Friday, September 23, 2011
Why Mahmoud Abbas' speech matters a lot
Friday, January 9, 2009
UNSCR 1860 and Abbas: clearly irrelevant
This is all good news, really. Now that these irrelevancies have been set aside the clock will be ticking louder and louder for the Israeli war on Gaza and each passing day with strengthen Hamas.
On the ground the situation is still way to early to call, but the fact that Hamas stood its ground for two weeks is, I think, rather encouraging.
The Israeli Air Force and Navy has run out of meaningful targets a long while ago already so its sole purpose will now be to terrorize Palestinian civilians as much as can be, hence the repeated attacks on UN positions. The Israeli ground forces have done the easy job exactly as predicted: the Gaza Strip has been cut into several sections. While the Israelis present that as a meaningful goal, all this really achieves is lengthening the frontlines inside Gaza. So far, the Israelis have clearly been unable to enter, much less so take control, of any urban center.
I would say that Hamas fighters have, so far, done better than I would have expected and this is also an ecouraging sign.
Bottom line: the Israelis have run out of political options now and they will now have to do what they clearly were hoping to avoid: get down to the ugly business of trying to fight the Palestinian resistance.
Wednesday, October 17, 2007
Formalizing apartheid packaged as peace initiative
Next month the US plans to host a regional meeting to discuss peace in the Middle East, or at least peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The maneuvering, deal making and negotiating about what will be on the table has been going on for some time. But the details of the agreement being discussed have been a well-guarded secret but for the steady flow of leaks and trial balloons. Deciphering this information combined with facts on the ground, one can put together a clear outline of Israel's "next generous offer."
Political maneuvers can be spun to sound good if the details are kept vague, but when held to scrutiny it becomes obvious that the upcoming Israeli offer is not so generous. Like the Oslo Accords and the "disengagement" from Gaza, the peace process being cooked now is a move to consolidate Israeli control of all of historic Palestine while taking a large portion of the Palestinian population off Israel's hands. The devil is in the details that follow.
The agreement on the table offers Palestinians what Israel's president Shimon Peres calls "the equivalent of 100 percent of the territory occupied in 1967." According to Peres, Israel will retain its major West Bank population centers, also known as settlement blocs, which Peres claims make up only five percent of the West Bank. In exchange Israel will offer to give the Palestinians the same amount of territory elsewhere. According to Peres, Israel will exchange land in Israel populated by Palestinians who hold Israeli citizenship. This will allow Israel to remove some of its Palestinian Arab population, whom most Jewish Israelis perceive as "demographic threat" to the nature of the Jewish state.
When Israeli politicians like Peres talk about retaining five percent of the West Bank, they do not include occupied East Jerusalem. Israel illegally and unilaterally annexed East Jerusalem in 1967-68. Hence, Israeli sources claim there are 250,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank, completely discounting the estimated additional 250,000 settlers in occupied East Jerusalem.
Israel's settlement blocs are being created and built as you read these words. For years Israel has been creating settlement blocs on strategic land that will carve the West Bank into disconnected islands, maintain Israeli access to the West Bank water resources and surround and strangle Arab Jerusalem. The de facto annexation of this strategic 9.5 percent of the West Bank's land behind Israel's apartheid wall has already taken place. The "peace" process will simply make it official.
In March 2006 the newly formed Kadima party was elected to implement Ariel Sharon's "convergence plan." According to this plan, the non-strategic settlements outside of the settlement blocs would be dismantled. The evacuated settlers would be resettled in the "blocs" behind the wall that would in turn be annexed by Israel.
On 14 April 2004, President Bush wrote to then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, "In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing population centers it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949 ..." This letter was subsequently ratified in both US Houses of Congress.
Israel took this as a green light from the US to keep whatever areas they can fill with settlers. Therefore, despite the Road Map requirement that Israel freeze settlement expansion, Israel accelerated the creation of so-called "existing" settlement blocs in strategically important areas.
In the same letter to Sharon, Bush also stated, "It seems clear that an agreed, just, fair and realistic framework for a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel." Consequently, in the offer to be made by Israel, Palestinian refugees will be allowed the right to return, not to their homes, but to small, non-contiguous parts of their original homeland, divided into disconnected territorial units, with no chance of maintaining a sustainable economy and with no control over water, power, or other necessary resources. They will be allowed to return to a cage, with Israel manning every door.
Israeli plans, backed by these US guarantees, create an unlivable apartheid situation for Palestinians. But Palestinians are not even likely to receive such a "generous" apartheid offer in November.
Now, with less than sixteen months left in the Bush administration, Ehud Olmert lacks the political clout to carry out Israel's end of the deal. Israeli Minister of Defense Ehud Barak recently stated his opposition to what he called "withdrawal from Israeli principles that have stood for 40 years, merely to gain favor in the eyes of an American president who is leaving office in a year." Therefore, at the Olmert's administration's insistence, the goals of the regional meeting have been watered down to a joint statement that will outline the basis of the future agreement. Olmert is demanding that the joint declaration include a reference to Bush's April 2004 letter to Sharon and to the Road Map.
Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni's stated objective is to declare a "transitional" Palestinian state with "provisional" borders, an option that appears in the second phase of the Road Map. When Israel accepted the Road Map in March 2003 it attached "14 reservations." Israel considers these reservations as integral parts of the Road Map. Israel's fifth reservation states: "The provisional state will have provisional borders and certain aspects of sovereignty, be fully demilitarized ... be without the authority to undertake defense alliances or military cooperation, and Israeli control over the entry and exit of all persons and cargo, as well as of its air space and electromagnetic spectrum." Such a state would be squeezed between the separation wall, Israel's "demographic border," and the Jordan Valley, Israel's "security border" with Jordan. With the Jordan Valley making up approximately 30 percent of the West Bank, under this scenario Israel would likely retain more than 40 percent of the West Bank. This transitional Palestinian state would consist of a series of isolated Bantustans, or as Sharon, who fathered the plan, preferred to refer to them, "cantons."
In the past the Palestinians have pressed to have this option of the temporary state removed from the Road Map, since the history of Israel's occupation shows that "temporary measures" are almost always permanent. However, Palestinian negotiators now accept the possibility of a temporary state on the condition that they receive international assurances that the third and final phase of the Road Map, that includes a permanent settlement, will be implemented within six months. Israel has no intention of accepting this condition.
