by Alexander Mercouris
Russia Insider has published my latest piece on the course of the Ukrainian war. It is a more refined and thought through version of the piece I previously wrote on this Page.
http://russia-insider.com/en/2015/02/02/3054
1. My key point is that it is not minor tactical movements that are determining the course of this war. It is the level of casualties the Ukrainian military is suffering. They were hammered in the summer and they are being hammered again now.
In my pieces for Russia Insider I quoted the number of Ukrainian military deaths on the basis of official Ukrainian documents obtained by a hacking group as 1,100 for a two week period that covered the battle for Donetsk airport. The NAF today puts the total number of Ukrainian military deaths presumably since the resumption of the fighting at 1,500. Colonel Cassad yesterday was saying that the number could be over 1,800.
The figures of 1,500 and 1,800 cover a longer period than the 1,100 in the hacked Ukrainian documents. The fact that they are all of the same order of magnitude however suggests that all these figures are reliable. If so then that that shows that my guess that the Ukrainian army is suffering deaths at a rate of several hundred a week is probably correct.
2. Of course the NAF is also currently suffering a high rate of losses. However it is clear that these are at a substantially lesser level than the Ukrainian. As I said in the Russia Insider piece an NAF spokesman put the loss ratio at 4 to 1. Colonel Cassad put the total number of NAF deaths at 600 for the same period as that of his 1,800 estimate for Ukrainian deaths. That is a 3 to 1 ratio.
I suspect that the number of NAF deaths over the last 3 weeks is higher than usual because the NAF has been on the attack for most of this period. When that stage ends after the Debaltsevo pocket is fully encircled I would guess the number will fall. By contrast as the pocket collapses the rate of deaths of Ukrainians will rise especially if the pattern of unsuccessful counterattacks the Ukrainians have a habit of launching is followed.
3. As I said in the article for Russia Insider the Ukrainian military simply cannot go on taking losses at a rate of several hundred a week. In the slugfest we are seeing it is only a matter of time before it breaks. This is especially so since I strongly suspect that I have greatly overestimated the total number of Ukrainian troops in the Donbass in my Russia Insider piece. I put the number in the same range of 60,000 or so thousand that was the case in the summer. I suspect the real total is substantially less, thus the attempted mobilisations about which in the Russia Insider piece I have much to say.
4. On the political front, the DPR/LPR are taking a very hardline in the negotiations. Specifically:
(1) they are now formally challenging Kuchma's plenipotentiary rights i.e. his right to sign agreements that formally and legally bind the junta. They are insisting that he formally be given such rights.
As I have argued before there was no doubt that Kuchma was acting on behalf of the junta when he signed the Minsk Protocol and it is fatuous to deny the fact. However the junta has repeatedly resisted pressure to formalise Kuchma's position since if they formally admit he is their representative then they formally admit they are negotiating with the NAF, which is something for political and ideological reasons they emphatically do not want to do.
(2) the NAF has said that they would agree to a new ceasefire on the basis of the actual combat line and not the line agreed in the Minsk Memorandum. This is a way of rejecting calls for a ceasefire because they know perfectly well that the junta will not agree to this. Importantly the NAF rejected a call for a temporary 7 day ceasefire in Debaltsevo today. I think this is the first time the NAF has rejected a ceasefire when it has been offered.
This is a fundamental shift from the position last spring and summer. At that time it was the NAF (and the Russians) who were repeatedly calling for a ceasefire and the junta that was ignoring such calls even as it purported to agree to them. Now the situation is reversed. There is no better indicator that the initiative has now passed to the NAF than that.
(3) The Russians are backing the NAF line. It has been completely overlooked but yesterday 2nd February 2015 Interfax carried this brief but momentous report at 20:03 hours Moscow time:
"Kremlin source: East Ukraine militias' hardline 'absolutely justifiable'"
As I have said previously, the Russians have abandoned hope of Western pressure to force the junta to negotiate. This provides further confirmation. The NAF has the green light from Moscow to see its offensive through.
(4) To understand why the Russians have given up hope of a negotiated solution consider Poroshenko's latest statement today. Even as the situation collapses around him he is continuing to reject calls for federalisation and is continuing to say that the Ukraine will remain a unitary state. As I have said previously, the ideological and political nature of the junta makes no other response possible and anyone who thinks the junta will voluntary agree a compromise is fooling himself.
5. I am not going to say anything about what looks like a gathering political crisis in Kiev because there are others who understand it better than me.
----------------
Saker commentary: here is what I wrote in the comments section of Russia Insider under Alexander's analysis.
Since Alexander has been so kind as to mention me I just want to say
that I indeed *fully* agree with his analysis, especially when he
predicts further disaster for the Ukrainian military. He is also
correct when he says that the number of killed Ukrainians is a
humanitarian catastrophe: we might well see something quite amazing
happening - a war where there are more military casualties then civilian
ones. Furthermore, I also fully agree that the decision to stop the
massacre depends not on Kiev, but on Washington. This war will last as
long as the US wants to keep this bleeding wound open and no amount of
western "aid" (lethal or otherwise) will turn the tide in this war. The
only question is how many Ukrainians will have to die for this
abomination to finally stop. Even the "solution" to this war is obvious
and understood by everybody: a nominally unitary Ukraine with full
cultural, economic and political autonomy for *all* its regions, not
only the Donbass and a full recognition of the Novorussian authorities
as a equal partner for negotiations. All this nonsense about "9000
Russian troops" "invading" the Ukraine and Russia as the "aggressor
country" (as the Rada says) or the nonsense about the LNR and DNR being
"terrorist organizations" (official Kiev position) only delays the
inevitable and will generate more useless deaths. Finally, I also agree
that the US/NATO cannot and therefore will not send forces to crush the
Novorussians. What US/NATO can, and will, do is provide some financial
and some military aid, and lots of hot air and big empty statements and
promises. That will not be enough. Alexander's analysis is flawless.
Cheers,
The Saker
Wednesday, February 4, 2015
Tuesday, February 3, 2015
From Napoleon to Adolf Hitler to Conchita Wurst
The EU met again and, with the Greek vote, they prolonged more sanctions on Russia. In the meantime, the EU-backed junta is continuing to kill scores of civilians in Novorussia every day. And while for "Charlie", we saw millions in the streets, nobody seems to care. Worse, the EU is backing the Nazis murderers (I won't even mention the USA).
This is tragic in more then one way. Of course, this is tragic for the people of Novorussia, but it is no less tragic for the Ukrainian people how now are living under a Nazi regime with no foreseeable hope for change. This is also tragic for the Russian people who are suffering the economic consequences of the sanctions. And, of course, this is tragic for the people of Europe who are also suffering from these (self-defeating) sanctions. But there is something else happening which might have very long lasting consequences.
For three centuries the Russian elites were more or less split into two camps: pro-western and anti-western. Of course in those days, "West" meant western Europe, not the USA or central Europe.
