SitRep Transcarpathia, Transnistria and Gagauzia 17 Nov - 23 Nov
A perambulation around the periphery of Ukraine, looking at local and regional viewpoints. The media coverage varies from relatively neutral to rabidly nationalist.
Note: some urls in the links are prefixed with 'z5h64q92x9.net/tr-url/ru-en.en/' . This form provides the reader with a Yandex translated version of the source. The original article can be reached by removing this prefix.
Kharkov has experienced numerous unexplained explosions may reflect actions by partisans. A recent status map shows the extent of purported partisan activity throughout Donbass. The connection from Kharkov to the border is interesting. Is there another voentorg in action?
Estonia - the national airline has lost 6.4 million euro as a result of the Ukraine crisis. The route Tallinin - Kiev has been severely disrupted.
Latvia seems to be feeling left out. It has claimed a Russian submarine passed about 27 miles from its territorial waters. This is seriously pathetic.
Galicia - low level discontent was exhibited at a recent football match. One of the teams, Shakhtar Donetsk, refused to wear T-shirts commemorating ATO forces.
Poland reportedly buying 40 AGM-158B JASSM cruise missiles from the US for around $250 million, with 50 % discount. These missiles have a range of 960 km, and an accuracy of around three meters. Even if you buy into the Polish missile defence is aimed at Iran and North Korea scam, these missiles certainly are not defensive and could reach Moscow.
Slovakia will continue to supply Ukraine with gas via reverse flow through the Vojny-Uzhgorod pipeline. This pipeline can supply about 30 million cubic metres gas per day from the Slovakian energy company Eustream. Slovakia claims to be able to maintain this despite a 50% decline in gas supplied to Slovakia from Russia. The head of the Ukraine gas company NaftoGaz claims this way Ukraine can completely avoid Russia as a gas supplier. He seems to be relying on ignorance of readers as to where Slovakia obtains its gas. The Ukraine gas company will defer any decision to buy further gas from Russia until 1 December
Czech Republic - Milos Zeman, the Head of State has stated that it is pointless to support Ukraine in the midst of a civil war. He also is a critic of EU sanctions against Russia, stating that he is not the only one leader with concerns. The leaders of Slovakia, Hungary, and Austria hold similar views. Sanctions are a loss-loss policy. He has invited the leaders of the four major WWII western powers to a ceremony commemorating the liberation of AUschwitz. Predictably some poodles have whined at the mention of Putin, but Zeman points out the camp was liberated by the Red Army. Equally predictably, there have been sign of a colour-coordinated response suggesting the US are hinting at regime change. Look out for red cards in the Czech Republic.
Transcarpathian military forces continue the dance of shuttling to and from the front in the east. In the last week, 27 volunteers have returned, with permission from Kiev, for two weeks leave. A further 36 officers from the Uzhgorod battalion of the National Guard have returned from two months duty at block posts in the Debaltsevo area. Small numbers of casualties are reported. Three were reported killed and two severely wounded in action around Debaltsevo. Initially these were described as members of the local 128th Mountain Infantry Brigade, but the identification was corrected to the 79th Brigade. A few days later, two troops from the 128th were reported killed after serving four months duty near Debaltsevo. One ATO soldier and nine were wounded in action at Donetsk airport.
The Transcarpathian press recently included a very surprising item - an interview with a man from the Lugansk region who had moved west with his family. The surprising thing was the fairly accurate representation of the situation, not jingoistic like all previous interviews with refugees. He notes that locals shun him when he mentions where he is from and asks why are Ukrainians killing Ukrainians.
This was counteracted to some extent by the appearance of an odious piece of propaganda. A Canadian outfit, Nordic Filmworks, has produced a slick propaganda piece linked to a StandWithUkr hash-tag. This seems to reflect an Israeli hasbara theme StandWithUs.
Prisoner exchanges recently resulted in the release of 17 Ukrainian prisoners of war. Transcarpathian police officers returned from the front claim to have arrested 100 separatists, 50 of whom were exchanged for prisoners. The charges justifying arrest are not specified, so maybe it was a quota in order to have someone to exchange.
Biden The US Vice President made a visit to Ukraine this week. Little was reported about the subject matter, The two key questions covered in the meeting were energy (Biden's son has a financial interest in shale oil/gas resources in the Donbass) and security. One report claims "the United States promised assistance in all areas" and "there are a lot of arrangements, which should not be mentioned at a press conference". Does this refer to the supply of weapons to the Ukraine forces? We will not see. Given the Novorossian forces ability in depriving Ukrainians of their weapon systems, maybe shiny new US equipment will show up on their side.
The Transcarpathia economy fares slightly better than the overall Ukraine position, but it is dire. Inflation is running at 19% for the year to date and is predicted to reach 25% by the end of the year. Salaries have risen by about 5.8%, to an average of 2660 UAH (~$178) per month. Wage arrears have reduced b 4.5 million UAH to 3.9 million UAH, one of the lowest rates in the country.Kiev, perhaps the wealthiest part of the country, has a budget deficit of 2 billion UAH, with only 25 million UAH on hand as a result of a government strategy to keep Kiev 'on short rations'.
The exchange rate position is worsening. There is evidence of manipulation of the exchange rate during the run up to the election election. Shortly after the coup, suspicious activity involving armed masked men, unmarked vehicles, forty large crates and an unmarked aircraft led to speculation that Ukraine's gold, or at least a significant part of it, had been secreted out of the country. One possibility is that the residual gold was sold to stabilise the rate of the Hryvnia in order to give an appearance of stability. The NBU however, claims the gold was sold to optimise the structure of international reserves. The exchange rate control was removed after the election and the rate increased dramatically from the nominal 13 UAH / USD to nearly 16 UAH / USD. The head of the Ukraine National Bank (NBU) notes that the UAH has devalued by ~100% since the beginning of the year and by ~50% since July. The NBU now claims to be operating a floating exchange rate. One other possibility for the manipulation is the influence of George Soros. The head of the NBU has admitted that Soros visited Ukraine two weeks ago and that Ukraine relies on financial support from him. There is also evidence of US financial support via the CIA front USAID.
The banking sector is in a very poor state in spite of this support. The overall banking system of Ukraine made a loss of 13.5 billion UAH for the period January to October 2014, compared to a $2.1 billion UAH profit in the same period the previous year. About one third of bank loans are 'non performing' i.e. they borrower is not making payments. The weak currency also makes it very difficult to pay debt owed in foreign currency. Initially the NBU said it was not going to close banks in spite of speculation in Transcarpathian media. A few days later, it refinanced the state-owned Oschadbank with 11 billion UAH and towards the end of the week, it declared that two public joint stock companies, 'VAB Bank' and 'CityCommerce Bank' were insolvent after shareholders failed to recapitalise the bank to new capital levels imposed to comply with IMF requirements.
Zakarpatgas, the local Transcarpathian gas supply company, is planning to spend 10.8 million UAH on infrastructure renovation, aimed at reducing gas losses in the distribution system and more accurate metering of gas used by customers.
The Ukraine nuclear power industry depends on Russia for its supply of nuclear fuel for its operational reactors. The contract runs until the end of 2015.
Hungary is under increasing pressure from the US regarding its perceived pro-Russian stance. Orban claims that the government is not pro-Russian, rather it is concerned about the protection of the interests and sovereignty of Hungary, including the Hungarian diaspora in neighbouring countries. In this light, Hungary still supports South Stream as a means of bypassing problems associated with Ukraine and gas supplies through it. It looks like the US is exploiting diverse internal sources of discontent to cover a standard colour-coordinated regime change warm-up. I guess the US hopes the mere threat would be sufficient to make the Hungarians see the error of their ways and put US interests first.
Serbia is not et a member of the EU, but it has been told to impose EU sanctions against Russia by the European Commissioner Johannes Hahn. This is effectively an ultimatum - obey or you do not join. Given the relatively close trading ties and historical association with Russia, the Serbian goverment has stated it will not impose such sanctions. It rightly fears the adverse effects of reverse sanctions. It also has an interest in the success of South Stream and funding for the reconstruction of Serbian railways. It seems likely that Serbia may also face the usual colour-coordinated threat of regime change if it choses to put its own interests before those of the US and EU.
Colour-coordinated regime change - so we have Russia as the big target, then China, but first the Czech Republic, Hungary and Serbia are in the sights of the US. If the German business people have their way, Merkel would change course so Germany would also join the list. I wonder how many simultaneous regime change actions the US can run. Will the totally manipulated US / global USD-backed financial system collapse first as a result of massive internal inconsistencies?
Romania has a new President Klaus Johannis who won a narrow victory over his rival the current Prime Minister Victor Ponta. Johannis is the mayor of Sibiu and the leader of the right wing Christian Liberal Alliance. He seems to have won by default in a protest vote against "wickedness, corruption, betrayal, lies, arrogance" of the system. The US State representative stated that "democracy is alive and well" in Romania and they are prepared to work with Johannes.
Moldova faces an election on 30 November. The results of a poll released on 18 November indicate PCRM (Communist) would get 19.4%, PLDM (Liberal Democrat) 15.1%, PDM (Democratic) 12.4%, PSRM (Socialist) 11.6%, Patria 8.1% and PL (Liberal) 7.1%. The Popular Movement Antimafia would gain 2.5% and the Peoples Party 2.1%. The pollsters surveyed 1591 people aged 18-72 from all localities except Transnistria in the period 1 - 10 November. The accuracy of the result is claimed to be within 2.6%. Other surveys indicate closure of the gap between PCRM and PLDM. Given the PLDM is more pro-EU/pro-US than the PCRM, it seems likely that the result will favour them, and consequent alignment of Moldova with the EU over the RF. Another youth group, the Alliance of Students, has stated it will stage protests if the PCRM win or are included in any governmental alliance. This is a clear indication that some democratic outcomes are not allowed and marks out their role as an EU/US tool.
The Moldovan economy continues to face problems. It's external debt has increased by $11.1 million to $1.3 billion over the course of 2014. Part of this increase arises from the attempt of the Moldovan national bank to stabilise the exchange rate of the national currency (the lei). The exchange rate has increased from 13 lei to the dollar at the start of the year to about 15 lei now. Moldova faces similar problems to Ukraine, facing increasing debt in foreign currency and a weakening exchange rate. Russian sanctions are also important, and the consequent reduced trade with Russia has had the effect of making Romania the dominant trading partner of Moldova. It claims it intends to repay part of the outstanding debt to Gazprom in the near future. It is also considering alternative sources of gas, Romania or Austria via reverse flow. The Democrat Party has come out in favour of the sale of agricultural land to foreigners, an essential part of the EU project. This will allow foreign companies to acquire land cheaply and introduce industrial agriculture, with profit exiting Moldova. This will greatly disadvantage any local farming units.
Gagauzia faces more problems should the PLDM win the election. A representative of the party has publicly stated that the PLDM will not recognise the autonomy of Gagauzia and may be preparing to remove the special status enshrined in law.
Transnistria also faces potential problems after the Moldovan elections. The PMR representative on the jCC 5+2 status negotiations team has expressed the view that Moldovan combatants may storm Transnistria, given the recent provocations against the PMR leader at Chisinau airport and the group of Moldovan soldiers travelling in plain clothes in PMR. Moldova continues to block progress at the JCC meetings originally intended to deliver a peaceful solution to the status of Transnistria. Moldova appears to have a position of no compromise which is consistent with US/EU support. Ukraine is continuing with the construction of a ditch along the border with Transnistria.
Reunification of Moldova and Romania would present further problems for Transnistria and more so, Gagauzia. The original impetus for autonomy or separation was the possibility of reunification of what became Moldova with Romania.
Crimea has a higher profile in the news following the election. As part of his electioneering, Dmitry Yarosh stated that Crimean Tatars would start to cause trouble. This has manifested in frequent appearances of Mustafa Dzhemilev, a Ukrainian representative of, and advisor to Poroshenko on, the Tatar people in the press. He makes unsupported claims that Crimean Tatars are living in a climate of fear. Human Rights Watch have produced a report about these allegations, but their position is compromised having used an image of a women crying in the presence of militia after the Odessa mas murder event claiming the women was being threatened by Russian police. They silently withdrew the petition once their misrepresentation was made public. Interestingly, Soros mentioned earlier also has his finger in the pie in Crimea. He seems to support or influence a Tatar NGO amongst others.
This concludes this short tour. I think it clearly indicates the degree of interaction and the expanding scale of problems enhanced by the coup in Ukraine. There is clear potential for further destabilisation of recalcitrant (in US eyes) countries further to the west with the consequent fallout. The EU politicians have done themselves proud in their obeisance to the Anglo-Zionist project. The remarkably diplomatic Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has stated the Russia will not shoot itself in the foot by ceasing to trade with Europe, but the former relationship is finished and "business as usual" is no longer possible.
Showing posts with label Transcarpathia Transnistria and Gagauzia SITREP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Transcarpathia Transnistria and Gagauzia SITREP. Show all posts
Tuesday, November 25, 2014
Tuesday, November 18, 2014
Transcarpathia, Transnistria and Gagauzia SitRep 10 Nov - 16 Nov
(Note: some urls in the links are prefixed with 'z5h64q92x9.net/tr-url/ru-en.en/'. This form provides the reader with a Yandex translated version of the source. The original article can be reached by removing this prefix.)
Transcarpathia
ATO
Only two individuals from Transcarpathia have been reported as killed at the front. The first served volunteered in AUgust and received two weeks training. He joined the 128 Mechanised Infantry Brigade and was killed by a sniper near Debaltsevo. The second was described as a Major, killed in an unreported location. A third solder, a resident of Mukachevo, who died of burns in a hospital in Dnepropetrovsk was commemorated this week.
The latest reports from the regime indicate that a total of 1654 individuals from Transcarpathia have served at the front. This presumably excludes the members of the militias who come and go as they wish. Of these, 24 are reported dead, 54 wounded and 15 have been released after being held prisoner in the east. Currently there are about 200 official combatants at the front from bases in Transcarpathia. The overall official loss figures are 1052 Ukraine military killed, more than 4000 injured and more than 400 are held prisoner. These figures contrast dramatically with those estimated by the Novorossian forces. They calculate the death toll at 20904. This includes 11590 regular Ukrainian military soldiers and 3382 from the various militias and special battalions.
The trickle of police officers rotating to and from the front continues. They seem to have been been based near Debaltsevo. One group of 50 returned after one month at the front whilst another group of 10 returned after 40 days. The Crimean Tatar spokesperson, Dzhemilev is reported claiming that 450 Crimean Tatars are serving in various battalions. He also claims that the relatives of these individuals in Crimea are at risk and are held hostage to local authorities. He seems to be doing a good job as a propaganda agent for the regime.
One recent development ids the appearance of videos in the local press of Transcarpathians serving at the front. As an example, this one shows a substantial camp located near residential buildings. The soldiers are filmed using these abandoned houses for shelter and cooking facilities. They also decorate the places with their symbolism. The local Hungarian press still refer to the Novorossians as pro-Russian dissidents rather than the term 'terrorist' ubiquitous in Ukrainian media.
The lustration process is still under way. This process of removing 'tainted' individuals has a couple of loopholes, allowing those who served under Yanukovich to continue in their posts. One loophole relates to those who have served in the ATO forces. A popular cam involves an affected person finding a quiet spot near the front to serve for a short while, gaining them exception to the process.
The Pravy Sektor (PS) forces have established a training camp in Transcarpathia. This allows those PS fighters who have seen enough of the reality of war to train other gungho individuals to take their place. A small number of individuals have been trained and form part of a so-called '1st battalion DYK'. Reports claim the PS fighters at Donetsk airport have left because their work is done there. The close combat work is being left to the Ukraine military. It appears that these PS 'cyborgs' have left without notifying the military authorities and have gone to parts unknown.
Economy
The Ukraine national bank has ceased trying to hold the Hryvnia exchange rate at about 13 UAH/$. This support was provided during the election period to mask the true state of the economy from the voters. Following the election, the central bank abandoned a fixed exchange rate policy and expected the rate to rise to 15-16. It did this almost immediately, running at 15.4 to 16.1 by mid week. To put this in context, the exchange rate was 6.99 UAH/$ at the beginning of the year and some analysts expect it to reach 20, certainly before the end of the year. In February this year, the Ukraine reserves included ~21 tons of gold, now there is only about 0.2 tons. It is not known publicly where this gold went. Possibly some of it was sold recently to support the UAH exchange rate stabilisation.