It is questionable whether Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas will be able to accept this offer without a timeframe for a permanent settlement. But perhaps he is not even meant to accept. For if Abbas refuses another Israeli-American "generous offer" his rejection could be presented to the world as more proof that there is no Palestinian "partner for peace." Israel would then be "justified" in implementing its convergence plan unilaterally.
Unilateral "convergence" will make it possible to create a situation in the West Bank similar to what unilateral "disengagement" has created in the Gaza. Gaza's residents, 70 percent of whom are refugees from what is now Israel, are currently isolated, starving and under total Israeli blockade from land, air and sea.
Olmert, Bush, Blair and their accomplices in the "Quartet" have vast, sophisticated and boundlessly resourced PR machinery that, through unlimited access to an uncritical media, can put a compelling "peace spin" on an apartheid process. During the November meeting they will assure the world of their commitment to a Palestinian state (with the appropriate Abbas/Olmert/Bush photo ops). They will promise to commit millions of dollars, funding Palestinian "institution building" and humanitarian aid and arming troops in order to "keep the peace" inside the Bantustans. Arab states will normalize relations with Israel, strengthening the "moderates" of the entire region, thus softening the Arab street as a prerequisite for an American-led strike on Iran.
If we, the peace and justice community, manage to expose this latest maneuver for what it really is, Israel could be forced into fair negotiations for the first time.
For this to happen we must mobilize immediately. It is our job to educate the rest of the world about what these talks really mean and the truth about what is happening. The writing is literally on the wall and on the ground. It took many months if not years to expose the ugly truth behind the first "generous offer." Let's not make that mistake again.
Neta Golan is an Israeli peace with justice activist living in Ramallah and a founder of the Internaitonal Solidarity Movement. Mohammed Khatib is a leading member of Bil'in's Popular Committee Against the Wall and the secretary of Bil'in's Village Council. For more information see: http://www.apartheidmasked.org/
Saturday, September 1, 2007
Shameless
Over the past two months a coalition has formed around Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in an attempt to bolster his rule. Desperate to maintain his hold on power, Abbas has chosen to forgo national unity and rely on support from the U.S. and Israel to tighten his hold on the West Bank and target Gaza. Abbas and his benefactors have made it clear to the residents of Gaza that only by abandoning Hamas will the siege be lifted. In the interim, any deaths or starvation, while regrettable, are the requisite price to maintain Abbas' presidency and the position of his cronies. In pursuing this course, he and his appointed Prime Minister Salam Fayyad have tied their fate to American and Israeli officials in the mistaken belief that they will deliver an independent Palestinian state. In doing so, Abbas and Fayyad ignore the personal, professional, and ideological relationships uniting these officials, which, contrary to their public statements, serve to undermine Palestinian aspirations. The result of this delusional strategy will be a cage disguised as a country.
Five years ago, as the second intifada spiraled out of control in the spring of 2002, President Bush asked his then National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice what was the "fundamental problem" preventing the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to the New York Times her answer was "Yasser Arafat." Rice explained, "When you think about the way people had thought about the Middle East, it was just about land." Her decision led the Bush administration's sidelining of Arafat, the emergence of Abbas, as well as their reliance on Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to end the conflict through force rather than negotiations. These policies have had a devastating impact on Palestinian society, with an immeasurable cost in human life, property and infrastructure.
During the 2000 Presidential Campaign, Rice was portrayed by the Bush campaign and the mainstream American media as one of Bush's foreign policy tutors and advisers. However, she is a former Soviet specialist and by her own admission had little knowledge (or interest) in the history or politics of the Middle East. What then was the source of her keen analysis of the conflict? Rice's key adviser for Middle East affairs on the National Security Council was neo-conservative American Likudnik Elliot Abrams. An avowed opponent of the "land for peace" formula which would be at the center of any negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians, Abrams is an infamous figure in Washington due to his role in the Iran-Contra affair. As Kathleen Christison recently detailed in Counterpunch, Abrams has actively worked to subvert the Palestinian national unity government and advocated a "hard coup" against Hamas. This included coordinating with like-minded allies in the State Department to pervert international law and human rights by pressuring the United Nations to impose sanctions on the occupied, not the occupier, in the wake of Hamas' election victory.
Rice's more recent confidant is Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni. In a fawning New York Times Magazine cover story profile of Livni last month, Rice described her as a "friend" and a "woman of peace." A trained lawyer and former Mossad agent, Livni's meteoric rise in Israeli politics was hastened by Sharon. According to the Times, Rice and Livni share "the same intensity and work ethic, the same difficulty in thinking beyond a doctrine once it has been formed, the same disciplined intelligence that sometimes appears to lack the subtlety of wisdom and the same penchant for talking about 'values' and what is 'right'" -- and then, of course, doing the exact opposite. One example of this approach was Livni's boast that through a meeting with Rice she directly influenced Bush's 14 April 2004 statement undercutting the right of return for Palestinian refugees. She claimed "I did the right thing -- and so did Bush."
Hoping to salvage her term as Secretary of State, Rice has been publicly preparing for a renewed peace effort for some time. In March, the Washington Post reported that she finally decided to review the peace efforts of previous administrations. According to Time Magazine, this also included requesting the notes of Jordanian diplomats from the ill-fated 2000 Camp David Summit, which the Bush administration had previously disparaged. Rice's belated efforts were supposed to coincide with a resurrected Arab League peace initiative, whose proposal was based on existing UN resolutions and was again rejected by Israel for the second time in five years. Attempting to prop up Abbas, President Bush initially called for a regional summit to be held in November. To galvanize support for this initiative, Rice paid yet another high profile visit to the region accompanied by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. In addition, Washington announced an increase in military aid to Israel over the next ten years. Yet, in spite of the attention and incentives, Bush's summit has since been downgraded to a "meeting," and one expects soon it will be further demoted to a "discussion." Meanwhile, as part of Rice's inane "confidence building measures," a process borrowed from the Oslo period, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Abbas meet regularly, supposedly to finalize yet another "declaration of principles." However, adamant denials from Olmert's office inevitably follow each highly placed leak about the substance of the negotiations.