Russia's European "friends" - a short reminder
The pro-European camp was formed by the new elites created by Czar Peter I to impose his reforms on the Russian people, and by the late 19th early 20th century, the pro-western camp was almost in total control of Russia. Then, the Soviet era more or less blurred these categories as ideology became central. While one could argue that the Trotskists were de-facto pro-western, they were such a small subset of the Bolshevik party which itself was such a tiny part of the Russian population that I don't think we can speak of pro-western factions inside the Bolshevik or Communist party. Not even Khrushchev, certainly the worst leader the USSR ever had, was really pro-western. I think that the first pro-western Soviet leader was also the last one, Gorbachev. But after 1991, the vast majority of Russians, tired of ideological tensions, tired of a Cold War they did not want, tired of being seen as the enemies of Europe sincerely desired to become part of the West and finally set aside the past.
We all know what happened then. For a full decade, the West maintained a degenerate regime of oligarchs, CIA puppets and thugs in power while NATO advanced on all fronts. Instead of the promised "democratic lovefest", Russia was plundered, humiliated, ridiculed, and fully colonized. In truth, from 1991 to 1996 Russia became Uncle Sam's "poodle", a thoroughly dysfunctional society run by freaks very similar to the ones sitting in Kiev today. By 1996 the situation became so bad as to be really explosive and Uncle Sam had to tread more carefully, with less visible arrogance, but it took the coming to power of Putin to really begin to reverse that trend. The period between 1991 and 1996 saw Russia suffer from human and material losses fully comparable to the kind of losses one would expect from nuclear war. During those years, the Russian society began noticing a strange lack of friendliness from the West: for all the back-slapping and lofty promises of partnership, the West (US and EU) gave a standing ovation the Chechen Wahabis even though they were at least as crazy and bloodthirsty as ISIS is today. Likewise, the US and EU broke all of their international obligations and jointly attacked both Yugoslavia and Serbia. Russians were aware of that, but they still held a general sympathy for Europeans who were mostly nice, polite, apparently well-intentioned people. Besides, one could always blame all these bizarre policies on the "legacy of the Cold War" cop-out. Finally, Eltsin and Milosevic were jerks, no doubt about that, and Russia was weak and, frankly, ugly. So most Russians kind of understood that the US and EU did not feel to kindly inclined towards Russia.
In a futile attempt to "behave", Russians tried hard to be "nice" and "hyper-democratic". They let the Latvians introduce apartheid, they agreed on sanctions against Iran, they saw NATO gradually encircle Russian with military bases and warships and they saw the US treat Russia with open contempt. In response, Russia made some rather vapid protests, participated in useless negotiations and let the USA spend 5 billions dollars in the Ukraine and even overturn elections.
In exchange for a total Russian submission, the West eventually "generously" agreed to stop supporting the Chechen Wahabis who had been defeated by the joint efforts of Vladimir Putin and Akhmad Hadji Kadyrov (and his son, Ramzan) anyway. Then, right when the hopelessly pro-western Dmitri Medvedev came to power and the hopes for the further subjugation of Russia were at an all time high, Saakashvili blew it all by listening to US Neocons and attacking South Ossetia. And here, for the very first time, Russia said "niet" and proceeded to smash the Georgian military even though the local force ratio were very much in the favor of Georgia and the Georgian forces better equipped. The US and NATO backed Georgian military, which some "experts" had referred to as a "tough nut to crack" for the "corrupt Russian military" but which was nevertheless destroyed in all of three days. And then, suddenly and for the first time, western politicians began to doubt their own propaganda: the quasi instantaneous defeat of Georgia, the lightening fast mobilization of the Black Sea fleet and the fact that the Russian Air Force achieved air superiority just 2 days after suffering some very humiliating initial losses, all that left a very bad taste in the mouths those who had believed in western military superiority myths.
Day after day, love turns gray, like the skin of a dying man (Roger Waters)
In Russia, however, this was also left a very bad taste. While the overwhelming majority of Russians had no hostility towards Georgia or the Georgian people, Russians simply could not understand two basic things:
a) How could the people in the West even seriously suggest that Russia was the aggressor when the Georgia attack was broadcast live TV?
b) How could the people in the West support such an obvious psychopath, scumbag and freak like Saakashvili?
Later we saw the West openly betray Russia at the UN over Libya only to immediately to turn to Syria with exactly the same intentions. At least the USA defended their own national interests (as their 1%er deep state understood it). But Europe? Why was France taking center stage in Libya and Syria? What was going on? What was wrong with these people?
The Ukraine from Napoleon to Adolf Hitler to Conchita Wurst
This latest crisis in the Ukraine really did "break" something in the Russian national awareness and now I think that the prevailing feeling in Russia about the West is simply disgust.
Disgust with the total hypocrisy of standing in theory for one thing and in supporting its exact opposite.
Disgust with an entire political system built on lies.
Disgust with a society which values homosexual "rights" to adopt children much more then the right of Novorussian children to live.
Disgust with the obscene whining of millions of "Charlies" combined the total heartless indifference towards thousands of killed civilians every day.
Disgust with an EU subservience to the USA even when it clearly goes against one own's national interest.
Disgust with a society which bans Nazi symbols or even an honest investigation of the so-called "Holocaust" but sends billions of dollars in support of Nazis in Kiev.
Disgust with a society which did not have the moral fiber to resist Hitler and which had to be freed from Hitler by Stalin.
Disgust for a society which now apparently "forgot" who freed it from Hitler.
Disgust for a society which is willing to commit economic seppuku just to please its imperial overlord, Uncle Sam.
Disgust with central Europeans for having nothing more to offer to their new masters then a competition of which country can be most hysterically anti-Russian (Poland and Latvia win) even though they all had it much better then Russia under Communist rule.
If Napoleon was hated and Hitler was feared, Conchita Wurst is simply despised. Even the Russian liberals, who still get plenty of time on Russian TV, now find nothing better to say than "our government is every bit as bad the those in the West" - hardly an enthusiastic response. The fact is that for all practical purposes, and for the first time in over 300 years, there really is no more truly pro-European or pro-Western camp in Russia, not in the elites, not amongst the common people. Oh sure, there are still plenty of 5th columnists in the top echelons of power (we have the West of 1980s and 1990s to thank for that too), but they cannot openly show their face and promote their ideas. Even they now have to pretend that they are disgusted with West and "patriotic". This process is made even deeper by another very important factor:
The Russians have changed too
Yes, the Russians have changed. There is an entire generation of Russians now which does not remember the Soviet Union and they don't have the kind of guilt/inferiority complex the older generation sometimes had.