In parallel, the bank base rate has risen from 6.5% in April this year to 14%. The public are reported to have withdrawn 110 billion UAH of savings from banks since the beginning of the year. Local media report that banks are 'unwilling' to return depositors funds, and queues of 500 have been mentioned forming outside banks in Mukachevo. The central bank has refinanced several such banks, not specifically identified, to prevent a run.
The dominant local economic statistics for the regions produce including grain, wheat, barley, potatoes, fruit, berries, timber, milk, cattle, sheep, pigs and poultry typically show yields a few percent down on last year. Hungary is still the dominant local trading partner. Incomes are stead or falling. Prices are rising locally; the price of heating gas has increased 63% since Dec 2013. Similarly electricity is 11% higher, medical costs are 24% higher, fuels and oils for transport 55% higher. The costs of burials have increased 18%. The official local inflation figure is 2.3% for October, effectively around 19% for year to date.
A local helicopter production company is on the verge of bankruptcy. It owes about 1.3 million UAH in unpaid wages. It had a contract to supply some equipment to India, but India cancelled the deal, reasons unspecified.
Russia holds about $3.1 billion of bonds from Ukraine. The terms of the deal allow for immediate repayment should government debt exceed 60% of GDP. Putin has said that Russia will not make a call on the bonds as that would destroy the Ukraine economy. No doubt Putin bashers will see this as weakness. This is not the case. It is a strong hint to those in power who clamour to own Ukraine that the whole pack of cards could be demolished at a stroke. By not doing so, Putin also precludes explicit blame for the collapse on Russia. The Ukraine economy will collapse on its own anyway, unless things change rapidly and dramatically for the better.
Election
The results of the election have more or less been determined. Of the 421 MPs, 225 are members of party lists and 196 are from the majority districts. The party "Bloc Petro Poroshenko" has won 132 seats, the "Popular Front" (Yatsenyuk) has won 82, the "Self-Help" (Semenchenko) party 33, the "Opposition Bloc" - 29, Lyashko's "Radical Party" - 22, "Batkivshchyna" (Tymoshenko) - 19, and Svoboda (Tyahnybok) - 6 seats. In addition, one deputy was elected for each of the "Strong Ukraine", "Spade", Svoboda and Pravy Sektor parties in the majority districts. Election results are still pending from two districts. The Central Election Commission has given District 38 (Novomoskovsk, Dnipropetrovsk oblast) and District 63 (Berdychiv, Zhytomyr oblast) 15 days to comply with court decisions regarding recounts.
Energy
Slovakia continues to supply gas via reverse feed. It claims to have supplied 20% of the needed volume and to have saved Ukraine $500 million.
Mobilisation
In spite of speculation of a fourth wave of mobilisation after the election, the regime says this is currently not necessary.
Politics
One of the local clan of politicians, Viktor Baloha, is in favour of a referendum in the east. The question would be for them to stay or go. This would avoid a long drawn out drain on Ukraine's resources. I suspect Ukraine's resources are close to zero anyway so this is a moot point.
Propaganda
The current invocation of the Carpathian Sich, an organisation aimed at fostering nationalist spirit and protecting the interests of the Ukraine nation, was founded in 2010. The organisation aims to educate new Ukrainians - to be "strong, fair, people of Faith and Honour. We must break the stereotypes of patriotism in Transcarpathia. People will understand that the nationalists are not 'thugs'". The organisation was founded in reaction to Hungarian aggression in 1938 and no responds to Russian aggression [for some obscure meaning of the word 'aggression']. To celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the original organisation, a torchlight march was held in Uzhgorod. The poor lighting makes it difficult to tell how many participated, but judging from the evidence of attendance at other meetings, it is probably only 20 or so members, including some from Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk. The leader of the Carpathian Sich favours a unification of all nationalist movements, which possibly reflects the low support for individual groups. The Carpathian Sich trains for military action with members of the Aidar battalion. The local head of the executive committee, Thomas Deak, has left supposedly to serve in the east.
Sanctions
Hungarian ministers report that Hungary now supports EU sanctions, providing everyone else does. It also is still committed to a balanced relationship with Russia. I guess the Hungarian government hope this will be sufficient to keep the Nuland regime changers off it's back. We will see.
Separatism
On 11th November, the Transcarpathian SBU arrested the chief editor of a local newspaper, "Workers' and Peasants' Truth". The editor is said to oppose the central government and support the calls for separatism in the east. The paper contained images representing Communist ideology and an article said to create a negative image of Ukraine, humiliate its national dignity and denigrate the honour of the Ukrainian and individual representatives of national minorities. ALl copies of the newspaper were confiscated. The editor faced two charges i) violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and ii) violation of citizen's equality based on their race, ethnicity, religious beliefs. The prosecutors sought preventative detention. The judge allowed the editor to go free on bail. The offences carry a 5 year prison sentence for anyone found guilty.
Transnistria (aka PMR) and Gagauzia
Economy
As a result of the financial blockade, PMR foreign exchange reserves have dropped by about ~ $5 million to ~$37 million.
A survey of business in PMR shows that about 70% have been affected by Ukraine sanctions, with 17.5% having their supply chain broken. Exports to Ukraine have declined between 40 and 90%. This may reflect the dramatic collapse of the Ukraine economy itself as much as the direct effects of the sanctions.
Currently, about 40 trucks destined for the PMR are held up at Ukraine border crossing points over alleged paperwork problems.
The Moldovan Minister of Agriculture sees the possibility of more sanctions from Russia relating to Moldovan agricultural produce.
Elections
A pre-election survey in Moldova asked 1005 respondents from 75 settlements how they would vote in the election to be held on 30 November. The sample size gives a survey error of around 3%. About 60% had decided how they would vote. The results were 'Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova' - 21.2%, 'Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova' (Liberal Conservative) - 17.8%, 'Democratic Party of Moldova' (Social Democrat) - 12.9%, for the 'Rodina Party' - 9.6% and 'Liberal Party' (Conservative liberalism) is 7.3%. The 'Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova', supposedly favoured by Russia, would not pass the electoral threshold, gaining only 3.9% and the electoral bloc 'Select Moldova Customs Union' would gain only 1.1% of the votes. A summary of the position claims that the main protoges of the US/EU position are the Democrats and the Liberal Democrats. Given the likely outcome will be a coalition, some suggest this may allow third parties to create instability, whilst others suggest this would make it difficult to run a Euromaidan or run a scenario as seen in Ukraine.
Energy
The negotiations between Gazprom and Moldova over the supply of gas were conducted quickly and without the apparent histrionics observed in Ukraine. The gas price was set at $380 per thousand cubic metres by the end of 2013. The new deal resulted in a price of $332, $45 less than current price. this is based on the purchase of 3 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas per year by Moldova and allows for the transit fees for 19 bcm for gas supplied to Turkey, Bulgaria and Albania.
Politics
On 10 November, the PMR Prime Minister Yevgeny Shevchuk travelled to Moscow for a meeting. On arriving at Chisinau airport in Moldova, he was held up by a group of 20 or so aggressive men who tried to prevent him travelling. The group were identified as current and past members of the Moldovan police, associated with the 1992 war against PMR. The leader is associated with the far right national Liberal party. The trouble makers were blocked by Shevchuk's unarmed bodyguard. The PMR government regarded the act as a pre-planned provocation aimed at prevent free movement of PMR politicians. The severity of the act is described as unprecedented. The PMR government demanded the Moldovan authorities take action against the provocateurs. The provocateurs in turn claimed they were the victims. This sort of action supports PMR claims for its own airport at Tiraspol.
Whilst in Moscow, Shevchuk signed five Memoranda of Cooperation with Russia, covering the financial sector, health, communications, consumer rights, and human welfare.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has expressed concern about corruption in Moldova, especially the influence of oligarchs. In a recent visit to assess electoral procedures, members of the committee formed the view that the process did not meet EU standards. There was a lack of transparency, the presence of 'dirty money', much of the media is under control of oligarchs, who have close ties with political parties. A member on the committee noted that the report was not disclosed publicly to avoid complicating elections.
The Moldovan Democrat Party is controlled by the oligarch Vladimir Plahotniucom. This party at one time had a two-track approach advocating the development of relations with both Russia and the West. Its representative in Gagauzia argued the party was the most pro-Russian party. However, 10,000 participants of the war against the PMR have recently joined, probably including those involved in the provocation against SHevchuk. A member of the Moldovan government considers this action as a show of force directed against those who disagree with him (Plahotniucom) According to the MP, "This scumbag [Plahotniucom] imagines himself Moldovan "Kolomoisky" and he is "ready to go on provoking a new war with Transnistria. This "plan B" to remain in power by imposing a state of emergency and postpone the elections".
Ukraine wants to open a consulate in Tiraspol for the benefit of Ukrainians living in PMR. This is at odds with the recent closure of nine consulates elsewhere. Russia has also sought to open a consulate in Tiraspol, but unsurprisingly, this has been blocked by Moldova.
The EU parliament ratified the Association Agreement with Moldova. The vote was 535 in favour, 94 opposed and 44 abstained. The pro vote amounted to about 80% of the full vote.
Serbia and Russia have quietly signed an agreement on military cooperation. They will hold their first joint military exercise named SREM 2014. This may lead to the presence of Russian forces west of Romania.
Propaganda
The young Gagauzian male, a supposed terrorist caught with clothing bearing a label 'G. E. Army' was released without charge 72 hours after being detained. He is being kept under watch by the Moldovan security services.
The NGO 'Youth of Moldova' has been displaying banners promoting the supposed benefits of reunification with Romania.
Sanctions
There is ongoing decline of trade from Moldova to Russia as a result of reverse sanctions. The trade is down 30% to about $345 million. The sanctions have al;so resulted in a negative trade balance for Moldova (imports > exports) of $140 million in the first nine months of 2014. Romania is now the leading export trade partner for Moldova. The Moldovan government petulantly insists that Russia's sanctions are unnecessary.
Separatism
The Government of PMR is ready to hold a rerun of the 2006 referendum on independence, subject to international acceptance of the results. In the earlier referendum,97% supported independence. This may be a precursor to Russian recognition of PMR as an independent state. Russia has reiterated its support for PMR and is keeping course towards formal recognition of PMR.
The Moldovan government continues to block the formal 5+2 JCC process for a negotiated settlement. It even ignores supposedly mandatory emergency meetings. A formal statement of the PMR position is listed in the resources section below. The PMR government insists on continued bilateral progress. The Russian and Transnistrian governments struggle to find ways to unblock the process. The PMR member of the JCC group holds the view that Moldova is preparing to withdraw from the 1997 agreement on how to resolve the dispute. This view is strengthened by Moldova's insistence that RUssian troops withdraw from the peacekeeping mission. Moldovan security service has searched the home of Paul Grigorchuk, who is publicly critical of the regime. A search warrant was issued, and his computer and phone were sized during the search. He is a forceful critic of the oligarch running the country and the far right supporters. The Moldovan government claim they suspect him of planning to destabilize the election and of illegal participation in the election campaign.
Resources
The site Regnum Ru provides a wealth of articles, either commissioned or syntheses with additional commentary clarifying or correcting the main text. It has filtering options allowing fairly specific topics to be monitored.
"Dialogue" EU - TMR: a hot meal in exchange for the surrender a view by a former PMR finance minister of the implications of the Moldova - EU Association Agreement for PMR.
Statement of position by the PMR government regarding the status of the JCC 5+2 negotiations.
Transcarpathia
ATO
Only two individuals from Transcarpathia have been reported as killed at the front. The first served volunteered in AUgust and received two weeks training. He joined the 128 Mechanised Infantry Brigade and was killed by a sniper near Debaltsevo. The second was described as a Major, killed in an unreported location. A third solder, a resident of Mukachevo, who died of burns in a hospital in Dnepropetrovsk was commemorated this week.
The latest reports from the regime indicate that a total of 1654 individuals from Transcarpathia have served at the front. This presumably excludes the members of the militias who come and go as they wish. Of these, 24 are reported dead, 54 wounded and 15 have been released after being held prisoner in the east. Currently there are about 200 official combatants at the front from bases in Transcarpathia. The overall official loss figures are 1052 Ukraine military killed, more than 4000 injured and more than 400 are held prisoner. These figures contrast dramatically with those estimated by the Novorossian forces. They calculate the death toll at 20904. This includes 11590 regular Ukrainian military soldiers and 3382 from the various militias and special battalions.
The trickle of police officers rotating to and from the front continues. They seem to have been been based near Debaltsevo. One group of 50 returned after one month at the front whilst another group of 10 returned after 40 days. The Crimean Tatar spokesperson, Dzhemilev is reported claiming that 450 Crimean Tatars are serving in various battalions. He also claims that the relatives of these individuals in Crimea are at risk and are held hostage to local authorities. He seems to be doing a good job as a propaganda agent for the regime.
One recent development ids the appearance of videos in the local press of Transcarpathians serving at the front. As an example, this one shows a substantial camp located near residential buildings. The soldiers are filmed using these abandoned houses for shelter and cooking facilities. They also decorate the places with their symbolism. The local Hungarian press still refer to the Novorossians as pro-Russian dissidents rather than the term 'terrorist' ubiquitous in Ukrainian media.
The lustration process is still under way. This process of removing 'tainted' individuals has a couple of loopholes, allowing those who served under Yanukovich to continue in their posts. One loophole relates to those who have served in the ATO forces. A popular cam involves an affected person finding a quiet spot near the front to serve for a short while, gaining them exception to the process.
The Pravy Sektor (PS) forces have established a training camp in Transcarpathia. This allows those PS fighters who have seen enough of the reality of war to train other gungho individuals to take their place. A small number of individuals have been trained and form part of a so-called '1st battalion DYK'. Reports claim the PS fighters at Donetsk airport have left because their work is done there. The close combat work is being left to the Ukraine military. It appears that these PS 'cyborgs' have left without notifying the military authorities and have gone to parts unknown.
Economy
The Ukraine national bank has ceased trying to hold the Hryvnia exchange rate at about 13 UAH/$. This support was provided during the election period to mask the true state of the economy from the voters. Following the election, the central bank abandoned a fixed exchange rate policy and expected the rate to rise to 15-16. It did this almost immediately, running at 15.4 to 16.1 by mid week. To put this in context, the exchange rate was 6.99 UAH/$ at the beginning of the year and some analysts expect it to reach 20, certainly before the end of the year. In February this year, the Ukraine reserves included ~21 tons of gold, now there is only about 0.2 tons. It is not known publicly where this gold went. Possibly some of it was sold recently to support the UAH exchange rate stabilisation.
In parallel, the bank base rate has risen from 6.5% in April this year to 14%. The public are reported to have withdrawn 110 billion UAH of savings from banks since the beginning of the year. Local media report that banks are 'unwilling' to return depositors funds, and queues of 500 have been mentioned forming outside banks in Mukachevo. The central bank has refinanced several such banks, not specifically identified, to prevent a run.
The dominant local economic statistics for the regions produce including grain, wheat, barley, potatoes, fruit, berries, timber, milk, cattle, sheep, pigs and poultry typically show yields a few percent down on last year. Hungary is still the dominant local trading partner. Incomes are stead or falling. Prices are rising locally; the price of heating gas has increased 63% since Dec 2013. Similarly electricity is 11% higher, medical costs are 24% higher, fuels and oils for transport 55% higher. The costs of burials have increased 18%. The official local inflation figure is 2.3% for October, effectively around 19% for year to date.
A local helicopter production company is on the verge of bankruptcy. It owes about 1.3 million UAH in unpaid wages. It had a contract to supply some equipment to India, but India cancelled the deal, reasons unspecified.
Russia holds about $3.1 billion of bonds from Ukraine. The terms of the deal allow for immediate repayment should government debt exceed 60% of GDP. Putin has said that Russia will not make a call on the bonds as that would destroy the Ukraine economy. No doubt Putin bashers will see this as weakness. This is not the case. It is a strong hint to those in power who clamour to own Ukraine that the whole pack of cards could be demolished at a stroke. By not doing so, Putin also precludes explicit blame for the collapse on Russia. The Ukraine economy will collapse on its own anyway, unless things change rapidly and dramatically for the better.