In contrast, ominous signs have appeared in the Arab and Israeli press that have not elicited denials. For several weeks the Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership has claimed that early elections would be needed to break the deadlock between Fatah and Hamas, a move the latter rejected as unconstitutional. However, Fayyad recently told reporters that new elections were "not feasible" at this time. Moreover, he and other officials have suggested that Hamas will be shut out from any new elections unless they accept existing agreements. Abbas even briefly flirted with the notion of reviving the Palestinian National Council, without including Hamas of course, and sought the support of moribund leftists. Desperate for relevancy, several, like Nayef Hawatmeh of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, were eager to comply. Predictably this effort has also stalled. Meanwhile, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that Abbas was requesting American weaponry, including new armored cars for "crowd dispersal," replacing those destroyed by the Israelis during the early part of the second intifada. In addition, Washington has also agreed to train Abbas' presidential guard. Concurrently, American Lt. General Keith Dayton continues training security personnel loyal to Fatah in Jericho, and a new training base may be created in Bethlehem. It would appear that Abbas and his backers are intent on a showdown with Hamas, not negotiations.
To prepare the ground for this confrontation, the PA leadership has embraced the siege of Gaza. This strategy reached a new nadir when Ambassador Riyad Mansour of the Palestinian Observer Mission to the UN recently blocked an attempt by Qatar and Indonesia to obtain a Security Council resolution expressing concern over a pending humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Mansour explained in a prepared statement that "It is unacceptable for anyone, including friends, to act on our behalf without our knowledge, without consulting us." When asked why the Palestinians did not coordinate with its "friends" to reintroduce the resolution, he answered that there was "no specific need" for one at this time, in spite of the dire warnings from multiple international aid organizations to the contrary. The diplomatic corps, which operates from the former Palestine Liberation Organization missions around the globe, purportedly represents the Palestinian people, but their recent actions and rhetoric culminating in the disgraceful charade perpetrated at the UN demonstrates where their loyalties truly lie.
Moreover, Mansour's statement of "no specific need" is as shockingly inaccurate as it is despicable. Gaza is one of the most densely populated places in the world, with nearly 1.5 million Palestinians -- roughly 80 percent of them refugees -- crowded into a mere 360 square kilometers. With unemployment of 40 percent and underemployment far higher, the UN estimates that over 60 percent of Palestinians live below its "poverty line" of less that two dollars a day. Gaza has no functioning sea or airport facilities and all human and commercial traffic flows through Israeli-controlled (and sealed) border crossings, rendering it totally isolated. Due to the border closures, there are constant shortages of medical and food supplies, and now fuel supplies are also being used as a weapon, forcing electricity to be shut off across the strip for hours and sometimes days at a time. These actions represent a continuation of the siege and sanctions policy promoted by Abrams. As Dov Weinglass, an adviser to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, explained the goal is to "put the Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them die of hunger." By adopting this strategy as their own, Abbas and Fayyad have demonstrated they are beyond redemption.
With each passing day the depth of the PA leadership's degeneracy is revealed. Their corruption and ineptitude, so blatant and glaring over the past 13 years, has now been supplemented by a cynicism and sadism directed toward their own people with the support and encouragement of the US, Israel, the European Union, and the international community. This leadership, which once proclaimed "revolution until victory," long ago abandoned that mantra and chose to turn rebellion into money. They have shamelessly ignored the needs and will of the Palestinian people and led them to the brink of ruin. Only by abandoning this leadership can Palestinians hope to reverse this course and ensure that they determine their own future. The choice has never been starker or more certain.
Osamah Khalil is a Palestinian-American doctoral candidate in US and Middle East History at the University of California, Berkeley, focusing on US foreign policy in the Middle East. He can be reached at okhalil@berkeley.edu.
Tuesday, August 7, 2007
Why Oblivion Looms for Abbas
By Mark Perry
In the summer of 1997 I found myself seated in the office of Yasser Arafat in Gaza. I had known Arafat for many years, and was a welcome visitor. Being an American and a friend gave me privileges. Others weighed their words, but I was constrained by no such requirement. So as he thumbed through a stack of papers, I pleaded clemency for a friend who had been under house arrest in Gaza for the better part of a year. The man, a prominent security official, had ordered Palestinian security forces to fire on a Hamas demonstration the summer before and Arafat, enraged, had ordered him home. “He made a mistake,” I said. “It’s time to bring him back.” Arafat ignored me.
There was a long moment of silence as Arafat’s aides eyed each other in discomfort. Arafat motioned to one of them and handed him a paper. This was typical of him. You could spend hours with the man in silence. He continued to pretend he hadn’t heard, so I plunged on. “The man is dedicated,” I said. Arafat stopped, his eyes widening, but he still refused to look at me. I waited many moments and pleaded my case again. “He’s a good man.” Finally, he spoke, but he bit off each word, making his point. “This is not your concern.” And he was silent again. “I think that it is,” I said. “He is a friend of mine.” Arafat was suddenly exasperated and locked me in his gaze, to emphasize his point: “He crossed a line.”
Those of us who know and understand something of Palestinian society were saddened by June’s Gaza troubles — the flickering YouTube films of Palestinian gunmen being dragged willy-nilly through the streets of the Strip seemed a talisman of lines crossed so many times they no longer existed. Palestinians have fought each other before — most notably in the Palestinian Civil War that raged in northern Lebanon in 1983 — but nothing like this. Palestinians themselves seemed to draw back, even recoil, from the violence. “Both sides made mistakes,” Hamas official Usamah Hamdan told me in Beirut in late June and there was sadness in his voice. “We are sorry for that.”
In the wake of these troubles, Palestinian President Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) cut ties with Hamas, declared an emergency government, suspended the workings of the Palestinian Legislative Council, arrested dozens of Hamas legislative members, clamped down on anti-government protests, purged critics in his own Fatah movement, and announced he would begin immediate talks with the Olmert government. The U.S reciprocated: it urged Israel to release hundreds of millions of dollars in tax monies, said it would work towards the creation of a Palestinian state, pressured Israel to ease travel restrictions in the West Bank, awarded the Abu Mazen government tens of millions of dollars in economic and security aid, urged Arab nations to support Abu Mazen’s political program, called on the EU to take similar actions, dispatched a team of experts to assess Palestinian needs, called for an international conference to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and conducted high-level talks with Arab nations to make certain their support for these programs was assured. The actions were breathtaking in their scope. They provided, for the first time in nearly a decade, the prospect for a political resolution of the daunting Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
And they have absolutely no prospect of success.