Here is a joke I heard for the first time in 2008: "how do you recognize a foreigner on the Red Square? He is the one dressed like a pauper" - not very funny unless you remember the Soviet years when the only people wearing fashionable clothes were only foreigners. Now this has turned around - the youth feels totally free from any Soviet-related guilt or inferiority complex and, in fact, a lot of young Russians feel confident and often quite superior to their European neighbors whom they view maybe like a good suitcase: nice, comfortable, useful - but most definitely not inspiring in the least. In some circles I even detect a bigger respect for the WWII Soviet generation then for the modern Europeans. Oh sure, they are welcome to sell Russia their cars or ham, but if they stop, there are plenty of other good cars and ham producers in the rest of the world.
Even the USA make more sense
Russian laugh when their hear that US-Russian trade has gone up and that NASA still purchases Russian rocket engines. That, at least, makes sense. In fact, what are the USA *really* doing right now? They are:
The consensus: just occupied territories
I was watching the famous "Sunday evening with Vladimir Soloviev" show (FortRuss has posted translated excerpts of it) and I was amazed to see that there was a quasi-consensus amongst most, if not quite all, guests: both the Ukraine and the EU are occupied territories and the war will last until the USA decide that they don't need it any more. This also means that there is nobody to negotiate with, not in Kiev and not in Brussels. And since the US musts have as much war and confrontation in the Ukraine and in Europe as possible, the only way to stop the war is to win it. That's the short version. The longer one goes something like that:
While negotiations with Kiev and Brussels cannot solve anything, it might be useful to participate in them just to break the West's momentum and let the economic crisis in the Ukraine and the EU begin to seriously erode the current US domination. So negotiate, just don't put any hope into that. And then there is interesting stuff happening in the EU, more and more countries, fractions, delegations and politicians are switching sides or, at least becoming uncomfortable with the situation. And we are not only taking about Greece here, even in Germany there is a lot of discontent. So "forget the EU" only applies to the current political EU, but this might change tomorrow. As for "winning the war", this does not mean Russian tanks in Lvov or even Kiev, this could mean a wholesale collapse of the junta and the Ukrainian military as a result of the defeat in the East (as this war is already absorbing every penny not sent info offshore accounts).
Finally, there is one difference that Russians make between the EU and the Ukraine. The vast majority of Russian sincerely feel sorry for the Ukrainian people from whom they feel no disgust at all (well, except for the Nazi freaks and their death squads, of course). Most Russians are heartbroken at the waste, the deaths, the mutilations, the poverty, the humiliation and all the evils which have, yet again, befallen this land. An entire lost generation of Ukrainians.
The most famous Russian author right now is probably Sergei Lukyanenko. Lukyanenko is the archetypical Russian: a mix of Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar families and he considers himself completely Russian, even a Russian patriot. Still, his last name is distinctly Ukrainian and he clearly was horrified by what took place in the Ukraine. In fact, Lukyanenko was so appalled and angry, that he personally banned any further translations of his books into the Ukrainian language. A couple of months after he made that announcement, Lukyanenko was invited to participate into one of the marathon Q&A sessions with Putin on Russian TV where people from all over Russia call in to ask questions. Lukyanenko was given the microphone and asked Putin a question about the Ukraine referring to it as "cursed land". Putin gently and respectfully corrected Lukyanenko saying that the Ukraine was not cursed, but long-suffering and martyred and then he asked Lukyanenko, as a personal favor, to lift the ban on the translations of his books into Ukrainian. Lukyanenko looked deeply moved for a few seconds, and then nodded his head and agreed (which got him and Putin an ovation from the entire audience).
This small incident shows the true face of Russia towards the Ukraine: one of immense sadness and sympathy, but never one of disgust.
The end of an era
But concerning the West (here as the US and the EU), I think that this last western invasion of the Ukraine will mark the end of a very long historic era which saw a long series of tragic, often bloody, and always unsuccessful attempts at somehow making Russia part of Europe or, more accurately, at submitting Russia and colonizing it for Europe. From the fanatic hatred of the Teutonic Knights to the lure of Napoleon's freemasonery, from Hitler's grim determination to conquer of what he believed was "his" Lebensraum to the imaginary "democratic lovefest" which never happened - Russia always zig-zagged between resistance and submission, between isolation and integration. I think that this process is now over: while the will to resist any invasion (military, economic or cultural) is still there, there is no more admiration and no more hope, only a sense of complete disgust.
Like all wars, the current one will end, but I think that the sense to complete disillusionment and disgust for the "West" and its "values" will remain a core reality of the Russian political future. Oh sure, diplomats will smile and past conflicts will be put to rest, but I don't think that there is any future in Russia for those who want Russia to become "like the West", at least no other than as a 5th columnist or the object of jokes.
The Saker
This is tragic in more then one way. Of course, this is tragic for the people of Novorussia, but it is no less tragic for the Ukrainian people how now are living under a Nazi regime with no foreseeable hope for change. This is also tragic for the Russian people who are suffering the economic consequences of the sanctions. And, of course, this is tragic for the people of Europe who are also suffering from these (self-defeating) sanctions. But there is something else happening which might have very long lasting consequences.
For three centuries the Russian elites were more or less split into two camps: pro-western and anti-western. Of course in those days, "West" meant western Europe, not the USA or central Europe.
Russia's European "friends" - a short reminder
The pro-European camp was formed by the new elites created by Czar Peter I to impose his reforms on the Russian people, and by the late 19th early 20th century, the pro-western camp was almost in total control of Russia. Then, the Soviet era more or less blurred these categories as ideology became central. While one could argue that the Trotskists were de-facto pro-western, they were such a small subset of the Bolshevik party which itself was such a tiny part of the Russian population that I don't think we can speak of pro-western factions inside the Bolshevik or Communist party. Not even Khrushchev, certainly the worst leader the USSR ever had, was really pro-western. I think that the first pro-western Soviet leader was also the last one, Gorbachev. But after 1991, the vast majority of Russians, tired of ideological tensions, tired of a Cold War they did not want, tired of being seen as the enemies of Europe sincerely desired to become part of the West and finally set aside the past.
We all know what happened then. For a full decade, the West maintained a degenerate regime of oligarchs, CIA puppets and thugs in power while NATO advanced on all fronts. Instead of the promised "democratic lovefest", Russia was plundered, humiliated, ridiculed, and fully colonized. In truth, from 1991 to 1996 Russia became Uncle Sam's "poodle", a thoroughly dysfunctional society run by freaks very similar to the ones sitting in Kiev today. By 1996 the situation became so bad as to be really explosive and Uncle Sam had to tread more carefully, with less visible arrogance, but it took the coming to power of Putin to really begin to reverse that trend. The period between 1991 and 1996 saw Russia suffer from human and material losses fully comparable to the kind of losses one would expect from nuclear war. During those years, the Russian society began noticing a strange lack of friendliness from the West: for all the back-slapping and lofty promises of partnership, the West (US and EU) gave a standing ovation the Chechen Wahabis even though they were at least as crazy and bloodthirsty as ISIS is today. Likewise, the US and EU broke all of their international obligations and jointly attacked both Yugoslavia and Serbia. Russians were aware of that, but they still held a general sympathy for Europeans who were mostly nice, polite, apparently well-intentioned people. Besides, one could always blame all these bizarre policies on the "legacy of the Cold War" cop-out. Finally, Eltsin and Milosevic were jerks, no doubt about that, and Russia was weak and, frankly, ugly. So most Russians kind of understood that the US and EU did not feel to kindly inclined towards Russia.
