran for its refusal to end uranium enrichment.

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*El Baradei is wrong here. The actual figure of casualties after the US invasion of Iraq is already over one million (sldo see updated info box on the lower right of this page)

Superior Derided Petraeus as Suck-Up, Opposed the Surge

by Gareth Porter

In sharp contrast to the lionization of Gen. David Petraeus by members of the US Congress during his testimony this week, Petraeus' superior, Admiral William Fallon, chief of the Central Command (CENTCOM), derided Petraeus as a sycophant during their first meeting in Baghdad last March, according to Pentagon sources familiar with reports of the meeting.

Fallon told Petraeus that he considered him to be "an ass-kissing little chickens**t" and added, "I hate people like that," the sources say. That remark reportedly came after Petraeus began the meeting by making remarks that Fallon interpreted as trying to ingratiate himself with a superior.

That extraordinarily contentious start of Fallon's mission to Baghdad led to more meetings marked by acute tension between the two commanders. Fallon went on develop his own alternative to Petraeus' recommendation for continued high levels of US troops in Iraq during the summer.

The enmity between the two commanders became public knowledge when the Washington Post reported Sep. 9 on intense conflict within the administration over Iraq. The story quoted a senior official as saying that referring to "bad relations" between them is "the understatement of the century."

Fallon's derision toward Petraeus reflected both the CENTCOM commander's personal distaste for Petraeus' style of operating and their fundamental policy differences over Iraq, according to the sources.

The policy context of Fallon's extraordinarily abrasive treatment of his subordinate was Petraeus' agreement in February to serve as front man for the George W. Bush administration's effort to sell its policy of increasing US troop strength in Iraq to Congress.

In a highly unusual political role for an officer who had not yet taken command of a war, Petraeus was installed in the office of Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, a Republican from Kentucky, in early February just before the Senate debated Bush's troop increase. According to a report in the Washington Post Feb. 7, senators were then approached on the floor and invited to go McConnell's office to hear Petraeus make the case for the surge policy.

Fallon was strongly opposed to Petraeus' role as pitch man for the surge policy in Iraq adopted by Bush in December as putting his own interests ahead of a sound military posture in the Middle East and Southwest Asia – the area for which Fallon's CENTCOM is responsible.

The CENTCOM commander believed the United States should be withdrawing troops from Iraq urgently, largely because he saw greater dangers elsewhere in the region. "He is very focused on Pakistan," said a source familiar with Fallon's thinking, "and trying to maintain a difficult status quo with Iran."

By the time Fallon took command of CENTCOM in March, Pakistan had become the main safe haven for Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda to plan and carry out its worldwide operations, as well as being an extremely unstable state with both nuclear weapons and the world's largest population of Islamic extremists.

Plans for continued high troop levels in Iraq would leave no troops available for other contingencies in the region.

Fallon was reported by the New York Times to have been determined to achieve results "as soon as possible." The notion of a long war, in contrast, seemed to connote an extended conflict in which Iraq was but a chapter.

Fallon also expressed great skepticism about the basic assumption underlying the surge strategy, which was that it could pave the way for political reconciliation in Iraq. In the lead story Sep. 9, the Washington Post quoted a "senior administration official" as saying that Fallon had been "saying from Day One, 'This isn't working.'"

One of Fallon's first moves upon taking command of CENTCOM was to order his subordinates to avoid the term "long war" – a phrase Bush and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates had used to describe the fight against terrorism.

Fallon was signaling his unhappiness with the policy of US occupation of Iraq for an indeterminate period. Military sources explained that Fallon was concerned that the concept of a long war would alienate Middle East publics by suggesting that US troops would remain in the region indefinitely.

During the summer, according to the Post Sep. 9 report, Fallon began to develop his own plans for redefine the US mission in Iraq, including a plan for withdrawal of three-quarters of the US troop strength by the end of 2009.