Instead, Abu Mazen will fail to solidify his position as President of the Palestinian Authority; the American program to support him will fail; there will be no international conference; and, within the next sixty to ninety days — and almost certainly by the end of the year — Abu Mazen and his colleagues will either be forced into exile or will take steps to reconstitute the national unity government that they have spent the last 60 days destroying.
And here’s why:
Palestinian society is more united than it has been in years, in spite of what we see on our televisions or read in the American press. The “Gaza coup” was not launched in Gaza, but in Ramallah — and the forces that brought instability to the Strip were funded and armed by the United States. They did not represent Fatah or even a majority in Fatah, but rather a small minority of Fatah radicals. The vast majority of mainline forces in Fatah, and even a significant number in the Fatah Central Committee did not support the arming of the Preventive Security Services. The leader of the PSS, Mohammad Dahlan is now in exile and his opponents are calling for his arrest. The Palestinian people know this. They know their vote was overturned by Abu Mazen and the United States, and they resent it.
It is true, there have been some dips in the popularity of the movement in some areas, but the losses are not significant. And, remember, there is a tendency in the U.S. to consistently underestimate Hamas’s popularity, which I attribute to:
– a disbelief that Palestinians could support such an organization
– a belief in U.S.-funded Palestinian polling numbers
– the reputed secular nature of Palestinian society
– a tendency to overlook the traditional strength of Hamas during periods of confrontation, and
– the impact of the economic embargo.
My own (admittedly unscientific), belief is that Hamas’s strength is likely to grow. The movement’s base of support has widened significantly — from about 9 percent in the late 1980s to about 25 to 30 percent now, numbers that match up well to any well-established Western political party. While its parliamentary victory in January of 2006 was due largely to Fatah’s poor reputation, Hamas has not repeated Fatah’s mistakes: despite the clear temptations of power, it has provided as good a government as its resources have allowed — no stain of impropriety has touched its senior leadership. This remains its most significant achievement.
Palestinian society is not secular, liberal, progressive and western. It is Arab, traditional, conservative and Muslim. Mahmoud Abbas, Salam Fayad, Saeb Erakat and Yasser Abed Rabbo are fine people — and they are friends of mine — but they do not represent mainstream Palestinian society. Hamas does. The election of Hamas and its continued strength is not a setback for Palestinian society, but a reflection of its growth. My own Hamiltonian tendencies are humbled. It is possible to understand America by visiting Boston, but I wouldn’t recommend it — any more than I would recommend that an American believe that Hanan Ashrawi is typically Palestinian. Americans aren’t governed from Nantucket but from Natchez, and Palestinians aren’t governed from Ramallah, but from Jubalya — and wishing it so doesn’t make it so. That Fatah was defeated is not simply a comment on their corruption, but on their inability to speak for the people of Palestine. It is for this that Hamas is likely to grow and prosper.
Hamas stood for an election and won. We decided to reverse the verdict of a democratic process, not them. There is certainly debate inside of Hamas on the efficacy of continuing the movement’s involvement in electoral politics. The loss of some popular support, the reversion to violence in Gaza, the inability of the movement to break the international boycott, emerging divisions inside Hamas itself, and the closing off of political options have sparked this internal debate. But I doubt that Hamas will abandon its current strategy in favor of violent confrontation, either with Fatah or with Israel. The view from Gaza may seem dark, perhaps the view is even darker in Damascus. But there is another side to the ledger, and it is as significant: Balancing Hamas’s strengths are Fatah’s continuing weaknesses — and those cannot be reversed with a simple infusion of our money.
Fatah is weak, aging, corrupt, disorganized, and even more divided than Hamas; it is funded exclusively through outside sources; it lacks a clear political program and political vision; its leadership is out-of-touch, conference-bound, tethered to a past era; it is dependent for its survival on the United States and Israel (a fact of which Palestinian society is well aware, at the expense of Fatah’s credibility) it is at war with its own younger cadre (which are abandoning the movement). Its militant Tanzim grassroots are growing in strength, but are alienated from Fatah’s leadership, disenchanted with its corruption and, perhaps most importantly, is cooperating with Hamas. The Fatah grassroots is pushing hard, just now, for the long-delayed General Conference to reform the organization. Abu Mazen can throw Hamas legislators in jail — it will be much more difficult to throw members of his own party in jail, which is why …
Abu Mazen’s power has been significantly eroded inside of his own organization. The recent meeting of the committee called to make an assessment of the Gaza troubles repudiated Abu Mazen’s appointees: Mohammad Dahlan, Rashid Abu Shabak and Tawfik Tarawi. Abu Mazen is within one vote of losing his Fatah power base. His closest aides (Salam Fayad, Saeb Erakat, Rafiq Husseini, Yasser Abed Rabbo) count for nothing in Fatah, because they have no vote in the organization. Abu Mazen’s plea to the Central Committee last Tuesday, that “my aides have told me my actions are legal,” brought laughter even from his closest supporters. Former Prime Minister Abu Alaa has refused to support him and Hani al-Hassan has denounced him. In response someone shot up Hassan’s house. He laughs: “They made sure I wasn’t here,” he told me. And the former national security advisor, Jabril Rajoub has called for Mohammad Dahlan’s arrest. Abu Mazen’s response has been to say he will hold national elections — but without allowing Hamas to run. And our president has conferred his blessing on this, calling Abu Mazen’s government “legitimate.” Truly, truly, truly, we are a light in the darkness, a city on a hill.