In a futile attempt to "behave", Russians tried hard to be "nice" and "hyper-democratic". They let the Latvians introduce apartheid, they agreed on sanctions against Iran, they saw NATO gradually encircle Russian with military bases and warships and they saw the US treat Russia with open contempt. In response, Russia made some rather vapid protests, participated in useless negotiations and let the USA spend 5 billions dollars in the Ukraine and even overturn elections.
In exchange for a total Russian submission, the West eventually "generously" agreed to stop supporting the Chechen Wahabis who had been defeated by the joint efforts of Vladimir Putin and Akhmad Hadji Kadyrov (and his son, Ramzan) anyway. Then, right when the hopelessly pro-western Dmitri Medvedev came to power and the hopes for the further subjugation of Russia were at an all time high, Saakashvili blew it all by listening to US Neocons and attacking South Ossetia. And here, for the very first time, Russia said "niet" and proceeded to smash the Georgian military even though the local force ratio were very much in the favor of Georgia and the Georgian forces better equipped. The US and NATO backed Georgian military, which some "experts" had referred to as a "tough nut to crack" for the "corrupt Russian military" but which was nevertheless destroyed in all of three days. And then, suddenly and for the first time, western politicians began to doubt their own propaganda: the quasi instantaneous defeat of Georgia, the lightening fast mobilization of the Black Sea fleet and the fact that the Russian Air Force achieved air superiority just 2 days after suffering some very humiliating initial losses, all that left a very bad taste in the mouths those who had believed in western military superiority myths.
Day after day, love turns gray, like the skin of a dying man (Roger Waters)
In Russia, however, this was also left a very bad taste. While the overwhelming majority of Russians had no hostility towards Georgia or the Georgian people, Russians simply could not understand two basic things:
a) How could the people in the West even seriously suggest that Russia was the aggressor when the Georgia attack was broadcast live TV?
b) How could the people in the West support such an obvious psychopath, scumbag and freak like Saakashvili?
Later we saw the West openly betray Russia at the UN over Libya only to immediately to turn to Syria with exactly the same intentions. At least the USA defended their own national interests (as their 1%er deep state understood it). But Europe? Why was France taking center stage in Libya and Syria? What was going on? What was wrong with these people?
The Ukraine from Napoleon to Adolf Hitler to Conchita Wurst
This latest crisis in the Ukraine really did "break" something in the Russian national awareness and now I think that the prevailing feeling in Russia about the West is simply disgust.
 |
| The new Europe |
Disgust with an entire political system built on lies.
Disgust with a society which values homosexual "rights" to adopt children much more then the right of Novorussian children to live.
Disgust with the obscene whining of millions of "Charlies" combined the total heartless indifference towards thousands of killed civilians every day.
Disgust with an EU subservience to the USA even when it clearly goes against one own's national interest.
Disgust with a society which bans Nazi symbols or even an honest investigation of the so-called "Holocaust" but sends billions of dollars in support of Nazis in Kiev.
Disgust with a society which did not have the moral fiber to resist Hitler and which had to be freed from Hitler by Stalin.
Disgust for a society which now apparently "forgot" who freed it from Hitler.
Disgust for a society which is willing to commit economic seppuku just to please its imperial overlord, Uncle Sam.
Disgust with central Europeans for having nothing more to offer to their new masters then a competition of which country can be most hysterically anti-Russian (Poland and Latvia win) even though they all had it much better then Russia under Communist rule.
If Napoleon was hated and Hitler was feared, Conchita Wurst is simply despised. Even the Russian liberals, who still get plenty of time on Russian TV, now find nothing better to say than "our government is every bit as bad the those in the West" - hardly an enthusiastic response. The fact is that for all practical purposes, and for the first time in over 300 years, there really is no more truly pro-European or pro-Western camp in Russia, not in the elites, not amongst the common people. Oh sure, there are still plenty of 5th columnists in the top echelons of power (we have the West of 1980s and 1990s to thank for that too), but they cannot openly show their face and promote their ideas. Even they now have to pretend that they are disgusted with West and "patriotic". This process is made even deeper by another very important factor:
The Russians have changed too
Yes, the Russians have changed. There is an entire generation of Russians now which does not remember the Soviet Union and they don't have the kind of guilt/inferiority complex the older generation sometimes had.
Here is a joke I heard for the first time in 2008: "how do you recognize a foreigner on the Red Square? He is the one dressed like a pauper" - not very funny unless you remember the Soviet years when the only people wearing fashionable clothes were only foreigners. Now this has turned around - the youth feels totally free from any Soviet-related guilt or inferiority complex and, in fact, a lot of young Russians feel confident and often quite superior to their European neighbors whom they view maybe like a good suitcase: nice, comfortable, useful - but most definitely not inspiring in the least. In some circles I even detect a bigger respect for the WWII Soviet generation then for the modern Europeans. Oh sure, they are welcome to sell Russia their cars or ham, but if they stop, there are plenty of other good cars and ham producers in the rest of the world.
Even the USA make more sense
Russian laugh when their hear that US-Russian trade has gone up and that NASA still purchases Russian rocket engines. That, at least, makes sense. In fact, what are the USA *really* doing right now? They are:
- Trying to protect the dollar
- Trying to maintain their global hegemony
- Trying to subdue Europe
- Trying to crush Russia as a potential challenger
The consensus: just occupied territories
I was watching the famous "Sunday evening with Vladimir Soloviev" show (FortRuss has posted translated excerpts of it) and I was amazed to see that there was a quasi-consensus amongst most, if not quite all, guests: both the Ukraine and the EU are occupied territories and the war will last until the USA decide that they don't need it any more. This also means that there is nobody to negotiate with, not in Kiev and not in Brussels. And since the US musts have as much war and confrontation in the Ukraine and in Europe as possible, the only way to stop the war is to win it. That's the short version. The longer one goes something like that:
While negotiations with Kiev and Brussels cannot solve anything, it might be useful to participate in them just to break the West's momentum and let the economic crisis in the Ukraine and the EU begin to seriously erode the current US domination. So negotiate, just don't put any hope into that. And then there is interesting stuff happening in the EU, more and more countries, fractions, delegations and politicians are switching sides or, at least becoming uncomfortable with the situation. And we are not only taking about Greece here, even in Germany there is a lot of discontent. So "forget the EU" only applies to the current political EU, but this might change tomorrow. As for "winning the war", this does not mean Russian tanks in Lvov or even Kiev, this could mean a wholesale collapse of the junta and the Ukrainian military as a result of the defeat in the East (as this war is already absorbing every penny not sent info offshore accounts).