The conflict between Fallon and Petraeus over Iraq came to a head in early September. According to the Post story, Fallon expressed views on Iraq that were sharply at odds with those of Petraeus in a three-way conversation with Bush on Iraq the previous weekend. Petraeus argued for keeping as many troops in Iraq for as long as possible to cement any security progress, but Fallon argued that a strategic withdrawal from Iraq was necessary to have sufficient forces to deal with other potential threats in the region.

Fallon's presentation to Bush of the case against Petraeus' recommendation for keeping troop levels in Iraq at the highest possible level just before Petraeus was to go public with his recommendations was another sign that Petraeus' role as chief spokesperson for the surge policy has created a deep rift between him and the nation's highest military leaders. Bush presumably would not have chosen to invite an opponent of the surge policy to make such a presentation without lobbying by the top brass.

Fallon had a "visceral distaste" for what he regarded as Petraeus' sycophantic behavior in general, which had deeper institutional roots, according to a military source familiar with his thinking.

Fallon is a veteran of 35 years in the Navy, operating in an institutional culture in which an officer is expected to make enemies in the process of advancement. "If you are Navy captain and don't have two or three enemies, you're not doing your job," says the source.

Fallon acquired a reputation for a willingness to stand up to powerful figures during his tenure as commander in chief of the Pacific Command from February 2005 to March 2007. He pushed hard for a conciliatory line toward and China, which put him in conflict with senior military and civilian officials with a vested interest in pointing to China as a future rival and threat.

He demonstrated his independence from the White House when he refused in February to go along with a proposal to send a third naval carrier task force to the Persian Gulf, as reported by IPS in May. Fallon questioned the military necessity for the move, which would have signaled to Iran a readiness to go to war. Fallon also privately vowed that there would be no war against Iran on his watch, implying that he would quit rather than accept such a policy.

A crucial element of Petraeus' path of advancement in the Army, on the other hand, was through serving as an aide to senior generals. He was assistant executive officer to the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Carl Vuono, and later executive assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Henry Shelton. His experience taught him that cultivating senior officers is the key to success.

The contrasting styles of the two men converged with their conflict over Iraq to produce one of the most intense clashes between US military leaders in recent history.

Is the countdown to the attack against Iran resuming?

According to the following sources, CENTCOM is stepping up its posture for a possible attack against Iran: Bush authorizes new covert action against Iran while nine US warships enter the Persian Gulf in show of force constituting largest naval force in the Middle-East since 2003.

An attack againt a country like Iran would have to go through several preparatory phases which, among others, would include the preparations outlined by the Truthout and Debka articles above.

The need of a "psychological preparation of the battlefield" will be taken care of by the United Nations report which will complain of the (predictable) "ongoing Iranian defiance", nevermind the fact that Iran is a member in good standing of the IAEA, that IAEA inspectors are on the groud in Iran, that the NPT not only obliges all nuclear countries to assist others in developing nuclear technologies for civil purposes (as the US helped the Shah before the Iranian Revolution), but that it also specifically recognizes that nothing in the NPT should be interpreted as limiting the right of any country to develop its civilian nuclear program. Nevermind that the Iranian enrichment program does not even come close to enriching to weapons grade specifications, and nevermind that Iran has never attacked a neighbor. When the Iranians simply claim their rights under the NPT their are in "defiance" of the UNSC. And since the UNSC members were dumb and immoral enough yield to US pressures to consider the Iranian nuclear program as a problem, now they will logically (if idiotically) have to take action and if they do not, the US will have to "shoulder its responsability as leader of the world". The Kosovo situation repeated all over again, except that unlike the Serbs, the Iranians do have the means to strike back at the Empire.

More to come soon, no doubt.

Have the crazies finally been sent back the the basement?

On January 26th of this year I sent out a rather alarmist email to my friends mentioning the very real risk of a US aggression against Iran. Among other things, I wrote " Unless the current campaign of leaks from various US officials to the independent media is successful and the public outrage tips the balance (which is still quite possible - as the anti-war rally in Washington, DC planned for this Monday shows) this new war should start fairly soon, probably within a couple of months". Well, a couple of months has passed and the reaction against the war plans has been far stronger than I have anticipated.