Election
The results of the election have more or less been determined. Of the 421 MPs, 225 are members of party lists and 196 are from the majority districts. The party "Bloc Petro Poroshenko" has won 132 seats, the "Popular Front" (Yatsenyuk) has won 82, the "Self-Help" (Semenchenko) party 33, the "Opposition Bloc" - 29, Lyashko's "Radical Party" - 22, "Batkivshchyna" (Tymoshenko) - 19, and Svoboda (Tyahnybok) - 6 seats. In addition, one deputy was elected for each of the "Strong Ukraine", "Spade", Svoboda and Pravy Sektor parties in the majority districts. Election results are still pending from two districts. The Central Election Commission has given District 38 (Novomoskovsk, Dnipropetrovsk oblast) and District 63 (Berdychiv, Zhytomyr oblast) 15 days to comply with court decisions regarding recounts.
Energy
Slovakia continues to supply gas via reverse feed. It claims to have supplied 20% of the needed volume and to have saved Ukraine $500 million.
Mobilisation
In spite of speculation of a fourth wave of mobilisation after the election, the regime says this is currently not necessary.
Politics
One of the local clan of politicians, Viktor Baloha, is in favour of a referendum in the east. The question would be for them to stay or go. This would avoid a long drawn out drain on Ukraine's resources. I suspect Ukraine's resources are close to zero anyway so this is a moot point.
Propaganda
The current invocation of the Carpathian Sich, an organisation aimed at fostering nationalist spirit and protecting the interests of the Ukraine nation, was founded in 2010. The organisation aims to educate new Ukrainians - to be "strong, fair, people of Faith and Honour. We must break the stereotypes of patriotism in Transcarpathia. People will understand that the nationalists are not 'thugs'". The organisation was founded in reaction to Hungarian aggression in 1938 and no responds to Russian aggression [for some obscure meaning of the word 'aggression']. To celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the original organisation, a torchlight march was held in Uzhgorod. The poor lighting makes it difficult to tell how many participated, but judging from the evidence of attendance at other meetings, it is probably only 20 or so members, including some from Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk. The leader of the Carpathian Sich favours a unification of all nationalist movements, which possibly reflects the low support for individual groups. The Carpathian Sich trains for military action with members of the Aidar battalion. The local head of the executive committee, Thomas Deak, has left supposedly to serve in the east.
Sanctions
Hungarian ministers report that Hungary now supports EU sanctions, providing everyone else does. It also is still committed to a balanced relationship with Russia. I guess the Hungarian government hope this will be sufficient to keep the Nuland regime changers off it's back. We will see.
Separatism
On 11th November, the Transcarpathian SBU arrested the chief editor of a local newspaper, "Workers' and Peasants' Truth". The editor is said to oppose the central government and support the calls for separatism in the east. The paper contained images representing Communist ideology and an article said to create a negative image of Ukraine, humiliate its national dignity and denigrate the honour of the Ukrainian and individual representatives of national minorities. ALl copies of the newspaper were confiscated. The editor faced two charges i) violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and ii) violation of citizen's equality based on their race, ethnicity, religious beliefs. The prosecutors sought preventative detention. The judge allowed the editor to go free on bail. The offences carry a 5 year prison sentence for anyone found guilty.
Transnistria (aka PMR) and Gagauzia
Economy
As a result of the financial blockade, PMR foreign exchange reserves have dropped by about ~ $5 million to ~$37 million.
A survey of business in PMR shows that about 70% have been affected by Ukraine sanctions, with 17.5% having their supply chain broken. Exports to Ukraine have declined between 40 and 90%. This may reflect the dramatic collapse of the Ukraine economy itself as much as the direct effects of the sanctions.
Currently, about 40 trucks destined for the PMR are held up at Ukraine border crossing points over alleged paperwork problems.
The Moldovan Minister of Agriculture sees the possibility of more sanctions from Russia relating to Moldovan agricultural produce.
Elections
A pre-election survey in Moldova asked 1005 respondents from 75 settlements how they would vote in the election to be held on 30 November. The sample size gives a survey error of around 3%. About 60% had decided how they would vote. The results were 'Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova' - 21.2%, 'Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova' (Liberal Conservative) - 17.8%, 'Democratic Party of Moldova' (Social Democrat) - 12.9%, for the 'Rodina Party' - 9.6% and 'Liberal Party' (Conservative liberalism) is 7.3%. The 'Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova', supposedly favoured by Russia, would not pass the electoral threshold, gaining only 3.9% and the electoral bloc 'Select Moldova Customs Union' would gain only 1.1% of the votes. A summary of the position claims that the main protoges of the US/EU position are the Democrats and the Liberal Democrats. Given the likely outcome will be a coalition, some suggest this may allow third parties to create instability, whilst others suggest this would make it difficult to run a Euromaidan or run a scenario as seen in Ukraine.
Energy
The negotiations between Gazprom and Moldova over the supply of gas were conducted quickly and without the apparent histrionics observed in Ukraine. The gas price was set at $380 per thousand cubic metres by the end of 2013. The new deal resulted in a price of $332, $45 less than current price. this is based on the purchase of 3 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas per year by Moldova and allows for the transit fees for 19 bcm for gas supplied to Turkey, Bulgaria and Albania.
Politics
On 10 November, the PMR Prime Minister Yevgeny Shevchuk travelled to Moscow for a meeting. On arriving at Chisinau airport in Moldova, he was held up by a group of 20 or so aggressive men who tried to prevent him travelling. The group were identified as current and past members of the Moldovan police, associated with the 1992 war against PMR. The leader is associated with the far right national Liberal party. The trouble makers were blocked by Shevchuk's unarmed bodyguard. The PMR government regarded the act as a pre-planned provocation aimed at prevent free movement of PMR politicians. The severity of the act is described as unprecedented. The PMR government demanded the Moldovan authorities take action against the provocateurs. The provocateurs in turn claimed they were the victims. This sort of action supports PMR claims for its own airport at Tiraspol.
Whilst in Moscow, Shevchuk signed five Memoranda of Cooperation with Russia, covering the financial sector, health, communications, consumer rights, and human welfare.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has expressed concern about corruption in Moldova, especially the influence of oligarchs. In a recent visit to assess electoral procedures, members of the committee formed the view that the process did not meet EU standards. There was a lack of transparency, the presence of 'dirty money', much of the media is under control of oligarchs, who have close ties with political parties. A member on the committee noted that the report was not disclosed publicly to avoid complicating elections.
The Moldovan Democrat Party is controlled by the oligarch Vladimir Plahotniucom. This party at one time had a two-track approach advocating the development of relations with both Russia and the West. Its representative in Gagauzia argued the party was the most pro-Russian party. However, 10,000 participants of the war against the PMR have recently joined, probably including those involved in the provocation against SHevchuk. A member of the Moldovan government considers this action as a show of force directed against those who disagree with him (Plahotniucom) According to the MP, "This scumbag [Plahotniucom] imagines himself Moldovan "Kolomoisky" and he is "ready to go on provoking a new war with Transnistria. This "plan B" to remain in power by imposing a state of emergency and postpone the elections".
Ukraine wants to open a consulate in Tiraspol for the benefit of Ukrainians living in PMR. This is at odds with the recent closure of nine consulates elsewhere. Russia has also sought to open a consulate in Tiraspol, but unsurprisingly, this has been blocked by Moldova.
The EU parliament ratified the Association Agreement with Moldova. The vote was 535 in favour, 94 opposed and 44 abstained. The pro vote amounted to about 80% of the full vote.
Serbia and Russia have quietly signed an agreement on military cooperation. They will hold their first joint military exercise named SREM 2014. This may lead to the presence of Russian forces west of Romania.
Propaganda
The young Gagauzian male, a supposed terrorist caught with clothing bearing a label 'G. E. Army' was released without charge 72 hours after being detained. He is being kept under watch by the Moldovan security services.
The NGO 'Youth of Moldova' has been displaying banners promoting the supposed benefits of reunification with Romania.
Sanctions
There is ongoing decline of trade from Moldova to Russia as a result of reverse sanctions. The trade is down 30% to about $345 million. The sanctions have al;so resulted in a negative trade balance for Moldova (imports > exports) of $140 million in the first nine months of 2014. Romania is now the leading export trade partner for Moldova. The Moldovan government petulantly insists that Russia's sanctions are unnecessary.
Separatism
The Government of PMR is ready to hold a rerun of the 2006 referendum on independence, subject to international acceptance of the results. In the earlier referendum,97% supported independence. This may be a precursor to Russian recognition of PMR as an independent state. Russia has reiterated its support for PMR and is keeping course towards formal recognition of PMR.
The Moldovan government continues to block the formal 5+2 JCC process for a negotiated settlement. It even ignores supposedly mandatory emergency meetings. A formal statement of the PMR position is listed in the resources section below. The PMR government insists on continued bilateral progress. The Russian and Transnistrian governments struggle to find ways to unblock the process. The PMR member of the JCC group holds the view that Moldova is preparing to withdraw from the 1997 agreement on how to resolve the dispute. This view is strengthened by Moldova's insistence that RUssian troops withdraw from the peacekeeping mission. Moldovan security service has searched the home of Paul Grigorchuk, who is publicly critical of the regime. A search warrant was issued, and his computer and phone were sized during the search. He is a forceful critic of the oligarch running the country and the far right supporters. The Moldovan government claim they suspect him of planning to destabilize the election and of illegal participation in the election campaign.
Resources
The site Regnum Ru provides a wealth of articles, either commissioned or syntheses with additional commentary clarifying or correcting the main text. It has filtering options allowing fairly specific topics to be monitored.
"Dialogue" EU - TMR: a hot meal in exchange for the surrender a view by a former PMR finance minister of the implications of the Moldova - EU Association Agreement for PMR.
Statement of position by the PMR government regarding the status of the JCC 5+2 negotiations.
Tuesday, November 11, 2014
Transcarpathia, Transnistria and Gagauzia SitRep 27 Oct - 09 Nov
by "Y"
Whilst the situations in Transcarpathia, Transnistria and Gagauzia remain essentially stable, the $5 billion bomb detonated at the Ukraine Maidan has set off shock waves that ripple and reflect off pre-existing dormant conflicts and tensions. These have expanded to Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, the Baltic States, Moldova and Romania in the immediate vicinity, let alone the major states at the heart of Europe.
Given these effects, I hope the reader will forgive references to actions outside the obvious immediate scope given by the title of this SitRep.
Transcarpathia
ATO
Volunteers are still collecting funds for equipment to be supplied to the troops at front. The main requirement is winter clothing and night vision imagers. A number of these imagers have been supplied by pro-regime individuals living abroad. As an expression of desperation, the proposal to transport firewood from Transcarpathia to the front takes some beating.
Casualty figures are confusing as usual and are subject to the usual caveats. A total of 29 individuals are reported as dead, with another 22 wounded. The dead include three Aidar members and one National Guard commander from block-post 32, along with another 5-6 individuals. Another soldier was killed near Lugansk possibly by a sniper. A group of seven Marines were wounded when their vehicle hit a mine, north of Lugansk, possibly near block-post 32. A member of the Carpathian Sich was severely wounded in fighting at Peski immediately west of Donetsk airport. A Transcarpathian solider from the 128th Mountain Infantry Brigade has died of wounds. He was injured on 18 October when he was a member of a howitzer unit between Lugansk and Debaltsevo. He was transferred to Lviv hospital and died 30 October. He was named as Sergeant Ruslan Vladimirovich Lishchuk of Khmelnitsky. The number of dead from Transcarpathia is one of the lowest rates per oblast in the country, along with Rivne and Chernivtsi.
To date, the military hospital at Mukachevo has treated 299 wounded soldiers. A number of wounded have been transferred to other countries for specialist treatment and rehabilitation, probably in relation to the fitting of prosthetic limbs. Fifteen individuals, including five injured at the Maidan and ten individuals from the Dnepr and other Pravy Sektor battalions have been treated in Estonia at a cost of 175,000 Euro. One individual was named as the Pravy Sektor coordinator Andrei Tarasenko, call sign Philipas. Croatia has accepted eight wounded soldiers for treatment whilst Hungary has said it will accept another ten for treatment at a military hospital. The largest contingent reported so far has 28 members of the 80th Air Mobile Battalion based in Lviv. These have been transferred to a private hospital in Poland for treatment of loss of limbs.
One of the problems for the Ukrainians regarding the dead is identification of victims. The volunteer units particularly don't use 'dog tags'. In Transcarpathia a newly formed NGO "Search-West" held a press conference in Uzhgorod. The representatives outlined a new humanitarian mission called 'Black Tulip' purposed with the task of tracking down and identifying the dead in the east. They called for volunteers and money to help with the search. They are looking for funds for 5-6 vehicles to transport volunteers and a further 1-2 refrigerated trucks to carry the remains, along with specialist equipment such as personal protection clothing. They claim to have identified 150 graves so far, in the areas around Ilovaisk, Shaktersk and Saur-Mogilla. Given the absence of dog tags, they propose to use DNA techniques to identify remains. How that will be financed was not discussed. Large numbers of volunteers would also be necessary given the psychologically demanding nature of the task.
News is slowly coming out giving an indication of the depth of discontent within the Ukraine military. Earlier a large number of soldiers from the Karpattya battalion left the Ilovaisk area without permission from high command in Kiev. One hundred of these individuals have returned to Transcarpathia, whilst a further forty have gone into hiding as they no longer wish to continue service. Thirty marines from the 80th Air Mobile Battalion based in Lviv have refused to return to the front and have been forced to go to Mukachevo military base in Transcarpathia. Given the large number of wounded reported above, it seems this unit was involved in some spectacularly horrific action, possibly in one of the cauldrons. Two individuals who absconded from the Dnepr battalion were detained at Alchevsk in the Donetsk region. They were given jail sentences of seven years for desertion. Relatives have been reported protesting outside the building where fort members of the 51st Mechanised Brigade are on trial. They were caught in a cauldron and forced, through lack of fuel and ammunition, to flee over the border into Russia. These individuals must have decided to return to Ukraine only to be charged with desertion.
The military base at Mukachevo holding the men from the 80th Air Mobile Battalion is reported to be in dreadful condition. The local authorities are seeking funding from Kiev to make it habitable. The exact nature of the problems are described as a 'military secret' though it is reported to lack basics such as beds, toilets and heating.
Economy
A major component of the local budget derives from gas transit fees derived from gas flowing out of Ukraine to the rest of Europe. These fees amounts to about $4 billion annually. Kiev leaves the region with about 2 billion UAH (~ 4%) of that amount.
Overall, Ukraine's GDP is down 5.1% to the end of the third quarter 2014 versus the same time last year. The IMF predict customer price inflation will be 11.4% for 2014 and 14% in 2015, a balance of payments decline of -2.5% and unemployment rising to 10%.
Concrete indicators of performance include a 77% decline in car production for October year on year. This sounds drastic, but the internal production is only a few thousand cars per year. Government statistics suggest inflation will reach 19% for the year. The highest components are gas heating at 10.8%, 7.8% for coal, eggs and bacon at 13.2-13.8% respectively. One of Transcarpathia's main exports is timber. The local timber is high quality furniture grade wood, but mismanagement has led to the timber being used for low quality, low profit uses. Local experts are concerned about the effects of deforestation on soil stability and the tourist trade. These concerns are reinforced by attempts to substitute wood fires for gas heating gas, both locally and elsewhere in the country.
Evidence has been released that supports the hypothesis that the UAH exchange rate was manipulated in run up to election. The graph shows that UAH / $ exchange rate was held flat at 12.95 for more than one 1 month. On 5 November control was released and the exchange rate jumped to 14.0 before falling back to 13.6 at the end of the day. The rate reached 14.3 the following day and went as high as 14.7 on the seventh of November. The Ukraine National Bank announced that it had spent $1.3 billion of foreign exchange reserves over last 6 weeks to maintain UAH exchange rate during election. This support has now stopped, hence the rising rate. The foreign exchange reserves amounted to $16.3 billion at the end of September. By 1 Nov these had fallen to $12.5 billion, a loss of 23.8% in 2 months.
A recent report on the 100 richest Ukrainians shows that only one originates in Transcarpathia. He originally made his money in the oil and energy sector, but now focusses on the local football club. The highest proportion of the high net worth individuals come from Donbass (17%) followed by Dnepropetrovsk (14%). Looking on the bright side, Igor Kolomoisky who is third on the list, has lost 33% net wealth since 2013.