Finally, there is one difference that Russians make between the EU and the Ukraine. The vast majority of Russian sincerely feel sorry for the Ukrainian people from whom they feel no disgust at all (well, except for the Nazi freaks and their death squads, of course). Most Russians are heartbroken at the waste, the deaths, the mutilations, the poverty, the humiliation and all the evils which have, yet again, befallen this land. An entire lost generation of Ukrainians.
The most famous Russian author right now is probably Sergei Lukyanenko. Lukyanenko is the archetypical Russian: a mix of Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar families and he considers himself completely Russian, even a Russian patriot. Still, his last name is distinctly Ukrainian and he clearly was horrified by what took place in the Ukraine. In fact, Lukyanenko was so appalled and angry, that he personally banned any further translations of his books into the Ukrainian language. A couple of months after he made that announcement, Lukyanenko was invited to participate into one of the marathon Q&A sessions with Putin on Russian TV where people from all over Russia call in to ask questions. Lukyanenko was given the microphone and asked Putin a question about the Ukraine referring to it as "cursed land". Putin gently and respectfully corrected Lukyanenko saying that the Ukraine was not cursed, but long-suffering and martyred and then he asked Lukyanenko, as a personal favor, to lift the ban on the translations of his books into Ukrainian. Lukyanenko looked deeply moved for a few seconds, and then nodded his head and agreed (which got him and Putin an ovation from the entire audience).
This small incident shows the true face of Russia towards the Ukraine: one of immense sadness and sympathy, but never one of disgust.
The end of an era
But concerning the West (here as the US and the EU), I think that this last western invasion of the Ukraine will mark the end of a very long historic era which saw a long series of tragic, often bloody, and always unsuccessful attempts at somehow making Russia part of Europe or, more accurately, at submitting Russia and colonizing it for Europe. From the fanatic hatred of the Teutonic Knights to the lure of Napoleon's freemasonery, from Hitler's grim determination to conquer of what he believed was "his" Lebensraum to the imaginary "democratic lovefest" which never happened - Russia always zig-zagged between resistance and submission, between isolation and integration. I think that this process is now over: while the will to resist any invasion (military, economic or cultural) is still there, there is no more admiration and no more hope, only a sense of complete disgust.
Like all wars, the current one will end, but I think that the sense to complete disillusionment and disgust for the "West" and its "values" will remain a core reality of the Russian political future. Oh sure, diplomats will smile and past conflicts will be put to rest, but I don't think that there is any future in Russia for those who want Russia to become "like the West", at least no other than as a 5th columnist or the object of jokes.
The Saker
Open letter of the members of the French Resistance to President Hollande
The voice of France, the UN and Russia,
an open letter to Monsieur le Président de la République
Monsieur le Président de la République
Fascisme is reemerging everywhere in
Europe, singularly in countries which have been freed from the USSR
where powerful and dark forces are using NéoNazism as an
ideological vector for their national emancipation and their
territorial sovereignty .In these circles and beyond them, the
Ukrainian crisis, which is politically and diplomatically
overexploited to undermine the Russian Federation is used as a
pretext for multiple attempts to rehabilitate the Third Reich, especially in the Baltic Countries, where monuments commemorating the
1945 victory are often desecrated with the covert or overt complicity
of the concerned governments.
The Western world is in no way immune
from these dangerous overflows. In defiance of it's historical
status, the European Union tolerates within itself, political
movements which have been able, with impunity, to send to the EU Parliament, legally elected deputies, although self styled Nazis.
In face of this situation, which is fed
and worsened by a never ending economical crisis on the old
continent, Russia submit every year to the general assembly of the
United Nations, a resolution calling for the refusal of « this
glorification of Nazis and their collaborators who, waiving Swastika
banners and marching with their right arms held up, are overtly
promoting xenophobia and racial superiority.
Unfortunately, The United States of
America, Canada and the Marshall Islands, systematically oppose this
text and the European Union - among which is France-, choosing in that
respect to renew with the disastrous spirit of Munich, chose to
refrain.Opponants and abstentions, put forward as an excuse...
Respect for freedom of expression, to justify their decisions. Under
the same pretext, they block the passing of similar decisions within
the OSCE. This attitude is pitiful and dangerous and can be
considered as a signed blank paper for the Fascists to keep on with
their criminal activities.
This year, the pretext put forward for
a 'no' vote or abstention to the resolution, is the Ukrainian crisis
and the « annexation » of Crimea. Putin should be made
to understand that the West won't tolerate an expansionist Russia.
This is of course only a pretext because in November of 2013, as the
Ukrainian crisis was just unfolding, their was no separatists claims
of any sort in Eastern Ukraine or in Crimea. The vote had been the
same. Most noticeable is the 2010 vote, during which the Russian
President was Medvedev, known to be closer to the West than the
actual President.
The fact that the Russian diplomatic
initiatives are thus subjected to contempt is unacceptable. The
tremendous death toll paid by the USSR during the second world war, morally forbid it. Resistants in Europe and especially in France, know
what they owe to the Red Army. Without the decisive victories over
Hitler, the world battle for liberty wouldn't have been possible and
the allies would have never landed in Italy nor on the Coast of
Normandie. Must it be reminded, that on the D Day, June the 6th
of 1944, the Werhmacht was collapsing everywhere on the East front
and that Hitler had thus already lost the war ? Must it be
reminded that, without the Soviets sacrifices, France would have
never recovered it's freedom ? Must it be reminded that without
Moscow, Stalingrad and Koursk's victories – the mains Nazis
military defeats- the world could never have freed itself from fascism
and the United Nations Organisation would have never existed ?
We would also want to remind you,
mister President, that during the spring and summer of 1942, the General De Gaulle had, in vain, tried to persuade the allies to open
a « second front ». If the General De Gaulle had been
heard, millions of people in the Soviet Union and in the
concentration camps, wouldn't have lost their lives. Must we remind
you that the landing in France as suggested by the General de
Gaulle, was replaced by a landing in North Africa and that the first
version of the now famous American « regime change » took
place at that time, the Americans having chosen the General Giraud
instead of De Gaulle.
France, which as a member of the
Security Council, have a right of veto, must not forget history and
the lessons it teaches. France must not forget the responsibilities
which have been bestowed to her by the fact of having been able to
sit at the winners table. France must not forget that without the
resistance movement, without the commitment of the General De
Gaulle saving the honor of our country from London, France wouldn't
enjoy the diplomatic weight and prestige which it has acquired.
Consequently, it's voice, which is heard, when relying on historical
principles, used and exalted by the National Resistance Council, it's
voice must be heard in the fight against the rebirth of Nazism, which
is to say, in fact, it's own values. Values that you invoked during
your multiple public interventions, especially during the
commemorations of the landings in Normandie and Provence.
As a Head of the State, it thus belongs
to you to break the guilty and spineless caution of a Europe which
flimsiness in foreign affairs never stops to tarnish the brilliance.