While the independent media and US anti-war movement should get a lot of the credit for their truly herculean efforts efforts to prevent yet another Imperial war, a very different group of people has played a crucial role in the efforts to prevent a war: the old Anglo-Saxon oil lobby.

There have been for many years already two very different groups at the helm of power in the US, the so-called "Neocons" and what I call the old Anglo guard, mostly oil people represented by the likes of James Baker or Brzezinski. Under Bush the Older, these guys referred to the Neocons as "the crazies in the basement" and mostly used them to appease AIPAC and the Evangelical Right. Under Bush the Lesser, the "crazies in the basement" clearly took control from the Old guard at least until the compounded military defeats in Iraq, of course, but also in Afghanistan.

As early as in February there were indications that the US military was opposed to a new war and, according to some sources, US general even threatened to resign en masse should an order to attack Iran be given to them (see the very good article on this issue in The Sunday Times). According to one usually very well informed reporter, Gareth Porter, the US CENCOM Commander, Adm. William Fallon, has now issued a similar threat (see article below and note the highlighted sentence referring to the Neocons).

Does that mean that the war in Iran is off the table now? Not at all.

First, there is little doubt that the US Congress is firmly in Neocon hands, as is the US corporate media. Second, of all the Presidential candidates only two, Ron Paul and Mike Gravel, oppose the war Party - all the rest of them are trying to out-compete each other in bellicose statements in particular Giuliani and the Democrats (the latter can only be described as clueless, brainless and, in particular, spineless)

It appears that the Neocons are running into a combination of problems right now, unexpected both in nature (lawsuits) and magnitude (Anglo campaign of leaks and anti-Neocon publications). Distasteful as it may otherwise be, it appears that only a clear Anglo political victory (say, a huge political scandal involving Cheney) can prevent a war. The scary thing is that for the Neocons, there would be no better way to counter any real political risk to their power than a war with Iran.

So while an imminent aggression against Iran does appear to be less likely, it would take only one "Iranian Gulf of Tonkin" incident to trigger such a war and rally the US public opinion around the flag.

So it ain't over yet, but one can keep hoping that somebody - anybody - will beat back the 'crazies' to the basement from which they crawled out in 2001.


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Commander's Veto Sank Threatening Gulf Buildup

by Gareth Porter

Adm. William Fallon, then President George W. Bush's nominee to head the Central Command (CENTCOM), expressed strong opposition in February to an administration plan to increase the number of carrier strike groups in the Persian Gulf from two to three and vowed privately there would be no war against Iran as long as he was chief of CENTCOM, according to sources with access to his thinking.

Fallon's resistance to the proposed deployment of a third aircraft carrier was followed by a shift in the Bush administration's Iran policy in February and March away from increased military threats and toward diplomatic engagement with Iran. That shift, for which no credible explanation has been offered by administration officials, suggests that Fallon's resistance to a crucial deployment was a major factor in the intra-administration struggle over policy toward Iran.

The plan to add a third carrier strike group in the Gulf had been a key element in a broader strategy discussed at high levels to intimidate Iran by a series of military moves suggesting preparations for a military strike.

Fallon's resistance to a further buildup of naval striking power in the Gulf apparently took the Bush administration by surprise. Fallon, then commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, had been associated with naval aviation throughout his career, and last January, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates publicly encouraged the idea that the appointment presaged greater emphasis on the military option in regard to the U.S. conflict with Iran.

Explaining why he recommended Fallon, Gates said, "As you look at the range of options available to the United States, the use of naval and air power, potentially, it made sense to me for all those reasons for Fallon to have the job."

Bush administration officials had just leaked to CBS News and the New York Times in December that the USS John C. Stennis and its associated warships would be sent to the Gulf in January six weeks earlier than originally planned in order to overlap with the USS Eisenhower and to "send a message to Tehran."