Election
In the recent election, the victory in all but one (68 Uzhgorod) of the six local electoral districts went to self-identified candidates. The candidates gained 39-62% of the votes. In district 68, Bloc Petro Poroshenko gained victory with ~21% of vote. The low percentage needed for victory is a consequence of the large number of candidates standing in Uzhgorod. Turnout varied from 31% to 68%. The city of Uzhgorod had the highest turnout; the lower figures tended to occur in the more rural districts. Bloc Petro Poroshenko gained 25.6% in Transcarpathia compared to 6-10% in Donbass, Kharkov, and Odessa (figures subject to final revision).
All three of the Baloha brothers won their seats, along with their cousin Vasily Petiovka. They propose a decentralisation of power to Transcarpathia along the lines of an EU model. To date, this local political clan claims to favour the Self-Help Party rather than the Bloc Petro Poroshenko. Of the three brothers, only Ivan Baloha has so far been appointed to the Rada.
In terms of local Hungarian representation in the Rada, Vasily Brenzovich, the Hungarian ethnic representative may receive a parliamentary mandate once all the results are in and the deals have been negotiated.
In the previous SitRep, I referred Dmitry Yarosh's visit to Uzhgorod. He is the leader of Pravy Sektor and was accompanied by his praetorian guard. The videos of an extended Q&A session were released on YouTube. He mentioned the potential for the Crimean Tartars to create problems in Crimea. My view was that this indicated he was connected with the US regime change managers. As if on cue Ukraine media started producing reports relating to Crimean Tartars. On 27 October, Mustafa Dzhemilev, a Ukrainian advocate of Crimean Tartar nationalism tried to enter Crimea to vote. As he has been banned from entering Russian territory for 5 years, he was not allowed into Crimea, as he knew very well. This low level propaganda effort was followed by others. Dzhemilev had discussion with Poroshenko covering the creation of a Ministry of Crimea to consider issues relating to the return of Crimea to Ukraine. This ministry would handle claims relating to violation of Tartar and Muslim rights in Crimea. He has also called for criminal proceedings to be opened against 387 Crimean soldiers who transferred to Russian military units. More recently, billboards promoting Dzhemilev have appeared in Prague. These criticise Czech Republic claims that the current status of Crimea should be accepted. Dzhemilev is clearly the US point man for manipulating alleged mistreatment of Tartars and Muslims in Crimea.
In contrast to peaceful well-attended elections in Donbass, election sites at some places in rest of Ukraine turned very ugly. Perhaps the worst case was the handling of the count in 59th electoral district in west Donetsk. Pravy Sektor thugs were filmed guarding the voting station, supervisors were intimidated, computers and paperwork removed under strange circumstances. Parts of the electoral committee were replaced. The outcome of the vote was not resolved by 6 Nov. Opora, an NGO monitoring voting process, described situation as scandalous. Videos show the process of intimidation in support of the Pravy Sektor candidate. Others show women adjudicators reduced to tears or being treated by medical staff. The dispute centres around the counts for two self-nominated candidates, one of whom is probably Pravy Sektor.
A similar dispute occurred in Electoral District 79 in Zaporizhzhya. A self-nominated candidate (probably Pravy Sektor) was declared the winner after a drawn-out recount process involving rejection of any vote slip with an imperfection, several bomb threats against the electoral office, intimidation by armed Pravy Sektor thugs culminating in staged provocation. The winning vote gate 22% of the total. The low proportion needed for victory is a side effect of the presence of a large number of candidates (23) on the electoral list.
It seems like Pravy Sektor are exploiting the mechanics of the Ukraine electoral system to gain control that is out of proportion to the official party support (~ 2-3%). Party candidates take half of the seats in the Rada whilst self-identified candidates take the other half. This will give the party plausible deniability - how can the government be Nazi when it only has 2-3% support? Now we know.
Energy
Gas is still a major problem. Ukraine has built up a stored capacity of about 16.6 billion cubic metres (bcm) in twelve underground storage sites that have a maximum capacity of 31 bcm. This stored amount reduced by about 1% in the first very mild week of the heating season. Once the temperature really drops, then depletion will increase rapidly.
The Ukraine government, regional and national is desperate to reduce gas consumption. One obvious approach is to increase prices. The first step has been to reduce subsidies for the poorer gas users who effectively get their gas free. This subsidy will now apply to a fixed quantity of gas. The remainder will have to be paid for. This will no doubt hit the poorer sector hard should the winter be extremely bad.
Other approaches include short term and long term substitution. In Transcarpathia, the short term solution would be to burn timber that grows prolifically in the mountainous area. One problem is that the trees are high grade wood, the last thing you would burn for fuel. In the longer term hydroelectricity may be feasible locally, given the mountainous terrain. Other fanciful options include solar and wind power, though these have high initial capital costs so maybe they will have to magic more money into existence for this to happen. Recently the coal mines in DOnbass were seen as a source of coal, rather than the dodgy South African deal. However, the recent heavy bombardment by Ukraine forces have led to the Donbass authorities calling off the potential deal. The local political big cheese, Baloha, denounced government plans to buy coal from the Donbass and the grounds that the government shouldn't deal with terrorists. His grandstanding has neatly been undermined.
The reverse gas saga continues. Slovakia has stated it will continue to supply gas in reverse through the pipeline near Uzhgorod, in spite of the fact that their gas supply has been reduced to contract minimum.
In contrast, the government of Hungary seems to take its own citizens and industry into account. It has declined to supply Ukraine via reverse flow in response to reduced supply to contractual minimums. In order to secure its own energy sources in light of Ukraine's actions, it has passed a law accelerating construction of its part of the South Stream infrastructure. This allows the pipeline to be built in advance of the granting of a licence to operate. The EU, unsurprisingly, suggests these actions may violate EU law. Orban has defended the support for South Stream noting that Germany has North Stream to allow it to cope with supply problems through Ukraine, so why not South Stream for Hungary and others?
The US is predictably not pleased with the actions of Hungary. It is trying to block a strategic deal between Hungary and Russia. The Hungarian energy group MOL is trying to sell its stake in Croatian market to a Russian company. MOL owns 49% of the Croatian energy company INA. The US does not want this to go ahead in case the Croatian company ends up under control of Gazprom.
Regarding the energy deal between Ukraine, Europe and Russia, a confusing profusion of prices have been mentioned. A useful report summarises the European gas supply situation using third party figures. In my understanding, there are three types of customer; end-user, transit and combined transit / end-user. End-users are typically at end of pipeline and simply pay for the gas the use. Transit customers receive payment to cover costs of pipeline and profit. This payment is related to the amount of gas carried through their network. Most countries are either end-user or combined (e.g. Ukraine) customers. The basic price of gas from Russia is $485 per thousand cubic metres (tcm). End-user countries are provided with a discount which is proportional to amount of gas they use. Germany, largest single user at ~40 billion cubic metres (bcm) per year pays ~$366 per tcm whilst Romania, using only ~1 bcm per year pays ~$480 per tcm. The average cost over all European countries taking gas from Gazprom is $387 per tcm. Ukraine was offered a $100 discount on the base price giving an effective price of $385 per tcm which seems not unreasonable given it is, shall we say, not a good customer. As a transit country, it also receives payment for gas transiting and exiting primarily through the Transcarpathian pipelines. This amounts to about $4 billion dollars per year. Ukraine wants to receive all of its gas by reverse supply which, to my understanding, is legitimately outside the contract between Gazprom and the prospective reverse suppliers. The reason reverse is not allowed by default is that Ukraine, in this case, would then receive transit payment for all the gas it uses as well as a lower price offered to a larger consumer providing the reverse supply. This would amount effectively to a double discount, with the extra bonus of it still being able to blackmail Russia and Europe. The current deal with Gazprom is valid until 31 March 2015 when a renegotiation for a lower summer gas price will take place. Yatsenyuk is looking for a lower price because of the drop in market prices. The current contracts are not based on spot prices in order to give stability to both customer and supplier. He has made claims that Ukraine will only pay $285 (or $268) per tcm against current price of $385 per tcm. I suspect if Yatsenyuk had his way, he would expect Russia to pay for the privilege of Ukraine deigning to use its gas.
Mobilisation
Now the election is over, the possibility of a fourth wave of mobilisation has surfaced. Currently there are no details so this may just be rumour. The Transcarpathian SBU has launched criminal proceedings against a military recruiter. He is accused of taking a bribe of about 16,000 UAH ($1100-1300) in order to provide someone with military identification so they could evade military service.
Politics
It looks like the US may have started regime change against Orban. On 27 October, it was reported that thousands of Hungarians came out in protest at a rally in Budapest protest. The action was ostensibly about a proposed tax to be imposed on internet data. For individuals, this would have been capped at 23 Euro. However, reported comments b attendees focussed on other matters such as corruption. This may have been meant as a warning to Orban. The proposed legislation for the tax was subsequently withdrawn.
The prime motive for this manifestation of US ire is the signs of independence shown by Hungary. A useful summary of the position enumerates the reasons for the US actions. Hungary is heavily dependent on good relations with Russia. Around 80% of it's natural gas comes from Russia, via the wretched Ukraine stranglehold. Hungary also exports 2.55 billion Euros worth of goods to Russia (in 2013). It also has a 10 billion Euro contract with a Russian company to upgrade the Paks nuclear plant. Hungary has very good reason to show interest in the South Stream project, for reasons outlined above.
The US view is clearly expressed in a statement by the US Charge d'affaires Andrew Goodfriend, referring to Hungary's actions and rapprochement with Russia - "If that trend continues it may reach a level where the United States can no longer cooperate with Hungary as an ally."
This is an ominous threat given that Hungary is a member of the EU and of NATO. It seems remarkable that the US would threaten a NATO member and supposed ally. The Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament, Laszlo Kover, expressed his dissatisfaction with EU diktats over South Stream. He made the comment that in the worst case, Hungary may leave the EU. This prompted outrage from members of the opposition parties and other politicians who condemned Kover's comments. In spite of this, Hungarian politicians reject German claims of isolation within the EU.
In short, Orban appears to be on the US hit list. Obama has compared Hungary compared to Azerbaijan, Russia, Venezuela and Egypt. Nuland hysterical questions how Orban can sleep at night following his actions.
Propaganda
Unsurprisingly, the US will provide increasing war aid to Ukraine in spite of the Minsk protocols. Geoffrey Payette, the US Ambassador to Ukraine was reported saying that "We'll also supply high military technology, which should help troops fighting in the East, to protect themselves. Including, for example, potent radar radar systems, which we will put together a training course, how to use them, in the coming months,". With an admirable lack of self awareness, he also stated that "Russia's annexation of the Crimea is a violation of the fundamental principles of the Euro-Atlantic security system".
Transcarpathia was recently honoured with a visit by the the Elena Vasilieva, Russian human rights activist behind the NGO(?) "Cargo 200...". 'Cargo 200' refers lorries full of dead (code 200, code 300 is wounded) Russian soldiers supposedly transferred to RUssia to hide the 'true' numbers of NAF dead. She told a rapt audience that 4000 Russian troops are missing. I suppose this is an excellent example of one falsehood being necessary (cargo 200) to explain an earlier falsehood (the glorious Ukraine army must be killing countless 'terrorists').
Sanctions
The sanctions against Russia are causing increasing problems within Europe. In an excuse for further sanctions Russia was instructed on how to react to the Donbass elections. Austria has come out against further sanctions, whilst Germany called on Russia to reconsider its actions regarding Donbass elections. They have had a significant negative effect on Hungary. It has proposed that the EU provide compensation to those that remain loyal to the sanctions regime.
In a perfect example of the Ukrainian mindset, the Transcarpathian politician Viktor Baloha proposed that Ukraine invoke sanctions against Russia economic and trade interests in spite of any subsequent consequences for Ukraine.
Separatism
The SBU and Right Sektor seem to have clamped down effectively on separatist / anti-junta sentiment, both in Transcarpathia and in other parts of Ukraine such as Odessa and Kharkov. This does not mean such sentiment no longer exists as anti-regime rallies still occur in Odessa for example.
There have been no significant follow-ups on the potential Galician separatist movement reported in an earlier SitRep. Given Galicia is the home of hard-core Banderism, it would be amusing if the Nazis were to clamp down on themselves via the SBU and Pravy Sektor. Banderite students have been reported stirring up trouble in Poland. This is ironic given Poland's assistance in training these people for the Maidan. Apparently the Ukrainian radicals claim that Ukraine should annex parts of Poland. These students are supposedly financed by the US.
Resources
The situation in Transcarpathia intensifies - an alternative view.
Ukraine electoral commission - party lists, manifestos, candidates etc.
A hit piece on Orban, by the bastion of Truthiness, the UK Guardian.
An acme of delusion, fifth columnist Nemtsov claims "Putin hates Ukraine and tries to take revenge for the Maidan". The interview with him is brought to you courtesy of that beacon of the 'Best Freedom Money Can Buy', Radio Liberty.
Trouble for Hungary Hungary could undermine the dictates of the US having stopped reverse flow putting own country first, which is totally outrageous to the Indispensable Nation.
Propaganda Pulpit or Sinkhole of Stupidity?. This site contains an onslaught of nonsense purveyed to the Ukrainian population.
How 'the world' supports Ukraine - details of financial, military and 'humanitarian' aid to Ukraine, along with EU donations(?). Japan stands out as the largest in monetary terms, making a clear loan with a specified interest rate. Are the other countries making gifts? Or are they more realistic in their expectation that Ukraine will never pay the money back?
Transnistria (aka PMR) and Gagauzia
Economy
The ongoing economic blockade by Moldova and Ukraine against the PMR continues with its consequent negative effects on the economy. There are some positive points. Russian trade representatives have pointed out that low cost, high quality PMR goods could replace those affected by sanctions against the Russian market. One PMR clothing manufacturer plans to expand into the school uniform market in Russia. This factory, Odema, already has multiple contracts for the assembly of clothing for a number well known American and Italian brands: "Warehoused", "Street One", "Calmo", "Canda", "Justina", "Martinelli", "Dolce&Gabbana", "Armani", "Belstaff", "PaJermo", "MaxMara", "Mariella Spa", "La Coccinella Spa" and "Via Nuova Spa". In this type of operation, most of the profit goes to the brand names. The organisation is now trying to make use of its skills to enter a more profitable market created by sanctions against Russia.
The blockade has not seriously affected the bilateral trade with the Czech Republic. In the past ear, the turnover has increased 40%, with exports from the PMR exceeding imports by $0.5 million.
The PMR is applying the same standards as Russia to meat products from Chernihiv region of Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Belarus has also adopted the same approach, with the addition of a total ban on pork products. This has resulted in price deflation for agricultural goods in Moldova. For the first nine months of this year, this deflation amounted to 9.4% for crops and 14.3% for livestock. Fresh and canned fruit and vegetables are down 13.1% in August compared to the previous year. Moldovan farmers understandably desperate about this situation. The CIS is still the main importer of Moldovan wines, and the EU market accounts for only about 20% of sales. In just six months of this year, wine exports to CIS decreased by 26.8%, and spirits dropped 30% as a result of Russian reverse sanctions. Moldova is looking to the UK as a possible replacement market.
The external debt of Moldova has increased 3.6% over the value at the end of 2013 value. This amounts to a deficit of $1.3 billion. The EU has recently opened a branch of its investment bank, in order to loan Moldova even more money, subject to suitable collateral (I guess). Inflation in Moldova has reached 4.6% as a consequence of the Ukraine crisis.
Energy
The Moldovan GRES power station in PMR has increased output by 39% from last year. This is a result of increased demand from export customers (in Moldova) and large domestic customers.
Romania has started supplying Moldova with natural gas via reverse flow. Romania is largely self reliant for natural gas.
Politics
The PMR foreign minster met with the OSCE delegation for progress meeting in relation to the 5+2 talks. There has been no progress. PMR has complained of Moldovan provocations. In one incident, PMR police stopped a car carrying four males. These individuals locked themselves in the car when asked to show identification. It turns out they were part of the Moldovan peace-keeping force which is supposed to be based on the Moldovan side of the river. Moldova has refused to explain what was going on. The Special Representative of the OSCE has presented these complaints to Moldova and received no response. The OSCE has urged both sides make frequent substantive contact. Moldova proposes weekly meeting after the elections to be held at the end of November.