Consequently, the signatories request
from you, that next year, the signature of France be added to those
of the nations having already backed the resolution of the Federation
of Russia.
Armand Conan, Résistant, membre du
Comité Départemental du Morbihan
René Jassaud, Résistant, ravitailleur
du maquis « camp Robert » dans le Var
Colette Lacroix, Résistante, membre du
réseau SOE « pimento » dans l'Ain
Antoine Payet, Résistant, membre du
groupe de St Fons dans le Rhône
Paul Raybaud, membre du réseau Camp
Robert dans le Var
Monday, February 2, 2015
MUST WATCH: Strelkov vs Starikov debate
MUST WATCH: a very high quality debate between Igor Strelkov and Nikolai Starikov. Most Russians views did say that Strelkov won the debate. I completely disagree. What do you think?
A HUGE THANK YOU to all those who translated and subtitled this most interesting confrontation between two good and very intelligent men!
Your turn to vote now:
A HUGE THANK YOU to all those who translated and subtitled this most interesting confrontation between two good and very intelligent men!
Translation: Shurik, DzhMM, Eugenia
Production: Marina & Augmented EtherYour turn to vote now:
Ukraine SITREP + open thread
The Saker:
Feeling better, but on the road all day today. Will resume full-time blogging tomorrow.
Debaltsevo cauldron - still *not* closed:
According to Cassad, the cauldron is still not closed and I trust him. This being said, the Novorussians are holding the only highway out of the cauldron under their fire and they selectively allow some units to leave (medical, support & staff, for propaganda purposes) while destroying others (combat units). So even if the cauldron ain't quite closed, the junta forces are de-facto surrounded. See map (from Cassad):
Novorussian air defenses:
Remember the Tochka-Us shot down over Saur Mogila? Auslander reported that they had been shot down by (non-Novo) Russian. Then recently, two junta Tochkas "broke up in mid air". This time around the Novorussians have admitted that they shot down at least one Tochka. See the photo (also from Cassad):
The interesting thing is that Cassad mentions the Russian short range air defense system Pantsir as the system which might have shot down the Tochka. This is interesting for a number of reasons:
1) The Pantsir is a brand new Russian system. IF a Pantsir really did this, then the fact that the Novorussians are saying so basically means "Putin is arming us and we ain't even hiding it". A message to Kiev maybe?
2) The Pantsir is not supposed to be designed to shoot down ballistic missiles. IF a Pantsir really did this, then it proves that its real capabilities are far larger then its officially advertised ones.
3) If this was NOT a Pantsir, then we go right back to the explanation of last summer: the Russians are "covering" Novorussians with their S-300PMs.
I am personally inclined to believe the that this is what happened. The Pantsir is a very advanced "combined" (missile+guns) mobile but *point* defense systems designed to shoot down cruise missiles, aircraft and precision weapons. Ballistic missiles are different due to their speed and flight trajectory. Whatever may be the case, the fact that the Novorussians admitted that "they" shot down the Tochka is very good news as it shows a degree of confidence which will horrify Kiev.
The 4th Junta mobilization is the 4th one to totally fail:
Yup, just like the 3 previous ones, the 4th mobilization completely failed. According to a Ukrainian newspaper up to 80% of the conscripts do not want to go to fight. I am not sure about the 80% figure, but it appears to be a huge problem which further waves of mobilizations (the 5th one has already been announce) will, of course, not solve at all.
Novorussia (finally) announces a full mobilization:
Zakharchenko has announced that Novorussia is declaring a full mobilization. The neat thing is that this mobilization will be *voluntary* but that Zakharchenko expects 100'000 men to show up. Here we can only "thank" the junta for its systematic terror campaign against the towns and cities of Novorussia which has acted better than any recruitment center ever could. If the Novorussians really succeed in getting these kinds of numbers, and my guess is that they will, by next summer the junta will be in real danger of really losing all of historical Novorussia and of having Crimea linked to Russia by land.
Summary and conclusion:
Ever since the junta resumed its offensive against Novorussia the Novorussians have acted very carefully, slowly and effectively. True, these counter-attacks were limited to tactical level engagements. However, this is the correct response as a full scale operational level counter-offensive would be very dangerous and considering how much time the junta forces had to dig in and prepare its defensive positions, such a counter-attack would probably have been stalled, if not defeated. Zakharchenko and his General Staff clearly have protected their most precious resource - their men - and have limited their response to relieving the pressure on Donetsky and Gorlovka.
However, I am beginning to detect the signs of a much bigger operation to come. For example, the combats around Mariupol were also a good way of probing the junta defenses. Combine that with the rumors that the Novorussians have one, possibly two, SU-25s (how much will they have by this summer?), that their air defenses are shooting down ballistic missiles, that the Russian Voentorg is almost an officially admitted reality, that the Novorussians will only negotiate on the basis of an existing line of contact (rather then the one agreed upon in Minsk) and you get the imagine.
Then look at the other side: the 4th mobilization failed. The junta's "winter offensive" was a complete disaster. The economy has tanked and not even the combined "moral" (so to speak) pressure of Soros and Levi has succeeded in getting the money to bail out the junta. Add to this protest and even riots in junta-controlled Banderastan, the EU cracking along all its seams (SYRIZA in Greece, Podemos Spain, the Charlie Hebdo psyops in France, the Swiss Franc earthquake, the use of "quantitative easing" (i.e. the printing press) by the ECB and ask yourself what the anti-Russian camp will look like in, say, 4-6 months.
I am starting to get the feeling that the Russians (Novo and others) have decided that they will solve the "Novorussian part" of the "Ukrainian problem" this summer (the Ukrainian one will probably take many years to solve).
Can you imagine what a 100'000 strong Novorussian army armed to the teeth with the latest Russian military hardware will look like by June? Especially from a riot-filled, economically devastated Kiev?
Am I dreaming or do you also get that feeling?
Cheers and,until tomorrow, open thread again!
The Saker
Feeling better, but on the road all day today. Will resume full-time blogging tomorrow.
Debaltsevo cauldron - still *not* closed:
According to Cassad, the cauldron is still not closed and I trust him. This being said, the Novorussians are holding the only highway out of the cauldron under their fire and they selectively allow some units to leave (medical, support & staff, for propaganda purposes) while destroying others (combat units). So even if the cauldron ain't quite closed, the junta forces are de-facto surrounded. See map (from Cassad):
Novorussian air defenses:
Remember the Tochka-Us shot down over Saur Mogila? Auslander reported that they had been shot down by (non-Novo) Russian. Then recently, two junta Tochkas "broke up in mid air". This time around the Novorussians have admitted that they shot down at least one Tochka. See the photo (also from Cassad):
 |
| Rear section of a Tochka-U ballistic missile |
1) The Pantsir is a brand new Russian system. IF a Pantsir really did this, then the fact that the Novorussians are saying so basically means "Putin is arming us and we ain't even hiding it". A message to Kiev maybe?