The non-payment of governmental salaries to Hamas members in the West Bank is causing deep disenchantment because it cuts across family and tribal lines. So it is that one brother, a Fatah member, is paid while another (a Hamas member) is not. Salam Fayad has thereby proven to be a good bean counter, but not much of a politician. He has set family against family, brother against brother. And doing that is deeply resented in the West Bank. So too, the security services are in a posture of near-revolt over the policy of continuing arrests of anti-Abu Mazen partisans. Posters have begun to appear in the West Bank, styling Abu Mazen a Palestinian Pinochet — or worse, an “Abu Musa” (the man whom Syrian President Hafez Assad sent to kill Arafat in Lebanon). The posters are being designed by Fatah, not Hamas. Do we really believe that the Palestinian police will continue to follow Abbas’s orders: to arrest Hamas activists because they do not meet the conditions of the Quartet? Because Hamas does not “recognize Israel?”
Indeed, the much-vaunted united front being built by the U.S. against Hamas is something of a myth: The Egyptians and Saudis have quietly repudiated the U.S. program to
overthrow Hamas, and instead have urged Fatah and Hamas to reconcile. Colin Powell has called for talks with the Hamas leadership, while Israel’s support for Abu Mazen remains predictably indifferent. (They’re no dummies – the Israelis, too, will end up talking to Hamas is my bet.) There are 542 roadblocks in the West Bank — the same number will be there tomorrow and next week and next month. Tell me I’m wrong. Israel has returned tax money collected for the Palestinians to the Palestinians, but not all of it — and it has trickled in. Do we really, really believe that Israel will suddenly rise up as one and say that they intend to endorse UN Resolutions 242 and 338? Or are they now quietly laughing into their tea and shaking their heads: we’re going to support Abu Mazen? We’re going to send him guns? We’re going to conduct talks with him and calculate that he will be able to produce competent and uncorrupt administration — and one that has the support of his people? Or are they will to see what we have failed: that the last time there was an election in Palestine Mr. Abu Mazen’s party lost. The U.S. program in Iraq is in a shambles, calm and stability are returning to Gaza, questions about the American program for Palestine are being raised in Washington. This is not a time for sudden political movement or a shift in strategy, it is a time for political calculation. Hamas knows it. Israel knows it. Egypt knows it. Saudi Arabia knows it. The only person who doesn’t seem to know it is George Bush.
Some U.S. politicians and Abu Mazen’s more alarmist allies like to paint the Hamas administration in Gaza as a kind of pro-Iranian Islamic State, but this hardly stands up to scrutiny. There is no enforcement of the veil or other conservative Islamic social laws, no Sharia council, no compulsion to attend the mosque. Stability has returned to Gaza. People are obeying the law, and feel secure. This is not a lesson lost on either Egypt or the Israelis. Which would they rather have — civil conflict or civil order?
Several years after my mild confrontation with Mr. Arafat in Gaza, I met with him at his headquarters in Ramallah. It was a bright early April morning and quite memorable for its beauty: just one day after the resolution of the Siege of the Church of the Nativity. Those in the church had, the day before, been sent out of the church to Europe — away from their families and into an involuntary exile. Their departure had been emotional: they had walked out of the church as their families, on the rooftops of Bethlehem, cheered and wept.
The next day I traveled very early to Ramallah to see Arafat to talk to him about the siege. When I arrived I was ushered into his upstairs office. It was just after dawn. I was exhausted, but I found Arafat in a good mood and open to my banter. “I think you crossed a line,” I told him. It was something I would not have dared to say at any other time, but he was smiling at me and so he nodded, as if humoring me. “Oh? he asked. “And what line would that be.” I had him, finally, and so I recited the rule, liturgically: “Palestinians do not send other Palestinians into exile,” I said. He looked at me and nodded and then looked down, suddenly sad. “Yes,” he said. “But I have another line,” and he reflected: “Palestinians do not send other Palestinians to Israeli jails.”
There are lines. Palestinians do not send other Palestinians into exile; Palestinians do not shoot other Palestinians; Palestinians do not betray other Palestinians, Palestinians do not resolve their political differences by gunfire, Palestinians do not collaborate with their enemies, do not betray their own people, Palestinians are not traitors to their own cause, Palestinians do not send Palestinians to Israeli jails. And at one time or another each of these lines has been crossed. But at no time, ever, has any Palestinian ever renounced the one principle — the one true commandment that has motivated every Palestinian patriot from Arafat to Abu Musa to Abu Nidal: that the Palestinian people are indivisible; that they cannot be divided.
Until now. By turning his back on the Palestinians in Gaza, but even actively seeking their impoverishment in the United Nations (as he did, shamefully, on Friday, when his diplomats blocked efforts to seek a Security Council statement on the humanitarian situation there), Abu Mazen has set out to divide the Palestinian nation, to set it against itself. And that line, in the end, cannot be crossed. And the fact that Abu Mazen has crossed it will, in the hearts and minds of the Palestinian people, make all the difference. There is only one Palestine and now, Abu Mazen is not a part of it.
Friday, June 29, 2007
Saudi king snubs Abbas
Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah has snubbed the Palestinian president, skipping a meeting with Mahmoud Abbas on a visit to Jordan.
An Abbas official said "the meeting was postponed due to lack of time as both leaders had busy schedules", but Al Jazeera's David Chater, reporting from Jordan, said it was a deliberate and undiplomatic snub.
Abbas was kept waiting at a palace room for a telephone call that never came.
Instead, the Saudi monarch, who brokered a power-sharing deal between Abbas's Fatah faction and rivals Hamas in February, urged both sides to talk to each other, saying the infighting was benefiting only the Israelis.
It would be a bitter pill for Abbas to swallow, just days after he dissolved the unity government set up under the Saudi deal and accused Hamas of attempting to assassinate him.
He had said then that he would not enter into talks with the group after it seized Gaza and humiliated Abbas by occupying his presidential compound there.
The official from Abbas's office said Abbas would meet Abdullah in Saudi Arabia "in the few coming weeks" but gave no details.
The leaders had been expected to discuss Hamas's takeover of Gaza.
The leaders of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt all fear that armed groups in their countries will be emboldened by Hamas's move and while they have publicly shown the Palestinian president support, they have also leaned on him to engage Hamas once more.
The Saudi monarch and his Jordanian counterpart, King Abdullah II, said on Wednesday that Hamas's Gaza takeover – which in effect split the Palestinians into two entities – could have "dangerous repercussions".
