Original: El Murid LiveJournal (Anatoliy Nesmeyanov)Translated from Russian by Gleb Bazov / Edited by @GBabeuf
Over
the course of my stay in Donetsk I saw nothing that was markedly
different from what is publicly known. Up close, however, many things
certainly appeared completely different in detail.
When
the Slavyansk Brigade came to Donetsk, almost immediately the question
of cooperation among the units gathered in the city was raised. Two
paths were evident: the creation of a centralized hierarchical command,
or the establishment of a kind of 'Shura'—a council of commanders. The
first option was fraught with the danger of a civil war within a civil
war; the second one immediately made the process of creating an army a
long-term affair.
The
commanders chose the second path, especially since I did not observe
any of them to have any particular disagreements with Strelkov. The
question of the Vostok Battalion and Khodakovskiy was treated
separately, although, as I understand it, a solution to this issue was
also found.
At
this moment in time, the Militia of Donetsk is comprised of three large
brigades: the Slavyansk Brigade and the Oplot and Vostok Battalions.
Apart from these, there are several self-sufficient militarized
structures, such as police units. Among them all there is complete
coordination and cooperation. The representatives of the Vostok
Battalion categorically abstain from attending joint meetings; however,
in spite of this, Strelkov has a mechanism for coordinating actions even
with them—right in front of me, literally five minutes after getting
disinformation concerning an attack on Yasinovataya by ten tanks [of the
Ukrainian Army], Strelkov received information from Vostok that there
were not ten, but three tanks, and, even so, that one of them was burned
out, while the rest had retreated. Apart from the Donetsk military
formations, there is an almost entirely self-sufficient unit commanded
by Bezler; however, here also there are no problems of cooperation or
coordination.
The
system works quite effectively, even though certain problems naturally
do exist. The independence of the Oplot and Vostok Battalions is due,
first and foremost, to their independent supply channels. These units
are practically independent from Strelkov also in this aspect; however,
even in this regard, when the need arises, they manœuvre
[and share] their available resources in the interest of their common
struggle—all without any problems. Overall, the process of building the
DPR [Donetsk People's Republic] Army is following a path that is fairly
traditional in similar situations. It can be said that, at this stage,
the most operationally capable management structure has been found.
Nonetheless,
this structure has its weak link. The council of commanders recognizes
Strelkov as their Commander-in-Chief; moreover, I noticed that this
acceptance is unconditional. Although he is merely a first among equals,
his role in the organization is extraordinarily important. And that is
why the persistent efforts of the Moscow Nazis [Note:
reference to Kurginyan and his sectarians, whose media attacks on
Strelkov benefit the Ukrainian Junta] appear exceedingly dangerous from
all points of view. In view of the chosen organizational form of
command, there is no one else that the commanders will agree to
subordinate to.
It may well be that the well-known political analyst [Note:
Kurginyan] and his pro-Nazi sect nourish the hope that, by removing
Strelkov and installing at the head of the Militia a commander
controlled by them, following victory they will gain the right to
construct a simulacrum of themselves in Novorossiya. The problem is that
there is no visible path to victory in such a scenario—the Militia will
never subordinate itself to anyone else. The breakdown of the control
structure would be inevitable, and then, in order to restore at least
some control, war would have to be waged between former allies. In this
case, the result of such infighting looks quite problematic for the
Moscow Nazis—it is the Slavyansk Brigade that is the most powerful force
in the Militia. Nevertheless, all of this still does not change the
fact that [Kurginyan’s] sect operates strictly in the interests of Kiev.
More
likely than not, the Moscow oligarchs that sent the fulminating
political analyst to Donetsk see the situation in the correct light and
hope, by removing Strelkov, finally to bury the idea of
Novorossiya—followed by a coup in Moscow. It is difficult to tell
whether the 'Guru of Treason' understands this. It may be that he is
being used without his knowledge [Gleb: Yes, and my right foot is green, while the left one changes colour daily...].
One
way or another—but any attempts to create problems for the Militia by
undermining the current command structure will at this stage lead to a
defeat. Essentially, this is the main thing that I finally was convinced
of in Donetsk.
It
is true that an army built on the basis of oral agreements is not,
strictly speaking, an army. And the need to establish a fully-fledged
command structure, which is not dependent on the identity of the
Commmander-in-Chief, will inevitably arise. At this time, however, there
are not the slightest prerequisites for this to happen. The value of
the DPR’s political component today is at best zero, if not negative.
The construction of a fully-fledged political and economic management
system has, so far, been unsuccessful. The constant shuffling of
premiers and deputy premiers is the best evidence of this fact. This
structure is only beginning to be formed; appropriate candidates are
being identified, base principles of the DPR’s political programme are
being formulated.
And
that is precisely why even an army based on oral agreement is the only
structure that provides the necessary stability to the DPR. Undermining
this army by discrediting its Commander-in-Chief and the targeted
attacks on him by corrupt politicians and their insane sectarians
represent deliberate attempts to destroy the entire idea of the Donbass
uprising. At this time, there is no other way to characterize or
understand these assaults on Strelkov.
I
say this not because I am acquainted with him or because I experience
feelings of friendship for him—in this case, all such considerations are
absolutely irrelevant. There is an entirely objective situation that
dictates its own rules of engagement. Essentially, I returned to Moscow
now, and not later, because the danger posed by these attacks is
currently exceedingly high. Their intensity is increasing, and there are
signs of this not only in the public domain. I did not come alone, and
we will try to convey this message to the highest of offices and to the
widest possible audience. At the moment, this is what is most important.
At the same time, the military prospects of the DPR at this time I would characterize as clearly 'non-zero' [Note:
i.e. positive]. Kiev does not appear to have any strategy to suppress
the uprising that would generate results in the short term. A war of
attrition would be ruinous for Novorossiya—particularly in a context
where Russian aid remains largely symbolic in nature and manifests
itself primarily as humanitarian and private deliveries.
Even so, Kiev also does not have a wide berth for manœuvre
in such a field—its situation appears no longer just critical, but
catastrophic. The solution may become a coup and the establishment of an
openly Nazi military dictatorship, which would then crush any and all
unrest in the territory of Ukraine, enabling it to continue the war in
the previous format even in the context of a complete collapse.
Whether
or not the Europeans would risk giving the go-ahead for the creation of
such a state is a difficult question to answer. So far, Poroshenko’s
regime, despite all its pro-Nazi orientation, still appears to the West
to be fairly controllable. However, the creation of a Banderite
'Caliphate' in the middle of Europe could completely change the
situation on the continent—just as the situation in the Middle East was
transformed by the creation of the ISIS 'Caliphate', which completely
unshackled itself from its creators.
At
the same time, the United States may well go along with this course of
events—it does not scare them in the least. And that is why the
likelihood of a coup in Kiev and the coming to power of radicals is
quite high.