2) The Pantsir is not supposed to be designed to shoot down ballistic missiles. IF a Pantsir really did this, then it proves that its real capabilities are far larger then its officially advertised ones.
3) If this was NOT a Pantsir, then we go right back to the explanation of last summer: the Russians are "covering" Novorussians with their S-300PMs.
I am personally inclined to believe the that this is what happened. The Pantsir is a very advanced "combined" (missile+guns) mobile but *point* defense systems designed to shoot down cruise missiles, aircraft and precision weapons. Ballistic missiles are different due to their speed and flight trajectory. Whatever may be the case, the fact that the Novorussians admitted that "they" shot down the Tochka is very good news as it shows a degree of confidence which will horrify Kiev.
The 4th Junta mobilization is the 4th one to totally fail:
Yup, just like the 3 previous ones, the 4th mobilization completely failed. According to a Ukrainian newspaper up to 80% of the conscripts do not want to go to fight. I am not sure about the 80% figure, but it appears to be a huge problem which further waves of mobilizations (the 5th one has already been announce) will, of course, not solve at all.
Novorussia (finally) announces a full mobilization:
Zakharchenko has announced that Novorussia is declaring a full mobilization. The neat thing is that this mobilization will be *voluntary* but that Zakharchenko expects 100'000 men to show up. Here we can only "thank" the junta for its systematic terror campaign against the towns and cities of Novorussia which has acted better than any recruitment center ever could. If the Novorussians really succeed in getting these kinds of numbers, and my guess is that they will, by next summer the junta will be in real danger of really losing all of historical Novorussia and of having Crimea linked to Russia by land.
Summary and conclusion:
Ever since the junta resumed its offensive against Novorussia the Novorussians have acted very carefully, slowly and effectively. True, these counter-attacks were limited to tactical level engagements. However, this is the correct response as a full scale operational level counter-offensive would be very dangerous and considering how much time the junta forces had to dig in and prepare its defensive positions, such a counter-attack would probably have been stalled, if not defeated. Zakharchenko and his General Staff clearly have protected their most precious resource - their men - and have limited their response to relieving the pressure on Donetsky and Gorlovka.
However, I am beginning to detect the signs of a much bigger operation to come. For example, the combats around Mariupol were also a good way of probing the junta defenses. Combine that with the rumors that the Novorussians have one, possibly two, SU-25s (how much will they have by this summer?), that their air defenses are shooting down ballistic missiles, that the Russian Voentorg is almost an officially admitted reality, that the Novorussians will only negotiate on the basis of an existing line of contact (rather then the one agreed upon in Minsk) and you get the imagine.
Then look at the other side: the 4th mobilization failed. The junta's "winter offensive" was a complete disaster. The economy has tanked and not even the combined "moral" (so to speak) pressure of Soros and Levi has succeeded in getting the money to bail out the junta. Add to this protest and even riots in junta-controlled Banderastan, the EU cracking along all its seams (SYRIZA in Greece, Podemos Spain, the Charlie Hebdo psyops in France, the Swiss Franc earthquake, the use of "quantitative easing" (i.e. the printing press) by the ECB and ask yourself what the anti-Russian camp will look like in, say, 4-6 months.
I am starting to get the feeling that the Russians (Novo and others) have decided that they will solve the "Novorussian part" of the "Ukrainian problem" this summer (the Ukrainian one will probably take many years to solve).
Can you imagine what a 100'000 strong Novorussian army armed to the teeth with the latest Russian military hardware will look like by June? Especially from a riot-filled, economically devastated Kiev?
Am I dreaming or do you also get that feeling?
Cheers and,until tomorrow, open thread again!
The Saker
Sunday, February 1, 2015
EU sanctions meeting
by Alexander Mercouris
As Eric Kraus has pointed out there is complete confusion in the
media today about how to spin the latest EU sanctions decision. Did
Syriza fold as per Reuters and Bloomberg. Or did the meeting expose
growing splits within the EU as per the Financial Times and the London
Times.
The best answer is that nothing definite
was decided at the latest EU Council meeting but Syriza did manage to
put a marker down.
I go back to my piece about Syriza for Russia Insider (http://russia-insider.com/en/
Given
that this is so, it is simply unrealistic to expect a very young
government in the very first days of its existence to provoke a crisis
within the European Union that pitches it against the Commission,
Germany, Britain and France, risking a deeper crisis in Greece and
putting in jeopardy its own existence, on an issue that for Greeks is of
only peripheral importance.
What Syriza did on Thursday was all that in the circumstances it could realistically do: apply a soft brake on the sanctions train.
The
European Council meeting was convened by Mogherini, the EU's "foreign
minister", following demands from the EU hardliners led by Donald Tusk
(who now nominally chairs the European Council when it meets at heads of
government level) who have been calling for a strong EU response to the
breakdown of the ceasefire and the ongoing NAF offensive, which has
resulted in the capture of Donetsk airport and the gradual encirclement
of the Debratselvo pocket. It also took place against a drumbeat of
orchestrated hysteria following the shelling in Mariupol. Prior to the
meeting Tusk said that he was not interested in a meeting that was
purely declamatory.
That however is what Tusk got. What came out of the meeting was essentially declamatory.
The
Greeks insisted on a belligerent paragraph directed against Russia
being removed from the text of the final EU statement and postponed any
further decision on further sanctions to a European Council meeting on 12th February 2015,
which will take place at heads of government level. In return they
agreed to an extension of the limited sanctions against specific Russian
companies and individuals that came into force in March, but not for a
full year (as the hardliners apparently wanted) but only for 6 months
(to September 2015).
These sanctions are a serious matter for the individuals concerned, but they are not critical for Russia.
This
is not the outcome that either the Russians or the EU hardliners led by
Tusk had wanted, but it gives time and space for Syriza to sort out its
own position and make whatever alliances within the EU it can, both on
the critical debt question and on the less critical question of
sanctions.
The next test will come at the European Council meeting on 12th February 2015
which Tsipras himself will attend. As of now it is looking unlikely
that the EU will impose further significant sanctions on Russia at that
meeting. Syriza is opposed to such sanctions but more importantly some
of the other EU states are not keen on them either. They now known that
one EU government - that of Greece - is strongly of that view, which is
likely to make their opposition still stronger. To what extent more
sanctions can be prevented at the meeting on 12th February 2015
will depend on the extent to which Syriza is able to play on the doubts
of these other EU states. Significantly Syriza did manage to play
successfully on these doubts at the meeting on Thursday, when it received the discrete support of several other EU states.
The
big test however will be when the sectoral sanctions come up for
renewal in July. That is the key decision upon which the future of the
sanctions ultimately depends.
I would add that by July - and even more by September when the sanctions that were extended on Thursday come up for renewal - we will also have a better idea of the prospects for a Podemos victory in Spain.