Thursday, June 28, 2007
Fatah-affiliated Al Aqsa Brigades reject decree of President Abbas
Bethlehem - Ma'an Exclusive – The Fatah-affiliated Al Aqsa Brigades have announced that they have rejected the presidential decree regarding the disbanding of militia in the occupied Palestinian territories.
The spokesman of the brigades, Abu Oday, told Ma'an that, following consultations with the brigades' leaders in the West Bank, they have issued the following declaration:
First: the rejection of the dissolution of the brigades, "because they are a resistance group, and are defending the country and the dignity of the people".
Second: the refusal to disarm the group, "because it is a legitimate arm of resistance, and is the only weapon to remain to defend the Intifada ["Uprising"]."
Third: the rejection of the description of the brigades as 'militias', "which defame the Palestinians, and it is nonsense to describe the only remaining armed wing as a militia."
Fourth: the brigades support the presidents' decision to withdraw illegal arms used in the lawlessness, and announce that they stand with the security forces to stop the state of disorder.
Fifth: the brigades will "do their best" to aid the security forces, "and will be honored to stand beside the security forces to defend the country."
Sixth: the brigades will not be complacent before the crimes of the occupation, "and will retaliate for the crimes committed [by the occupying Israeli military], especially in the recent days in the [Gaza] Strip, Nablus and Jenin.
Seventh: the brigades reject the connection established between themselves and the current state of lawlessness, and confirm that they "were created to confront the occupation and its aggression against the Palestinian people".
Eighth: the brigades will not be committed to a truce with the Israelis, as long as the occupation continues the crimes and incursions against Palestinians and their cities.
Monday, June 25, 2007
Olmert misses a huge opportunity (again)
"As a gesture of goodwill towards the Palestinians, I will bring before the Israeli cabinet a proposal to free 250 Fatah prisoners who do not have blood on their hands."
Again, besides the recurring and bizzare Israeli obsession about "blood" (more on that in a previous post), what is really important here is that Olmert will not release Barghouti.
Considering that Israel holds about 10'000 Palestinian hostages freeing 250 of them is really utterly meaningless (unless you are one of them, of course). Moreover, refusing to free Barghouti even though this is what Abbas officially demanded is truly a slap in Abbas' face by his Imperial masters.
I would argue that freeing these 250 is actually *worse* than not freeing any of them. The message this sends is that "we don't care in the least about what you need, all we care about is what we want". I am sure that the message will be received loud and clear by all Palestinians.
My guess is that Abbas' political future, which was never stellar to begin with, is now even in worse shape that 24 hours ago and that he will gradually have to manifest signs of frustrations with Israel.
The real questions is: will he, unlike Olmert, have the lucidity to accept Hamas' numerous offers of negotiations?
Abbas to demand release of Barghouti
Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas is expected to demand the release of hundreds of Fatah prisoners from Israeli jails during Monday's summit in Sharm e-Sheikh, PA officials said.
The officials also said Abbas would call for supplying the Fatah-controlled security forces with more weapons to thwart attempts by Hamas to try to take over the West Bank.
"We want thousands of rifles, hundreds of armored vehicles and a lot of ammunition," one PA official told The Jerusalem Post. "We also want Jordan and Egypt to help train our forces in the West Bank.
Another official said that Abbas and his aides would ask Israel to release senior Fatah operative Marwan Barghouti and hundreds of Fatah prisoners to enhance Fatah's status. "We will also ask Israel to remove most of the checkpoints in the West Bank and to increase the number of Palestinians who are permitted to work in Israel," he said. "These measures are needed to boost Fatah's standing in the West Bank and to prevent Hamas from establishing bases of support there."
He said Abbas would also ask Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to instruct the IDF to stop pursuing Fatah gunmen and to refrain from raiding Palestinian cities and villages in the West Bank.
The official said Abbas would also seek backing for the deployment of an international force in the Gaza Strip.
Abbas, who met on Sunday in Amman with Jordan's King Abdullah, reiterated his refusal to refusal to talk to Hamas, which he accused of staging a "coup" in the Gaza Strip. He called for a "political horizon in the forthcoming stage that falls in conformity with the relevant UN resolutions and US President George W. Bush's vision" for creating an independent Palestinian state.
Asked whether Abbas expected Olmert to extend anything to him during the summit, Abbas said, "We have received promises from US and Israeli parties, but the important thing is to find these promises honored on the ground."
The Jordanian monarch released a royal court statement which read, "The king underscored the importance of seizing this opportunity for producing a clearly defined vision along with a timetable for relaunching the negotiation process."
Abdullah also urged Arab countries and the world community to extend support to "efforts under way for resuming the peace process," which he said should lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that lives in peace with Israel.
In addition, Abdullah said that today's summit "should discuss possible means for supporting the Palestinian people and lifting the siege" imposed on the Palestinians after Hamas came to power in 2006.
In his first pubic speech since Hamas took control over the Gaza Strip, deposed Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas warned the Arab states and the Palestinians against pinning high hopes on Monday's summit in Sharm e-Sheikh.
"Summits with the Americans and Israelis won't restore the rights of the Palestinians," Haniyeh said. "These rights will be restored only through resistance and perseverance."
Haniyeh's remarks came as a top PA security official in Ramallah accused Iran of backing Hamas's takeover of the Gaza Strip.
Haniyeh accused Israel of meddling in Palestinian internal affairs by tightening its siege on the Gaza Strip and pouring millions of dollars and weapons on Fatah in the West Bank.
He said Hamas's decision to take over the Gaza Strip came after the movement had come under pressure and attack in the past 18 months.
Haniyeh said, "We have no problem with Fatah, but with a certain group inside Fatah that was working with foreign parties against Hamas," he said. He also called on Abbas to distribute the tax revenues that Israel is about to transfer to the government of Salaam Fayad to all Palestinians.
Haniyeh denied allegations that Hamas had planned to assassinate Abbas. He said that the booby-trapped underground tunnels that were discovered in the Gaza Strip were only supposed to be used against Israel.
Fatah officials here scoffed at Haniyeh's remarks, saying he was now trying to provide a political cover for the military coup that Hamas staged in the Gaza Strip.
"The man is a liar," said Fahmi Za'rour, a Fatah spokesman in the West Bank. "The day will come when he will face a criminal tribunal for his crimes."