The Transnistrian conflict and Moldova was the subject of a round table conference held on October 30, 2014, at the European Policy Centre in Brussels, supported by the Romanian Cultural Institute. The event claimed to bring together experts from think-tanks, independent sites, members of Parliament and the EU diplomacy, as well as heads of diplomatic missions of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. One noticeable absence was any explicit form of PMR representation.
The Governor of Gagauzia was declared persona non grata by the Ukrainians when he attempted to travel to Odessa in Ukraine. No reason for the decision was given at the time.
A Moldovan agency Vox Populi conducted a survey and found that 48% of Moldovans were against entry to NATO with only 24% for entry. The figures for EU association were much closer and more favourable, with 43% for and 40% against. No details of the methodology are provided so further comment is not possible. SHortly afterwards, Nikolai Starikov made his first visit to PMR to hold a meeting with the President and Foreign Minister. He pointed out that about half of the Moldovan population did not agree with EU integration. He included PMR, Gagauz, and the northern part of Moldova in this group. He concluded that forcing the issue may lead to further break up of Moldova.
It seems that the US favours Romania annexing Moldova. An NGO 'Civilian Youth of Moldova' promotes absorption of Moldova within Romania. One Romanian minister states that Moldova has already lost the PMR and should consider joining Romania without it. The US Ambassador to Moldova has played the 'corrupt government' card and called on the Moldovan people to act (shades of Ukraine?). There is speculation of a possible US supported Maidan in Moldova, leading the way for Romania to annex Moldova. This is certainly a possibility given the presence of outfits like 'Civilian Youth of Moldova'.
Propaganda
The Ukrainian SBU Ukraine reported the capture of a number of individuals carrying weapons. They claimed these weapons were smuggled from PMR to Odessa for the benefit of the so-called "Odessa National Republic". The items included a shotgun, a tin of corroded bullets, a rusty hand grenade and a set of nun-chucks. Some of the material looked as though it was discovered accidentally. The whole set formed a totally unconvincing set of equipment for a putative army.
A hapless young man was detained at Chisnau airport accused of serving in Donbass militia. The evidence for this was a collection nondescript military clothing, the sort found in any second hand military shop. The crucial piece of evidence was a tag on a jacket, stating 'G. E. Army' in English. This was considered evidence of the existence of a Gagauzian army. The man was inevitably represented as 'green man' in Ukraine media.
Separatism
The possibility of Romania annexing Moldova is a grave concern to PMR and Gagauzia. In PMR, around 60% of its inhabitants are Russians and Ukrainians. They sought to secede from Moldova before the collapse of the Soviet Union, fearing that Moldova will join Romania. This led to the creation of the PMR. Whilst the Romanian Deputy Eugen Tomak says that Gagauzians have nothing to fear from unification of Moldova and Romania, the may have a different view. In an earlier response to Moldovan interest in unification with Romania, Gagauzian calls for elections were met with convoys of activists from the Popular Front of Moldova and others from ROmania intended to disrupt the elections. Posters were produced displaying text such as "Gagauzia - herpes on the body of Moldova" and "Good Gagauz - dead Gagauz". This sort of thing tends to severely mitigate against Tomak's bland statements. There is also a substantial Gagauzian population in Odessa. Mihail Formuzal, the Governor of Gagauzia mentioned earlier may be involved with the creation of a new group 'People's Movement of Gagauzia' representing the interests of Gagauzians and their diaspora. If that is the case, it may explain the actions of the Ukraine government, perceiving the potential for another separatist movement.
The Moldovan authorities are holding two young men from Gagauzia who are charged with treason. Their trial is due to start on November 7. Rallies have been called to demand their release. The parents of the two young men have stated they may seek the adjudication of the European Court of Human Rights.
Resources
A short article looking at post-Soviet frozen conflicts in Abkhazia & South Ossestia, Nagorno Karabakh and Transnistria. The authors description of the present state of Transnistria seems fair. The comments about a pro-Ukraine over pro-Russia may reflect internal politics rather than external influence.
Conclusions
The earlier tensions relating to the desire for autonomy by some of the ethnic groups in Transcarpathia have been suppressed, at least in major public expression, by the actions of the SBU and the extreme right wing factions such as Pravy Sektor. The wider recognition of these desires and somewhat surprisingly given the general supine nature of European leaders, a desire to act in its own national interests have give rise to conflict between Hungary and the US. The US has imposed sanctions on some individuals in or closely associated with the right wing Hungarian government of Orban. This is an indication that the US has regime change in mind for Hungary, a member of the European Community and of NATO. Given the substantial support within the government for its actions, this may lead to interesting and perhaps unintended outcomes. European people, if not their governments, are increasingly aware and resentful, of US interference within the country. The Hungarian government , for its part, is aware of the pernicious nature of NGO's opaquely funded by foreign countries and NGO's.
The PMR continues to suffer from a blockade imposed, under US direction, by Moldova and Ukraine. A further complication arises from Romania's desire to annex Moldova. A large number of Moldovan politicians have Romanian citizenship and the current Romanian Prime Minister has recently applied for Moldovan citizenship.
In my view, the presence of Yarosh in Transcarpathia served several functions. At a simple level, it raised his presence and allowed him to display his amicable public persona, something that I think The Saker has mentioned in the past. Secondly, it served to reinforce the solidarity of the Pravy Sektor forces present in Transcarpathia. Thirdly his prescient comments about the Crimean Tartars suggests an awareness of pre-planned big picture activities. Finally the presence of his praetorian guard in perhaps the safest region of Ukraine indicates things to come.
Recently, the Australian and Dutch governments have brought MH17 to the fore. When coupled with German 'intelligence' reports of possibly involvement of the aircraft, this clearly indicates the US managers have something in mind. My thought is that blame may be pinned on Poroshenko. The disastrous handling of the ATO in the east certainly has meant the Anglo-Zionist aim of a cleansed east has not been achieved. The blame could be passed on to Poroshenko (and others as necessary), and the unacceptable killing of innocents in MH17 would be the key to removing him for good. Yarosh could them be positioned to take over leading to a more aggressive approach in the east. Yatsenyuk would no doubt be keen to do this, but I suspect he doesn't have the direct support of the Pravy Sektor rank and file that Yarosh clearly has. The people in the west of Ukraine have been conditioned to blaming Russia for all atrocities, so even more atrocities would be used to paint Russia even blacker. The outcome for the managers would be expulsion of the pro-Russian citizens as plan A, atrocities sufficient to compel Russia to act overtly as Plan B or reduction of Ukraine to a failed state, causing a drain on Russia's resources as it would have to provide long term military support for Novorossia.
The antipathy of the PMR and Gagauzian populations to Romanian annexation is without doubt sincerely held. There is a potential for significant trouble in this region should the annexation go ahead. This may parallel to situation in Donbass, with the complication of no direct border connection and no voentorg. On the other hand, the presence of Russian troops would provide Russia with a causus belli should they be harmed in an potential conflict. There is no doubt that this lies behind the US driven Moldovan attempts to eject them. In the long term, depending on the will of the people in south Ukraine, this may be resolved by them joining Novorossia, once the Pravy Sektor thugs have been handled.
Whilst the situations in Transcarpathia, Transnistria and Gagauzia remain essentially stable, the $5 billion bomb detonated at the Ukraine Maidan has set off shock waves that ripple and reflect off pre-existing dormant conflicts and tensions. These have expanded to Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, the Baltic States, Moldova and Romania in the immediate vicinity, let alone the major states at the heart of Europe.
Given these effects, I hope the reader will forgive references to actions outside the obvious immediate scope given by the title of this SitRep.
Transcarpathia
ATO
Volunteers are still collecting funds for equipment to be supplied to the troops at front. The main requirement is winter clothing and night vision imagers. A number of these imagers have been supplied by pro-regime individuals living abroad. As an expression of desperation, the proposal to transport firewood from Transcarpathia to the front takes some beating.
Casualty figures are confusing as usual and are subject to the usual caveats. A total of 29 individuals are reported as dead, with another 22 wounded. The dead include three Aidar members and one National Guard commander from block-post 32, along with another 5-6 individuals. Another soldier was killed near Lugansk possibly by a sniper. A group of seven Marines were wounded when their vehicle hit a mine, north of Lugansk, possibly near block-post 32. A member of the Carpathian Sich was severely wounded in fighting at Peski immediately west of Donetsk airport. A Transcarpathian solider from the 128th Mountain Infantry Brigade has died of wounds. He was injured on 18 October when he was a member of a howitzer unit between Lugansk and Debaltsevo. He was transferred to Lviv hospital and died 30 October. He was named as Sergeant Ruslan Vladimirovich Lishchuk of Khmelnitsky. The number of dead from Transcarpathia is one of the lowest rates per oblast in the country, along with Rivne and Chernivtsi.
To date, the military hospital at Mukachevo has treated 299 wounded soldiers. A number of wounded have been transferred to other countries for specialist treatment and rehabilitation, probably in relation to the fitting of prosthetic limbs. Fifteen individuals, including five injured at the Maidan and ten individuals from the Dnepr and other Pravy Sektor battalions have been treated in Estonia at a cost of 175,000 Euro. One individual was named as the Pravy Sektor coordinator Andrei Tarasenko, call sign Philipas. Croatia has accepted eight wounded soldiers for treatment whilst Hungary has said it will accept another ten for treatment at a military hospital. The largest contingent reported so far has 28 members of the 80th Air Mobile Battalion based in Lviv. These have been transferred to a private hospital in Poland for treatment of loss of limbs.
One of the problems for the Ukrainians regarding the dead is identification of victims. The volunteer units particularly don't use 'dog tags'. In Transcarpathia a newly formed NGO "Search-West" held a press conference in Uzhgorod. The representatives outlined a new humanitarian mission called 'Black Tulip' purposed with the task of tracking down and identifying the dead in the east. They called for volunteers and money to help with the search. They are looking for funds for 5-6 vehicles to transport volunteers and a further 1-2 refrigerated trucks to carry the remains, along with specialist equipment such as personal protection clothing. They claim to have identified 150 graves so far, in the areas around Ilovaisk, Shaktersk and Saur-Mogilla. Given the absence of dog tags, they propose to use DNA techniques to identify remains. How that will be financed was not discussed. Large numbers of volunteers would also be necessary given the psychologically demanding nature of the task.
News is slowly coming out giving an indication of the depth of discontent within the Ukraine military. Earlier a large number of soldiers from the Karpattya battalion left the Ilovaisk area without permission from high command in Kiev. One hundred of these individuals have returned to Transcarpathia, whilst a further forty have gone into hiding as they no longer wish to continue service. Thirty marines from the 80th Air Mobile Battalion based in Lviv have refused to return to the front and have been forced to go to Mukachevo military base in Transcarpathia. Given the large number of wounded reported above, it seems this unit was involved in some spectacularly horrific action, possibly in one of the cauldrons. Two individuals who absconded from the Dnepr battalion were detained at Alchevsk in the Donetsk region. They were given jail sentences of seven years for desertion. Relatives have been reported protesting outside the building where fort members of the 51st Mechanised Brigade are on trial. They were caught in a cauldron and forced, through lack of fuel and ammunition, to flee over the border into Russia. These individuals must have decided to return to Ukraine only to be charged with desertion.
The military base at Mukachevo holding the men from the 80th Air Mobile Battalion is reported to be in dreadful condition. The local authorities are seeking funding from Kiev to make it habitable. The exact nature of the problems are described as a 'military secret' though it is reported to lack basics such as beds, toilets and heating.
Economy
A major component of the local budget derives from gas transit fees derived from gas flowing out of Ukraine to the rest of Europe. These fees amounts to about $4 billion annually. Kiev leaves the region with about 2 billion UAH (~ 4%) of that amount.
Overall, Ukraine's GDP is down 5.1% to the end of the third quarter 2014 versus the same time last year. The IMF predict customer price inflation will be 11.4% for 2014 and 14% in 2015, a balance of payments decline of -2.5% and unemployment rising to 10%.
Concrete indicators of performance include a 77% decline in car production for October year on year. This sounds drastic, but the internal production is only a few thousand cars per year. Government statistics suggest inflation will reach 19% for the year. The highest components are gas heating at 10.8%, 7.8% for coal, eggs and bacon at 13.2-13.8% respectively. One of Transcarpathia's main exports is timber. The local timber is high quality furniture grade wood, but mismanagement has led to the timber being used for low quality, low profit uses. Local experts are concerned about the effects of deforestation on soil stability and the tourist trade. These concerns are reinforced by attempts to substitute wood fires for gas heating gas, both locally and elsewhere in the country.
Evidence has been released that supports the hypothesis that the UAH exchange rate was manipulated in run up to election. The graph shows that UAH / $ exchange rate was held flat at 12.95 for more than one 1 month. On 5 November control was released and the exchange rate jumped to 14.0 before falling back to 13.6 at the end of the day. The rate reached 14.3 the following day and went as high as 14.7 on the seventh of November. The Ukraine National Bank announced that it had spent $1.3 billion of foreign exchange reserves over last 6 weeks to maintain UAH exchange rate during election. This support has now stopped, hence the rising rate. The foreign exchange reserves amounted to $16.3 billion at the end of September. By 1 Nov these had fallen to $12.5 billion, a loss of 23.8% in 2 months.
A recent report on the 100 richest Ukrainians shows that only one originates in Transcarpathia. He originally made his money in the oil and energy sector, but now focusses on the local football club. The highest proportion of the high net worth individuals come from Donbass (17%) followed by Dnepropetrovsk (14%). Looking on the bright side, Igor Kolomoisky who is third on the list, has lost 33% net wealth since 2013.
Election
In the recent election, the victory in all but one (68 Uzhgorod) of the six local electoral districts went to self-identified candidates. The candidates gained 39-62% of the votes. In district 68, Bloc Petro Poroshenko gained victory with ~21% of vote. The low percentage needed for victory is a consequence of the large number of candidates standing in Uzhgorod. Turnout varied from 31% to 68%. The city of Uzhgorod had the highest turnout; the lower figures tended to occur in the more rural districts. Bloc Petro Poroshenko gained 25.6% in Transcarpathia compared to 6-10% in Donbass, Kharkov, and Odessa (figures subject to final revision).
All three of the Baloha brothers won their seats, along with their cousin Vasily Petiovka. They propose a decentralisation of power to Transcarpathia along the lines of an EU model. To date, this local political clan claims to favour the Self-Help Party rather than the Bloc Petro Poroshenko. Of the three brothers, only Ivan Baloha has so far been appointed to the Rada.
In terms of local Hungarian representation in the Rada, Vasily Brenzovich, the Hungarian ethnic representative may receive a parliamentary mandate once all the results are in and the deals have been negotiated.
In the previous SitRep, I referred Dmitry Yarosh's visit to Uzhgorod. He is the leader of Pravy Sektor and was accompanied by his praetorian guard. The videos of an extended Q&A session were released on YouTube. He mentioned the potential for the Crimean Tartars to create problems in Crimea. My view was that this indicated he was connected with the US regime change managers. As if on cue Ukraine media started producing reports relating to Crimean Tartars. On 27 October, Mustafa Dzhemilev, a Ukrainian advocate of Crimean Tartar nationalism tried to enter Crimea to vote. As he has been banned from entering Russian territory for 5 years, he was not allowed into Crimea, as he knew very well. This low level propaganda effort was followed by others. Dzhemilev had discussion with Poroshenko covering the creation of a Ministry of Crimea to consider issues relating to the return of Crimea to Ukraine. This ministry would handle claims relating to violation of Tartar and Muslim rights in Crimea. He has also called for criminal proceedings to be opened against 387 Crimean soldiers who transferred to Russian military units. More recently, billboards promoting Dzhemilev have appeared in Prague. These criticise Czech Republic claims that the current status of Crimea should be accepted. Dzhemilev is clearly the US point man for manipulating alleged mistreatment of Tartars and Muslims in Crimea.