But that was not the end of the signaling to Iran by naval deployment planned by administration officials. The plan was for the USS Nimitz and its associated vessels, scheduled to sail into the Gulf in early April, to overlap with the other two carrier strike groups for a period of months, so that all three would be in the Gulf simultaneously.

Two well-informed sources say they heard about such a plan being pushed at high levels of the administration, and Newsweek's Michael Hirsh and Maziar Bahari reported Feb. 19 that the deployment of a third carrier group to the Gulf was "likely."

That would have brought the U.S. naval presence up to the same level as during the U.S. air campaign against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, when the Lincoln, Constellation, and Kitty Hawk carrier groups were all present. Two other carrier groups helped coordinate bombing sorties from the Mediterranean.

The deployment of three carrier groups simultaneously was not part of a plan for an actual attack on Iran, but was meant to convince Iran that the Bush administration was preparing for possible war if Tehran continued its uranium enrichment program.

At a mid-February meeting of top civilian officials over which Secretary of Defense Gates presided, there was an extensive discussion of a strategy of intimidating Tehran's leaders, according to an account by a Pentagon official who attended the meeting given to a source outside the Pentagon. The plan involved a series of steps that would appear to Tehran to be preparations for war, in a manner similar to the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

But Fallon, who was scheduled to become the CENTCOM chief March 16, responded to the proposed plan by sending a strongly-worded message to the Defense Department in mid-February opposing any further U.S. naval buildup in the Persian Gulf as unwarranted.

"He asked why another aircraft carrier was needed in the Gulf and insisted there was no military requirement for it," says the source, who obtained the gist of Fallon's message from a Pentagon official who had read it.

Fallon's refusal to support a further naval buildup in the Gulf reflected his firm opposition to an attack on Iran and an apparent readiness to put his career on the line to prevent it. A source who met privately with Fallon around the time of his confirmation hearing and who insists on anonymity quoted Fallon as saying that an attack on Iran "will not happen on my watch."

Asked how he could be sure, the source says, Fallon replied, "You know what choices I have. I'm a professional." Fallon said that he was not alone, according to the source, adding, "There are several of us trying to put the crazies back in the box."

Fallon's opposition to adding a third carrier strike group to the two already in the Gulf represented a major obstacle to the plan. The decision to send a second carrier task group to the Gulf had been officially requested by Fallon's predecessor at CENTCOM, Gen. John Abizaid, according to a Dec. 20 report by the Washington Post's Peter Baker. But as Baker reported, the circumstances left little doubt that Abizaid was doing so because the White House wanted it as part of a strategy of sending "pointed messages" to Iran.

CENTCOM commander Fallon's refusal to request the deployment of a third carrier strike group meant that proceeding with that option would carry political risks. The administration chose not to go ahead with the plan. Two days before the Nimitz sailed out of San Diego for the Gulf on April 1, a Navy spokesman confirmed that it would replace the Eisenhower, adding, "There is no plan to overlap them at all."

The defeat of the plan for a third carrier task group in the Gulf appears to have weakened the position of Cheney and other hawks in the administration who had succeeded in selling Bush on the idea of a strategy of coercive threat against Iran.

Within two weeks, the administration's stance had already begun to shift dramatically. On Jan. 12, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had dismissed direct talks with Iran in the absence of Tehran's suspension of its uranium enrichment program as "extortion." But by the end of February, Rice had gotten authorization for high-level diplomatic contacts with Iran in the context of a regional meeting on Iraq in Baghdad.

The explanation for the shift offered by administration officials to the New York Times was that the administration now felt that it "had leverage" on Iran. But that now appears to have been a cover for a retreat from the more aggressive strategy previously planned.

Throughout March and April, the Bush administration avoided aggressive language and the State Department openly sought diplomatic engagement with Iran, culminating in the agreement confirmed by U.S. officials last weekend that bilateral talks will begin with Iran on Iraq.

Despite Vice President Dick Cheney's invocation of the military option from the deck of the USS John C. Stennis in the Persian Gulf last week, the strategy of escalating a threat of war to influence Iran has been put on the shelf, at least for now.

(Inter Press Service)

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