Tawfik Tirawi, head of the PA General Intelligence Service, accused Iran of supporting Hamas's takeover of the Gaza Strip. He told reporters that Hamas members had traveled to Iran and other Islamic countries where they underwent military training.
He denied charges by Hamas that the PA security forces had been collaborating with Israel. He said Hamas members in the West Bank have been stockpiling weapons ahead of a possible confrontation with Fatah.
Hamas Blasts Cairo Summit
He called any hopes generated by the summit a "mirage'' and "illusions.''
Haniyeh accused Abbas, the Western-Israel backed Fatah leader, of violating Palestinian law by dismissing his government and then appointing an emergency administration in the occupied West Bank after Hamas routed Abbas's forces and seized control of Gaza.
In his first major speech since Hamas's takeover just over a week ago, Haniyeh said Abbas's actions have resulted in the separation of Hamas-ruled Gaza from a Fatah-dominated West Bank.
Haniyeh said, "experience proves that the more pressure on Hamas and the greater the siege will only increase Hamas's strength".
The Hamas leader dismissed Israel's decision to release Palestinian tax funds to Abbas as "bribery".
He said "resistance" against Israel was the only way forward for the Palestinians, brushing aside Abbas's push for renewed peace talks with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.
Haniyeh accused the United States of providing Abbas's Fatah forces with money and arms in order to "oust Hamas or push it to make political concessions", suggesting Hamas's violent takeover of the Gaza Strip earlier this month was defensive.
"The arms and money (for Fatah) showed that things were going towards a pre-planned explosion," Haniyeh said.
The United States and Israel want to isolate Hamas economically, diplomatically and militarily in its Gaza stronghold, while allowing funds and goods to flow to Abbas's emergency government.
"America will not give us anything. The occupation (Israel) will not give us anything. Our rights and lands will only return to us by steadfastness and resistance," Haniyeh said.
Israel agreed on Sunday to transfer several hundred million dollars to Abbas's government, a measure designed to undercut Hamas Islamists controlling Gaza.
The money, some of the Palestinian tax revenues withheld by Israel since Hamas won a 2006 election, is part of an initial package of benefits to bolster Abbas that Olmert is likely to announce at a summit in Egypt on Monday.
Haniyeh called Israel's release of the tax money "financial bribery" and "political blackmail" aimed at "deepening the crisis and divisions" between Fatah and Hamas.
"It is our right and our money," Haniyeh said. "But this money ... should reach all the Palestinian people."
On Monday, Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert are to join the president of Egypt and king of Jordan for a summit meeting meant to boost Abbas in his battle with Hamas.
Haniyeh also referred to the case of British journalist Alan Johnston, kidnapped March 12 by Hamas-linked militants. Haniyeh denounced the kidnapping, saying it harms Palestinian interests.
Sunday, June 24, 2007
Hamas asks Fatah to open dialogue before it is too late
| Press Release: Palestinian Information Center |
GAZA, (PIC)-- The Hamas Movement on Tuesday renewed invitation to Fatah faction to initiate joint dialogue to solve pending problems before it is too late.
MP Khalil Al-Hayya, one of the Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip, told a press conference in Ramattan news agency that what happened in the Strip was not pre-planned but rather was in response to crimes committed by the mutiny trend within the Fatah faction, including murder and burning homes and mosques.
He said that Hamas was ready for talks and was ready to provide protection for all national institutions, warning at the same time that those who wish to trek other roads than that of dialogue then they should shoulder the responsibility of such a choice.
Hayya asked PA chief Mahmoud Abbas to respect the PA basic law, explaining that the president is not entitled to dissolve the PLC or cancel any article of the basic law.
The caretaker government headed by premier Ismail Haneyya would continue performing its duty in its capacity as the legitimate government, the lawmaker underlined, affirming that the emergency government formed by Abbas was illegal because it was formed without referring to the PLC.
Hayya reiterated readiness to cooperate with the Arab fact-finding committee, affirming that contacts never ceased with the Arab League or Egypt.
Saturday, June 23, 2007
The Empire's strike back - last preparations
First, the Empire is sending a poodle version of Darth Vador, Tony Blair, as a Middle-East
envoy. So much for the "negotiations" which, one would presume, will be between Abbas, Dahlan, Olmert and Netanyahu (or somebody equally acceptable to the Imperial High Command).Second, the Imperial High Command abducts the most moderate Hamas leader who was attempting to bring the two Palestinian factions together.
Third, Imperial Stooges will be briefed on Monday about the Imperial plan to retake Gaza. The Palestinian Pundit has provided a translated summary of this plan as reported by Al-Akhbar, a reputable Lebanese newspaper:
The decision for decisive action against Hamas in Gaza has apparently been taken at many levels involving local and outside powers. The military component of the plan will be what Olmert will outline to Abbas, Abdullah and Mubarak next Monday in Sharm El-Sheikh, in Egypt.
Western and American sources in Cairo have revealed the existence of a draft joint U.S.-Israeli plan which will be proposed in that meeting. The plan includes political and military measures to force Hamas out of Gaza. Olmert will be pressing his Arab counterparts to let him carry out a "limited" military strike in Gaza to destroy Hamas' "infrastructure" and to end its control in Gaza. Simultaneous with that military operation, Israel will be targeting Hamas' leadership and both its political and military cadres.
An Egyptian official said that Egypt and Jordan are unlikely to agree to the plan. Western sources said that Cairo is concerned that such Israeli intervention would increase tension along Egypt's borders.
Israel's Radio stated that Olmert has proposed that a Saudi official attend the forthcoming summit to convey the impression that the Arab world stands behind Abbas. It is worth noting that the Saudi king will be in Cairo on Monday.
Lastly, Israeli authorities plan to hand one billion dollars to Abbas to finance his fight against Hamas.

Clearly, Abbas has been upgraded from "irrelevant entity" to main ally in the war on terror, sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, moderate voice for democracy and peace and, last and not least, most dedicated friend of the Empire. Any disagreeing Palestinian will henceforth be considered as a "terrorist".
Make sure to regularly visit the Palestinian Pundit for news updates on the developing situation in Palestine.