In contrast to peaceful well-attended elections in Donbass, election sites at some places in rest of Ukraine turned very ugly. Perhaps the worst case was the handling of the count in 59th electoral district in west Donetsk. Pravy Sektor thugs were filmed guarding the voting station, supervisors were intimidated, computers and paperwork removed under strange circumstances. Parts of the electoral committee were replaced. The outcome of the vote was not resolved by 6 Nov. Opora, an NGO monitoring voting process, described situation as scandalous. Videos show the process of intimidation in support of the Pravy Sektor candidate. Others show women adjudicators reduced to tears or being treated by medical staff. The dispute centres around the counts for two self-nominated candidates, one of whom is probably Pravy Sektor.
A similar dispute occurred in Electoral District 79 in Zaporizhzhya. A self-nominated candidate (probably Pravy Sektor) was declared the winner after a drawn-out recount process involving rejection of any vote slip with an imperfection, several bomb threats against the electoral office, intimidation by armed Pravy Sektor thugs culminating in staged provocation. The winning vote gate 22% of the total. The low proportion needed for victory is a side effect of the presence of a large number of candidates (23) on the electoral list.
It seems like Pravy Sektor are exploiting the mechanics of the Ukraine electoral system to gain control that is out of proportion to the official party support (~ 2-3%). Party candidates take half of the seats in the Rada whilst self-identified candidates take the other half. This will give the party plausible deniability - how can the government be Nazi when it only has 2-3% support? Now we know.
Energy
Gas is still a major problem. Ukraine has built up a stored capacity of about 16.6 billion cubic metres (bcm) in twelve underground storage sites that have a maximum capacity of 31 bcm. This stored amount reduced by about 1% in the first very mild week of the heating season. Once the temperature really drops, then depletion will increase rapidly.
The Ukraine government, regional and national is desperate to reduce gas consumption. One obvious approach is to increase prices. The first step has been to reduce subsidies for the poorer gas users who effectively get their gas free. This subsidy will now apply to a fixed quantity of gas. The remainder will have to be paid for. This will no doubt hit the poorer sector hard should the winter be extremely bad.
Other approaches include short term and long term substitution. In Transcarpathia, the short term solution would be to burn timber that grows prolifically in the mountainous area. One problem is that the trees are high grade wood, the last thing you would burn for fuel. In the longer term hydroelectricity may be feasible locally, given the mountainous terrain. Other fanciful options include solar and wind power, though these have high initial capital costs so maybe they will have to magic more money into existence for this to happen. Recently the coal mines in DOnbass were seen as a source of coal, rather than the dodgy South African deal. However, the recent heavy bombardment by Ukraine forces have led to the Donbass authorities calling off the potential deal. The local political big cheese, Baloha, denounced government plans to buy coal from the Donbass and the grounds that the government shouldn't deal with terrorists. His grandstanding has neatly been undermined.
The reverse gas saga continues. Slovakia has stated it will continue to supply gas in reverse through the pipeline near Uzhgorod, in spite of the fact that their gas supply has been reduced to contract minimum.
In contrast, the government of Hungary seems to take its own citizens and industry into account. It has declined to supply Ukraine via reverse flow in response to reduced supply to contractual minimums. In order to secure its own energy sources in light of Ukraine's actions, it has passed a law accelerating construction of its part of the South Stream infrastructure. This allows the pipeline to be built in advance of the granting of a licence to operate. The EU, unsurprisingly, suggests these actions may violate EU law. Orban has defended the support for South Stream noting that Germany has North Stream to allow it to cope with supply problems through Ukraine, so why not South Stream for Hungary and others?
The US is predictably not pleased with the actions of Hungary. It is trying to block a strategic deal between Hungary and Russia. The Hungarian energy group MOL is trying to sell its stake in Croatian market to a Russian company. MOL owns 49% of the Croatian energy company INA. The US does not want this to go ahead in case the Croatian company ends up under control of Gazprom.
Regarding the energy deal between Ukraine, Europe and Russia, a confusing profusion of prices have been mentioned. A useful report summarises the European gas supply situation using third party figures. In my understanding, there are three types of customer; end-user, transit and combined transit / end-user. End-users are typically at end of pipeline and simply pay for the gas the use. Transit customers receive payment to cover costs of pipeline and profit. This payment is related to the amount of gas carried through their network. Most countries are either end-user or combined (e.g. Ukraine) customers. The basic price of gas from Russia is $485 per thousand cubic metres (tcm). End-user countries are provided with a discount which is proportional to amount of gas they use. Germany, largest single user at ~40 billion cubic metres (bcm) per year pays ~$366 per tcm whilst Romania, using only ~1 bcm per year pays ~$480 per tcm. The average cost over all European countries taking gas from Gazprom is $387 per tcm. Ukraine was offered a $100 discount on the base price giving an effective price of $385 per tcm which seems not unreasonable given it is, shall we say, not a good customer. As a transit country, it also receives payment for gas transiting and exiting primarily through the Transcarpathian pipelines. This amounts to about $4 billion dollars per year. Ukraine wants to receive all of its gas by reverse supply which, to my understanding, is legitimately outside the contract between Gazprom and the prospective reverse suppliers. The reason reverse is not allowed by default is that Ukraine, in this case, would then receive transit payment for all the gas it uses as well as a lower price offered to a larger consumer providing the reverse supply. This would amount effectively to a double discount, with the extra bonus of it still being able to blackmail Russia and Europe. The current deal with Gazprom is valid until 31 March 2015 when a renegotiation for a lower summer gas price will take place. Yatsenyuk is looking for a lower price because of the drop in market prices. The current contracts are not based on spot prices in order to give stability to both customer and supplier. He has made claims that Ukraine will only pay $285 (or $268) per tcm against current price of $385 per tcm. I suspect if Yatsenyuk had his way, he would expect Russia to pay for the privilege of Ukraine deigning to use its gas.
Mobilisation
Now the election is over, the possibility of a fourth wave of mobilisation has surfaced. Currently there are no details so this may just be rumour. The Transcarpathian SBU has launched criminal proceedings against a military recruiter. He is accused of taking a bribe of about 16,000 UAH ($1100-1300) in order to provide someone with military identification so they could evade military service.
Politics
It looks like the US may have started regime change against Orban. On 27 October, it was reported that thousands of Hungarians came out in protest at a rally in Budapest protest. The action was ostensibly about a proposed tax to be imposed on internet data. For individuals, this would have been capped at 23 Euro. However, reported comments b attendees focussed on other matters such as corruption. This may have been meant as a warning to Orban. The proposed legislation for the tax was subsequently withdrawn.
The prime motive for this manifestation of US ire is the signs of independence shown by Hungary. A useful summary of the position enumerates the reasons for the US actions. Hungary is heavily dependent on good relations with Russia. Around 80% of it's natural gas comes from Russia, via the wretched Ukraine stranglehold. Hungary also exports 2.55 billion Euros worth of goods to Russia (in 2013). It also has a 10 billion Euro contract with a Russian company to upgrade the Paks nuclear plant. Hungary has very good reason to show interest in the South Stream project, for reasons outlined above.
The US view is clearly expressed in a statement by the US Charge d'affaires Andrew Goodfriend, referring to Hungary's actions and rapprochement with Russia - "If that trend continues it may reach a level where the United States can no longer cooperate with Hungary as an ally."
This is an ominous threat given that Hungary is a member of the EU and of NATO. It seems remarkable that the US would threaten a NATO member and supposed ally. The Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament, Laszlo Kover, expressed his dissatisfaction with EU diktats over South Stream. He made the comment that in the worst case, Hungary may leave the EU. This prompted outrage from members of the opposition parties and other politicians who condemned Kover's comments. In spite of this, Hungarian politicians reject German claims of isolation within the EU.
In short, Orban appears to be on the US hit list. Obama has compared Hungary compared to Azerbaijan, Russia, Venezuela and Egypt. Nuland hysterical questions how Orban can sleep at night following his actions.
Propaganda
Unsurprisingly, the US will provide increasing war aid to Ukraine in spite of the Minsk protocols. Geoffrey Payette, the US Ambassador to Ukraine was reported saying that "We'll also supply high military technology, which should help troops fighting in the East, to protect themselves. Including, for example, potent radar radar systems, which we will put together a training course, how to use them, in the coming months,". With an admirable lack of self awareness, he also stated that "Russia's annexation of the Crimea is a violation of the fundamental principles of the Euro-Atlantic security system".
Transcarpathia was recently honoured with a visit by the the Elena Vasilieva, Russian human rights activist behind the NGO(?) "Cargo 200...". 'Cargo 200' refers lorries full of dead (code 200, code 300 is wounded) Russian soldiers supposedly transferred to RUssia to hide the 'true' numbers of NAF dead. She told a rapt audience that 4000 Russian troops are missing. I suppose this is an excellent example of one falsehood being necessary (cargo 200) to explain an earlier falsehood (the glorious Ukraine army must be killing countless 'terrorists').
Sanctions
The sanctions against Russia are causing increasing problems within Europe. In an excuse for further sanctions Russia was instructed on how to react to the Donbass elections. Austria has come out against further sanctions, whilst Germany called on Russia to reconsider its actions regarding Donbass elections. They have had a significant negative effect on Hungary. It has proposed that the EU provide compensation to those that remain loyal to the sanctions regime.
In a perfect example of the Ukrainian mindset, the Transcarpathian politician Viktor Baloha proposed that Ukraine invoke sanctions against Russia economic and trade interests in spite of any subsequent consequences for Ukraine.
Separatism
The SBU and Right Sektor seem to have clamped down effectively on separatist / anti-junta sentiment, both in Transcarpathia and in other parts of Ukraine such as Odessa and Kharkov. This does not mean such sentiment no longer exists as anti-regime rallies still occur in Odessa for example.
There have been no significant follow-ups on the potential Galician separatist movement reported in an earlier SitRep. Given Galicia is the home of hard-core Banderism, it would be amusing if the Nazis were to clamp down on themselves via the SBU and Pravy Sektor. Banderite students have been reported stirring up trouble in Poland. This is ironic given Poland's assistance in training these people for the Maidan. Apparently the Ukrainian radicals claim that Ukraine should annex parts of Poland. These students are supposedly financed by the US.
Resources
The situation in Transcarpathia intensifies - an alternative view.
Ukraine electoral commission - party lists, manifestos, candidates etc.
A hit piece on Orban, by the bastion of Truthiness, the UK Guardian.
An acme of delusion, fifth columnist Nemtsov claims "Putin hates Ukraine and tries to take revenge for the Maidan". The interview with him is brought to you courtesy of that beacon of the 'Best Freedom Money Can Buy', Radio Liberty.
Trouble for Hungary Hungary could undermine the dictates of the US having stopped reverse flow putting own country first, which is totally outrageous to the Indispensable Nation.
Propaganda Pulpit or Sinkhole of Stupidity?. This site contains an onslaught of nonsense purveyed to the Ukrainian population.
How 'the world' supports Ukraine - details of financial, military and 'humanitarian' aid to Ukraine, along with EU donations(?). Japan stands out as the largest in monetary terms, making a clear loan with a specified interest rate. Are the other countries making gifts? Or are they more realistic in their expectation that Ukraine will never pay the money back?
Transnistria (aka PMR) and Gagauzia
Economy
The ongoing economic blockade by Moldova and Ukraine against the PMR continues with its consequent negative effects on the economy. There are some positive points. Russian trade representatives have pointed out that low cost, high quality PMR goods could replace those affected by sanctions against the Russian market. One PMR clothing manufacturer plans to expand into the school uniform market in Russia. This factory, Odema, already has multiple contracts for the assembly of clothing for a number well known American and Italian brands: "Warehoused", "Street One", "Calmo", "Canda", "Justina", "Martinelli", "Dolce&Gabbana", "Armani", "Belstaff", "PaJermo", "MaxMara", "Mariella Spa", "La Coccinella Spa" and "Via Nuova Spa". In this type of operation, most of the profit goes to the brand names. The organisation is now trying to make use of its skills to enter a more profitable market created by sanctions against Russia.
The blockade has not seriously affected the bilateral trade with the Czech Republic. In the past ear, the turnover has increased 40%, with exports from the PMR exceeding imports by $0.5 million.
The PMR is applying the same standards as Russia to meat products from Chernihiv region of Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Belarus has also adopted the same approach, with the addition of a total ban on pork products. This has resulted in price deflation for agricultural goods in Moldova. For the first nine months of this year, this deflation amounted to 9.4% for crops and 14.3% for livestock. Fresh and canned fruit and vegetables are down 13.1% in August compared to the previous year. Moldovan farmers understandably desperate about this situation. The CIS is still the main importer of Moldovan wines, and the EU market accounts for only about 20% of sales. In just six months of this year, wine exports to CIS decreased by 26.8%, and spirits dropped 30% as a result of Russian reverse sanctions. Moldova is looking to the UK as a possible replacement market.
The external debt of Moldova has increased 3.6% over the value at the end of 2013 value. This amounts to a deficit of $1.3 billion. The EU has recently opened a branch of its investment bank, in order to loan Moldova even more money, subject to suitable collateral (I guess). Inflation in Moldova has reached 4.6% as a consequence of the Ukraine crisis.
Energy
The Moldovan GRES power station in PMR has increased output by 39% from last year. This is a result of increased demand from export customers (in Moldova) and large domestic customers.
Romania has started supplying Moldova with natural gas via reverse flow. Romania is largely self reliant for natural gas.
Politics
The PMR foreign minster met with the OSCE delegation for progress meeting in relation to the 5+2 talks. There has been no progress. PMR has complained of Moldovan provocations. In one incident, PMR police stopped a car carrying four males. These individuals locked themselves in the car when asked to show identification. It turns out they were part of the Moldovan peace-keeping force which is supposed to be based on the Moldovan side of the river. Moldova has refused to explain what was going on. The Special Representative of the OSCE has presented these complaints to Moldova and received no response. The OSCE has urged both sides make frequent substantive contact. Moldova proposes weekly meeting after the elections to be held at the end of November.
The Transnistrian conflict and Moldova was the subject of a round table conference held on October 30, 2014, at the European Policy Centre in Brussels, supported by the Romanian Cultural Institute. The event claimed to bring together experts from think-tanks, independent sites, members of Parliament and the EU diplomacy, as well as heads of diplomatic missions of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. One noticeable absence was any explicit form of PMR representation.
The Governor of Gagauzia was declared persona non grata by the Ukrainians when he attempted to travel to Odessa in Ukraine. No reason for the decision was given at the time.
A Moldovan agency Vox Populi conducted a survey and found that 48% of Moldovans were against entry to NATO with only 24% for entry. The figures for EU association were much closer and more favourable, with 43% for and 40% against. No details of the methodology are provided so further comment is not possible. SHortly afterwards, Nikolai Starikov made his first visit to PMR to hold a meeting with the President and Foreign Minister. He pointed out that about half of the Moldovan population did not agree with EU integration. He included PMR, Gagauz, and the northern part of Moldova in this group. He concluded that forcing the issue may lead to further break up of Moldova.
It seems that the US favours Romania annexing Moldova. An NGO 'Civilian Youth of Moldova' promotes absorption of Moldova within Romania. One Romanian minister states that Moldova has already lost the PMR and should consider joining Romania without it. The US Ambassador to Moldova has played the 'corrupt government' card and called on the Moldovan people to act (shades of Ukraine?). There is speculation of a possible US supported Maidan in Moldova, leading the way for Romania to annex Moldova. This is certainly a possibility given the presence of outfits like 'Civilian Youth of Moldova'.
Propaganda
The Ukrainian SBU Ukraine reported the capture of a number of individuals carrying weapons. They claimed these weapons were smuggled from PMR to Odessa for the benefit of the so-called "Odessa National Republic". The items included a shotgun, a tin of corroded bullets, a rusty hand grenade and a set of nun-chucks. Some of the material looked as though it was discovered accidentally. The whole set formed a totally unconvincing set of equipment for a putative army.
A hapless young man was detained at Chisnau airport accused of serving in Donbass militia. The evidence for this was a collection nondescript military clothing, the sort found in any second hand military shop. The crucial piece of evidence was a tag on a jacket, stating 'G. E. Army' in English. This was considered evidence of the existence of a Gagauzian army. The man was inevitably represented as 'green man' in Ukraine media.