If
Podemos does win in Spain, then the entire calculus changes with Syriza
having one of the big EU countries as an ally. I hardly need say that
Spain carries immeasurably more weight within the EU than does Greece. A
Podemos government in Spain can afford to go it alone on sanctions and
defy the other big powers in the EU. A Syriza government cannot.
In
my opinion Thursday's decision was the best that could be expected in
the circumstances. As I said the big decisions are still to come. It
would be of no benefit to Russia, Greece or Syriza if Syriza had
provoked a crisis in the EU on Thursday
on a question of extending the least important sanctions, which caused a
dramatic escalation of the economic crisis in Greece, which in turn
meant that Syriza was either swept from power in Greece or was unable to
make independent decisions when the big decisions come up in July.
I would finish by again repeating what I said before in my Russia Insider piece and here.
Greece
is a small and economically very weak country. For its people the
sanctions are not the priority. The economic crisis is. That is why
they voted for Syriza: to solve the economic crisis, not to get the
sanctions on Russia lifted. On the sanctions issue people should not
expect more from Syriza than it promised or can realistically deliver.
Novorussia SITREP: Debaltsevo cauldron *not* closed yet
Here is, according to Colonel Cassad (by far the best source of info right now) the map of the situation this evening (local time):
The junta forces are definitely in a bad operational situation. They are surrounded all all sides except the north, but the highway leading north which the junta needs resupply its forces in and around Debaltsevo and which it could use to withdraw these forces is under constant Novorussian fire.
They crucial city of Uglegorsk (УГЛЕГОРСК on the map, bottom left) is mostly in Novorussian hands, but the outskirts are still held by the junta. In Chernukhino (ЧЕРНУХИНО on the map, bottom right) the Novorussian attack was successfully repelled by the junta forces.
Yesterday evening I listened with interest at the combat report of Basketok, the military commentator of the Anti-Maidan website who looked at the bigger picture and who commented in some details about the situation around Mariupol. So, as they say, there is good news and there is bad news.
The good news: the junta appears to be completely unable to mount any effective offensive. Except for one successful counter-attack north of Peski, even the junta can't even claim a single tactical success.
The bad news: the Novorussians are clearly stronger, and they are generally prevailing, but nowhere near the kind of superiority to achieve an operational breakthrough.
At this point in time, and unless something qualitatively changes, my very tenuous prognosis is that the Novorussians will close the Debaltsevo cauldron and most of the junta forces will either die or be taken prisoner with only a minority extracted on time. I hope that Novorussians will be able to take Avdeevka, Pervomaiskoe, Nevelskoe, Krasnogorovka and Mar'inka and relieve the pressure on Donetsk, but I don't see the Novorussians retaking Mariupol (I hope that I am wrong, of course).
If I am correct, and that is a very big "if", then the new frontlines will give the Novorussians a more or less viable line of contact. The one agreed upon in Minsk left most of Donetsk within striking range of junta artillery, unless, of course, the junta complied with a 40 or 50 kilometer withdrawal, which it clearly did not. This is why the Novorussians have indicated that a return to the original Minsk line of contact was unacceptable, and this is the correct decision, of course.
The last very good and important news item is that the junta's mobilization is a disaster which now forces the junta to even use road cops to hunt down draft dodgers. I know that I have said that many times in the past, and caught hell for doing so, but time is definitely not on the junta's side, not politically, not economically and not militarily.
The Saker
 |
| Junta in blue, Novorussians in red |
The junta forces are definitely in a bad operational situation. They are surrounded all all sides except the north, but the highway leading north which the junta needs resupply its forces in and around Debaltsevo and which it could use to withdraw these forces is under constant Novorussian fire.
They crucial city of Uglegorsk (УГЛЕГОРСК on the map, bottom left) is mostly in Novorussian hands, but the outskirts are still held by the junta. In Chernukhino (ЧЕРНУХИНО on the map, bottom right) the Novorussian attack was successfully repelled by the junta forces.
Yesterday evening I listened with interest at the combat report of Basketok, the military commentator of the Anti-Maidan website who looked at the bigger picture and who commented in some details about the situation around Mariupol. So, as they say, there is good news and there is bad news.
The good news: the junta appears to be completely unable to mount any effective offensive. Except for one successful counter-attack north of Peski, even the junta can't even claim a single tactical success.
The bad news: the Novorussians are clearly stronger, and they are generally prevailing, but nowhere near the kind of superiority to achieve an operational breakthrough.
At this point in time, and unless something qualitatively changes, my very tenuous prognosis is that the Novorussians will close the Debaltsevo cauldron and most of the junta forces will either die or be taken prisoner with only a minority extracted on time. I hope that Novorussians will be able to take Avdeevka, Pervomaiskoe, Nevelskoe, Krasnogorovka and Mar'inka and relieve the pressure on Donetsk, but I don't see the Novorussians retaking Mariupol (I hope that I am wrong, of course).
If I am correct, and that is a very big "if", then the new frontlines will give the Novorussians a more or less viable line of contact. The one agreed upon in Minsk left most of Donetsk within striking range of junta artillery, unless, of course, the junta complied with a 40 or 50 kilometer withdrawal, which it clearly did not. This is why the Novorussians have indicated that a return to the original Minsk line of contact was unacceptable, and this is the correct decision, of course.
The last very good and important news item is that the junta's mobilization is a disaster which now forces the junta to even use road cops to hunt down draft dodgers. I know that I have said that many times in the past, and caught hell for doing so, but time is definitely not on the junta's side, not politically, not economically and not militarily.
The Saker
Request for help from a friend of our community
Dear friends,
I got this email from Kotaro Kazzura, the friend who does a lot of the English subtitled videos I post here:
Many thanks and kind regards,
The Saker
I got this email from Kotaro Kazzura, the friend who does a lot of the English subtitled videos I post here:
Hi, I'd like to ask for your help, the thing is that there's such site as liveleak.com which is rather useful for delivering the truth for people, usually I post my translations there as well, but recently they downgraded my channel (so I can only upload videos there instead of embedding, and can upload only 3 a day, it's rather annoying to waste time uploading videos twice), then they downgraded 2 of my other channels there, but I'd like to have my vids embedded and posted there too, if it's possible, like you or maybe someone else has accounts there or can register there, could you please embed videos from my youtube channel there instead of me? If you register a new channel there, you've gotta upload about 16 videos (or just posts with text and photos) or something to be able to embed so it's rather annoying, but it works even if you just upload there old videos too to 'Ukraine' channel for example, or to other channels, but once you get about 25 points or something you'll be able to simply embed videos from youtube which is significantly faster.Considering how much we all owe Kotaro for his absolutely amazing work, I think that we ought to help him (her?) in any way we can. If you can help him, please email him directly at kazzuraengsubs@gmail.com
Many thanks and kind regards,
The Saker
 |
| Kazzura's YouTube channel is crucial for our struggle |
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