Thursday, June 21, 2007
Voices of reason and common sense in Ha'aretz
George W. Bush and Ehud Olmert looked pathetic giving their "full backing" to the broken-down crutch that is Mahmoud Abbas. Contrary to the talk in Washington, nothing has changed to open a new opportunity for negotiations over a final settlement. It is impossible to hold talks with Abbas, just like it was impossible to hold talks in the past on any kind of arrangement, and certainly not on a permanent settlement. The Hamas victory in the Gaza Strip and the establishment of a "moderate" government in Ramallah do not divide the territory into Hamastan in the Gaza Strip and Fatahstan in Judea and Samaria. This is only another illusion in the basket of Israeli illusions - a fallacy that's part of the same belief that there is an Arab leader (it used to be Yasser Arafat, and now it is Mahmoud Abbas) who wants to sign an agreement with us, and one that entails relinquishing the right of return and recognizing Israel's right to exist as a Jewish and Zionist state.
It is not only the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria and their leadership who do not recognize the right of Israel to exist as a state with a Jewish and Zionist character, but as a number of recently published documents have revealed, it is a view shared by entities representing the Arab citizens of Israel too.
The Palestinian government sworn in earlier this week is a fiction, even if the United States and Israel support it. In Ramallah, where this fictitious government sits, Hamas won a decisive victory in the last elections: four seats in parliament for Hamas, and only one for Fatah. In Nablus, four seats went to Hamas and two to Fatah. In Hebron: nine to Hamas and none for Fatah. In Jerusalem: four to Hamas and two for Fatah. In the cities of Judea and Samaria Hamas won 30 parliamentary seats. Fatah got only 12.
Given the circumstances, the new government does not represent the Palestinians - only Israeli illusions, and possibly also those of the Americans and the Europeans. The Israel Defense Forces cannot prevent the erosion of Fatah's military power, and it is doubtful whether it is even worth investing efforts in such futility. The experience of recent years proves that our "allies," Mohammad Dahlan among them, are only boisterous characters - corrupt and lacking any real power. They are certainly no ally of Israel.
In any case, Hamas will defeat them, and Israel should prepare well for the confrontation ahead. And in a confrontation of this nature, the various Dahlans would bring no benefit, only a burden.
Abbas' men lost in the fight not because Hamas militants are more brutal or better trained. If Fatah could, it would have adopted the same methods. Hamas won because the vast majority of the Gaza Strip population supports it, and this is first and foremost support for the religious ideology of the movement, which calls for the destruction of the Zionist entity. And as the elections have shown, this call is shared by the vast majority in Judea and Samaria, the area which Israeli analysts and politicians have designated for a Fatah state.
Certainly since the elections, areas A and B have been controlled by Hamas. As the events in the Gaza Strip show, the fact that many countries around the world have opposed the Hamas regime did not weaken support for the group. While in Judea and Samaria, thanks to the "occupation," Israel is able to prevent, and it is important that it prevent, some of the bloodletting, it is unable to prevent the weakening, and even the disappearence of Fatah as a significant force.
It is therefore time to let the truth out: Abbas is a fiction, and he cannot be saved.
Free Barghouti: Haaretz Editorial
One of the leaders of the Palestinian people has been incarcerated for approximately five years now in Hadarim Prison, in central Israel. The time has come to release him. For years, Marwan Barghouti has tried to persuade Israelis to end the occupation through negotiation. He has gone from one Israeli party headquarters to the next, meeting with politicians across the political spectrum. He tried to persuade them in order to preempt the next confrontation.
Barghouti failed, the second intifada broke out, and he himself turned to the path of violent struggle. After going underground for months, during which he still tried to address the Israeli public through its own media, Barghouti was arrested in April 2002 and prosecuted. He was sentenced for five life terms in prison, plus 40 years.
It is doubtful whether arresting and prosecuting him was diplomatically wise, but there is no doubting the political wisdom of releasing him.
During his years in prison, Barghouti has acted to restrain the armed struggle and bolster his people's moderate leadership, using envoys to achieve this goal. Barghouti never left his native West Bank, never took to the habits of power characteristic of the Palestine Liberation Organization leadership in Tunisia. He became a popular leader - especially in the West Bank, and to a lesser degree in the Gaza Strip.
Modern history - including Israel's - has known national leaders who turned to violence and were jailed for years, until they were released to become political leaders who marched their peoples toward independence peacefully. Nelson Mandela is one such example. The leaders of the Zionist undergrounds in prestate Israel are another. Now, Barghouti's turn has come. Environmental Protection Minister Gideon Ezra deserves praise for speaking in favor of releasing Barghouti. Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer did not rule out the possibility either.
Fatah's moderate leadership is in a serious crisis. Israel's interest calls for its consolidation, albeit after outrageous delays, and no one matches Barghouti's ability to achieve that. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's promises in Washington that Israel would be willing to take "far-reaching" measures to assist the Palestinian Authority's emergency government must be backed by immediate action. Releasing prisoners is the first step one should demand of anyone who promises such steps.
The Israeli government should have long since helped Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas to govern his people. Among other measures, it should have done this by allowing him to bring home real achievements. Releasing prisoners, Barghouti among them, could serve to change the atmosphere between Israel and the Palestinians in a heartbeat. It would prove the sincerity of Israel's statements regarding its intention to turn over a new leaf and bolster the moderate forces. The issue of prisoners who have been jailed for years holds extreme importance for Palestinian society. Any Palestinian leader who would succeed in bringing about their release will receive instant and widespread public sympathy.
The prime minister's statements must not remain empty words - especially not now, when a practical opportunity for dialogue with a moderate Palestinian leadership has presented itself. Now that Gaza has fallen into Hamas' hands, no effort should be spared in the attempt to salvage the West Bank from extremists. Barghouti as a free leader could greatly assist in achieving that.
Friday, June 15, 2007
Former World Bank executive appointed Palestinian PM by Abbas
My take on all this is that this is yet another case of what the French call "la fuite en avant" (the "escape forward"): a situation in which a subject is overcome by panic and "does more of the same expecting different results" (one of the best definitions of insanity). Considering Mr. Fayyad's World Bank, IMF, Fatah and pro-Israel "credentials" we can be sure that the situation in the West Bank will deteriorate even further.