Separatism
The possibility of Romania annexing Moldova is a grave concern to PMR and Gagauzia. In PMR, around 60% of its inhabitants are Russians and Ukrainians. They sought to secede from Moldova before the collapse of the Soviet Union, fearing that Moldova will join Romania. This led to the creation of the PMR. Whilst the Romanian Deputy Eugen Tomak says that Gagauzians have nothing to fear from unification of Moldova and Romania, the may have a different view. In an earlier response to Moldovan interest in unification with Romania, Gagauzian calls for elections were met with convoys of activists from the Popular Front of Moldova and others from ROmania intended to disrupt the elections. Posters were produced displaying text such as "Gagauzia - herpes on the body of Moldova" and "Good Gagauz - dead Gagauz". This sort of thing tends to severely mitigate against Tomak's bland statements. There is also a substantial Gagauzian population in Odessa. Mihail Formuzal, the Governor of Gagauzia mentioned earlier may be involved with the creation of a new group 'People's Movement of Gagauzia' representing the interests of Gagauzians and their diaspora. If that is the case, it may explain the actions of the Ukraine government, perceiving the potential for another separatist movement.
The Moldovan authorities are holding two young men from Gagauzia who are charged with treason. Their trial is due to start on November 7. Rallies have been called to demand their release. The parents of the two young men have stated they may seek the adjudication of the European Court of Human Rights.
Resources
A short article looking at post-Soviet frozen conflicts in Abkhazia & South Ossestia, Nagorno Karabakh and Transnistria. The authors description of the present state of Transnistria seems fair. The comments about a pro-Ukraine over pro-Russia may reflect internal politics rather than external influence.
Conclusions
The earlier tensions relating to the desire for autonomy by some of the ethnic groups in Transcarpathia have been suppressed, at least in major public expression, by the actions of the SBU and the extreme right wing factions such as Pravy Sektor. The wider recognition of these desires and somewhat surprisingly given the general supine nature of European leaders, a desire to act in its own national interests have give rise to conflict between Hungary and the US. The US has imposed sanctions on some individuals in or closely associated with the right wing Hungarian government of Orban. This is an indication that the US has regime change in mind for Hungary, a member of the European Community and of NATO. Given the substantial support within the government for its actions, this may lead to interesting and perhaps unintended outcomes. European people, if not their governments, are increasingly aware and resentful, of US interference within the country. The Hungarian government , for its part, is aware of the pernicious nature of NGO's opaquely funded by foreign countries and NGO's.
The PMR continues to suffer from a blockade imposed, under US direction, by Moldova and Ukraine. A further complication arises from Romania's desire to annex Moldova. A large number of Moldovan politicians have Romanian citizenship and the current Romanian Prime Minister has recently applied for Moldovan citizenship.
In my view, the presence of Yarosh in Transcarpathia served several functions. At a simple level, it raised his presence and allowed him to display his amicable public persona, something that I think The Saker has mentioned in the past. Secondly, it served to reinforce the solidarity of the Pravy Sektor forces present in Transcarpathia. Thirdly his prescient comments about the Crimean Tartars suggests an awareness of pre-planned big picture activities. Finally the presence of his praetorian guard in perhaps the safest region of Ukraine indicates things to come.
Recently, the Australian and Dutch governments have brought MH17 to the fore. When coupled with German 'intelligence' reports of possibly involvement of the aircraft, this clearly indicates the US managers have something in mind. My thought is that blame may be pinned on Poroshenko. The disastrous handling of the ATO in the east certainly has meant the Anglo-Zionist aim of a cleansed east has not been achieved. The blame could be passed on to Poroshenko (and others as necessary), and the unacceptable killing of innocents in MH17 would be the key to removing him for good. Yarosh could them be positioned to take over leading to a more aggressive approach in the east. Yatsenyuk would no doubt be keen to do this, but I suspect he doesn't have the direct support of the Pravy Sektor rank and file that Yarosh clearly has. The people in the west of Ukraine have been conditioned to blaming Russia for all atrocities, so even more atrocities would be used to paint Russia even blacker. The outcome for the managers would be expulsion of the pro-Russian citizens as plan A, atrocities sufficient to compel Russia to act overtly as Plan B or reduction of Ukraine to a failed state, causing a drain on Russia's resources as it would have to provide long term military support for Novorossia.
The antipathy of the PMR and Gagauzian populations to Romanian annexation is without doubt sincerely held. There is a potential for significant trouble in this region should the annexation go ahead. This may parallel to situation in Donbass, with the complication of no direct border connection and no voentorg. On the other hand, the presence of Russian troops would provide Russia with a causus belli should they be harmed in an potential conflict. There is no doubt that this lies behind the US driven Moldovan attempts to eject them. In the long term, depending on the will of the people in south Ukraine, this may be resolved by them joining Novorossia, once the Pravy Sektor thugs have been handled.
Monday, October 27, 2014
Transcarpathia, Transnistria and Gagauzia SitRep 20 Oct - 26 Oct
by "Y"
Transcarpathia
ATO
Volunteers from the Tachyiv district have shipped ~ 2.5 tons of supplies to the front. These supplies intended for Aidar, the 128th Brigade and the 24th Brigade are described as 'humanitarian aid', and consist mainly of winter clothing along with a few specialist items such as night vision imaging devices. Some have raised concerns over these latter items as they appear to have been bought at 100,000 UAH, whereas the typical price is about 55,000 UAH. A group of supporters in the Vynograd area collected 68,000 UAH on behalf of Transcarpathian troops.. A group of Ukrainians in Austria, 'UKROP Austria' donated a van, which was repaired locally in Transcarpathia and used to transport supplies as far as Kiev. There it was supposed to be upgraded to a first aid vehicle with the provision of medical equipment.
Aidar have established a training base in the mountain village of Dymka in the Volovets district. This was originally a demonstrator base formed by Aidar members on their return from front. The new 4 hectare base is currently funded by donations. It has provided 3-4 weeks training for about 50 recruits who then go on to the front.
A small number of individuals have been reported wounded, one from Aidar, one from the 95th Brigade and several others. The action took place in the town of Shchastya 18 km north of Lugansk. An unspecified number of individuals from the 128th Mountain Infantry Brigade based in Transcarpathia were wounded when the unit came under fire in action at Debaltsevo. The Ukraine regime states that 2500 people are officially missing or held prisoner in the east. They state that 822 have been released so far in prisoner exchanges.
Rotation of the police units continues. On 20 October, 56 members of the 'Green Berets' border guard detachment returned from the front. There are still 170 at the front due for rotation. One Transcarpathian border police detachment is based around Artemovsk, manning block posts on the roads around and especially leading to Debaltsevo. This is an area of conflict ~ 40 km south east of Artemovsk. Small numbers of volunteers still move to and from the front. A group of four members of the Carpathian Sich (a founder group of the Pravy Sektor block) went to the front, whilst five ethnic Hungarians returned to their villages in Transcarpathia.
The Ukrainian internal committee investigating the Ilovaisk disaster have absolved the troops of the Prykarpattya battalion of all responsibility, laying the blame totally on the actions of Geletey and Murzenko.
Economy
Recently released figures indicate that the average monthly salary in Transcarpathia is 2731 UAH (~ 210$). The unemployment rate is said to be an incredibly low 1.3%.
The Hryvnia exchange rate is still stable at about 12.95 UAH to the USD. However, economic experts suggest the exchange rate is being held at this level until after the election when it may drop 20-30% to 17-18 or even 20 UAH/USD.
Energy
Weather reports predict the first snows of the winter will fall this week in the higher parts of Transcarpathia.
As ever, the gas problem is central. The Ukraine regime is looking at various methods of reducing gas demand, and is considering incentive plans to reduce consumption, to promote biodiesel as an alternative, to encourage energy conservation and tariff changes to force consumers to reduce the amount of gas used.
Ukraine has been importing gas via the reverse flow network in Transcarpathia, pumping the gas into underground storage in anticipation of high winter demand. The gas comes largely from Slovakia, with some from Poland. There are suggestions that the Ukrainian and Slovakian gas transport companies, Naftogas and Eustream may seek to work closely together or even merge. The head of Naftogas has called on Slovakia to end its contract with Gazprom, and renegotiate to allow for reverse flow, which is currently not allowed according to Gazprom. The Slovakian gas company plans to reduce the amount of gas it buys from Gazprom by 10-15%, and expects to pay a lower price. This is presumably some kind of wishful starting point for any new contract with Gazprom. In a statement that is unbelievably detached from reality, Marecek, the head of Slovakia's Eustream states that the European Union must oppose the construction of South Stream otherwise that would mean it does not recognise Ukraine as a reliable supplier of gas. The more obvious threat that it poses to Eustream's profits is not mentioned.
More realistically, the Prime Minister of Slovakia notes that Ukraine wants to pass the costs of its gas delivery and debts on to EU. He quite reasonably states that the world does not work that way. Even the President of Romania, who is trying to put the squeeze Moldova and the PMR, notes the problem. He states that "Romania is not against assisting Ukraine in payment of debts, but Ukraine should understand that it is a big country that itself needs to find solutions for survival, not asking all the time for money." Meanwhile in La-la land, Yatsenyuk claims that the Ukraine gas problem can only be solved once the reverse gas flow issue has been clarified. He presumably sees that Russia is no longer prepared to be a sucker, and is hoping to pass the buk over to the EU instead. In response, Barosso has stated that the EU can provide a maximum $1 billion bridge loan to cover part of the costs. The Ukraine gas disaster has clearly become the parcel in a game of 'pass the parcel', with no one wanting to be caught with it once the music stops.
Following the self-inflicted wound caused by destruction of coal mines in the east, Ukraine has resorted to importing coal from South Africa. I have seen no details of costings so far but I do hope everyone involved in the supply chain gets cash up front.
Politics
The big news politically is the election to be held on 26 October. This arose after parliament was dissolved following a failure to agree on the austerity measures necessary for the IMF loans and in preparation for EU association. The opposing parties have been neutralised by various means, primarily lustration.
One major event in Uzhgorod was the appearance of Dmitry Yarosh, the leader of Pravy Sektor at an extended Q&A session (links to videos are given in Resources). He caused a stir by appearing with an armed guard, who stationed themselves at doorways. He claimed this was in response to comments from the SBU that there would be actions against him. Of course, nothing untoward happened, so this becomes part of the normalisation process by which he appears in public surrounded by his praetorian guard. The Q&A was extended, ~30 minutes, but there was one particularly interesting comment. He stated that Crimea will return to Ukraine at some stage. He claims Putin has not taken the Crimean Tartars into account. Yarosh states that they can become a driving force of revolution. This is exactly what happened to Pravy Sektor. Members were trained in Poland and led the violence at the Maidan. To me, this suggests he is, and perhaps always has been, closely connected to those behind the Ukraine regime change. He is certainly a more marketable front for Pravy Sektor than the odious Sashko Bily (alias of Oleksandr Muzychko) who died in mysterious circumstances earlier in the year.
Legislation allowing troops at the front to vote failed to pass. However, they were allowed to vote via a loophole in which they were treated as immigrants. A rumour that males voting would be conscripted turned out to be just a rumour.
As hinted in a previous report, Orban's perceived rapprochement with Russia has not pleased the US. Sanctions have been imposed against six Hungarian officials, described as members of the Orban government or civil servants. These individuals are denied entry to the US, supposedly because of personal corruption. Retaliation for the rapprochement with Russia, or investigation of US companies tax affairs are more likely explanations.
Political experts predicted voter turnout in Transcarpathia would be less than 60%, typically around 50% for this kind of election. Polling stations nominally opened at 9 am and by 4 pm, the turnout in the five Transcarpathian districts varied from about 25% to nearly 48%, with an average of about 34%. Throughout the country, the turnout was greater in the west than in the east. The average for the eight oblasts forming west Ukraine was around 46% whilst it was only around 33% in the five eastern oblasts including Donetsk and Lugansk. Over all 196 electoral districts the turnout was highest in Kiev and lowest in Donetsk at about 26%. People in the areas of Donetsk and Lugansk east of the demarcation line were not taking part in the vote. Exit polls gave 24% of the vote to 'Bloc Poroshenko', 21% to the 'Popular Front' (Yatsenyuk), 'Self Help' (deputy leader Semen Semnchenko) with 13%, 'Opposition Bloc' (Boyko) with 8%, 'Radical Party' (Lyashko) with 7%, 'Svoboda' (Tyagnybok) with 6% and 'Batkivshchyna' (Tymoshenko) with 6%. Pravy Sektor gained about 2.4% of votes at exit polls. Of these seven crossing the 6% threshold, six are pro-Europe/America and one (Opposition Bloc) is possibly 'pro-Russian'. These are results obviously subject to revision with the actual and final count of votes. The ultimate power structure will be governed by the allegiance of the large number of 'self identified' candidates who probably align with Pravy Sektor or Svoboda, as half the seats come from party blocs and half from individuals.
An unknown number of those voting chose to invalidate their votes, voting for Putin, Novorossia, DNR and LNR for example. Their exit poll statements are not noted.
The last word on the election lies with the inimitable Ukrainian journalist, Anatoly Sharii and his response to a program describbing voter turnout on Kolomoisky's TV channel .... 99.90%!
Propaganda
The linked map claiming to show activity in the east represents the propaganda the average Ukrainian is exposed to. It is mainly propaganda by omission. The map shows no weapons west of the demarcation line, only to the east and in Russia. Hence the claim that all killing and damage is the result of RUssia and the pro-Russian forces.
The election day propaganda was not unexpected. Firstly, the SBU detained two men in Transcarpathia, one described as Russian, the other as 'from Crimea'. They were described as a 'sabotage group' in the press. They were actually tourists visiting local residents. The SBU released them without charge and with little fanfare.
Secondly, Poroshenko paid a flying visit to Kramatorsk, purportedly to verify the voting process in person and to 'protect the rights of troops to vote'. It didn't seem to do him much good at the end of the day.
Separatism
Separatism in Transcarpathia appears to have been heavily clamped down by the SBU and possibly local Pravy Sektor members. However, in Lviv, the European Galician Assembly has intensified its activities. It skirts away from explicit separatism, but states that it would be happy to get into the EU without Ukraine. Its immediate aims are to unite at least three areas of Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk. The stated goal of the organisation is to return Galicia to Europe. It is another matter as to whether Europe would be really happy to have a hard-core Galician state as a member.
Resources
Yarosh Q&A video links:
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 1
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 2
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 3
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 4
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 5
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 6
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 7
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 8
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 9
Transnistria (aka PMR) and Gagauzia
Economy
The electrical machinery plant Electromash has been accredited by Gazprom as a source of replacement pump motors needed for the renovation of the Gazprom pipeline network.
The PMR is hoping to transform its current tax system into a classical tax system, with taxation of income, the property of legal entities and the imposition of a value-added tax. The reform is seen as part of the solution to the problem of the budget deficit which exceeds 40%. This arises partly from the economic blockade imposed by Moldova and Ukraine with consequent loss of sales.
Energy
The gas contract involving Moldova and Gazprom is to be renegotiated early next year. In spite on Moldova's actions against PMR, it expects a price cut for gas supply next year. The repayment of historic gas debts totally $23 million is also part of the negotiation.
Politics
The attempts to coerce PMR away from Russia into Moldova continue. The possibility of Moldova uniting with Romania or joining NATO has led Lavrov to remind everyone about the context for the status negotiations. He notes that 'all agreed that if Moldova loses its sovereignty and gets annexed by another country, or if Moldova changes its military-political non-bloc status, the people of Transnistria have the right to decide their future independently' This is a warning that Russia may recognise Transnistria should either of these events occur. He also stated the he hoped Moldova would not interfere with the economic affairs of PMR. The Memorandum of 1997 established the right to freedom of economic activity, which means unimpeded trade and investment ties with Russia and Europe. Lavrov also claims the US has usurped the position of head of OSCE mission, the mediation role in the '5+2' talks. He states that 'one American goes, another American comes in'.
Ukraine has joined the EU in placing visa restrictions for several former leaders of PMR. Lavrov and the PMR government consider this an act of intimidation and a restriction on free travel. Ukraine is part of '5+2' group trying to resolve the status issue. Its role is supposed to be that of guarantor, along with Russia, the OSCE is supposed to be a mediator, whilst the EU and the US are supposedly mere observers.
Recently. the Moldovan constitutional court has declared as unconstitutional any party whose goal is not European integration. Lavrov has rightly described this as outrageous and undemocratic. This outcome in the Moldovan court is not surprising given that six of the seven judges in the constitutional court are citizens of Romania.
In recent negotiations with PMR about the free trade zone, Luke Devine, the EU negotiator issued an ultimatum that "We must bear in mind that in late 2015, when the Transnistrian authorities decide not to apply the DCFTA (deep and comprehensive free trade agreement), Transnistria will lose preferences with largest trading partner. So Tiraspol need to decide whether to follow its policies on the economic interests of the population and business, or to stand in the ideological position". Gagauzia is in a similar position. The EU Free Trade Zones are subject to variation when convenient. Moldova currently has quota allowing it to export 80,000 tons of apples into EU free of duty. The European FTA is clearly a means of making weaker smaller countries chose between the EU and the Customs Union. This in turn is a means of reducing the potential for free trade with Russia. European integration has clearly been co-opted by US-UK interests into a mechanism for reducing the influence of Russia.
In the forthcoming Moldovan elections, workers abroad have the right to vote. Moldova is reducing the number of voting stations in Russia. There are about 500,000 Moldovans working in Russia with 15 polling stations in contrast to Italy where 250,000 Moldovan migrants have access to 25 stations. The Moldovan government plans to reduce the number of stations in Russia from 15 to 5, with 2 in St. Petersburg and 3 in Moscow. This will make it difficult for Moldovans in Russia, possibly perceived to be pro-Russia, from voting.
Propaganda
Poroshenko has banned the use of the term 'TMR' (Transnistrian Moldovan Republic). He claims there is only the Transnistrian section of the Ukraine / Moldova border. This really does not fit in with Ukraine's supposed role as guarantor in the '5+2' negotiations over the status of PMR.
Romania has stated it needs to increase its presence in Gagauzia, as the prolonged exposure to Russian TV and media gives a false impression of Europe. Such control, of course, has nothing to do with maintaining and extending Romanian ownership and control of the media.
Sanctions
Russia has included meats products from Moldova in its list of sanctions. The claim is that they do not meet Russian safety standards and often include inaccurate veterinary certificates. The free trade agreement with Moldova was terminated earlier in the year, so the zero rate of duty on imports of agricultural products was abolished. Moldova regards these actions as political rather than legitimate economic responses.
Separatism
Gagauzia is considering establishing a private broadcasting council to allow it to control media relay irrespective of Chisinau. The Moldovan government wants to reduce the transmission of Russian media as part of the program of mandating European integration.
Transcarpathia
ATO
Volunteers from the Tachyiv district have shipped ~ 2.5 tons of supplies to the front. These supplies intended for Aidar, the 128th Brigade and the 24th Brigade are described as 'humanitarian aid', and consist mainly of winter clothing along with a few specialist items such as night vision imaging devices. Some have raised concerns over these latter items as they appear to have been bought at 100,000 UAH, whereas the typical price is about 55,000 UAH. A group of supporters in the Vynograd area collected 68,000 UAH on behalf of Transcarpathian troops.. A group of Ukrainians in Austria, 'UKROP Austria' donated a van, which was repaired locally in Transcarpathia and used to transport supplies as far as Kiev. There it was supposed to be upgraded to a first aid vehicle with the provision of medical equipment.
Aidar have established a training base in the mountain village of Dymka in the Volovets district. This was originally a demonstrator base formed by Aidar members on their return from front. The new 4 hectare base is currently funded by donations. It has provided 3-4 weeks training for about 50 recruits who then go on to the front.
A small number of individuals have been reported wounded, one from Aidar, one from the 95th Brigade and several others. The action took place in the town of Shchastya 18 km north of Lugansk. An unspecified number of individuals from the 128th Mountain Infantry Brigade based in Transcarpathia were wounded when the unit came under fire in action at Debaltsevo. The Ukraine regime states that 2500 people are officially missing or held prisoner in the east. They state that 822 have been released so far in prisoner exchanges.
Rotation of the police units continues. On 20 October, 56 members of the 'Green Berets' border guard detachment returned from the front. There are still 170 at the front due for rotation. One Transcarpathian border police detachment is based around Artemovsk, manning block posts on the roads around and especially leading to Debaltsevo. This is an area of conflict ~ 40 km south east of Artemovsk. Small numbers of volunteers still move to and from the front. A group of four members of the Carpathian Sich (a founder group of the Pravy Sektor block) went to the front, whilst five ethnic Hungarians returned to their villages in Transcarpathia.
The Ukrainian internal committee investigating the Ilovaisk disaster have absolved the troops of the Prykarpattya battalion of all responsibility, laying the blame totally on the actions of Geletey and Murzenko.
Economy
Recently released figures indicate that the average monthly salary in Transcarpathia is 2731 UAH (~ 210$). The unemployment rate is said to be an incredibly low 1.3%.
The Hryvnia exchange rate is still stable at about 12.95 UAH to the USD. However, economic experts suggest the exchange rate is being held at this level until after the election when it may drop 20-30% to 17-18 or even 20 UAH/USD.
Energy
Weather reports predict the first snows of the winter will fall this week in the higher parts of Transcarpathia.
As ever, the gas problem is central. The Ukraine regime is looking at various methods of reducing gas demand, and is considering incentive plans to reduce consumption, to promote biodiesel as an alternative, to encourage energy conservation and tariff changes to force consumers to reduce the amount of gas used.
Ukraine has been importing gas via the reverse flow network in Transcarpathia, pumping the gas into underground storage in anticipation of high winter demand. The gas comes largely from Slovakia, with some from Poland. There are suggestions that the Ukrainian and Slovakian gas transport companies, Naftogas and Eustream may seek to work closely together or even merge. The head of Naftogas has called on Slovakia to end its contract with Gazprom, and renegotiate to allow for reverse flow, which is currently not allowed according to Gazprom. The Slovakian gas company plans to reduce the amount of gas it buys from Gazprom by 10-15%, and expects to pay a lower price. This is presumably some kind of wishful starting point for any new contract with Gazprom. In a statement that is unbelievably detached from reality, Marecek, the head of Slovakia's Eustream states that the European Union must oppose the construction of South Stream otherwise that would mean it does not recognise Ukraine as a reliable supplier of gas. The more obvious threat that it poses to Eustream's profits is not mentioned.
More realistically, the Prime Minister of Slovakia notes that Ukraine wants to pass the costs of its gas delivery and debts on to EU. He quite reasonably states that the world does not work that way. Even the President of Romania, who is trying to put the squeeze Moldova and the PMR, notes the problem. He states that "Romania is not against assisting Ukraine in payment of debts, but Ukraine should understand that it is a big country that itself needs to find solutions for survival, not asking all the time for money." Meanwhile in La-la land, Yatsenyuk claims that the Ukraine gas problem can only be solved once the reverse gas flow issue has been clarified. He presumably sees that Russia is no longer prepared to be a sucker, and is hoping to pass the buk over to the EU instead. In response, Barosso has stated that the EU can provide a maximum $1 billion bridge loan to cover part of the costs. The Ukraine gas disaster has clearly become the parcel in a game of 'pass the parcel', with no one wanting to be caught with it once the music stops.
Following the self-inflicted wound caused by destruction of coal mines in the east, Ukraine has resorted to importing coal from South Africa. I have seen no details of costings so far but I do hope everyone involved in the supply chain gets cash up front.
Politics
The big news politically is the election to be held on 26 October. This arose after parliament was dissolved following a failure to agree on the austerity measures necessary for the IMF loans and in preparation for EU association. The opposing parties have been neutralised by various means, primarily lustration.
One major event in Uzhgorod was the appearance of Dmitry Yarosh, the leader of Pravy Sektor at an extended Q&A session (links to videos are given in Resources). He caused a stir by appearing with an armed guard, who stationed themselves at doorways. He claimed this was in response to comments from the SBU that there would be actions against him. Of course, nothing untoward happened, so this becomes part of the normalisation process by which he appears in public surrounded by his praetorian guard. The Q&A was extended, ~30 minutes, but there was one particularly interesting comment. He stated that Crimea will return to Ukraine at some stage. He claims Putin has not taken the Crimean Tartars into account. Yarosh states that they can become a driving force of revolution. This is exactly what happened to Pravy Sektor. Members were trained in Poland and led the violence at the Maidan. To me, this suggests he is, and perhaps always has been, closely connected to those behind the Ukraine regime change. He is certainly a more marketable front for Pravy Sektor than the odious Sashko Bily (alias of Oleksandr Muzychko) who died in mysterious circumstances earlier in the year.
Legislation allowing troops at the front to vote failed to pass. However, they were allowed to vote via a loophole in which they were treated as immigrants. A rumour that males voting would be conscripted turned out to be just a rumour.
As hinted in a previous report, Orban's perceived rapprochement with Russia has not pleased the US. Sanctions have been imposed against six Hungarian officials, described as members of the Orban government or civil servants. These individuals are denied entry to the US, supposedly because of personal corruption. Retaliation for the rapprochement with Russia, or investigation of US companies tax affairs are more likely explanations.
Political experts predicted voter turnout in Transcarpathia would be less than 60%, typically around 50% for this kind of election. Polling stations nominally opened at 9 am and by 4 pm, the turnout in the five Transcarpathian districts varied from about 25% to nearly 48%, with an average of about 34%. Throughout the country, the turnout was greater in the west than in the east. The average for the eight oblasts forming west Ukraine was around 46% whilst it was only around 33% in the five eastern oblasts including Donetsk and Lugansk. Over all 196 electoral districts the turnout was highest in Kiev and lowest in Donetsk at about 26%. People in the areas of Donetsk and Lugansk east of the demarcation line were not taking part in the vote. Exit polls gave 24% of the vote to 'Bloc Poroshenko', 21% to the 'Popular Front' (Yatsenyuk), 'Self Help' (deputy leader Semen Semnchenko) with 13%, 'Opposition Bloc' (Boyko) with 8%, 'Radical Party' (Lyashko) with 7%, 'Svoboda' (Tyagnybok) with 6% and 'Batkivshchyna' (Tymoshenko) with 6%. Pravy Sektor gained about 2.4% of votes at exit polls. Of these seven crossing the 6% threshold, six are pro-Europe/America and one (Opposition Bloc) is possibly 'pro-Russian'. These are results obviously subject to revision with the actual and final count of votes. The ultimate power structure will be governed by the allegiance of the large number of 'self identified' candidates who probably align with Pravy Sektor or Svoboda, as half the seats come from party blocs and half from individuals.
An unknown number of those voting chose to invalidate their votes, voting for Putin, Novorossia, DNR and LNR for example. Their exit poll statements are not noted.
The last word on the election lies with the inimitable Ukrainian journalist, Anatoly Sharii and his response to a program describbing voter turnout on Kolomoisky's TV channel .... 99.90%!
Propaganda
The linked map claiming to show activity in the east represents the propaganda the average Ukrainian is exposed to. It is mainly propaganda by omission. The map shows no weapons west of the demarcation line, only to the east and in Russia. Hence the claim that all killing and damage is the result of RUssia and the pro-Russian forces.
The election day propaganda was not unexpected. Firstly, the SBU detained two men in Transcarpathia, one described as Russian, the other as 'from Crimea'. They were described as a 'sabotage group' in the press. They were actually tourists visiting local residents. The SBU released them without charge and with little fanfare.
Secondly, Poroshenko paid a flying visit to Kramatorsk, purportedly to verify the voting process in person and to 'protect the rights of troops to vote'. It didn't seem to do him much good at the end of the day.
Separatism
Separatism in Transcarpathia appears to have been heavily clamped down by the SBU and possibly local Pravy Sektor members. However, in Lviv, the European Galician Assembly has intensified its activities. It skirts away from explicit separatism, but states that it would be happy to get into the EU without Ukraine. Its immediate aims are to unite at least three areas of Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk. The stated goal of the organisation is to return Galicia to Europe. It is another matter as to whether Europe would be really happy to have a hard-core Galician state as a member.
Resources
Yarosh Q&A video links:
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 1
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 2
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 3
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 4
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 5
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 6
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 7
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 8
Yarosh in Uzhgorod 9
Transnistria (aka PMR) and Gagauzia
Economy
The electrical machinery plant Electromash has been accredited by Gazprom as a source of replacement pump motors needed for the renovation of the Gazprom pipeline network.
The PMR is hoping to transform its current tax system into a classical tax system, with taxation of income, the property of legal entities and the imposition of a value-added tax. The reform is seen as part of the solution to the problem of the budget deficit which exceeds 40%. This arises partly from the economic blockade imposed by Moldova and Ukraine with consequent loss of sales.
Energy
The gas contract involving Moldova and Gazprom is to be renegotiated early next year. In spite on Moldova's actions against PMR, it expects a price cut for gas supply next year. The repayment of historic gas debts totally $23 million is also part of the negotiation.
Politics
The attempts to coerce PMR away from Russia into Moldova continue. The possibility of Moldova uniting with Romania or joining NATO has led Lavrov to remind everyone about the context for the status negotiations. He notes that 'all agreed that if Moldova loses its sovereignty and gets annexed by another country, or if Moldova changes its military-political non-bloc status, the people of Transnistria have the right to decide their future independently' This is a warning that Russia may recognise Transnistria should either of these events occur. He also stated the he hoped Moldova would not interfere with the economic affairs of PMR. The Memorandum of 1997 established the right to freedom of economic activity, which means unimpeded trade and investment ties with Russia and Europe. Lavrov also claims the US has usurped the position of head of OSCE mission, the mediation role in the '5+2' talks. He states that 'one American goes, another American comes in'.
Ukraine has joined the EU in placing visa restrictions for several former leaders of PMR. Lavrov and the PMR government consider this an act of intimidation and a restriction on free travel. Ukraine is part of '5+2' group trying to resolve the status issue. Its role is supposed to be that of guarantor, along with Russia, the OSCE is supposed to be a mediator, whilst the EU and the US are supposedly mere observers.
Recently. the Moldovan constitutional court has declared as unconstitutional any party whose goal is not European integration. Lavrov has rightly described this as outrageous and undemocratic. This outcome in the Moldovan court is not surprising given that six of the seven judges in the constitutional court are citizens of Romania.
In recent negotiations with PMR about the free trade zone, Luke Devine, the EU negotiator issued an ultimatum that "We must bear in mind that in late 2015, when the Transnistrian authorities decide not to apply the DCFTA (deep and comprehensive free trade agreement), Transnistria will lose preferences with largest trading partner. So Tiraspol need to decide whether to follow its policies on the economic interests of the population and business, or to stand in the ideological position". Gagauzia is in a similar position. The EU Free Trade Zones are subject to variation when convenient. Moldova currently has quota allowing it to export 80,000 tons of apples into EU free of duty. The European FTA is clearly a means of making weaker smaller countries chose between the EU and the Customs Union. This in turn is a means of reducing the potential for free trade with Russia. European integration has clearly been co-opted by US-UK interests into a mechanism for reducing the influence of Russia.
In the forthcoming Moldovan elections, workers abroad have the right to vote. Moldova is reducing the number of voting stations in Russia. There are about 500,000 Moldovans working in Russia with 15 polling stations in contrast to Italy where 250,000 Moldovan migrants have access to 25 stations. The Moldovan government plans to reduce the number of stations in Russia from 15 to 5, with 2 in St. Petersburg and 3 in Moscow. This will make it difficult for Moldovans in Russia, possibly perceived to be pro-Russia, from voting.
Propaganda
Poroshenko has banned the use of the term 'TMR' (Transnistrian Moldovan Republic). He claims there is only the Transnistrian section of the Ukraine / Moldova border. This really does not fit in with Ukraine's supposed role as guarantor in the '5+2' negotiations over the status of PMR.
Romania has stated it needs to increase its presence in Gagauzia, as the prolonged exposure to Russian TV and media gives a false impression of Europe. Such control, of course, has nothing to do with maintaining and extending Romanian ownership and control of the media.
Sanctions
Russia has included meats products from Moldova in its list of sanctions. The claim is that they do not meet Russian safety standards and often include inaccurate veterinary certificates. The free trade agreement with Moldova was terminated earlier in the year, so the zero rate of duty on imports of agricultural products was abolished. Moldova regards these actions as political rather than legitimate economic responses.
Separatism
Gagauzia is considering establishing a private broadcasting council to allow it to control media relay irrespective of Chisinau. The Moldovan government wants to reduce the transmission of Russian media as part of the program of mandating European integration.
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